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Foreword
The motivation behind this piece of research was cemented during a meeting
attended by Professor Gary Fields—one of the co-editors of this book—and
myself in mid-2013 where we discussed in depth the linkages between
economic growth, changing employment conditions, and the reduction of
poverty. Gary has been working on the frontier of our profession on employ-
ment and development issues all of his academic career, and he pointed to
new inroads and data to be explored within the growth–employment–poverty
nexus, focusing on Latin America.
At the time of our exploratory discussions the target date for completion of
the UN Millennium Development Goals was looming, with the number one
goal—to halve between 1990 and 2015 the proportion of people living on less
than 1 dollar a day—having already been achieved. The new Post-2015 Devel-
opment Agenda, since adopted, was under intense debate. Leading the charge
among the Sustainable Development Goals is the aim to end poverty in all its
forms everywhere, followed closely by the SDG to promote inclusive and
sustainable economic growth, full and productive employment, and decent
work for all. Thus the proposed research could not have been more timely for
the international agenda. And more so as UNU-WIDER was then launching a
new research programme—focusing on the three development challenges of
transformation, inclusion, and sustainability—wherein work on the growth–
employment–poverty nexus was a straightforward ﬁt.
I hereby express my sincere appreciation of the four editors, Guillermo
Cruces, Gary S. Fields, David Jaume, and Mariana Viollaz, for bringing this
academic work to full fruition, and particularly for their analytical skills
brought out so clearly in this book.
UNU-WIDER gratefully acknowledges the support and ﬁnancial contribu-
tions to its research programme by the governments of Denmark, Finland,
Sweden, and the United Kingdom.
Finn Tarp
Helsinki
September 2016
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Part I
Introduction to the Volume

1Introduction and Motivation
for the Project
1.1 Context and Motivation
The year 2015 marked the conclusion of the United Nations’ Millennium
Development Goals and the beginning of the UN’s 2030 Agenda for Sustain-
able Development. Foremost among the Sustainable Development Goals is to
end poverty in all its forms everywhere. Another of the SDGs is to promote
sustained, inclusive, and sustainable economic growth, full and productive
employment, and decent work for all.
This book examines the links between economic growth, changing employ-
ment conditions, and the reduction of poverty in Latin America. The research
project that led to this book had its origins in a mid-2013meeting attended by
the director of UNU-WIDER, Finn Tarp, and Gary Fields, one of the researchers
on this project. At that time, the United Nations’ Millennium Development
Goals were nearing their target date for completion, and the number one
goal—to halve, between 1990 and 2015, the proportion of people whose
income is less than 1 dollar a day—had already been achieved. The new
Post-2015 Development Agenda, since adopted, was under discussion.
UNU-WIDER, for its part, had just launched a four-year research programme
with the three development challenges of transformation, inclusion, and
sustainability. Fields has had a long-term research interest in improving labour
market conditions as a means of helping the poor lead better material lives
and had just published a book on this topic (Fields 2012). Other important
works had just appeared as well—in particular, theWorld Bank’sWorld Devel-
opment Report 2013, entitled simply ‘Jobs’ (World Bank 2013a). What struck
Tarp and Fields and their colleagues was how much was known about some
aspects of the problem, but also how little was known about others. In
particular, a priority for deeper analysis was the growth–employment–poverty
nexus in the various countries of the world.
By then, the dismal growth–employment–poverty record of the United
States and other OECD countries had been well-documented. In the case of
the United States, Stiglitz (2012, 2015) showed: recent United States’ eco-
nomic growth took place primarily in the top 1 per cent of the income
distribution; as a result, there was growing inequality of income and wealth;
those at the bottom and in the middle are actually worse off now than they
were in 2000; life is particularly harsh at the bottom, and the recession
made it much worse; and there has been a hollowing-out of the middle
class. Other OECD countries have not done much better. The OECD
Employment Outlook (2012, 2015) tells us: economic growth has not been
strong enough to make more than a small dent in OECD-wide unemploy-
ment; labour market conditions are improving but recovery is far from
complete; employment is still growing too slowly to close the jobs gap
induced by the crisis any time soon; the jobs mix has shifted towards more
part-time work, making it harder for some unemployed to ﬁnd full-time
jobs; the OECD average unemployment rate is still 1.6 percentage points
above its pre-crisis level; long-term unemployment also remains unaccept-
ably high; and weak real wage growth also remains a concern, particularly in
the euro area.
UNU-WIDER had a strong interest in learning about the links between
growth, employment, and poverty in the poorer regions of the world. It
would have been an impossibly ambitious task to analyse the entirety of the
rest of the world. Fortunately, though, an exceptional database had been
compiled for Latin America and was available for our use.
Household datasets have been processed by CEDLAS (Centro de Estudios
Distributivos, Laborales y Sociales, Universidad Nacional de La Plata), com-
piled into the database SEDLAC—Socio-Economic Database for Latin America
and the Caribbean (CEDLAS andWorld Bank 2014), and made available for us
to analyse in this project.1 The microeconomic data used in this project
included more than 150 household surveys, comprising observations for ﬁve
million households and eighteen million persons for sixteen Latin American
countries: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican
Republic, Ecuador, Honduras, Mexico, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, El Salvador,
Uruguay, and Venezuela. Most countries offered annual household surveys,
though a few were biennial, with sample sizes typically numbering in the tens
of thousands of households. Further details are given in Chapter 2.
Our research project answers the following broad questions: Has economic
growth resulted in gains in standards of living and reductions in poverty via
improved labour market conditions in Latin America in the 2000s, and have
1 Three of the researchers—Cruces, Jaume, and Viollaz—are afﬁliates of CEDLAS.
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these improvements halted or been reversed since the Great Recession of
2008? How do the rate and character of economic growth, changes in the
various employment and earnings indicators, and changes in poverty and
inequality indicators relate to each other?
From the very outset of the study, we adopted broad conceptualizations of the
three key terms: growth, employment, and poverty. Economic growth includes
the usual measure: the growth of real gross domestic product (GDP) per capita.
But growthgoes beyond just the growth rate to include also attention to the type
of growth being pursued. Are mechanisms in place making the economic
growth inclusive in the sense that ordinary people can share in improved
standards of living through the work they do and/or through the social pro-
grammes available to them? Employment and unemployment include the usual
measures promulgated by the ILO—employed if working even one hour for pay
or ﬁfteen hours or more not for pay in the reference week; unemployed if not
employed but actively looking for work; but in addition employment and
unemployment also include other aspects of employment such as the amount
earned in amonth and the type ofwork performed. Poverty is gauged by ‘income
poverty’, measured using a number of alternative absolute poverty lines.
The ﬁrst stage of our research was a collection of sixteen detailed country
studies completed in late 2014 and revised early in 2015 (Cruces et al. 2015a–
2015p). We then compiled all of the individual country data and results into a
new dataset on the rate of economic growth, changes in employment and
earnings indicators, and changes in poverty and inequality indicators. With
this dataset, we performed cross-country analysis of the growth–employment–
poverty nexus and provided additional within-country evidence (Cruces et al.
2015q). This volume is based on these working papers.
1.2 The Analytical Framework Adopted
Following Fields (in press), the analytical framework adopted in this volume
can be visualized schematically in the following way. Consider a policy action
of interest and an outcome variable by which the policy action is judged—in
this study, it is pursuing economic growth as a means for reducing poverty.
For economic growth to contribute to poverty reduction, theremust be at least
one channel, maybe more, through which growth reduces poverty.
The channel emphasized in this research is the employment channel.
Employment is understood to include not only wage and salaried employ-
ment but also self-employment. The issue is not just whether people are
employed but also how much they earn for the work they do. Thus, besides
employment/unemployment per se, the types of jobs people are working in
and their labour market earnings are central to the analysis.
Introduction and Motivation for the Project
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There are good reasons for concentrating on labour markets. One is that
national accounts data show that labour incomes account for more of total
income than do all other income sources combined. Another reason is that
income and expenditure surveys indicate that most people derive most if not
all of their income from the work they and other members of their households
do. A third reason is that decomposition studies reveal that labour income
inequality accounts for a larger share of total income inequality than do the
inequalities of all other income sources combined.
But employment is not the only important channel. Economic growth may
provide the tax revenues enabling countries to increase spending on existing
social programmes and create new ones. Some of these social programmes
work through the labour market, reaching people as workers (e.g. unemploy-
ment insurance, old-age pensions, and job-related health coverage). Others
work in other ways, reaching people as consumers and citizens (e.g. free or
subsidized transportation, food, or housing).
Consider Figure 1.1. Employment as a channel linking growth and poverty
is the focal point of our analysis. For economic growth to reduce poverty via
the employment channel, the growth must result in improved employment
conditions (Channel A), and improved employment conditions must result in
reduced poverty (Channel B). The growth–employment–poverty channel
receives the bulk of the emphasis in what follows. But in addition, economic
growth reduces poverty insofar as it results in improved social programmes
(Channel C) and if the social programmes reach the poor (Channel D). These
social programme channels are discussed in the speciﬁc country chapters, but
they are not analysed from a cross-country perspective as this book is focused
on the employment channel. Figure 1.1 displays the case in which all these
channels are open, and consequently economic growth reduces poverty via
both the employment channel and the social programmes channel.
Unfortunately, these channels may be blocked, because employment is
created but the wages and hours of work offered are so limited that workers
cannot escape poverty, or because the beneﬁts of the social programmes go to
the haves but not to the have-nots. This second case is depicted in Figure 1.2.
Policy Action
Economic growth
and other policy 
actions
Transmission 
Channel
Employment
Social
programmes
Outcome Variable
Poverty
and other outcome 
variables
A
B
C
D
Figure 1.1 Open transmission channels
Source: The ﬁgure is taken from Fields (in press).
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In such a case, economic growth may take place, but employment conditions
may improve only for those at the very top of the income distribution but not
for those in the middle or the bottom, and the same may be true for socially
provided goods and services. Thus, although economic growth takes place, the
poor may be left out, and thus poverty is not reduced.
Does economic growth beneﬁt everyone? Or does it beneﬁt just those at the
top to the exclusion or even impoverishment of those further down in the
income distribution? Neither answer can be assumed, especially in a region
with as much inequality as Latin America has. A fruitful way to proceed is to
examine which channels are open in Latin American countries, which are
sluggish, and which are blocked. That is what the research in this book
investigates.
1.3 Previous Literature and our Contributions
As detailed in our conceptual framework, we study the growth–employment–
poverty nexus in Latin America. This work is related to several literatures
dealing (mostly separately) with the growth–employment nexus, with the
employment–poverty nexus, and with the growth–inequality nexus in the
Latin American region. In the following pages, we highlight some of the most
important multi-country contributions to these literatures. There are also
country-speciﬁc studies covering growth patterns and changes in some labour
market indicators on the one hand, and the relationship between changes
in some labour market conditions and changes in poverty on the other hand.
We provide more details about these studies in each of the corresponding
country chapters.
In the latest of a series of papers, Weller (2014) studies mainly the growth–
employment nexus in Latin America and the Caribbean for the years 2003 to
2012. He ﬁnds that, at the regional level, during the period of high economic
growth from 2003 to 2012, the region experienced: an important reduction in
Policy Action
Economic growth
and other policy 
actions
Transmission
Channel
Employment
Social
programmes
Outcome Variable
Poverty
and other outcome 
variables
A
B
C
D
Figure 1.2 Blocked transmission channels
Source: The ﬁgure is taken from Fields (in press).
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the unemployment rate; an improvement in employment quality indicators,
such as wages, share of workers registered with social security, share of self-
employed and wage/salaried employees, sectoral composition of employ-
ment, and level of education of employed workers; and a reduction in the
wage gap between highly and low educated workers. The paper focuses on the
whole period under study, does not analyse in detail the impact of the inter-
national crisis of 2008–9 on labour markets in Latin America, and has little to
say about changes in individual countries. In the discussion of the results, the
author attributes the generalized improvement in labour market conditions in
Latin America over this period to the role of labour market institutions.
Another recent multi-country study (World Bank 2015a) also covers the
2003–12 period but focuses on the employment–poverty nexus rather than
on the growth–employment nexus. The report, based as ours is on the SEDLAC
database for almost the same group of countries (excluding Venezuela and
including Guatemala), emphasizes the post-international-crisis period. Based
on different microeconomic decomposition approaches, the study highlights
the importance of changes in labour earnings to explain poverty reduction in
the region during the 2003–8 and 2008–13 periods, documenting that the
magnitude of this effect was lower for the post-international-crisis period. The
report relates the rise in mean labour earnings to improvements in the educa-
tional composition of theworkforce. Finally, the report also documents a fall in
wage skill premiums, which it attributes to external conditions (e.g. the com-
modity price boom) and government policies (e.g. minimumwage increases).
There are other studies of the employment–poverty nexus for the region
based on microeconomic decompositions of household survey data. ECLAC
(2014) uses a variation of this methodology and concludes that the most
important factor for poverty reduction was the combined increase in employ-
ment and wages, although in general, labour earnings increases had a greater
impact than employment growth on household income changes. This is
consistent with results from Beccaria et al. (2011), World Bank (2013b), and
Inchauste et al. (2014), who also decompose changes in the poverty rate and
report increases in labour income as the main channel to poverty reductions.
While not based on decompositions, ECLAC-ILO (2015) is another example of
a study of the labour market determinants of the fall in poverty in Latin
America for the period 2002–12. The study highlights the role of strong job
creation, especially in wage/salaried positions, and public policies, such as
minimum wages increases, formalization of workers, and expanded coverage
of education and social protection systems.2
2 Other less comprehensive multi-country studies have also been carried out which include a
more limited group of countries or fewer labour market indicators, or focus on previous years and
not on the whole decade of 2000. Pagés, Pierre, and Scarpetta (2009), for instance, discuss the
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Another strand of the recent literature on Latin America deals with the well-
documented fall in income inequality since 2002, and most of these studies
cover the connection between labourmarkets and these changes in inequality.
Some recent examples include López Calva and Lustig (2010), Gasparini and
Lustig (2011), Gasparini et al. (2011), Alvaredo and Gasparini (2015), and
Cornia (2014). The conclusion from these studies is that the fall in inequality
in the region is attributable to global economic conditions, growth acceler-
ation, and a rapid equitable accumulation of human capital. Others also
speculate about the role of new policy approaches, including macroeconomic
policies, ﬁscal and monetary policies, trade and ﬁnancial policies, and labour
and social expenditure policies (Cornia 2014).
Finally, a series of studies also cover the social programmes—poverty reduc-
tion nexus, dealing with the role of social policies in reducing poverty, high-
lighting conditional cash transfers (CCT), among others. The multi-country
studies on these issues document an increase in the number of countries in the
region adopting programmes of this type. They also ﬁnd that the ﬁscal
resources allocated to CCT programmes increased as a percentage of GDP
from 2000 to 2010, which implied an increase in the percentage of the
population covered by these programmes during the same period (Cecchini
and Madariaga 2011; Stampini and Tornarolli 2012). While we do not cover
this channel directly in our work, the country chapters discuss the speciﬁc
initiatives adopted in each case during the period under study.
We build on these studies by analysing the growth–employment–poverty
nexus in Latin America in the decade of the 2000s, which was only partially
covered by the previous literature. Previous papers have only focused on the
ﬁrst part of the link (growth–employment and growth–poverty) or the second
one (employment–poverty).
Building on what came before, our contribution is an in-depth study of the
multi-pronged growth–employment–poverty nexus based on a large number of
labour market indicators (twelve employment and earnings indicators and four
poverty and inequality indicators) for a large number of Latin American coun-
tries (in our case, sixteen of them). Moreover, we present an exhaustive analysis
of the growth–employment–poverty nexus which directly relates changes in all
labour market indicators to economic growth, and changes in all employment
growth–employment nexus in Latin America, with data up to the year 2004, and found that
many jobs were created during the 1990–2004 period in the Latin American and the Caribbean
region, but they were of low productivity and low pay. Cho et al. (2012) document the fact that in
Latin America, as in other low- and middle-income countries, employment increased apace of
labour force growth in every country but one, although the study does not identify any single
country by name. ILO (2014) reports an increase in the share of workers registered with social
security in Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Jamaica, Mexico,
Paraguay, Peru, and Uruguay, caused mainly by the favourable economic context and several
government programmes.
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and earnings indicators to changes in poverty. We also base our analysis on a
broader set of labour market indicators than those used in other studies: the
previous literature focused mainly on labour earnings, unemployment, and a
limited set of job mix indicators (mainly, the share of workers registered with
social security), whereas we offer a greater detail in terms of jobmix and sectors.
In terms of the period under study, we cover the whole decade of 2000, starting
in 2000 up to 2012–13, but our analysis is not limited to the whole period only:
we include the domestic economic crises that some of the countries suffered at
the beginning of the 2000s, and we also study the generalized crisis that
followed the Great Recession of 2008–9. Finally, while we present a cross-
country analysis of broad patterns for the whole region, our multi-country
analysis is based on a consistent and systematic review of the experience of
each one of the sixteen countries in our sample.
1.4 Main Questions and Major Findings
This section proceeds in two stages: ﬁrst, the principal questions asked, and
second, our major ﬁndings.
Some of our questions about the growth–employment–poverty nexus in
Latin America are on a country-by-country basis. If a country grows faster,
what is the effect on the employment and earnings indicators and on poverty
and inequality indicators? What is the relationship between employment and
earnings indicators and poverty rates? How did earnings change over all
deciles of each country’s income distribution during the 2000s?
We also ask a set of cross-country questions. Do those countries that grew
faster have larger and more widespread improvements in labour market
conditions and consequently larger reductions in poverty? How tight is this
cross-country relationship? To the extent that substantial variance is left
unexplained by countries’ rates of economic growth alone, what other factors
might be responsible for improving labour market indicators? The other
factors examined include initial GDP, the initial value of the labour market
indicators, and a list of selected macroeconomic variables: agriculture as a
percentage of GDP, industry as a percentage of GDP, services as a percentage
of GDP, ﬁnal consumption expenditure as a percentage of GDP, expenditure
in education and health as a percentage of GDP, expenditure in social security
as a percentage of GDP, terms of trade, foreign investments as a percentage of
GDP, revenues from natural resources as a percentage of GDP, and stock
of public debt as a percentage of GDP. Other questions we ask in this study
are: are labour market indicators moving together—improving or worsening?
Do those countries that enjoyed larger andmore widespread improvements in
labour market conditions have larger reductions in poverty? Regarding the
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economic crisis of 2008, how did labour market indicators change during the
crisis and its aftermath in Latin America?
We turn now to the ﬁndings. Looking ﬁrst at a comparison between each
country’s initial household survey (typically the year 2000) and the ﬁnal year
(typically 2012), we ﬁnd remarkable progress in all three aspects of the
growth–employment–poverty nexus:
Growth: National income accounts reveal that all sixteen countries achieved
positive rates of growth of real GDP per capita. These annualized rates ranged
from just below 1 per cent in the case of Mexico to 5.6 per cent in the case of
Panama and Peru. The regional average (unweighted) for the sixteen Latin
American countries was just under 3 per cent, well above the annualized rate
of growth of GDP per capita in OECD countries, which was 1.0 per cent.
Labour market indicators: The rate of improvement in labourmarket indicators in
Latin America was exceptional. All sixteen of the labour market indicators used
in this study improved in Bolivia, Brazil, and Peru, ﬁfteen of the sixteen
improved inPanama, and themajorityof the labourmarket indicators improved
in all of the other countries except for one (Honduras).
Poverty rates: Using the 4 dollars-a-day poverty line (‘poverty’) and the 2.5
dollars-a-day poverty line (‘extreme poverty’), we ﬁnd reduced rates of poverty
and extreme poverty in ﬁfteen of the sixteen countries. Once again, Honduras
was the only Latin American country to have registered an increase in its rate
of poverty.
In short, the 2000s were a time of strong improvement in the growth–
employment–poverty nexus in Latin America. The only exception to this
pattern was Honduras, which was simultaneously affected by the inter-
national crisis and episodes of political instability that led to most of the
deteriorations observed by the end of the period.
Of course, like the rest of the world, Latin America suffered from the global
economic crisis of 2008. However, the downturns in Latin America were
milder and more short-lived. Real GDP per capita in Latin America fell at a
1.5 per cent annual rate in 2008–9, but then grew at a near 3 per cent annual
rate from 2009 to 2012. In the labour market, most countries in the region
suffered a deterioration in at least some labour market indicators as a conse-
quence of the international crisis of 2008, but the negative effects were
reversed very quickly in most countries, with the result that nearly all labour
market indicators showed improvements in 2012 compared to where they had
been in 2008. And both poverty and extreme poverty rates fell monotonically,
even during the global economic crisis.
In sum, in the great majority of Latin American countries, economic growth
took place and brought about improvements in almost all labour market
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indicators and consequent reductions in poverty rates. But not all improve-
ments were equal in size or caused by the same things. To understand why
some countries progressed more in some dimensions than others, we per-
formed a number of additional analyses, from which we draw the following
lessons, detailed below:
• For the region as a whole, real GDP per capita grew during the 2000s,
all employment and earnings indicators improved, and poverty and
inequality fell.
• Country by country, real GDP per capita grew during the 2000s in all
Latin American countries, the great majority of labour market indicators
improved in all countries but one, poverty rates using the 2.5 and
4 dollars-a-day poverty lines fell in all countries but one.
• Looking across countries, faster growth was associated with larger improve-
ments in labour markets indicators, but the relationships were not tight.
• Looking across countries, increases in some macroeconomic factors were
associated with changes in labour market conditions in Latin America
during the 2000s, some of them always in the welfare-improving direc-
tion and some others always in the welfare-reducing direction.
• Looking across countries, larger improvements in employment and earn-
ings were associated with larger reductions in poverty.
• Looking at year-by-year changes within countries, when economic growth
was faster, employment and earnings indicators andpoverty and inequality
indicators improved more rapidly, and the faster labour market conditions
improved, the faster poverty was reduced. The magnitude of the effect and
the pattern over time varied substantially from country to country.
• Thepatternsof changes in labourmarket earningswere stronglyprogressive.
In conclusion, the growth–employment–poverty nexus in Latin America
changed much more favourably than was the case in the OECD countries in
general and the United States in particular. It would be interesting to know
about developing economies in other regions of the world. Such studies deﬁne
the current research frontier.
1.5 Differences between Latin America and the United States
and Other OECD Countries
Contrary to the Latin American experience, during the 2000s, inequality
soared in developed countries even in the context of economic growth. More-
over, employment indicators have not yet recovered from the crisis of 2009,
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and wages at the bottom have not increased. The question that naturally
follows is: why was it different in Latin America? We cannot provide an
exact answer to this important question, but we explore below three possible
interrelated explanations.
First, the rate of economic growth was higher in Latin America than
in the OCED countries (including the United States and excluding Chile
and Mexico). Between 2000 and 2012, average GDP per capita grew by 35.2
per cent in the Latin American region, a growth rate nearly three times larger
than that of developed countries. The corresponding ﬁgures for high-income
OECD countries and the United States in particular were 12.4 and 10.7 per cent
respectively (World Bank 2014). As postulated in our framework, higher eco-
nomic growth could lead to larger improvements in employment and earnings
indicators and expansion of social programmes, and to a subsequent reduction
in poverty if the channels relating them are open.
Second, Latin America experienced a different type of economic growth
compared to that of the United States and other high-income OECD coun-
tries. In particular, South America enjoyed excellent external conditions that
not only promoted economic growth but also endowed governments with
increased ﬁscal revenues. This was translated into more stable macroeco-
nomic environments andmore resources being devoted to social programmes
(such as conditional cash transfers). Countries in Central America did not
enjoy these exceptional external conditions, and with the exception of
Panama, they had a more mixed experience in terms of the number of labour
market indicators that improved. In the United States and high-income
OECD countries, economic growth during the same period was based on
rapid productivity increases, built mainly on innovation and information
technology. This process of economic growth led to job losses for workers in
the middle of the wage distribution (see Acemouglu and Autor 2011 for the
United States, and Goos, Manning, and Salomons 2010 for evidence on
Europe). It also led to stagnant wages for unskilled workers and to increasing
wages for high-skilled workers.
Third, political conditions seem to have changed signiﬁcantly in Latin
America. In the words of Roberts (2014: 67):
Declining levels of inequality registered in most Latin American countries during
the ﬁrst decade of the twenty-ﬁrst century coincided with a basic shift in the
political and economic landscape—a shift from the politics of market-based struc-
tural adjustment to a new, post-adjustment era in which democratic competition
has repoliticized social inequalities and placed redistributive policies at the fore-
front of the political agenda. Although new Leftist governments have increased
the salience of redistributive politics and adopted innovative social welfare
reforms, the renewed attention placed on social problems is hardly the exclusive
preserve of the left. With heightened electoral competition from the left and
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widespread public sentiments for an active state role in the provision of social
welfare, conservative governments have also taken signiﬁcant steps to address the
needs of low-income groups. Consequently, the institutionalization of electoral
competition in contexts of egregious social and economic inequalities appears to
be producing new forms of democratic accountability, as parties and governments
of diverse ideological proﬁles struggle to respond to popular demands for equity
and social inclusion. The historic tensions between universal rights of democratic
citizenship and de facto social exclusion continue to exist, but they have clearly
given rise to new political expressions and policy outputs in Latin America’s post-
adjustment era.
Although these ideas are hypotheses and as such difﬁcult to test empirically,
there is a widespread consensus that Latin America has advanced towards
governments whose redistributive policies play a more important role, at
least compared to the previous decade which was marked by widespread
structural reforms. One example is that during these years every country in
the region implemented or extended social programmes targeting the poor
(in most cases, conditional cash transfers). A further sign of the increased
importance of redistributive policies is the increase in minimum wages in
real terms between 2002 and 2012 in most countries of the region, Mexico
and the Dominican Republic being the exceptions.
These three factors are related to each other: high economic growth was
possible because of favourable external conditions, which in turn made add-
itional resources available for implementing social programmes.
1.6 Recent Developments
At the time that this research project was launched in 2014, the most recent
labour market data available for Latin American countries came from surveys
conducted in 2012 and 2013. It was not feasible to include an additional year
or years of data and redo all the analysis for each of the countries or for all of
them taken together. Nonetheless, it is worth noting some of the latest
developments that have taken place in the interim.
Since 2012/13, the rate of economic growth has slowed down for a large
number of countries in Latin America, especially those located in South
America. Argentina, Brazil, and Venezuela were affected the most (World
Bank 2015b). Argentina and Brazil practically did not grow from 2012 to
2014, while Venezuela entered a deep recession: GDP per capita decreased
5.3 per cent during this period. The other South American countries had a
less marked deceleration in the rate of economic growth starting in 2013.
The average rate of economic growth went from 5.3 per cent during 2012–13
to 2.5 during 2013–14. External conditions changed for these countries.
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First, the commodity boom that most of these countries experienced during
the ﬁrst decade of the 2000s either slowed down or reversed after 2010,
deteriorating their terms of trade. This affected the private sector, but it
also reduced government revenues and increased pressure on government
ﬁscal balances. The latter had not yet recovered from the deﬁcits incurred to
ﬁnance countercyclical policies during the international crisis of 2009. Pro-
jections for 2015 and 2016 indicate that this scenario of low growth is not
likely to change (International Monetary Fund 2015). Our framework indi-
cates that labour market conditions are likely to be affected, with a slowdown
in the rate of improvement in some dimensions or even some worsenings,
contrary to what happened in the ﬁrst decade of the century. Furthermore,
the tight relationship described in this book between improvements in
employment conditions and poverty reduction indicates that the rate of
poverty reduction is likely to slow down as well. Moreover, it might not be
feasible to ﬁnance a further expansion of social programmes such as were
implemented by most governments in the region in 2009, since the ﬁscal
space has also diminished.
On the other hand, the experience since 2012 has been more positive
for countries in Central America (Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Honduras,
Mexico, Panama, and El Salvador). These counties continued to experience rates
of economic growth similar to the period 2000–12 (between 2 and 3 per cent a
year on average). This process of growth was based on the service sector rather
than commodities and on the economic recovery of the United States, which is
the main trading partner of these countries. Our framework indicates that this
group of countries is likely to continue to improve in terms of labour market
indicators in the future at a similar rate as during the period 2000–12.
The post-2012 period seems to be marked by more heterogeneous country
experiences than the period 2000–12 analysed in this book. Countries in
the South will face the challenge of achieving economic growth without the
tailwind of the commodity boom that took place at the beginning of the
century. While policies to achieve economic growth are being put into
place, the channels to improve employment conditions and social pro-
grammes should remain open and be enhanced: it is the only way economic
growth will help reduce poverty, the single most important objective these
countries can pursue.
1.7 Roadmap
The book is divided into three parts. Part I provides an overview of the project.
In the two chapters in this part, the reader will learn about the principal
questions, previous literature and our contributions, the analytical framework
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adopted, overview of the major ﬁndings, and data and methodology. Part II
presents cross-country analysis across sixteen Latin American countries in the
2000s. This part consists of four textual chapters—‘Changing Labour Market
Indicators and theRate of EconomicGrowth inLatinAmerica during the 2000s’,
‘Cross-Country Analysis of the Growth–Employment–Poverty Nexus’, ‘Within-
Country Analysis of the Growth–Employment–Poverty Nexus: Additional
Evidence’, and ‘Conclusions from the Cross-Country Analysis’—plus two data
chapters. Part III presents sixteen country chapters, each comprising a country
study. These country chapters—for Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia,
Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Honduras, Mexico, Panama,
Paraguay, Peru, El Salvador, Uruguay, and Venezuela—follow a common
format: introduction, economic growth, unemployment, job mix, labour
earnings, poverty and inequality, and conclusions.
Overall, the book presents a positive and hopeful set of ﬁndings for the
period 2000–12/13. Economic growth took place in all sixteen of the coun-
tries. The employment and earnings indicators and poverty and inequality
indicators used in this study overwhelmingly moved in the welfare-increasing
direction: in ﬁfteen of the sixteen countries, most or all of the indicators
improved, the only exception being Honduras. Thus, despite Latin America
being one of the most unequal regions of the world (together with sub-
Saharan Africa), economic growth brought about improvements in employ-
ment conditions and thereby reduced poverty.
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2Data and Methodology
2.1 Data Sources
This study is based on microeconomic data from more than 150 household
surveys, ﬁve million households, and eighteen million persons contained in
the SEDLAC—Socio-Economic Database for Latin America and the Caribbean
(CEDLAS andWorld Bank 2014). These data cover the following sixteen Latin
American countries: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica,
Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Honduras, Mexico, Panama,
Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela. Based on these household surveys
and the SEDLAC harmonization methodology, we constructed comparable
time series for a wide range of labour market, poverty, and income inequal-
ity indicators. In Chapters 3–4, we focus mainly on the changes from the
initial to the ﬁnal year in the period under study, listed for each country
in Table 2.1. We present the indicators’ time series for each country in
Appendix 1. For some countries, the period under study in this cross-
country paper differs from the time period analysed in the corresponding
country papers. The reason for using a different time period is the lack of
comparability between the initial and ﬁnal-year surveys. That was the case
for Costa Rica, where we used 2000–9 as the period of analysis for all the
labour market and income inequality indicators in this paper. For other
countries, we used a different time period only for some particular indicators.
Appendix 1 indicates with a vertical line when the country changed a clas-
siﬁcation so that it is not possible to use a consistent deﬁnition throughout
the full time period.
In this book, we also employ aggregate macroeconomic indicators from two
sources: the World Bank’s World Development Indicators (World Bank 2014)
and the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and the
Caribbean’s database on social expenditure (UN-ECLAC 2015).
2.2 Labour Market Indicators
The main purposes of the analysis are to determine whether each labour
market indicator has improved or deteriorated over time on a country-by-
country and cross-country basis, and what are the determinants and correlates
of these changes. We use, in total, sixteen labour market indicators which we
assign to one of two different categories: employment and earnings indicators,
and poverty and income inequality indicators. For the employment and earn-
ings indicators, we judge a welfare improvement to have taken place if we ﬁnd:
Unemployment:
• A decrease in the unemployment rate.
Occupational composition:
• A decrease in the share of low-earnings occupations.
• An increase in the share of high-earnings occupations.1
Table 2.1 Latin American household surveys and period under study by country
Country Isocode
(two digits)
Initial
year
Final
year
Name of household survey
Argentina AR 2000 2012 Encuesta Permanente de Hogares (2000–2)
Encuesta Permanente de Hogares-Continua
(2003–12)
Bolivia BO 2000 2012 Encuesta de Hogares—MECOVI
Brazil BR 2001 2012 Pesquisa Nacional por Amostra de Domicilios
Chile CL 2000 2011 Encuesta de Caracterización Socioeconómica
Nacional
Colombia CO 2002 2013 Encuesta Continua de Hogares (2000–5)
Gran Encuesta Integrada de Hogares
(2008–13)
Costa Rica CR 2001 2009 Encuesta de Hogares de Propósitos Múltiples
Dominican Republic DO 2000 2012 Encuesta Nacional de Fuerza de Trabajo
Ecuador EC 2003 2012 Encuesta de Empleo, Desempleo y Subempleo
Honduras HN 2001 2012 Encuesta Permanente de Hogares de
Propósitos Múltiples
Mexico MX 2000 2012 Encuesta Nacional de Ingresos y Gastos de los
Hogares
Panama PA 2001 2012 Encuesta de Hogares
Peru PE 2003 2012 Encuesta Nacional de Hogares
Paraguay PY 2001 2013 Encuesta Integrada de Hogares (2001)
Encuesta Permanente de Hogares (2002–13)
El Salvador SV 2000 2012 Encuesta de Hogares de Propósitos Múltiples
Uruguay UY 2000 2012 Encuesta Continua de Hogares
Venezuela VE 2000 2012 Encuesta de Hogares Por Muestreo
Note: Venezuela’s surveys over 2000–6 are part of SEDLAC. From 2007 onwards, we carried out our own processing.
Source: SEDLAC (CEDLAS and World Bank 2014).
1 The residual category is the share of medium-earning occupations.
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• An increase in the share of wage/salaried employees.
• A decrease in the share of self-employment.
• A decrease in the share of unpaid family workers.2
• A decrease in the share of workers in low-earnings sectors.
• An increase in the share of workers in high-earnings sectors.3
• A decrease in the share of workers with low levels of education.
• An increase in the share of workers with high levels of education.4
• An increase in the share of workers registered with the social security system.
Labour earnings:
• An increase in mean labour earnings.
For the poverty and income inequality indicators, we judge a welfare
improvement to have taken place if we ﬁnd:
Poverty and inequality:
• A decrease in the 4 dollars-a-day poverty rate.
• A decrease in the 2.5 dollars-a-day poverty rate.
• A decrease in Gini coefﬁcient of household per capita income.
• A decrease in Gini coefﬁcient of labour income.
More speciﬁcally, these indicators are deﬁned as follows.
The unemployment indicator is deﬁned following the ILO guidelines: it
represents the share of unemployed persons divided by the number of persons
in the labour force. A person is unemployed if s/he is 15 years old or more and
during the reference period (usually one month, but it depends on the survey
of each country), s/he was without work, available for work, and seeking work.
A fall in the unemployment rate is classiﬁed as an improvement in the labour
market.
Occupational groups are deﬁned by means of a two-step process. First, for
each country, we identify the following occupational categories:5 manage-
ment; professionals; technicians and associate professionals; clerical; service
and sales workers; agricultural, forestry, and ﬁshery workers; craft and related
trades workers; plant and machine operators and assemblers; elementary and
armed forces. Second, we classify them into low-earnings, medium-earnings,
and high-earnings occupations. For each country, the low-earnings occupations
are deﬁned as the three occupational categories with the lowestmean earnings
2 The residual category is the share of employers.
3 The residual category is the share of medium-earning sectors.
4 The residual category is the share of medium-educated workers.
5 This is the International Standard Classiﬁcation of Occupations of 2008 (ISCO-08) at a one-
digit level. In the case of Argentina, this classiﬁcation cannot be obtained from household survey
data. Argentina is then excluded from the analysis of changes in the occupational composition of
the employed population.
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during the analysed period, the high-earnings occupational categories are the
three occupations with the highestmean incomes, and the rest are classiﬁed as
medium-earnings occupations. A fall in the share of low-earnings occupations
and an increase in the share of high-earnings occupations imply an improve-
ment in the labour market.
Occupational position is classiﬁed into four categories: employer, wage/
salaried employee, self-employed, and unpaid worker. Given the nature of
labour markets in Latin America, the analysis of the employment structure
according to occupational positions identiﬁes as improvements in the labour
market the following situations: a decrease of self-employment, a decrease in
the share of unpaid family workers, and an increase in the share of wage/
salaried employees.
Sector of employment is also classiﬁed by means of a two-step procedure.
We ﬁrst identify ten sectors: primary activities; low-tech industry; high-tech
industry;6 construction; commerce; utilities and transportation; skilled ser-
vices; public administration; education and health; and domestic workers. We
further classify the sectors according to the shares of workers in low-, medium-,
and high-earnings sectors, using the same criteria as in the case of the occupa-
tional groups. An increase in the share of high-earnings sectors and a decrease
in the share of low-earnings sectors represent improvements in the labour
market in our analysis.
With respect to the educational level of employed workers, we deﬁne three
categories for the analysis: low (eight years of schooling or less); medium
(from nine to thirteen years of schooling); and high (more than thirteen
years of schooling). An increase in the education of the employed population
is considered an improvement in the labour market, as the share of workers
that are expected to receive high levels of earnings increases and the share of
workers with low earnings levels decreases.
We also classify the employed population according to whether they are
registered with the social security system or not. In some of the countries, only
wage and salaried employees are asked about registration in the social security
system. We assume that it is better for employed workers to be registered, and
thus an increase in this indicator is classiﬁed as an improvement in the labour
market.
Labour earnings are expressed on amonthly basis in 2005 purchasing power
parity (PPP) dollars. Higher earnings represent an improvement in the labour
market.
Poverty and inequality are calculated as follows. Poverty rates are based on
the international poverty lines of 4 dollars a day and 2.5 dollars a day (all in
6 For Bolivia and Paraguay, we cannot distinguish between low- and high-tech industries.
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PPP dollars), and represent the poverty and extreme poverty levels respect-
ively, often used in Latin America. These poverty indicators are based on
household income per capita. Household income is the sum of labour income
plus non-labour income, which includes capital income, pensions, public and
private transfers, and the imputed rent from own-housing. Income inequality
is calculated using the Gini coefﬁcient of household per capita income and of
labour earnings among employed workers. Some caveats should be stated
regarding the use of household surveys to calculate inequality indices as the
Gini coefﬁcient. Household surveys suffer from non-response to income ques-
tions, underreporting of incomes, and lack of coverage of very high incomes.
All these problems may have impacts on calculated inequality levels and
trends. In this book we use income variables from SEDLAC databases which
are based on ‘raw data’ from household surveys, without applying any adjust-
ment or correction procedure.
To sum up, changes in labourmarket indicators in Latin American countries
during the 2000s are evaluated using the following criteria. Improvements in
labour market conditions are associated with: a decrease in unemployment;
increases in the shares of high-earnings occupations, wage/salaried employees,
workers in high-earnings sectors, and workers with high levels of education; an
increase in monthly labour earnings; declines in the shares of low-paid occupa-
tions, unpaid family workers, self-employed, low-earnings sectors, and workers
with low levels of education; and declines in poverty rates and inequality
indicators. Worsenings in labourmarket conditions are associated with changes
in labour indicators in the opposite direction.
2.3 Macroeconomic Indicators
We also use data on macroeconomic variables to correlate them to the changes
in labour market indicators described in section 2.2. These data come from two
sources. First, from theWorld Bank’s World Development Indicators (WDI), we
use: GDP per capita in the initial year; agriculture as a percentage of GDP;
industry as percentage of GDP; services as a percentage of GDP; ﬁnal consump-
tion expenditure as a percentage of GDP; exports as a percentage of GDP; terms
of trade; foreign direct investment as a percentage of GDP; and revenues from
natural resources as a percentage of GDP. Second, from the United Nations
Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (UN-ECLAC
2015) database on social expenditure, we use: expenditure in education and
health as a percentage of GDP; public expenditure in social security as a percent-
age of GDP; and stock of public debt as a percentage of GDP. For all macroeco-
nomic variables with the exception of GDP per capita in the initial year, we use
data on the initial and ﬁnal years and calculate the annualized change.
Introduction to the Volume
24
2.4 Variables and Notations
We denote each of the K labour market indicators as Yk and each of the j
macroeconomic variables as Xj. In the following analysis, we will use this
notation:
Xijt : Macroeconomic variable k for country i at time t.
Yikt : Labour market indicator k for country i at time t.
%ΔXij: Annualized percentage change of macroeconomic variable j for country
i from initial to ﬁnal year.
ΔXij: Annualized change in percentage points of macroeconomic variable j for
country i from initial to ﬁnal year.
%ΔYik: Annualized percentage change of labourmarket indicator k for country i from
initial to ﬁnal year.
ΔYik: Annualized change in percentage points in labour market indicator k for
country i from initial to ﬁnal year.
Zi : Percentage of labour market indicators that improved for country i from initial to
ﬁnal year.
Note that the operator %Δ embodies an annualized percentage change. We
calculate annualized percentage changes for GDP per capita, labour earnings,
Gini coefﬁcients, and terms of trade. For the rest of the indicators, the operator
Δ is used, indicating annualized changes in percentage points. For example,
annualized changes in percentage points include the change in unemploy-
ment, in the share of workers registered with the social security system, or in
industry’s share of GDP.
We calculate these changes as follows. Let initial year be t0 and ﬁnal year be
t1. Then:
%ΔXij ¼
Xijt1
Xijt0
0
@
1
A
1=ðt1t0Þ
 1
2
64
3
75∗100;
%ΔYik ¼ Yikt1Yikt0
0
@
1
A
1=ðt1t0Þ
 1
2
64
3
75∗100;
ΔXij ¼
Xijt1  Xijt0
t1  t0
0
@
1
A;
ΔYik ¼ Yikt1  Yikt0t1  t0
0
@
1
A: ð1Þ
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As a way to summarize the evolution of the large number of indicators covered
in each country study, we devised a measure Zi based on the percentage of
the available labour market indicators for each country over the period under
study which exhibited a statistically signiﬁcant improvement at the 5 per cent
level.7We express Zi as a percentage instead of the actual number of indicators
that increased because not all indicators are available for all countries in every
year. This measure provides a general direction of change in the labour market.
The costs of this simple synthetic index are that it implicitly assigns an equal
weight to each indicator, and it does not take into account themagnitude of the
changes (only if the change was statistically signiﬁcant or not). Nonetheless,
this index provides a handy summary indicator of labourmarket improvements
in each country, and so we make extensive use of it in the analysis that follows.
2.5 A Note on Causality versus Correlation
The change in a macroeconomic variable j (ΔXj or %ΔXj) and the change in a
labour market indicator k (ΔYk or %ΔYk) may be associated with each other
either because ΔXj causes ΔYk or because the two of them are caused by a third
factor. An example of ΔXj causing ΔYk would be a situation in which a shock
in terms of trade brings about an increase in the demand for labour and in
mean labour earnings. An example of ΔXj and ΔYk being caused by a third
factor would be a situation in which training more workers in occupations
where shortages exist results in higher exports and an improvement in
employment composition in favour of high-earnings occupations.
We implicitly assume throughout the analysis that there is not reverse
causation: that is, that changes in labour market indicators do not affect
macroeconomic variables (or at least not directly). It is a judgement call whether
to make causal interpretations or to be more cautious and choose wording in
terms of correlations between variables, and we have done some of each.
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Part II
Cross-Country Analysis

3Changing Labour Market Indicators
and the Rate of Economic Growth in
Latin America during the 2000s
3.1 Economic Growth Rate and Changes in Labour Market
Indicators in the Latin American Region as a Whole
The Latin American region exhibited an outstanding performance in terms of
GDP per capita growth and improvements in labour market indicators over
the 2000s. Figure 3.1 provides the evolution over time of the unweighted
average (counting each country with a weight of 1 regardless of the size of
its population) of GDP per capita at 2005 PPP, and of each of the sixteen
labour market indicators, from 2000 to 2012.
Between 2000 and 2012, average GDP per capita grew by 35.2 per cent in the
Latin American region, a growth rate nearly three times larger than in devel-
oped countries. The corresponding ﬁgures for OECD countries and the United
States in particular were 12.4 and 10.7 per cent respectively (World Bank
2014). All employment and earnings indicators improved for the average of
the region during the 2000s. Just to mention a few examples, the average
unemployment rate across the sixteen countries fell from 8.7 per cent in 2000
to 5.7 per cent in 2012, the share of registered workers increased from 40.2 to
46.9 per cent over the same period, and the share of unpaid family workers in
total employment declined from 6.8 to 5.5 per cent. All poverty and income
inequality indicators improved as well. The moderate and extreme poverty
rates exhibited sharp reductions from 2000 to 2012. The 4 dollars-a-day
poverty rate fell from an average of 40.4 per cent in 2000 to 20.4 per cent in
2012,while the2.5dollars-a-daypoverty ratedecreased from23.9 to12.8per cent
over the same period. The Gini coefﬁcient of household per capita income
decreased from 0.531 in 2000 to 0.477 in 2012 and the Gini coefﬁcient of labour
earnings from 0.515 to 0.468.
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Figure 3.1 Evolution of GDP per capita and labour market indicators in the Latin American region: Unweighted average 2000–12
Note: All series represent the unweighted averages across the sixteen Latin American countries in our sample. In the years when we do not have data for a
particular country, we use a linear extrapolation. In the cases where we do not have data for the initial or ﬁnal year, we impute the value of the following or
previous year.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on SEDLAC (CEDLAS and World Bank 2014) and World Development Indicators (World Bank 2014).
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Figure 3.1 Continued
Other studies have also documented these trends. Weller (2014) studies
the experience of most countries in Latin America and the Caribbean for the
years 2003–12. The author documents the remarkable growth experience of
the region, as well as improvements in labour market outcomes over the
same period: an important reduction in the unemployment rate; an improve-
ment in employment quality indicators, such as wages, share of workers
registered with social security, share of self-employed and wage/salaried
employees, sectoral composition of employment, and level of education of
employed workers; and a reduction in the wage gap between highly and low-
educated workers. TheWorld Bank (2015) report documents similar trends in
GDP and labour market indicators (labour earnings, educational level of
the workforce, and employment position for the sample of low-educated
workers). ECLAC-ILO (2015) also relates the remarkable progress in reducing
poverty during 2002–12 in the Latin America region to labour market trends,
highlighting the importance of strong job creation (especially in wage/
salaried positions) and public policies, such as minimum-wage increases,
formalization of workers, and expanding coverage of education and social
protection systems.
In summary, from beginning to end in the region as a whole, GDP per capita
grew, all employment and earnings indicators improved, and poverty and
inequality indicators fell remarkably.
3.2 Economic Growth Rate and Changes in Labour Market
Indicators Country by Country
The growth experience during the 2000s was positive for all Latin American
countries: all countries in the region experienced an increase in their GDP per
capita. Each of the country chapters presents an overview of other studies
covering national growth trajectories over this period. Table 3.1 presents
annualized growth rates of GDP per capita for each country in our sample
for the years for which we have detailed labour market indicators (starting in
c.2000 and up to c.2012). The ﬁgures in the table indicate positive growth rates
overall, withmost countries close to the region’s average growth rate of 2.9 per
cent per year. However, a small number of countries grew at comparatively
modest rates (0.8 per cent per year in Mexico, 1.4 per cent per year in El
Salvador, and 1.7 per cent per year in Venezuela), while others experienced
particularly large growth rates by Latin American standards (5.6 per cent in
both Panama and Peru).
Increases in GDP per capita were accompanied by generalized improve-
ments in labour market indicators over time for most countries in our sample.
The rest of this section details these improvements: we succinctly describe the
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evolution of each of the sixteen labour market indicators in each country. We
do so in two ways, ﬁrst by presenting the changes in the indicators one by one
(%ΔYik or ΔYik, i=AR, BO, . . . ,VE and k=1, . . . ,16) and then by aggregating
them into an index Zi.
Table 3.2 presents the qualitative changes over time in each of the sixteen
selected labourmarket indicators for each country.We deﬁne these changes so
that a positive value always signiﬁes a welfare improvement (e.g. decrease in
unemployment rate instead of change in the unemployment rate). The ‘+’
sign in a cell indicates that for that indicator and country, there was a change
in the welfare-improving direction from the ﬁrst survey year to the last and
this change was statistically signiﬁcant at the 5 per cent level. The ‘’ sign
indicates the opposite, that is, the labour market indicator changed in the
welfare-worsening direction for that country over the years under study, and
that change was statistically signiﬁcant at the 5 per cent level. Finally, the ‘NC’
in a cell refers to no statistically signiﬁcant change.
Figure 3.2, in turn, depicts the evolution over time for each speciﬁc labour
market indicator in each country. Here, the data are presented untransformed,
so that for example the unemployment rate in Argentina ﬁrst rose and then
fell, ending up much lower at the end of the period than at the beginning.
Table 3.1 Annualized growth rates of GDP per capita (at PPP 2005) for different time
periods by country
Country Initial year Final year Annualized growth rate of GDP per capita
Initial–ﬁnal 2000–12 2000–8 2008–9 2009–12
AR 2000 2012 3.57 3.57 3.25 0.03 4.22
BO 2000 2012 2.24 2.24 1.98 1.71 2.33
BR 2001 2012 2.41 2.20 2.42 1.22 2.07
CL 2000 2011 2.96 3.10 3.13 1.97 3.55
CO 2002 2013 3.18 2.76 2.79 0.21 2.63
CR 2001 2009 2.92 2.69 3.11 2.49 2.49
DO 2000 2012 3.62 3.62 3.68 2.05 2.99
EC 2003 2012 2.96 2.63 2.74 1.10 2.68
HN 2001 2012 2.14 2.01 2.94 4.36 1.30
MX 2000 2012 0.85 0.85 0.92 5.89 2.23
PA 2001 2012 5.59 5.12 4.50 2.06 5.81
PE 2003 2012 5.56 4.58 4.63 0.15 4.51
PY 2001 2013 2.40 1.22 1.29 5.65 2.56
SV 2000 2012 1.45 1.45 2.19 3.63 0.91
UY 2000 2012 3.13 3.13 2.19 1.89 4.53
VE 2000 2012 1.67 1.67 2.71 4.77 0.85
Average 2.92 2.68 2.78 1.46 2.85
Note: The column Initial–Final shows the annualized growth rate for the period we have household surveys data available
for each country. The following columns provide the annualized growth rate for comparable periods across countries.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on World Development Indicators (World Bank 2014).
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Table 3.2 Qualitative changes in labour market indicators from initial to ﬁnal year by country
Indicator AR BO BR CL CO CR DO EC HN MX PA PE PY SV UY VE
Unemployment
Decrease in the unemployment rate + + + + +  NC + +  + + + + + +
Occupations
Decrease in the share of low-earnings occupations + +  + +  + NC + + + + + + +
Increase in the share of high-earnings occupations + + + + + + + NC + + + NC  + +
Occupational position
Increase in the share of wage/salaried employees + + + +  +    + + + + NC + +
Decrease in the share of self-employment + + + NC  +   NC  + + + + + NC
Decrease in the share of unpaid family workers + + + + NC + NC NC  + NC + +  + +
Economic Sector
Decrease in the share of workers in low-earnings
sectors
NC + +   + + +  + + + + + + +
Increase in the share of workers in high-earnings
sectors
+ + + + + + + + NC + + + + NC NC +
Education
Decrease in the share of low-educated workers + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +
Increase in the share of high-educated workers + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +
Workers registered with SS
Increase in the share of workers registered with SS + + + + + + + +   + + +  + NC
Earnings
Increase in mean labour earnings + + + + + +  +   + + +   +
Poverty
Decrease in 4 dollars-a-day poverty + + + + + + + +  + + + + + + +
Decrease in 2.5 dollars-a-day poverty + + + + + + + +  + + + + + + +
Inequality
Decrease in GINI of household per capita income + + + + + NC + +  + + + + + + +
Decrease in GINI of labour earnings + + + + + NC + +  + + + + + + +
Number of improving indicators 13 16 16 13 12 13 10 13 3 12 15 16 15 10 14 14
Total number of indicators 14 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16
% of improving indicators 93 100 100 81 75 81 63 81 19 75 94 100 94 63 88 88
Note: The table summarizes the changes in each labour market indicator from initial to ﬁnal year of the period indicated in Table 3.1, except for some countries where the classiﬁcation of
occupations and/or the deﬁnition of registered workers are not comparable over the entire period. See each country chapter for more details. References: + denotes improvement;  denotes
worsening; NC denotes no changes. All the improvements and worsenings are statistically signiﬁcant at 5 per cent level.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on SEDLAC (CEDLAS and World Bank 2014).
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Figure 3.2 Evolution of labour market indicators over time by country
Note: Shaded ﬁgures indicate that there was an improvement from initial to ﬁnal year that was
statistically signiﬁcant at 5 per cent level. Vertical lines indicate that the series to the left and the
right are not fully comparable. In these cases, the shadow corresponds to the larger comparable
period for each indicator–country cell.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on SEDLAC (CEDLAS and World Bank 2014).
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Adding yet further detail, we include the underlying time series to each graph;
please see Appendix 1 for country-by-country presentations.
3.2.1 Analysis of the Labour Market Indicators One by One (Yk)
Looking at the employment and earnings indicators, here is how they
changed over time.
Unemployment rates fell in most of the countries (thirteen out of sixteen
countries over the 2000s); theywere Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia,
Ecuador, Honduras, Panama, Peru, Paraguay, El Salvador, Uruguay, and Vene-
zuela. However, there were statistically signiﬁcant increases in unemployment
inCosta Rica andMexico andno signiﬁcant change in theDominican Republic.
There was also a generalized improvement in the job mix in most countries
in the sample for which these indicators are available (the distributions of
workers among occupations, occupational positions, sectors, and educational
levels). The most consistent changes in the job mix were the improvement in
the educational level of the employed population and in the distribution of
employment by economic sector. The educational level of the employed
population improved in all countries in the sample: the share of employed
workers with low educational levels diminished at the same time that the
share of employed workers with high educational levels increased. The sec-
toral composition of employment improved in thirteen countries (Argentina,
Bolivia, Brazil, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Mexico, Panama,
Peru, Paraguay, El Salvador, Uruguay, and Venezuela): either the share of low-
earnings sectors decreased (with no change in the share of high-earnings
sectors) or the share of high-earnings sectors increased (with no change in
the share of low-earnings sectors) or both. For ten countries (Bolivia, Brazil,
Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Mexico, Panama, Peru, Paraguay,
and Venezuela), there was both a decline in the share of low-earnings sectors
and an increase in the share of high-earnings sectors. For two countries, only
the share of low-earnings sectors improved (El Salvador and Uruguay), and for
one country (Argentina), there was only an increase in the share of high-
earnings sectors. For the remaining three countries that did not follow the
general trend, the changes were ambiguous for Chile and Colombia (where
therewere increases in both shares), and therewas a deterioration forHonduras
(therewas an increase in the share of low-earnings sectors andno change in the
share of high-earnings sectors).
The distribution of employment by occupation improved in eleven coun-
tries (Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Mexico, Panama, Peru,
Paraguay, Uruguay, and Venezuela): either the share of low-earnings occupa-
tions decreased (with no change in the share of high-earnings occupations) or
the share of high-earningsoccupations increased (withnochange in the shareof
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low-earnings occupations) or both. For ten countries (Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia,
Costa Rica, Ecuador,Mexico, Panama, Peru, Uruguay, andVenezuela), therewas
both a decline in the share of low-earnings occupations and an increase in the
share of high-earnings occupations. For only one country (Paraguay) did the
share of low-earnings occupations decreasewith no change in the share of high-
earnings occupations. For the remaining four countries, three exhibited amixed
change (Chile, Dominican Republic, and El Salvador), i.e. an improvement in
one of the indicators jointly with deterioration in the other one, while in only
one country (Honduras) there were no signiﬁcant changes in the employment
composition by occupation during the period.
The distribution of the employed population by occupational position
improved signiﬁcantly in ten countries in our sample (Argentina, Bolivia,
Brazil, Chile, Costa Rica, Panama, Peru, Paraguay, Uruguay, and Venezuela):
the share of wage/salaried employees increased and the shares of self-
employed and unpaid family workers fell or did not change signiﬁcantly.
The distribution by occupational position deteriorated in four countries,
with a fall in the share of wage/salaried employees and an increase (or no
signiﬁcant change) in the shares of the self-employed and of unpaid family
workers (Colombia, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, and Honduras). The pat-
tern of change was ambiguous for El Salvador, where the change in the share
of wage/salaried employees was not statistically signiﬁcant, the share of the
self-employed fell, and that of unpaid family workers increased, and for
Mexico where the share of wage/salaried employees increased, the share of
unpaid family workers fell, but the share of self-employment grew.
In most of the countries in our sample (twelve out of sixteen countries:
Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic,
Ecuador, Panama, Peru, Paraguay, and Uruguay), there was also an increase
in the share of workers registered with the social security system. The evolu-
tion of this indicator, however, was negative in three countries in our
sample—the registration of workers fell signiﬁcantly in Honduras, Mexico,
and El Salvador—and we do not observe a statistically signiﬁcant change for
Venezuela.
Average labour earnings increased in eleven out of sixteen countries,
although they fell signiﬁcantly for the remaining ﬁve. Increases in labour
earnings took place in Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa
Rica, Ecuador, Panama, Peru, Paraguay, and Venezuela, with decreases in
labour earnings taking place in the Dominican Republic, Honduras, Mexico,
El Salvador, and Uruguay. It should be noted, however, that this indicator
evolved differently over time in different countries. For instance, average
earnings fell at the beginning of the period under study and then grew
steadily in Argentina, Chile, Costa Rica, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, and
Uruguay, but the overall change was positive for all except Uruguay. On the
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other hand, labour earnings grew over most of the period in Bolivia, Brazil,
Colombia, and Ecuador, and fell steadily in El Salvador. Finally, labour earn-
ings moved erratically over the period in the Dominican Republic, Honduras,
Mexico, and Venezuela.
Turning now to the poverty and income inequality indicators, poverty rates
measured by both the 2.5 and 4 dollars-a-day international lines declined in
ﬁfteen out of sixteen countries in our sample, with the sole exception of
Honduras, where both indicators increased.
The poverty-reducing pattern in the region goes hand-in-hand with the
upward trend in labour earnings and with the reduction in the unemploy-
ment rate in most countries. Interestingly, the reduction in poverty indicators
occurred also in countries where mean labour earnings fell (Dominican
Republic, Mexico, El Salvador, and Uruguay) and/or unemployment increased
(Costa Rica and Mexico). This ﬁnding brings the role of public expenditure in
social security systems as a potential factor to explain the reduction in poverty
in Latin America. The relationship between changes in public expenditure in
social security and in education and health, and changes in poverty indicators
is analysed in section 3.4. In the same section, a detailed analysis of the
relationship between changes in poverty and changes in employment and
earnings indicators is also presented.
Inequality of household per capita income and of labour income fell in
fourteen out of sixteen countries in our sample (Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil,
Chile, Colombia, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Mexico, Panama, Peru,
Paraguay, El Salvador, Uruguay, and Venezuela). All countries exhibited
signiﬁcant reductions in the Gini coefﬁcient of household per capita income
and labour earnings with the exceptions of Costa Rica (where inequality of
labour earnings increased and inequality of household per capita income
remained unchanged) and Honduras (where both inequality indicators
grew). The inequality-reducing pattern that took place in most countries
indicates that increases in labour earnings, the main source of income of
households in Latin America (as in other parts of the world), were accom-
panied by welfare-improving inequality changes. In sum, in the 2000s, in
most of the countries nearly all labour market indicators improved, Hon-
duras being the exception to this general trend. Unemployment rates fell in
the majority of the countries, as did poverty and inequality. The job mix and
labour earnings also improved in the great majority of countries.
3.2.2 Analysis of the Percentage of Labour Market Indicators that
Changed in the Welfare-Improving Direction (Z)
As a way to summarize the evolution of the large number of indicators covered
in each country study, we devised a measure based on how many of these
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indicators exhibited a statistically signiﬁcant improvement, calculated as a
percentage of the available indicators for each country over the period of
study.1 This measure provides a general direction of change in the labour
market. The calculations using this measure are presented in the bottom
row of Table 3.2. Our results indicate that 75 per cent or more of our selected
labour market indicators improved in the following thirteen countries:
Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Mexico,
Panama, Peru, Paraguay, Uruguay, and Venezuela. Of the remaining coun-
tries, 62.5 per cent of indicators improved in the Dominican Republic and El
Salvador. Honduras is the only Latin American country that experienced a
generalized worsening of labour market indicators (an improvement in only
three out of sixteen available indicators).2
3.2.3 Summary
In sum, our systematic evidence reveals that all countries in the region experi-
enced an increase in their GDP per capita during the 2000s, and nearly all
countries experienced substantial improvements over time in most labour
market indicators.
3.3 The 2008 Economic Crisis and Changes
in Labour Market Indicators
Up to now, we have analysed changes in GDP per capita and labour market
indicators between the start of our data series (the year 2000 inmost countries)
and the end (most commonly, 2012). Of course, this period includes the
international crisis of 2008. In this section, we analyse how this crisis affected
labour markets in Latin American countries, whether they recovered fully
or partially, and how speedy was the recovery (or how long-lasting was
the crisis).
Throughout the world, the international economic crisis brought about
negative economic growth of greater or lesser severity, followed by recovery.
Focusing on a comparison between Latin America and some developed coun-
tries, the countries in our study suffered a reduction, on average, of 1.5 per cent
in GDP per capita between 2008 and 2009. The average fall for the group of
OECD countries was 3.95 per cent in GDP per capita, whereas the loss for the
1 We express this as a percentage instead of the actual number of indicators that increased
because not all indicators are available for all countries in every year.
2 Most of the worsening changes in Honduras took place during and after the international crisis
and coincided with a military coup. See Chapter 16 on Honduras for more details and references.
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United States was 3.65 per cent over the same period (World Bank 2014). The
OECD countries as a whole and the United States in particular recovered the
pre-crisis GDP per capita level in 2012.
The impact of the economic crisis on labour markets was heterogeneous
across developed countries. In some European countries, such as Luxembourg,
Denmark, and Germany, the effects were short-lived, while in others, such as
Spain, Cyprus, Greece, and Ireland, dramatic losses of employment and
increases in unemployment rates were observed, and by 2012 data tended to
show a reintensiﬁcation of the negative effects of the crisis (ECB 2012). The
United States exhibited larger employment losses compared to Europe despite
the similar reduction in GDP. In fact, the unemployment rate more than
doubled in the United States during the crisis with a considerable increase in
long-term unemployment (Elwell 2013). The increase in the unemployment
rate in the United States was long-lived: it recovered its pre-crises level only by
2015 (Bureau of Labour Statistics 2015). Additionally, following the inter-
national crisis, labour markets became increasingly polarized with the share
of low-earnings occupations increasing by more than the share of high-
earnings occupations (Autor and Dorn 2013).
Some recent studies for Latin America have analysed the impact of the Great
Recession on growth and labour market outcomes. The World Bank (2015)
report documents the fall in GDP and the relative worsening in several labour
market indicators from 2008 to 2009, highlighting the difference between the
subperiods, 2003–8 and 2008–13. While GDP increased (with the exception
of 2008–9) and labour market outcomes improved during both subperiods,
leading to reductions in poverty, the impact of improved labour market
conditions on poverty was stronger during 2003–8 than during 2008–13.
ECLAC-ILO (2015) also documents similar trends, and highlights the role of
rising real wages in 2009, which the report considers to have been an import-
ant factor in stabilizing domestic demand and in turn fostering the rapid
recovery from the impacts of the international crisis.
Our evidence also indicates the same underlying trends in Latin American
countries. At the time of negative economic growth in 2008–9 (Table 3.1), GDP
per capita fell on average by 1.5 per cent in the region, less than half of the
reduction in the OECD countries. The impact of the crisis was heterogeneous
across countries in Latin America. Mexico, Paraguay, Venezuela, Honduras,
and El Salvador were all severely affected, with reductions in GDP per capita
of 4 to 6 per cent. GDP per capita fell by 1 to 3 per cent in Brazil, Chile, Costa
Rica, and Ecuador; it virtually remained unchanged in Argentina, Colombia,
and Peru, while it still increased by about 2 per cent in Bolivia, the Dominican
Republic, Panama, and Uruguay.
After 2008–9, recovery quickly ensued. In the post-crisis period, all countries
once again achieved positive economic growth rates and recovered their
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pre-crisis GDP per capita levels by 2010, two years earlier than most of the
OECD countries. Table 3.1 shows that the annualized growth rates in the post-
crisis period were positive for all Latin American countries, and for seven of
the sixteen countries in our sample, the annualized growth rate in the post-
crisis period (2009–12) was larger than in the pre-crisis period (2000–8).
How did labour market indicators change during the crisis and its aftermath
in Latin America? As shown above, we know from studies from other regions
that labour market indicators worsened and then recovered to a greater or
lesser degree.
In Latin America, starting with the crisis period, labour markets in most
countries of the region were affected adversely by the international crisis,
with a great deal of heterogeneity across countries in the number of labour
market indicators that worsened during the crisis. Table 3.3 summarizes the
changes in indicators for each country between 2008 and 2009, using again
the ‘+’, ‘’, and ‘NC’ signs to denote changes in the welfare-improving
direction, changes in the welfare-worsening direction, and non-signiﬁcant
changes, as in the previous tables. The most widespread negative change was
the increase in the unemployment rate (for twelve out of sixteen countries),
followed by a fall in the share of wage/salaried employees (seven out of
sixteen countries) and an increase in self-employment (seven out of sixteen
countries).
The evidence in Table 3.3 indicates that Colombia and Honduras were the
most affected, with negative changes in ten labour market indicators. In
Bolivia, Peru, and Uruguay, we do not observe a deterioration in any of the
labour market indicators, although they experienced a slowdown in the
improving trend in most of them. The rest of the countries suffered a deteri-
oration in at least one labour market indicator during the international crisis,
with different degrees of exposure. For instance, in Brazil and Paraguay only
the unemployment rate increased substantially, whereas Ecuador and El
Salvador experienced negative changes in several other indicators.
Figure 3.3 illustrates the relationship between the percentage of labour
market indicators that worsened during the crisis and the change in GDP
per capita between 2008 and 2009. There is a negative relationship (reductions
in GDP per capita are associated with a larger percentage of indicators moving
in the worsening direction), but only marginally signiﬁcant between the two
variables, with an R-squared of only 0.11. The patterns are, again, heteroge-
neous across countries. The three countries in which labour market indicators
were not affected by the crisis (Bolivia, Peru, and Uruguay) experienced posi-
tive levels of growth. The Dominican Republic grew at similar rates, but
suffered a deterioration of several labour market indicators during the crisis.
At the other extreme, the countries with the largest fall in GDP per capita
(Panama, Paraguay, and Venezuela) suffered a deterioration in about the same
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Table 3.3 Qualitative changes in labour market indicators during the international crisis of 2008 by country
Indicator AR BO BR CL CO CR DO EC HN MX PA PE PY SV UY VE
Unemployment
Decrease in the unemployment rate  NC       NC   NC   + 
Occupations
Decrease in the share of low-earnings
occupations
+ NC   NC    + + NC NC + NC
Increase in the share of high-
earnings occupations
NC + +  NC NC   + +  NC + +
Occupational position
Increase in the share of wage/
salaried employees
NC + + +  NC NC    NC   NC 
Decrease in the share of self-
employment
 NC NC NC NC NC     NC NC  NC 
Decrease in the share of unpaid
family workers
 + + +  NC +  NC NC NC NC  NC +
Economic Sector
Decrease in the share of workers in
low-earnings sectors
NC NC NC NC  NC + NC  NC NC + NC NC + NC
Increase in the share of workers in
high-earnings sectors
+ NC NC + NC NC  NC  + + + NC NC NC NC
Education
Decrease in the share of low-
educated workers
+ + + +  + + NC  + NC NC + NC + +
Increase in the share of high-
educated workers
+ + + +  NC  NC  + NC NC NC NC + +
Workers registered with SS
Increase in the share of workers
registered with SS
+ NC +   NC + NC   + + NC  + +
Earnings
Increase in mean labour earnings + NC + + + + +    NC + NC NC + 
Poverty
Decrease in 4 dollars-a-day poverty NC + + + +  +  +  + +  + + 
Decrease in 2.5 dollars-a-day poverty + + + + + NC + + +  + + + + + NC
(continued)
Table 3.3 Continued
Indicator AR BO BR CL CO CR DO EC HN MX PA PE PY SV UY VE
Inequality
Decrease in GINI of household per
capita income
+ + NC NC NC  NC + + + NC NC + + NC NC
Decrease in GINI of labour earnings NC + NC +  NC NC + + + NC NC + NC + +
Number of worsening indicators 3 0 1 3 10 3 5 8 10 5 3 0 4 5 0 5
Total number of indicators 14 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 11 16 16 16 16 16 16
% of worsening indicators 21.4 0.0 6.3 18.8 62.5 18.8 31.3 50.0 62.5 45.5 18.8 0.0 25.0 31.3 0.0 31.3
Note: The table summarizes the changes in each labour market indicator during 2008–9 except for Chile (2006–9) and Mexico (2006–10). In the case of Chile, there is no household survey in
between the years 2006 and 2009. Mexico was already in recession in the year 2008, so we considered 2006 as the base year (there was no survey in 2007).
References: + denotes improvement;  denotes worsening; NC denotes no changes. All the improvements and worsenings are statistically signiﬁcant at 5 per cent.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on SEDLAC (CEDLAS and World Bank 2014).
number of labour market indicators as the Dominican Republic, but far from
the generalized deterioration in Colombia, with almost no change in GDP per
capita during the crisis.
Paying particular attention to the growth–employment–poverty nexus, it is
interesting to observe that poverty rates increased in only a few countries during
the crisis: moderate poverty (computed with the 4 dollars-a-day poverty line)
increased inﬁve countries, and extreme poverty (computedwith the 2.5 dollars-
a-day poverty line) increased in only one country. The small effect of the crisis
on poverty rates can be related to the small effect the crisis had on labour
earnings. Table 3.3 shows that only four countries suffered a reduction in labour
earnings during the crisis (Ecuador, Honduras, Mexico, and Venezuela). To see
more clearly the connection between labour earnings and poverty, of the four
countries where labour earnings fell during the crisis, three also exhibited
increases in their poverty rates (Ecuador, Mexico, and Venezuela). However,
unemployment rates increased in twelve out of sixteen countries, indicating
that during the crisis, employment declined with a small effect on wages.
Section 3.4 presents a more in-depth analysis of the relationship between
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Figure 3.3 Cross-country relationship between the percentage of labour market
indicators moving in the welfare-worsening direction and growth rate of GDP per
capita during the international crisis
Note: This ﬁgure displays the percentage of labour market indicators that change in the welfare-
worsening direction according to Table 3.4 and the growth rate of GDP per capita during the
international crisis. The economic crisis period is 2008–9, except for Chile (2006–9) and Mexico
(2006–10). The line represents the linear regression speciﬁed at the bottom of the ﬁgure. Robust
standard error of the slope coefﬁcient between parentheses.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on SEDLAC (CEDLAS and World Bank 2014).
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poverty indicators and employment and earnings indicators. Most countries
reacted quickly during the crisis, implementing or expanding cash transfers and
emergency programmes, thereby mitigating the effect of the increase in
unemployment on poverty (Veras Soares 2009; Cecchini and Madariaga 2011).
The accompanying country case studies describe some of the interventions of
the governments in the regionduring the aftermathof the crisis. Just tomention
a few of them: Argentina increased social expenditure during and after the
international crisis through the creation (and subsequent rise in levels) of the
Asignacion Universal por Hijo cash transfer programme, and also increased public
works and public employment; Costa Rica expanded the coverage of the cash
transfer programme Avancemos and also increased non-contributory pensions;
El Salvador implemented cash and in-kind transfers and ﬁnancial support to
local producers; Mexico introduced and expanded employment programmes
such asPrograma de Preservación del Empleo and ProgramaTemporal de Empleo, and
also expanded the Oportunidades cash transfer programme. The only two coun-
tries which did not implement any countercyclical policy during the inter-
national crisis were Honduras (which was facing political instability) and
Venezuela (which suffered reduced oil revenues during the crisis).
Turning now to the post-crisis period, labour market indicators fully or
partially recovered in most countries. Table 3.4 presents the post-crisis evolu-
tion of the labour market indicators that deteriorated during the crisis. We
distinguish between total and partial recoveries: total recoveries (‘++’ sign in
the table) signify that the indicator surpassed its pre-crisis level; partial recov-
ery (‘+’) indicates that the indicator improved from the worst year of the crisis,
but not by enough to achieve its pre-crisis level. Figure 3.4 shows for each
country the distribution of labour market indicators that were affected and
not affected during the crisis.3 Most labour market indicators had fully or
partially recovered in most countries by 2012–13. The share of low-earnings
occupations, the share of low-educated workers, and the moderate and
extreme poverty rates recovered fully or partially in all countries which suf-
fered a deterioration in these indicators during the crisis. Other labour market
indicators recovered in at least half of the countries that faced a worsening
during the crisis. These indicators were the unemployment rate, the share of
high-earnings occupations, the shares of wage/salaried employees, self-
employment, and unpaid family workers, the share of low-earnings sectors,
the share of high-educated workers, the share of registered workers, mean
labour earnings, and the Gini coefﬁcient of labour earnings. The only labour
3 Some labour market indicators improved during the crisis and deteriorated in the post-crisis
period. Since the purpose of this section is to assess the impact of the crisis and the ensuing
recovery, in Figure 3.4 we classiﬁed these cases as indicators that were not affected by the crisis.
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Table 3.4 Qualitative changes after the international crisis of 2008 in labour market indicators which worsened during the crisis by country
Indicator AR BO BR CL CO DO EC HN MX PA PE PY SV UY VE
Unemployment
Decrease in the unemployment rate ++ ++ + ++  ++ + ++ ++ + +
Occupations
Decrease in the share of low-earnings
occupations
++ + + ++ +
Increase in the share of high-earnings
occupations
++ ++ 
Occupational position
Increase in the share of wage/salaried
employees
+   ++ ++ + ++
Decrease in the share of self-employment ++ +   ++ + 
Decrease in the share of unpaid family
workers
++ + ++ ++ 
Economic Sector
Decrease in the share of workers in low-
earnings sectors
+ 
Increase in the share of workers in high-
earnings sectors
 
Education
Decrease in the share of low-educated
workers
++ ++
Increase in the share of high-educated
workers
++  +
Workers registered with SS
Increase in the share of workers registered
with SS
++ ++ +  
Earnings
Increase in mean labour earnings ++  + ++
Poverty
Decrease in 4 dollars-a-day poverty ++ ++ ++ ++
Decrease in 2.5 dollars-a-day poverty +
(continued)
Table 3.4 Continued
Indicator AR BO BR CL CO DO EC HN MX PA PE PY SV UY VE
Inequality
Decrease in GINI of household per capita
income
Decrease in GINI of labour earnings ++ 
Total number of indicators affected by
the crises
3 0 1 3 10 5 8 10 5 5 0 3 5 0 5
Number of continued deterioration 0 0 0 0 0 3 2 6 1 1 0 0 2 0 1
Number of partial recoveries 0 0 0 1 4 2 0 3 3 0 0 0 3 0 1
Number of total recoveries 3 0 1 2 6 0 6 1 1 4 0 3 0 0 3
% of total recoveries 100.0 – 100.0 66.7 60.0 0.0 75.0 10.0 20.0 80.0 – 100.0 0.0 – 60.0
Note: The table summarizes the changes in labour market indicators that worsened during the crisis according to Table 3.3. Estimations correspond to: Argentina 2008–12, Bolivia 2008–12, Brazil
2008–12, Chile 2006–11, Colombia 2008–13, Dominican Republic 2008–12, Ecuador 2008–12, Honduras 2008–12, Mexico 2006–12, Panama 2008–12, Peru 2008–12, Paraguay 2008–13, El
Salvador 2008–12, Uruguay 2008–12, and Venezuela 2008–12. In Paraguay, the classiﬁcation of occupations during 2010–13 cannot be compared with the classiﬁcation before 2010. Costa Rica
does not appear in this table since from 2010 onwards household surveys are not comparable to previous surveys.
References: ++ denotes total recovery: the indicator improved after 2009 above the pre-crisis level of 2008; + denotes partial recovery: the indicator improved after 2009 but did not recover its
pre-crisis level of 2008;  denotes continued deterioration: the indicator continued worsening after 2009. All the improvements and worsenings are statistically signiﬁcant at 5 per cent.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on SEDLAC (CEDLAS and World Bank 2014).
market indicator that did not recover in the aftermath of the crisis was the
share of workers in high-earnings sectors.
Besides the three countries whose labour market indicators were not affected
by the crisis (Bolivia, Peru, and Uruguay), three other countries (Argentina,
Brazil, and Paraguay) recovered completely from the deterioration suffered dur-
ing the crisis (i.e. the indicators were better in the ﬁnal year than in the pre-crisis
year). Chile and Colombia experienced a mix of total and partial recoveries in
their indicators (i.e. the situationwas better thanduring the crisis but not always
better than in the pre-crisis year). Honduras continued to have a generalized
deterioration in its labour market indicators following the crisis. The bad per-
formance of Honduras during and after the crisis was related to the political
instability (the country suffered a military coup in 2009) that prevented the
country from adopting the measures needed to counteract the effects of the
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Figure 3.4 Distribution of labour market indicators according to the post-crisis path
by country
Note: ‘Not affected’ indicates the percentage of indicators that did not worsen during the inter-
national crisis. ‘Total recoveries’ denotes the percentage of indicators that improved after 2009
surpassing the pre-crisis level. ‘Partial recoveries’ denotes the percentage of indicators that
improved after 2009 but the recovery was not enough to reach its pre-crisis level of 2008. ‘Con-
tinued worsening’ denotes the percentage of indicators that continued to worsen after the crises.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on SEDLAC (CEDLAS and World Bank 2014).
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global recession. The remaining seven countries experienced amixed evolution,
with a deterioration and some partial or total recoveries in different indicators.
In sum, most of the countries in the region experienced a reduction or a
stagnation in their GDP per capita during 2008–9 and a recovery thereafter.
Following an initial worsening of labour market indicators in most Latin
American countries, the majority recovered or surpassed their pre-crisis levels
by the end of the period for which we have data (typically 2012).4 In the
majority of countries, poverty rates did not increase, even during the crisis
period; changes in labour market earnings and the introduction or expansion
of government transfer programmes to mitigate the temporary increases in
unemployment were related to the small effect on poverty indicators. Thus,
contrary to the experiences of the OECD countries, the effects of the crisis in
Latin America were generally short-lived.
3.4 In Summary
Summing up, the review of our aggregate evidence reveals three main results.
First, GDP per capita grew in the Latin American region as a whole during the
2000s, all employment and earnings indicators improved, and poverty and
inequality indicators fell.
Second, on a country-by-country basis, all Latin American countries exhib-
ited positive GDP per capita growth rates during the 2000s. Most countries
experienced substantial improvements in labour market conditions over the
period, Honduras being the only exception to this general pattern. The
unemployment rate fell in thirteen out of sixteen countries. There was a
generalized improvement in the distribution of employed workers by occupa-
tions, occupational positions, sectors, and educational levels. The share of
workers registered with the social security system increased in twelve out of
sixteen countries. Labour earnings increased in eleven out of sixteen coun-
tries, although they fell signiﬁcantly for the remaining ﬁve. Poverty and
extreme poverty fell signiﬁcantly in all countries but one. Inequality of house-
hold per capita income and of labour income also fell in fourteen out of
sixteen countries.
Finally, the growth rates of most countries in the region were negatively
affected by the economic crisis of 2008, which also affected several labour
market indicators in the worsening direction: most notably, a generalized
increase in the unemployment rate, a fall in the share of wage/salaried
4 The limited impact of the international crisis on Latin American labour markets was also
reported in World Bank (2012) and ECLAC-ILO (2012).
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workers, and an increase in self-employment. A remarkable ﬁnding about the
crisis is that poverty rates increased in only ﬁve of the sixteen countries, and
extreme poverty rates in only one. In light of the evidence presented in this
section and in the country studies, the small effect of the crisis on poverty
rates can be related, ﬁrst, to the small effect of the crisis on labour earnings. In
fact, three of the countries that suffered an increase in the moderate poverty
rate during the crisis are among the four countries in our sample that exhib-
ited a reduction in labour earnings (Ecuador, Mexico, and Venezuela). Second,
most of the countries in the region implemented countercyclical policies to
reduce the negative impacts of the crisis, including the implementation and
expansion of cash transfer programmes, mitigating the adverse effect on
poverty of the increase in unemployment. The effect of the crisis on labour
market indicators was short-lived: most countries’ labour market indicators
had fully or partially recovered by 2012–13.
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4Cross-Country Analysis of
the Growth–Employment–Poverty Nexus
4.1 Cross-Country Patterns: Economic Growth Rate
and Changes in Labour Market Indicators
Chapter 3 showed that the improvements in labour market indicators during
the 2000s were remarkably widespread in the Latin American countries. In
this chapter, we analyse whether the improvements in labour market indica-
tors were directly related to the rate of economic growth across countries.
Cross-country analysis of the role of the rate of economic growth in deter-
mining improvements in labour market indicators is presented in two comple-
mentaryparts. First,we analysehow the rateof economic growth is related to the
percentage of labour market indicators that moved in the welfare-improving
direction during the 2000s in each of the sixteen countries. Second, we perform
cross-country analysis separately for each labour market indicator.
Previous literature has covered this topic only partially, presenting the
correlation between cross-country changes in labour market indicators and
the GDP per capita growth rate for a limited subset of indicators. Pagés, Pierre,
and Scarpetta (2009) provide an example of this type of analysis linking the
annual growth rate of employment for some Latin American and other devel-
oping countries during 1980–2004 to the annual GDP per capita growth rate.
For this time period (longer but out of date compared to our analysis), the
authors ﬁnd that Latin American countries outperformed many of the com-
parator countries, as they had higher rates of employment growth for a given
GDP per capita growth rate. However, the authors claim that jobs were created
at the same rate that labour supply increased, leading to small increases in the
employment rate and even unemployment rate rises for some countries.
Weller and Kaldewei (2013) and Weller (2014) perform a similar exercise,
correlating changes in the shares of wage/salaried employees and self-employed
workers with the GDP growth rate for the Latin American and the Caribbean
region overall during the 1995–2012 period. The analysis is performed on a
year-by-year basis and indicates a strong positive correlation between changes
in the share of wage/salaried employees and the GDP growth rate. For the
share of self-employed workers, the authors ﬁnd a less clear relationship with
the GDP growth rate; in several years of the analysed period self-employment
behaved countercyclically, while in some other years it behaved procyclically.
Finally, ILO (2013) analyses the cross-country relation between annual growth
in both GDP and employment before the international crisis (1997–2007) and
after that episode (2008–11). The correlationwas positive in both subperiods, but
stronger before the crisis. This last result is explained by the fact that in Central
American and theCaribbean countries, whose economies are strongly connected
to the North American market, the recovery was slower than in South American
countries. We turn now to our analysis.
4.1.1 Analysis of the Percentage of Labour Market Indicators that
Changed in the Welfare-Improving Direction (Z)
What is the relationship between improvements in labour market indicators
and the rate of economic growth? Figure 4.1 presents a scatterplot. We see in
the ﬁgure that over the 2000s, GDP per capita increased in every country and
that more than 60 per cent of the labour market indicators increased in every
country except for Honduras, which suffered a generalized worsening of
labour market conditions.
Across these countries, does a higher economic growth rate result in a
higher percentage of labour market indicators improving? Let Zi be the per-
centage of labour market indicators with a statistically signiﬁcant improve-
ment in country i, and %ΔGDPpci be the annualized percentage change of
GDP per capita in country i. To quantify the association between the two
variables in the ﬁgure, we estimate the following regression:
Zi ¼ Cþ β %ΔGDPpci þ μi: ð2Þ
We observe a positive but weak relationship (R-squared of 0.112 and statistic-
ally insigniﬁcant) between the percentage of labour market indicators that
improved during the 2000s and the rate of economic growth. Upon removing
Honduras, which is the only country in our sample with a generalized worsen-
ing in labour market indicators over the period, the R-squared increases
slightly to 0.120, but the slope coefﬁcient is smaller and still not statistically
signiﬁcant. The reason for the lack of relationship between the percentage of
improving indicators and the rate of economic growth is the limited variation
in the evolution of labour market indicators, since for most countries in
our sample and regardless of their annualized rates of economic growth we
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observe that 75 per cent or more of these indicators improved during the
period under study.
4.1.2 Analysis of the Labour Market Indicators One by One (Yk)
The weak relationship between the percentage of labour market indicators
that improved in each country (Zi) and the rate of economic growth
(%ΔGDPpci) may be due to the type of aggregation implicit in our index of
the percentage of labour market indicators that improved over the period.
Rather than constructing alternative indices, which would also be arbitrary in
terms of the indicators included, the weight assigned to each one, etc., we can
instead extend this analysis beyond our aggregate measure of improvement of
labour markets and study the relationship between economic growth and
each of the underlying indicators one by one.
Our results indicate that faster growth is associated with larger improve-
ments in labour market indicators, but the goodness of ﬁt of most of the
relationships analysed is generally low. This conclusion is based on Figure 4.2,
which displays the scatterplots for each country’s annualized change in the
%
 o
f i
m
p
ro
vi
ng
 la
bo
ur
 m
ar
ke
t 
in
di
ca
to
rs
% Δ GDPpc at PPP 2005
Regression details:
With HN:  Y=65.4+5.26(3.95)X, R2= .112
Without HN: Y=75.3+3.24(2.43)X, R2= .12
AR
BO BR
CL CO
CR
DO
EC
HN
MX
PA
PE
PY
SV
UYVE
20
40
60
80
100
1 2 3 4 5 6
 With HN  Without HN
Figure 4.1 Cross-country relationship between the percentage of labour market indi-
cators moving in the welfare-improving direction and growth rate of GDP per capita
during the 2000s
Note: This ﬁgure displays the percentage of labour market indicators that changed in the welfare-
improving direction according to Table 3.2 and the annualized growth rate during the period under
study according to Table 3.1. The line represents the linear regression speciﬁed at the bottom of the
ﬁgure. Robust standard error of the slope coefﬁcient between parentheses.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on SEDLAC (CEDLAS and World Bank 2014).
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Δ Poverty rate 4 USD-a-day. R2=.105.
A
nn
ua
liz
ed
 c
ha
ng
es
 in
 la
bo
ur
 m
ar
ke
t 
in
di
ca
to
rs
% Δ GDPpc at PPP 2005
Figure 4.2 Cross-country relationship between the annualized changes in labour
market indicators and annualized growth rate of GDP per capita during the 2000s
Note: The vertical axes display the annualized change in each labour market indicator. Δ denotes
changes in percentage points and % Δ denotes percentage changes. The line in each ﬁgure
represents the linear regression speciﬁed at the bottom. Robust standard error of the slope
coefﬁcient between parentheses. R-squared of the regression indicated along the title of each
ﬁgure.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on SEDLAC (CEDLAS and World Bank 2014) and World
Development Indicators (World Bank 2014).
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k’th labourmarket indicator and its rate of economic growth (one plot for each
labour market indicator). Let GDPpci be GDP per capita in country i, Yik be the
labour market indicator k for country i, Δ be the annualized change in per-
centage points, and %Δ be the annualized percentage change. We quantify
the underlying relationship between the variables in the plots by estimating
one of the following regressions, depending on the units of the indicators:
ΔYik ¼ Cþ β%ΔGDPρci þ εik or %ΔYik ¼ Cþ β %ΔGDPρci þ εik ð3Þ
We consider a relationship to be tight if the R-squared is above the arbitrary
threshold of 0.15. The R-squared was chosen instead of other commonly used
statistics as the slope or an F test of statistical signiﬁcance, since we wanted to
capture how much of the variation in Yk can be explained by changes in GDP
per capita.
Among the employment and earnings indicators, only three exhibited a
relatively tight relationship between their changes during the 2000s and the
rate of economic growth. These indicators were the share of registered work-
ers, the share of high-earnings occupations, and the share of low-earnings
occupations. There thus seems to be a signiﬁcant relationship between the
rate of economic growth and different aspects of the occupational mix. More
speciﬁcally, countries that grew faster experienced larger declines in the share
of low-earnings occupations, and higher increases in the share of highly paid
occupations in total employment (R-squareds of 0.15 and 0.33, respectively).
Moreover, the share of workers registered with social security tended to
increase more in countries with stronger economic growth, and this is the
tightest of the relationships we computed (R-squared of 0.44). The increase in
the share of registered workers is a manifestation of the procyclicality of
registered employment, which has been extensively documented and dis-
cussed before for the region as a whole, and for most countries in the region
over time (Gasparini and Tornarolli 2009).
For the remaining employment and earnings indicators, as well as for the
poverty and inequality indicators, we ﬁnd no statistically signiﬁcant relation-
ship or only a weak relationship between the annualized change in the labour
market indicator and the rate of economic growth (R-squared lower than
0.15). For instance, there is a weak positive relationship between growth and
the change in the share of wage/salaried employees (R-squared of 0.09). There
are also weak negative relationships between the rate of economic growth and
the changes in the unemployment rate, in the moderate poverty rate, and in
the shares of unpaid workers and of low-earnings sectors.
These mostly weak relationships between the rate of economic growth and
the substantial majority of indicators of labour market performance seem to be
drivenby the experiences of the countrieswhich grewatmoderate rates by Latin
American standards. The two fastest-growing economies (Panama and Peru)
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exhibitedwidespread and large improvements in their labourmarket indicators,
and the two slowest-growing economies (Mexico and El Salvador) showed
among the smallest improvements (and even some deteriorations) in labour
market indicators over the 2000s. However, these changes and deteriorations
were not extreme, which accounts partially for the modest slopes of the aggre-
gate relationships across all sixteen countries. Moreover, the other twelve coun-
tries in the middle of the growth scale exhibited a large degree of variability in
the magnitudes of the changes in labour market indicators despite having
similar economic growth rates. For instance, Bolivia, Brazil, and Honduras had
nearly the same economic growth, and while in Bolivia and Brazil all labour
market indicators improved and in some cases the improvements were larger
than for Panama or Peru (the two fastest-growing economies), Honduras had by
far the worst performance among the sixteen countries (Table 3.2 in Chapter 3).
Someother countries exhibited larger economic growth rateswhencompared to
Bolivia and Brazil, but smaller improvement in labour market indicators. That
was the case of the Dominican Republic.
4.2 Cross-Country Patterns: Beyond Economic Growth
The analysis in sections 4.1.1 and 4.1.2 revealed that labourmarket conditions
improved substantially in all but one of the sixteen Latin American countries
covered in this study. These improvements, though widespread, occurred in
countries with high and low rates of economic growth. This lack of a system-
atic cross-country relationship between economic growth and improvements
in the labour market as measured either by the aggregate index Z or by the
individual labour market indicators Yk motivates the analysis in this chapter,
in which we attempt to move beyond aggregated indicators such as economic
growth and delve into more detailed macroeconomic variables.
The analysis of the role of macroeconomic variables other than the rate of
economic growth in determining changes in labourmarket indicators proceeds
as follows. To determine whether the richer Latin American countries differed
from the poorer ones in terms of their labour market trajectories, we ﬁrst study
the relationship between countries’ changes in labour market conditions and
their initial level of GDP. Next, we study the changes in each labour market
indicator as a function of the country’s initial level of this indicator, to uncover
any potential convergence effect in these indicators. Then we analyse a num-
ber of other macroeconomic variables which might be signiﬁcant correlates of
changes in labour market conditions. These variables are changes in: agricul-
ture as a percentage of GDP; industry as a percentage of GDP; services as a
percentage of GDP; domestic consumption expenditure as a percentage of
GDP; exports as a percentage of GDP; terms of trade; foreign direct investment
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as a percentage of GDP; revenues from natural resources as a percentage of
GDP; expenditure in education and health as a percentage of GDP; public
expenditure in social security as a percentage of GDP; and the stock of public
debt as a percentage of GDP. Finally, we look to see whether the changes in
certain labour market indicators are linked systematically to the changes
in others: for example, whether countries with more rapidly rising real wages
are those withmore rapidly rising unemployment or whether real earnings and
employment move together.
Someof these topics have been studied in the previous literature although in a
more limitedway—typically, for a smaller group of labourmarket indicators, for
a smaller group of countries, or for a different time period. For instance, World
Bank (2012) highlights the role of the increasing terms of trade for the net
commodity-exporting countries in the region to explain the increase in the
relative demand for low-skilledworkers and then the reduction in labour income
inequality (measured by the returns to secondary and higher education)
between 2000 and 2009–10. Similarly, World Bank (2015) relates real wage
increases, reductions in household income inequality (measured by the Gini
coefﬁcient), and reductions in the poverty rate (measured by the 4 dollars-a-day
international line) in the Latin American region during 2003–12 to improving
terms of trade, because countries experiencing a commodity boom did much
better in these labour market indicators than non-commodity-boom countries.
Tsounta and Osueke (2014) analyse the determinants of falling income
inequality in Latin America from 1990 to 2012. The authors present evidence
of convergence in the Gini coefﬁcient of household per capita income across
Latin American countries (eighteen countries) over the period. They also ﬁnd
a negative cross-country correlation between changes in tax revenues as a
share of GDP and changes in household income inequality (where changes
correspond to the difference between the years 2000 and 2012), and a negative
cross-country correlation between changes in government spending on edu-
cation as a share of GDP and changes in income inequality.
Finally, Damill and Frenkel (2014) estimate the effect of annual changes in
the real exchange rate on annual changes in the unemployment rate for a
panel of eighteen Latin American countries from 1990 to 2010. They ﬁnd that
a more depreciated real exchange rate tends to reduce unemployment. In a
similar exercise, they relate the poverty rate to unemployment and the inﬂa-
tion rate and ﬁnd that increases in the unemployment rate and in the inﬂation
rate tend to increase the poverty rate.
4.2.1 Initial GDP per Capita
An ongoing debate in themodern theory of economic growth is whether there
is convergence or divergence in growth rates: that is, whether poorer countries
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tend to grow at higher rates than richer ones (thus tending to converge in
terms of GDP) or not. We start our analysis with the related question of
whether the improvement in labour market indicators over the period under
study was correlated with each country’s initial GDP per capita. This relation-
ship could be either positive or negative: poorer economies could have more
room to improve in the labour market, so that these countries might exhibit
larger improvements in related indicators, or alternatively initially richer
economies may have better conditions to channel the economic growth
during the period under study in the direction of improved conditions in
the labour market.
Examining these competing views empirically, we ﬁnd that there is no
important cross-country relationship between initial GDP per capita and
aggregate changes in labour market conditions. Figure 4.3 plots initial GDP
per capita in 2005 PPP dollars and the percentage of improving labour market
indicators for each country. Let GDPit0 be the GDP per capita at 2005 PPP in
the ﬁrst period under study for country i, and Zi be the percentage of labour
market indicators that experienced an improvement in the period under
study. To quantify the cross-country relationship, we estimate the following
regression:
Zi ¼ Cþ β GDPit0 þ μi ð4Þ
The relationship is positive, indicating that initially richer countries enjoyed
larger improvements in labour market indicators measured by Z, but weak
(R-squared of 0.11). However, even this low association is entirely driven by
Honduras, which is a clear outlier: without Honduras, the R-squared and slope
of the ﬁtted line are virtually equal to zero.
Our ﬁnding of a lack of relationship between initial GDP per capita level
and labour market conditions across countries means that there were sub-
stantial improvements in labour markets both in initially poorer and in
initially richer countries, and that countries with similar initial levels of
GDP per capita exhibited very different patterns in the number of labour
market indicators that improved over the period under study. For instance,
Peru and the Dominican Republic had almost the same level of initial GDP
per capita, but the Peruvian experience was markedly more successful: all
sixteen labour market indicators improved in Peru, but only ten improved in
the Dominican Republic.
While there does not seem to be a relationship between initial GDP per
capita and the percentage of indicators that improved, there could still be a
relationship between the magnitude of changes in some of the individual
labour market indicators and the initial level of GDP per capita. In
Figure 4.4, we present this relationship for each of the sixteen labour market
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indicators. Let GDPit0 be the GDP per capita at 2005 PPP in the initial year
under study for country i, Yik be the labour market indicator k for country i, Δ
be the annualized change in percentage points, and let %Δ be the annualized
percentage change. We quantify these relationships estimating regressions of
the form:
ΔYik ¼ Cþ β GDPit0 þ εik or %ΔYik ¼ Cþ β GDPit0 þ εik: ð5Þ
Using equation (5), we also fail to ﬁnd a relationship between initial GDP per
capita and changes in individual labourmarket indicators. The results displayed
in Figure 4.4 indicate thatwe can reject thehypothesis of anassociationbetween
the initial level of GDP per capita and the changes in each of the labour market
indicators. All the R-squareds are lower than 0.06, and the slopes are practically
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Figure 4.3 Cross-country relationship between the percentage of labour market indi-
cators moving in the welfare-improving direction during the 2000s and initial GDP
per capita
Note: This ﬁgure displays the percentage of labour market indicators that changed in the welfare-
improving direction according to Table 3.2 and GDP per capita of the initial year at PPP 2005. The
line represents the linear regression speciﬁed at the bottom of the ﬁgure. Robust standard error of
the slope coefﬁcient between parentheses.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on SEDLAC (CEDLAS and World Bank 2014) and World
Development Indicators (World Bank 2014).
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Figure 4.4 Cross-country relationship between the annualized changes in labour mar-
ket indicators during the 2000s and initial GDP per capita
Note: The vertical axes display the annualized change in each labour market indicator. Δ denotes
changes in percentage points; % Δ denotes percentage changes. The line represents the linear
regression speciﬁed at the bottom of the ﬁgure. Robust standard error of the slope coefﬁcient
between parentheses. R-squared of the regression indicated along the title of each ﬁgure.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on SEDLAC (CEDLAS and World Bank 2014) and World
Development Indicators (World Bank 2014).
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equal to 0. In brief, initial GDPper capita does notmake an important difference
to the rate of change of any of the labour market indicators.
4.2.2 Convergence/Divergence Patterns in Labour Market Indicators
In this section, we study how, across countries, the change in each of the
sixteen labour market indicators is related to the initial level of that indicator.
In order to do that, let Yikt0 be the value of the labour market indicator k in the
initial year under study for country i, Yik be the labour market indicator k for
country i, and let Δ be the annualized change in percentage points, and %Δ
be the annualized percentage change. We estimate regressions of the form:
ΔYik ¼ Cþ β Yikt0 þ εik or %ΔYik ¼ Cþ βYikt0 þ εik: ð6Þ
We deﬁne convergence and divergence as follows: given the initial value of
the k’th labour market indicator, a convergent (divergent) relationship is one
where the countries with worse (better) initial values tend to have larger
subsequent improvements. Convergent patterns would reﬂect some sort of
decreasing marginal returns to growth or to improvements in a given indica-
tor, i.e. it is harder to achieve large reductions when the labour market
indicator is already high (in a welfare-increasing direction). Alternatively,
divergent patterns would signal the presence of ‘traps’ or absorbent states in
that once the labourmarket indicator is at a low level, it is hard for the country
to bring it up.
Figure 4.5 presents the relationship between the changes in each labour
market indicator and its initial value. There seems to be convergence for
about a third (ﬁve out of sixteen) of our selected indicators, namely: the
unemployment rate, the share of unpaid family workers, the poverty and
extreme poverty rates, and the inequality of household per capita income.
The relationships are especially tight for the unemployment rate, and for the
share of unpaid family workers (R-squareds of about 0.73 and about 0.5,
respectively). That is, countries with higher initial unemployment rates
and higher shares of unpaid family workers exhibited much larger reduc-
tions in these indicators than other countries; these countries are not stuck
with high unemployment rates or high shares of workers in unpaid family
jobs. The results in Figure 4.5 also reveal some weak convergent patterns: for
example, the share of low-earnings occupations and the share of workers
with low levels of education converged, but not as much as the unemploy-
ment rate and the share of unpaid family workers did (R-squareds of 0.06
and 0.09). For the other indicators, no discernible convergence/divergence
patterns appeared.
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Figure 4.5 Cross-country relationship between the annualized changes in labour mar-
ket indicators during the 2000s and the initial value of labour market indicators
Note: The vertical axes display the annualized change in each labour market indicator. Δ denotes
changes in percentage points; % Δ denotes percentage changes. The line represents the linear
regression speciﬁed at the bottom of the ﬁgure. Robust standard error of the slope coefﬁcient
between parentheses. R-squared of the regression indicated along the title of each ﬁgure.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on SEDLAC (CEDLAS and World Bank 2014).
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4.2.3 Other Potential Macroeconomic Correlates of Changing
Labour Market Indicators
In this section, we turn to other macroeconomic variables besides the rate of
economic growth and the initial level of national income, and study which, if
any, are signiﬁcantly correlated with improvements in the labour market. The
macroeconomic variables analysed here fall into two categories. Most have to
do with the composition of GDP. These variables, expressed as changing
percentages of GDP, include the share of agriculture, the share of industry,
the share of service, the share of domestic consumption expenditure, the
share of expenditure in education and health, the share of expenditure in
social security, the share of exports, the share of foreign direct investments,
the share of revenues of natural resources, and the share of the stock of public
debt. We also consider the changes in the country’s terms of trade; this
variable is not a share of GDP (Appendix 3 provides the macroeconomic
variables time series for each country). Let Zi be the share of improving labour
market indicators for country i, and Xij be the macroeconomic variable j in
country i. To quantify the association between the two variables we estimate
the following regression:
Zi ¼ Cþ β ΔXij þ εik or Zi ¼ Cþ β %ΔXij þ εik: ð7Þ
These bivariate tests yield several strong relationships. Most notably, the share
of labour market indicators that improved was larger in countries with larger
increases in exports as a percentage of GDP, larger reductions in domestic
consumption expenditure as a percentage of GDP, and larger falls in the stock
of public debt as a percentage of GDP (when excluding Honduras, an outlier as
discussed in section 4.1.1) (Figure 4.6). There appear to be some weak positive
relationships also between the share of labour market indicators that impro-
ved and the change in terms of trade and in revenues from natural resources as
a percentage of GDP.
Besides these relationships between changes in thesemacroeconomic aggre-
gates and the share of labour market indicators that improved over the period
under study, we can also study the relationship between these macroeco-
nomic variables and the sixteen individual labour market indicators. To
gauge their importance, we perform a series of regressions between the change
in labour market indicator and the changes in the macroeconomic variables.
Let Yik be the labour market indicators k for country i, and Xij be the macro-
economic variable j in country i. To quantify the association between the two
variables we estimate the following regression:
ΔYik ¼ Cþ β ΔXij þ εik or %ΔYik ¼ Cþ βΔXij þ εik; ð8Þ
and
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Figure 4.6 Cross-country relationship between the percentage of improving labour
market indicators and the annualized changes in macroeconomic variables during
the 2000s
Note: The vertical axes display the annualized change in each labour market indicator. Δ denotes
changes in percentage points; % Δ denotes percentage changes. The line represents the linear
regression speciﬁed at the bottom of the ﬁgure. Robust standard error of the slope coefﬁcient
between parentheses. R-squared of the regression indicated along the title of each ﬁgure.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on SEDLAC (CEDLAS and World Bank 2014), World Develop-
ment Indicators (World Bank 2014), and CEPALSTAT (UN-ECLAC 2015).
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ΔYik ¼ Cþ β %ΔXij þ εik or %ΔYik ¼ Cþ β%ΔXij þ εik: ð9Þ
With sixteen indicators and eleven macroeconomic variables, we have 176
regressions to estimate. The results are summarized in Table 4.1. In Table 4.1,
Positive indicates that the R-squared is above 0.15 and that an increase in the
macroeconomic variable is associated with an improvement in the labour
indicator; and similarly Negative indicates that the relationship is also signiﬁ-
cant, but an increase in the macro variable is related to a deterioration in the
indicator;NR (No relationship) indicates a regression with an R-squared of less
than 0.15. In Table 4.2, we present the R-squared for each regression, and
Appendix 2 presents the ﬁgures corresponding to each of these individual
regressions.
The results are mixed, with some robust positive and negative relationships
and several instances of no clear pattern of association. The change in the
share of industry in GDP has a positive association with a number of
indicators—an increase in labour earnings, a decline in the unemployment
rate, and better distributional indicators (i.e. lower levels of poverty, extreme
poverty, and inequality of household per capita income and labour earn-
ings)—and no statistically discernible association with other labour market
indicators. The change in exports as a percentage of GDP is positively associ-
ated with an increase in mean earnings and in improvements in the labour
mix (decline in the share of low-earnings occupations, increase in the share of
wage/salaried employees, fall in the share of self-employment and unpaid
family workers), as well as improved distributional indicators. The change in
terms of trade and the change in revenues from natural resources as a percent-
age of GDP have a similar pattern of relationships with labour market indica-
tors as the change in exports.
Other macroeconomic variables appear to have a negative association with
some of our selected labour market indicators (i.e. increases in the macroeco-
nomic variables seem related to worsenings in these indicators). This is the
case for the change in the share of services in GDP, the change in domestic
expenditure as a percentage of GDP, and the change in the stock of public debt
as a percentage of GDP. Increases in the share of services in GDP are associated
with smaller increases/declines in mean labour earnings, smaller declines/
increases in the unemployment rate, and a worsening in distributional indi-
cators (i.e. higher levels of poverty and inequality). Similarly, increases in
domestic expenditure as a percentage of GDP are associated with smaller
increases/declines in mean labour earnings, smaller declines/increases in
unemployment, and a worsening in distributive indicators. Increases in the
stock of public debt are associated with a general worsening in labour market
outcomes (with the exception of the unemployment rate, the share of regis-
tered workers, and levels of inequality).
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Table 4.1 Direction of the cross-country relationship between annualized changes in macroeconomic variables and annualized changes in labour market
indicators and GDP per capita growth during the 2000s
Indicator Share of
agriculture
in GDP
Share of
industry
in GDP
Share of
services
in GDP
Domestic
expenditure
(% of GDP)
Public expend. in
education and
health (% of GDP)
Public expend.
in social security
(% of GDP)
Exports
(% of
GDP)
Terms of
trade
Foreign direct
investment
(% of GDP)
Revenues from
natural
resources (% of
GDP)
Stock of
public debt
(% of GDP)
Unemployment
Decrease in the
unemployment rate
NR Positive Negative Negative NR NR NR Negative NR NR NR
Occupations
Decrease in the share of
low-earnings occupations
NR NR NR Negative NR NR Positive NR NR Positive Negative
Increase in the share of
high-earnings
occupations
NR NR NR NR NR NR NR NR NR NR Negative
Occupational position
Increase in the share of
wage/salaried employees
NR NR NR NR NR NR Positive NR NR NR Negative
Decrease in the share of
self-employment
NR NR NR NR NR NR Positive NR NR NR Negative
Decrease in the share of
unpaid family workers
NR NR NR Negative NR NR Positive Positive NR Positive Negative
Economic sector
Decrease in the share of
workers in low-earnings
sectors
NR NR NR NR NR NR NR NR NR NR Negative
Increase in the share of
workers in high-earnings
sectors
NR NR NR NR NR Positive NR NR NR NR Negative
Education
Decrease in the share of
low-educated workers
NR NR NR NR NR Positive NR NR Negative NR Negative
Increase in the share of
high-educated workers
NR NR NR NR NR Positive NR NR NR NR Negative
Workers registered with SS
Increase in the share of
workers registered with SS
NR NR NR NR NR NR NR NR Positive NR NR
Earnings
Increase in mean labour
earnings
NR Positive Negative Negative NR NR Positive Positive NR Positive Negative
Poverty
Decrease in 4 dollars-a-day
poverty
NR Positive Negative Negative NR NR Positive Positive NR Positive Negative
Decrease in 2.5 dollars-a-day
poverty
NR Positive Negative Negative NR NR Positive Positive NR Positive Negative
Inequality
Decrease in GINI of
household per capita
income
NR Positive Negative Negative NR NR Positive Positive Negative Positive NR
Decrease in GINI of labour
earnings
NR Positive Negative Negative NR NR Positive Positive Negative Positive NR
Economic growth
Increase in GDPpc at PPP
2005
NR NR NR Negative NR Negative NR NR Positive NR Negative
Number of relationships
with labour market
indicators
0 6 6 8 0 3 9 7 4 7 12
Percentage of total
indicators
0.0 37.5 37.5 50.0 0.0 18.8 56.3 43.8 25.0 43.8 75.0
Note: Positive denotes an increase of the macroeconomic variable is associated with a change in the labour market indicator in the welfare-improving direction. Negative denotes an increase of the macroeconomic
variable is associated with a change in the labour market indicator in the welfare-worsening direction. NR denotes no relationship, that is the R-squared of a linear regression is smaller than 0.15.
Grey shading implies that the R-squared is higher than 0.15 and the relationship is Positive. Bold typeface with no shading implies that the R-squared is larger than 0.15 and the relationship is Negative.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on SEDLAC (CEDLAS and World Bank 2014), World Development Indicators (World Bank 2014), and CEPALSTAT (UN-ECLAC 2015).
Table 4.2 Tightness of the cross-country relationship (R-squared) between annualized changes in macroeconomic variables and annualized changes in labour
market indicators and GDP per capita growth during the 2000s
Indicator Share of
agriculture
in GDP
Share of
industry
in GDP
Share of
services
in GDP
Domestic
expenditure
(% of GDP)
Public expend.
in education
and health
(% of GDP)
Public expend.
in social
security
(% of GDP)
Exports
(% of
GDP)
Terms
of
trade
Foreign direct
investment
(% of GDP)
Revenues
from natural
resources
(% of GDP)
Stock of
public debt
(% of GDP)
Unemployment
Decrease in the
unemployment rate
0.00 0.21 0.32 0.20 0.02 0.02 0.11 0.15 0.01 0.03 0.02
Occupations
Decrease in the share of
low-earnings occupations
0.00 0.06 0.09 0.19 0.01 0.01 0.18 0.10 0.00 0.01 0.55
Increase in the share of high-
earnings occupations
0.09 0.02 0.01 0.11 0.08 0.03 0.06 0.03 0.01 0.04 0.27
Occupational position
Increase in the share of wage/
salaried employees
0.08 0.01 0.00 0.12 0.00 0.01 0.23 0.02 0.00 0.04 0.28
Decrease in the share of
self-employment
0.11 0.08 0.02 0.06 0.00 0.01 0.24 0.04 0.00 0.02 0.19
Decrease in the share of unpaid
family workers
0.00 0.07 0.10 0.27 0.00 0.01 0.20 0.18 0.00 0.29 0.28
Economic sector
Decrease in the share of
workers in low-earnings
sectors
0.01 0.00 0.00 0.11 0.02 0.04 0.03 0.02 0.00 0.03 0.15
Increase in the share of workers
in high-earnings sectors
0.05 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.36 0.02 0.12 0.11 0.01 0.25
Education
Decrease in the share of
low-educated workers
0.05 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.37 0.01 0.02 0.20 0.01 0.18
Increase in the share of
high-educated workers
0.07 0.00 0.04 0.06 0.02 0.17 0.07 0.14 0.04 0.00 0.22
Workers registered with SS
Increase in the share of workers
registered with SS
0.12 0.05 0.00 0.06 0.00 0.06 0.00 0.00 0.16 0.04 0.06
Earnings
Increase in mean labour
earnings
0.06 0.30 0.25 0.29 0.00 0.06 0.21 0.40 0.09 0.24 0.53
Poverty
Decrease in 4 dollars-a-day
poverty
0.07 0.34 0.26 0.39 0.09 0.02 0.33 0.41 0.12 0.38 0.31
Decrease in 2.5 dollars-a-day
poverty
0.05 0.36 0.31 0.41 0.05 0.02 0.31 0.46 0.07 0.38 0.38
Inequality
Decrease in GINI of household
per capita income
0.00 0.16 0.23 0.27 0.09 0.01 0.23 0.16 0.19 0.24 0.03
Decrease in GINI of labour
earnings
0.00 0.29 0.39 0.28 0.00 0.08 0.15 0.36 0.30 0.19 0.09
Economic growth
Increase in GDPpc at PPP 2005 0.08 0.02 0.00 0.25 0.08 0.15 0.04 0.00 0.42 0.06 0.21
Note: Grey shading implies that the R-squared is higher than 0.15 and the relationship is Positive according to Table 4.1. Bold typeface with no shading implies that the R-squared is larger than 0.15 and the
relationship is Negative according to Table 4.1.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on SEDLAC (CEDLAS and World Bank 2014), World Development Indicators (World Bank 2014), and CEPALSTAT (UN-ECLAC 2015).
We ﬁnd little or no consistent pattern of association of labour market
indicators with the following macroeconomic variables: change in the share
of agriculture in GDP, change in public expenditure on education and health
as a percentage of GDP, change in public expenditure on social security as
a percentage of GDP, and change in foreign direct investment as a percentage
of GDP.
Looking at the experiences of countries with widespread labour market
improvements in Latin America, we ﬁnd that there is no unique conﬁguration
of macroeconomic factors associated with the number of welfare-improving
changes in labour market indicators. On the one hand, there is a group of
countries which beneﬁted from better external conditions: higher terms of
trade, increased exports, and related to that, increasing revenues from natural
resources, and increasing share of industry in GDP. That was the case, for
example, for Bolivia and Peru. For these countries, increases in exports seem to
have resulted in a shift to the right of the labour demand for high-earnings
occupations and wage/salaried employees (improving the mix of jobs), raising
labour earnings, and reducing poverty. Some of these countries took advan-
tage of the favourable external conditions, and translated them into higher
levels of investment (proxied by the reduction in consumption’s share of
GDP) and to an improved ﬁscal balance (as indicated by the fall in the stock
of public debt as a percentage of GDP). On the other hand, there is a group of
countries where the better external conditions were not present, but the
labour market conditions also improved. That was the case of Panama and
Costa Rica, which exhibited some of the largest increases in the share of
services in GDP and some of the largest reductions in terms of trade and in
the stock of public debt as a percentage of GDP. These countries were success-
ful in increasing the labour demand in the service sector, the driving force of
these economies.
Our next step is to add the GDP per capita growth rate as a second explana-
tory variable in the previous models. Our objective is to test the robustness of
some of the results obtained in this section: (1) faster growth is associated with
larger improvements in labour market indicators, but the relationship is weak;
and (2) somemacroeconomic variables were associated with changes in labour
market conditions always in the welfare-improving direction and some others
always in the welfare-reducing direction. The reason for adding the GDP per
capita growth rate as an additional regressor to the bivariate models where the
explanatory factor is a macroeconomic variable is that the two variables (GDP
per capita growth rate and macroeconomic variable) could be correlated, e.g.
countries with larger increases in terms of trade enjoy larger increases in GDP
per capita. Including the two of them as regressors allows us to separate, at
least partially, the effect of the GDP per capita growth rate on the change in
labour market indicators from the effect of macroeconomic factors.
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Weperform a series of regressions for the change in labourmarket indicators
on the changes in the macroeconomic variables and the change in GDP per
capita. Let Yik be the labour market indicators k for country i, Xij be the
macroeconomic variable j in country i, and GDPpci be GDP per capita in
country i. We estimate the following regression for two employment and
earnings indicators (the hange in the unemployment rate and the change in
mean labour income), and two poverty indicators (changes in the 2.5 and
4 dollars-a-day poverty rates):
ΔYik ¼ Cþ βΔXij þ γ%ΔGDPρci þ εik or
%ΔYik ¼ Cþ βΔXij þ γ%ΔGDPρci þ εik ð10Þ
and
11ΔYik ¼ Cþ β%ΔXij þ γ%ΔGDPρci þ εik or
%ΔYik ¼ Cþ β%ΔXij þ γ%ΔGDPρci þ εik: ð11Þ
Our results are presented in Table 4.3. Model 1 uses GDP per capita growth
rate as the only regressor and replicates the results obtained in section 4.1.
Model 2 uses the changes in macroeconomic variables as regressors (one at a
time) and replicates the results obtained previously in this section. Finally,
Model 3 includes both the GDP per capita growth rate and the changes in
macroeconomic variables as explanatory factors. In general, the magnitudes
of the coefﬁcients and standard errors of the estimations in the multivariate
model (Model 3) are similar to those obtained in the bivariate models
(Models 1 and 2). The details of these ﬁndings are as follows. First, from the
forty-four regressions (eleven macroeconomic variables  four labour market
indicators), in only four cases did the macroeconomic variables move from
being not statistically signiﬁcant in the bivariate model (Model 2) to being
signiﬁcant at the 5 per cent level in the multivariate model (Model 3). In all
four cases, the sign of the relationship remained the same when moving
from the bivariate model to the model that also includes the change in GDP
per capita as a control variable. Second, in no case did a macroeconomic
variable that was signiﬁcant in statistical terms in the bivariate model
(Model 2) turn to insigniﬁcance in the multivariate model (Model 3). Third,
out of the forty-four regressions, in only six cases was the GDP per capita
growth rate a signiﬁcant factor explaining changes in labour market indicators
across countries in the multivariate model (Model 3) when it was not in
the bivariate model (Model 1), and the sign of the relationship was always
the same as the one obtained in the bivariate regression. In conclusion, the
weakness of the relationship between changes in labour market indicators
and the GDP per capita growth rate across countries is not related to the effect
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Table 4.3 Cross-country relationship between annualized changes in labour market indicators and annualized changes inmacroeconomic variables and in
GDP per capita during the 2000s
Part A
Δ Unemployment rate Δ% Mean labour earnings
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
GDPpc
growth
rate
coefﬁcient
R-squared ΔX
variable
coeff.
R-squared ΔX
variable
coeff.
GDPpc
growth
rate
coefﬁcient
R-squared GDP pc
growth
rate
coefﬁcient
R-squared ΔX
variable
coeff.
R-squared ΔX
variable
coeff.
GDP pc
growth
rate
coefﬁcient
R-squared
Δ% GDP per capita 0.075 0.090 0.228 0.032
(0.05) (0.254)
Δ Exports (% of GDP) 0.143 0.105 0.121 0.061 0.162 1.033 0.209 0.992 0.114 0.217
(0.108) (0.108) (0.058) (0.505)** (0.546)* (0.259)
Δ% Terms of trade 0.039 0.151 0.040 0.078 0.248 0.000 0.000 0.322 0.398 0.325 0.254 0.437
(0.022) (0.022) (0.063) (0.109)** (0.107)** (0.19)
Δ Share of services
in GDP
0.467 0.316 0.466 0.075 0.405 0.000 2.124 0.249 2.123 0.228 0.281
(0.197)* (0.187)* (0.068) (1.019)* (1.056)* (0.217)
Δ Share of industry
in GDP
0.313 0.205 0.287 0.058 0.259 0.000 1.938 0.300 1.885 0.122 0.309
(0.166) (0.176) (0.059) (0.908)* (0.954)* (0.215)
Δ Share of
agriculture in GDP
0.070 0.003 0.208 0.086 0.110 0.000 1.665 0.055 1.417 0.154 0.068
(0.316) (0.318) (0.057) (1.374) (1.39) (0.27)
Δ Public expend. in
education and
health (% of GDP)
0.313 0.024 0.522 0.093 0.150 0.000 0.389 0.001 0.983 0.262 0.040
(0.651) (0.625) (0.057) (2.341) (2.68) (0.289)
Δ Public expend. in
social security
(% of GDP)
0.223 0.018 0.493 0.104 0.165 0.000 2.013 0.056 3.082 0.411 0.144
(0.298) (0.395) (0.045)* (1.394) (1.533)** (0.274)
Δ Domestic
expenditure
(% of GDP)
0.204 0.198 0.180 0.025 0.205 0.000 1.255 0.286 1.398 0.155 0.297
(0.12) (0.148) (0.073) (0.547)* (0.602)* (0.26)
Δ Foreign direct
investment (% of
GDP)
0.108 0.008 0.599 0.152 0.223 0.000 1.945 0.092 4.596 0.820 0.332
(0.327) (0.517) (0.076)* (1.312) (1.216)** (0.292)**
Δ Revenues from
natural resources
(% of GDP)
0.138 0.029 0.086 0.068 0.100 0.000 2.025 0.238 1.959 0.087 0.242
(0.215) (0.243) (0.057) (0.859)* (0.926)* (0.268)
Δ Stock of public
debt (% of GDP)
0.033 0.022 0.003 0.073 0.090 0.000 0.813 0.527 0.914 0.252 0.558
(0.055) (0.069) (0.064) (0.177)** (0.21)** (0.235)
Part B
Δ 2.5 dollars-a-day poverty Δ 4 dollars-a-day poverty
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
GDP pc
growth
rate
coefﬁcient
R-squared ΔX
variable
coeff.
R-squared ΔX
variable
coeff.
GDP pc
growth
rate
coefﬁcient
R-squared GDP pc
growth
rate
coefﬁcient
R-squared ΔX
variable
coeff.
R-squared ΔX
variable
coeff.
GDP pc
growth
rate
coefﬁcient
R-squared
Δ% GDP per capita 0.138 0.056 0.249 0.105
(0.097) (0.138)
Δ Exports (% of GDP) 0.589 0.325 0.563 0.073 0.340 0.753 0.308 0.692 0.170 0.355
(0.191)** (0.193)** (0.081) (0.26)** (0.266)*** (0.123)
Δ% Terms of trade 0.149 0.410 0.151 0.150 0.475 0.208 0.462 0.212 0.266 0.582
(0.051)** (0.045)** (0.095) (0.065)** (0.053)** (0.105)*
Δ Share of services
in GDP
0.991 0.260 0.991 0.138 0.315 1.409 0.305 1.408 0.249 0.410
(0.423)* (0.427)* (0.095) (0.527)** (0.51)** (0.116)*
Δ Share of industry
in GDP
0.947 0.343 0.910 0.087 0.365 1.276 0.361 1.197 0.182 0.416
(0.391)* (0.413)* (0.088) (0.499)* (0.524)* (0.113)
Δ Share of
agriculture in GDP
0.826 0.065 0.659 0.103 0.093 0.936 0.048 0.583 0.219 0.123
(0.601) (0.707) (0.122) (0.739) (0.819) (0.163)
Δ Public expend. in
education and
health (% of GDP)
1.400 0.086 1.178 0.098 0.112 1.380 0.049 0.884 0.219 0.124
(1.063) (1.202) (0.114) (1.354) (1.523) (0.158)
(continued )
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Part B
Δ 2.5 dollars-a-day poverty Δ 4 dollars-a-day poverty
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
GDP pc
growth
rate
coefﬁcient
R-squared ΔX
variable
coeff.
R-squared ΔX
variable
coeff.
GDP pc
growth
rate
coefﬁcient
R-squared GDP pc
growth
rate
coefﬁcient
R-squared ΔX
variable
coeff.
R-squared ΔX
variable
coeff.
GDP pc
growth
rate
coefﬁcient
R-squared
Δ Public expend. in
social security
(% of GDP)
0.579 0.022 1.109 0.204 0.125 0.748 0.022 1.650 0.347 0.194
(0.783) (0.877) (0.126) (1.099) (1.096) (0.162)*
Δ Domestic
expenditure
(% of GDP)
0.668 0.388 0.724 0.060 0.396 0.899 0.407 0.896 0.004 0.408
(0.226)** (0.23)** (0.081) (0.3)** (0.314)** (0.109)
Δ Foreign direct
investment
(% of GDP)
1.003 0.117 2.481 0.457 0.475 1.045 0.074 3.169 0.657 0.502
(0.767) (0.639)** (0.141)** (1.019) (0.708)** (0.166)**
Δ Revenues from
natural resources
(% of GDP)
1.176 0.384 1.133 0.056 0.393 1.543 0.383 1.432 0.146 0.418
(0.36)** (0.401)** (0.115) (0.458)** (0.484)** (0.137)
Δ Stock of public
debt (% of GDP)
0.287 0.314 0.293 0.016 0.314 0.413 0.378 0.397 0.041 0.381
(0.089)** (0.136)* (0.141) (0.105)** (0.162)* (0.179)
Note: ** signiﬁcant at 1% level, * signiﬁcant at 5% level.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on SEDLAC (CEDLAS and World Bank 2014), World Development Indicators (World Bank 2014), and CEPALSTAT (UN-ECLAC 2015).
of macroeconomic variables added one at a time. Similarly, the ﬁnding of a
tight relationship between changes in labour market indicators and
changes in some macroeconomic factors is not related to the rate of GDP
per capita growth.
In summary, increases in some macroeconomic variables were associated
with changes in labour market conditions in Latin America during the 2000s,
some of them always in the welfare-improving direction and some others
always in the welfare-reducing direction. There is no unique conﬁguration
of macroeconomic variables that was associated with the several successful
experiences among our sample of sixteen countries. Finally, the correlation
between the change in GDP per capita and the change in macroeconomic
variables seemed to be small enough so as not to affect in general the magni-
tudes of the coefﬁcients and standard errors in the estimations of the relation-
ships between changes in labour market indicators and the rate of GDP per
capita growth on the one hand, and changes in macroeconomic variables on
the other hand.
4.2.4 Relationship between Labour Market Indicators
Another question is whether the labour market indicators tend to improve or
worsen together, or whether there are pairs of indicators such that a higher
rate of improvement in one is associated with a lower rate of improvement or a
worsening of the other. For example, a higher rate of earnings growth could be
associated with a higher increase in unemployment due to employers moving
up along a single downward-sloping labour demand curve.
Our ﬁndings indicate that labour market indicators either improved jointly
or worsened jointly. Table 4.4 displays the cross-country correlations between
the changes or percentage changes in each of our sixteen labour market
indicators. In particular, we estimate the following sets of correlations:
CorrðΔYik;ΔYimÞ or CorrðΔYik;%ΔYimÞ or
Corrð%ΔYik;%ΔYimÞ
for
k 6¼ m ð12Þ
A correlation coefﬁcient between 0.4 and 1 implies that, in a regression of
the annualized changes in two labour market indicators, the R-squared is
larger than 0.15 (which corresponds with the cut-off value we used previ-
ously), and that the association between the two variables is positive. Con-
versely, a coefﬁcient between 1 and 0.4 indicates a negative relationship.
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Table 4.4 Cross-country correlation matrix between the annualized changes in labour market indicators during the 2000s
Part A
Occupations Occupational position Economic sector
Decline in
unemployment
Declined in
share of low-
earnings
occupations
Increase in
share of high-
earnings
occupations
Increase in the
share of
wage/salaried
employees
Decrease in
the share of
self-
employment
Decrease in
the share of
unpaid family
workers
Decline in the
share of workers
in low-earnings
sectors
Increase in the
share of workers
in high-earnings
sectors
Unemployment
Decrease in the unemployment rate 1.00 0.33 0.20 0.06 0.03 0.15 0.07 0.01
Occupations
Decrease in the share of low-earnings
occupations
0.33 1.00 0.43 0.57 0.37 0.53 0.52 0.44
Increase in the share of high-earnings
occupations
0.20 0.43 1.00 0.35 0.42 0.23 0.22 0.21
Occupational position
Increase in the share of wage/salaried
employees
0.06 0.57 0.35 1.00 0.82 0.75 0.57 0.67
Decrease in the share of self-employment 0.03 0.37 0.42 0.82 1.00 0.39 0.32 0.50
Decrease in the share of unpaid family
workers
0.15 0.53 0.23 0.75 0.39 1.00 0.66 0.58
Economic sector
Decrease in the share of workers in
low-earnings sectors
0.07 0.52 0.22 0.57 0.32 0.66 1.00 0.66
Increase in the share of workers in
high-earnings sectors
0.01 0.44 0.21 0.67 0.50 0.58 0.66 1.00
Education
Decrease in the share of low-educated
workers
0.02 0.35 0.31 0.64 0.52 0.53 0.68 0.89
Increase in the share of high-educated
workers
0.32 0.61 0.60 0.68 0.58 0.48 0.50 0.75
Workers registered with SS
Increase in the share of workers registered
with SS
0.23 0.08 0.10 0.03 0.16 0.18 0.46 0.05
Earnings
Increase in mean labour earnings 0.42 0.72 0.51 0.48 0.22 0.52 0.44 0.67
Poverty
Decrease in 4 dollars-a-day poverty 0.36 0.65 0.44 0.55 0.28 0.58 0.62 0.61
Decrease in 2.5 dollars-a-day poverty 0.41 0.73 0.47 0.59 0.28 0.61 0.58 0.61
Inequality
Decrease in GINI of household per capita
income
0.23 0.32 0.07 0.38 0.24 0.48 0.55 0.29
Decrease in GINI of labour earnings 0.47 0.43 0.29 0.33 0.13 0.50 0.58 0.46
Part B
Education Poverty Inequality
Decrease in the share
of low-educated
workers
Increase in the share
of high-educated
workers
Workers
registered
with SS
Increase in
mean labour
earnings
Decline in 4-
dollar-a-day
poverty
Decline in 4-
dollar-a-day
poverty
Decline in GINI of
household per capita
income
Decline in GINI
of labour
earnings
Unemployment Decrease
in the unemployment
rate
0.02 0.32 0.23 0.42 0.36 0.41 0.23 0.47
Occupations
Decrease in the share
of low-earnings
occupations
0.35 0.61 0.08 0.72 0.65 0.73 0.32 0.43
Increase in the share
of high-earnings
occupations
0.31 0.60 0.10 0.51 0.44 0.47 0.07 0.29
Occupational position
Increase in the share
of wage/salaried
employees
0.64 0.68 0.03 0.48 0.55 0.59 0.38 0.33
Decrease in the share
of self-employment
0.52 0.58 0.16 0.22 0.28 0.28 0.24 0.13
Decrease in the share
of unpaid family workers
0.53 0.48 0.18 0.52 0.58 0.61 0.48 0.50
(continued )
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Part B
Education Poverty Inequality
Decrease in the share
of low-educated
workers
Increase in the share
of high-educated
workers
Workers
registered
with SS
Increase in
mean labour
earnings
Decline in 4-
dollar-a-day
poverty
Decline in 4-
dollar-a-day
poverty
Decline in GINI of
household per capita
income
Decline in GINI
of labour
earnings
Economic sector
Decrease in the share of
workers in low-earnings
sectors
0.68 0.50 0.46 0.44 0.62 0.58 0.55 0.58
Increase in the share of
workers in high-
earnings sectors
0.89 0.75 0.05 0.67 0.61 0.61 0.29 0.46
Education
Decrease in the share of
low-educated workers
1.00 0.67 0.01 0.60 0.53 0.51 0.28 0.46
Increase in the share of
high-educated workers
0.67 1.00 0.07 0.68 0.56 0.63 0.20 0.49
Workers registered with SS
Increase in the share of
workers registered with SS
0.01 0.07 1.00 0.04 0.17 0.17 0.30 0.40
Earnings
Increase in mean labour
earnings
0.60 0.68 0.04 1.00 0.83 0.88 0.28 0.58
Poverty
Decrease in 4 dollars-a-
day poverty
0.53 0.56 0.17 0.83 1.00 0.98 0.70 0.77
Decrease in 2.5 dollars-a-
day poverty
0.51 0.63 0.17 0.88 0.98 1.00 0.62 0.75
Inequality
Decrease in GINI of house-
hold per capita income
0.28 0.20 0.30 0.28 0.70 0.62 1.00 0.85
Decrease in GINI of labour
earnings
0.46 0.49 0.40 0.58 0.77 0.75 0.85 1.00
Note: The grey shading indicates a positive correlation larger than 0.4. Correlations for occupations do not include Argentina for which we do not have data.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on SEDLAC (CEDLAS and World Bank 2014).
The shaded cells in Table 4.4 indicate a strong relationship between two
labour market indicators.
We ﬁnd that most of our labour market indicators tend to move together,
with not even one instance of a substantial trade-off between changes in our
selected labour market indicators, i.e. improvements in one do not come at
the cost of worsening in others. Speciﬁcally, of the 120 correlations we
computed, we ﬁnd that seventy-one (59 per cent of the total) of the pairs of
indicators have a positive and signiﬁcant association, while for the forty-nine
remaining pairs we found only weak but generally positive associations.
Finally, there is not even a single value in the matrix with a negative sign
and above (in absolute value) our cut-off value equal to 0.4, which will
indicate a trade-off between two labour market indicators: the lower value is
equal to 0.16.
Several labour market indicators are highly correlated among them, with
a few exceptions (Table 4.4). On the one hand, labour earnings, the sectoral
and educational composition of employment, and the distributive indica-
tors have a signiﬁcant correlation with at least ten other labour market
indicators. On the other hand, the unemployment rate, the share of self-
employed, the share of registered workers, the Gini of household per capita
income, and the share of high-earnings occupations do not co-vary as
much with other indicators (they are signiﬁcantly correlated with six or
fewer of the others).
Some clear patterns of correlations appear from this evidence. The results
from Table 4.4 and Figure 4.7 indicate that changes in labour earnings tend to
be highly correlated with changes in the job mix (i.e. the occupational,
positional, sectoral, and educational composition of the employed popula-
tion). There may be a simple explanation for these relationships: a rightward
shift of the labour demand curve, such that in order to attract more workers
into the better job categories, employers must raise wages. Average earnings
may also increase just by a composition effect: in a context of high unemploy-
ment, a rightward shift of the labour demand curve may lead to an increase in
the share of better paying occupations, and thus in average earnings, with
ﬁxed hourly wages. As expected, increases in labour earnings are also highly
correlated with reductions in poverty: countries in which labour earnings
increased were generally ones in which poverty fell, which indicates the
importance of labour earnings in the total income of the household. Increases
in labour earnings are also related to reductions in the inequality of their
distribution, indicating that the process of growth was also inequality-
reducing. The evidence of improvements in the jobmix, of increases in labour
earnings, and of reductions in earnings inequality suggests that workers
moved on average to better-paying jobs.
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Figure 4.7 Cross-country relationship between annualized changes in labour market
indicators and annualized changes in mean labour earnings during the 2000s
Note: The vertical axes display the annualized changes in each labour market indicator.Δdenotes
changes in percentage points; % Δ denotes percentage changes. The line represents the linear
regression speciﬁed at the bottom of the ﬁgure. Robust standard error of the slope coefﬁcient
between parentheses. R-squared of the regression indicated along the title of each ﬁgure.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on SEDLAC (CEDLAS and World Bank 2014).
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Figure 4.8 Cross-country relationship between annualized changes in selected labour market indicators and annualized changes in the
share of wage/salaried employees in total employment during the 2000s
Note: The vertical axes display the annualized changes in each labour market indicator. Δ denotes changes in percentage points; % Δ denotes percentage
changes. The line represents the linear regression speciﬁed at the bottom of the ﬁgure. Robust standard error of the slope coefﬁcient between parentheses. R-
squared of the regression indicated along the title of each ﬁgure.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on SEDLAC (CEDLAS and World Bank 2014).
We now turn to analyse the relationship between the share of wage/salaried
employees and some selected indicators, illustrated in Figure 4.8.1 An increase
in the share of wage/salaried employees is associated with a general improve-
ment in the labour market. Not only is the share of wage/salaried employees
related to reductions in moderate and extreme poverty, but also with increases
in the shares of high-earnings occupations and high-earnings sectors, as well as
reductions in the shares of low-earnings occupations and sectors. These ﬁnd-
ings are also consistentwith a rightward shift of labourdemand inwage/salaried
jobs, which seem to have a high incidence in high-earnings occupations and
sectors, increasing their shares of employment and reducing poverty.
4.3 Cross-Country Patterns: Changing Employment, Earnings,
and Inequality Indicators and Changes in Poverty
Our results in Chapter 3 indicated that real GDP per capita grew substantially
in all Latin American countries in the 2000s, with an average per capita
growth rate of approximately 3 per cent a year. We also reported that poverty,
extreme poverty, and inequality also fell substantially in all but one of the
sixteen countries in the region in the 2000s. At the same time, while employ-
ment and earnings indicators also improved in most countries, they did so
more in some countries than in others. In this section, we analyse in more
detail the relationship between changes in employment and earnings indica-
tors, and changes in poverty indicators. We aim to establish whether larger
improvements in employment and earnings are associated with larger reduc-
tions in poverty, over and above the rate of economic growth.We present here
a cross-country analysis of the employment and earnings–poverty relation-
ships based on sixteen data points (one for each country) representing the
annualized changes between the initial and the ﬁnal years for each country.
Although poverty reduction in the region is a well-documented fact, the
studies that analyse its labour market determinants are scarcer and they only
focus on a small group of labour market variables to explain the fall in the
poverty rates during the 2000s. An example is ECLAC-ILO (2015), which
relates the remarkable progress in reducing poverty during the period
2002–12 in the Latin America region to labourmarket trends. Themain factors
mentioned in this study are: the strong job creation, especially in wage/
salaried positions, and public policies, such as minimum wages increases,
formalization of workers, and expanding coverage of social protection systems
and education. Other papers rely on decomposition approaches to disentangle
1 We provide a detailed analysis of the cross-country relationship between poverty indicators
and employment and earnings indicators in section 4.3.1.
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the importance of different labour market outcomes in reducing poverty.
This is the case of World Bank (2015), which uses different decomposition
approaches to investigate the role played by different income sources in
reducing poverty. The study ﬁnds that changes in labour earnings were the
most important factor in explaining poverty reduction in the region during
2003–8 and 2008–13, but its importance was lower in the post-international-
crisis period than before. ECLAC (2014) points out that the most important
factor explaining the decline in poverty during the 2000s was the combined
increase in employment and wages, although in general, labour earnings
increases had a greater impact than employment growth on household
income changes. This is consistent with Beccaria et al. (2011), World Bank
(2013), and Inchauste et al. (2014), who also decompose changes in the
poverty rate and report increases in labour income as the main channel to
poverty reductions.
4.3.1 Response of Poverty to Employment and Earnings Indicators
Our evidence reveals a strong and consistent cross-country pattern of associ-
ation between reductions in poverty and extreme poverty, and improvements
in earnings and employment indicators. These relationships are illustrated in
the scatter plots presented in Figure 4.9 (for poverty based on the 2.5 dollars-a-
day poverty line) and Figure 4.10 (for poverty based on the 4 dollars-a-day
poverty line). We ﬁnd that eleven out of fourteen of the associations in
Figure 4.9 and twelve out of fourteen of the associations in Figure 4.10 (exclud-
ing the relationship between the two poverty indicators in both cases) present
an R-squared above a 0.15 threshold, and in almost all cases, whether the
relationships are above this threshold or not, the sign of correlation is in the
expected direction, i.e. improvements in earnings and employment indicators
are associated with reductions in poverty rates.
Among employment and earnings indicators, there is a very strong negative
cross-country correlation between changes in mean earnings and changes in
moderate and extreme poverty rates during the period under study, with a
stronger relationship for moderate poverty: that is, mean earnings rose faster
while poverty fell faster. The relationships between changes in the two pov-
erty rates and the percentage change inmean labour earnings are the strongest
in both Figures 4.9 and 4.10. In both cases, larger increases in labour earnings
are associated with larger reductions in poverty levels, with a somewhat
stronger relationship for moderate poverty in Figure 4.9 (R-squared of 0.78),
than for extreme poverty in Figure 4.10 (R-squared of 0.68). The correlations
between percentage changes in mean labour earnings and changes in the two
poverty measures, however, are both very strong, and the difference between
the two is only a matter of degree. This result is consistent with the discussion
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Figure 4.9 Cross-country relationship between annualized changes in labour market
indicators and annualized changes in the 2.5 dollars-a-day poverty rate during the 2000s
Note: The vertical axes display the annualized changes in each labour market indicator. Δ denotes
changes in percentage points; % Δ denotes percentage changes. The line represents the linear
regression speciﬁed at the bottom of the ﬁgure. Robust standard error of the slope coefﬁcient
between parentheses. R-squared of the regression indicated along the title of each ﬁgure.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on SEDLAC (CEDLAS and World Bank 2014).
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Figure 4.10 Cross-country relationship between annualized changes in labour market
indicators and annualized changes in the 4 dollars-a-day poverty rate during the 2000s
Note: The vertical axes display the annualized changes in each labour market indicator. Δ denotes
changes in percentage points; % Δ denotes percentage changes. The line represents the linear
regression speciﬁed at the bottom of the ﬁgure. Robust standard error of the slope coefﬁcient
between parentheses. R-squared of the regression indicated along the title of each ﬁgure.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on SEDLAC (CEDLAS and World Bank 2014).
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in the literature for Latin America stressing that the extreme poor do not
beneﬁt as much as those closer to the moderate poverty line from the
trickle-down of economic growth (and the subsequent increase in labour
earnings), which implies that improving the living conditions of those harder
to reach needs more government-based redistribution than those relatively
better-off among the poor (see, for instance, Cruces and Gasparini 2013, and
references therein). This is also apparent in the weaker relationship between
poverty rates and unemployment that we analyse in the following paragraph.
There is a positive but relativelyweak correlationbetween changes inmoderate
and extreme poverty rates and changes in the unemployment rate, with a
somewhat stronger relationship for moderate poverty. Whereas we found a
very strong and tight association between changes in labour earnings and
changes in poverty rates, the scatter plots in Figures 4.9 and 4.10 for the
unemployment rate evidence a much weaker relationship. For the extreme
poverty rate, the R-squared is only about 0.13, and this weak relationship is
evident in the ﬁgure: for instance, Argentina, Colombia, Panama, Uruguay,
and Venezuela all experienced an annualized reduction in unemployment of
about 0.5 percentage points a year, but the changes in extreme poverty differed
vastly between these countries, with almost no change for Uruguay and reduc-
tions from about 0.75 (Argentina) to about 1.5 percentage points (Colombia,
Panama, Venezuela). Moreover, countries with about the same change in
extreme poverty also experienced quite dissimilar changes in unemployment:
for instance, Argentina, Costa Rica, El Salvador, and Mexico all saw annualized
reductions in extreme poverty of about 0.75 percentage points, but unemploy-
ment fell by about 0.6 percentage points a year in Argentina, remained mostly
unchanged in El Salvador, and increased by about 0.2 percentage points a year in
Costa Rica and Mexico. The R-squared for the relationship between changes in
unemployment and changes in moderate poverty (Figure 4.10) is higher, at
about 0.17, but there is a similar dispersion of countries around the regression
line, evidencing a weaker relationship.
There is a consistent and relatively strong cross-country pattern of associ-
ation between reductions in poverty and extreme poverty, and improvements
in the job mix (distributions of workers among occupations, occupational
positions, sectors, and educational levels). The correlations in Figures 4.9
and 4.10 are qualitatively and quantitatively similar for moderate and extreme
poverty, although slightly tighter for the moderate poverty rate. We thus
report them together, citing the R-squared for extreme poverty (Figure 4.9)
ﬁrst and then that for moderate poverty (Figure 4.10). Speciﬁcally, we ﬁnd a
clear pattern of a positive correlation between changes in poverty and changes
in the share of low-earnings occupations (R-squared of 0.36 for extreme
poverty and of 0.43 for moderate poverty), and a corresponding negative
correlation between changes in poverty and changes in the share of
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high-earnings occupations (R-squared of 0.26 and 0.29). Similarly, reductions
in the share of low-earnings sectors are associated with reductions in the
poverty rates (R-squared of 0.38 and 0.34), whereas increases in the share of
high-earnings sectors over the period are correlated negatively with changes
in the poverty rates (R-squared of 0.37 and 0.38). The share of workers with
low educational levels tended to fall over this period, while that of workers
with high educational levels tended to increase, and both changes were
associated with reductions in the poverty rates (R-squared of 0.26 and 0.28
for the share of workers with low educational levels and R-squared of 0.40 and
0.31 for the share of workers with high educational levels). Finally, the pattern
for occupational position is not as clear as in the cases of occupations, sectors,
and education. We observe a negative correlation between poverty changes
and changes in the share of wage/salaried employees over the period (R-
squared of 0.31 and 0.35), and also a relatively strong positive correlation
between poverty changes and changes in the share of unpaid workers (R-
squared of 0.33 and 0.37). However, we do not ﬁnd a meaningful pattern
between poverty changes and changes in the share of self-employed workers,
with positive but weak correlations (R-squared of 0.08 in both cases). The same
is true, perhaps surprisingly, for the changes in the share of workers registered
with social security. While the correlations between changes in this indicator
and changes in poverty measures are negative, as expected, the relationships
are relatively ﬂat and not very tight (R-squared of 0.11 in both cases).
The negative cross-country correlation between percentage changes in
mean earnings and changes in moderate and extreme poverty rates in Latin
America in the 2000s is robust: it is still present after controlling for changes in
unemployment and changes in GDP per capita. We check the robustness of
the bivariate relationship between changes in mean earnings and changes in
poverty by also performing multivariate regressions. We regress the percent-
age changes in extreme andmoderate poverty rates on the percentage changes
in labour earnings, GDP per capita, and unemployment. The analysis is
limited since we only have sixteen observations when studying cross-country
correlations over the 2000s, but we can still probe whether the correlation
between changes in the poverty rates and in mean earnings is present condi-
tional on one or two other relevant variables.
The top panel of Table 4.5 presents the results of these regressions for the
extreme poverty rate. In line with the previous discussion about the lack of
trickle-down effects of growth at the very bottom of the income distribution
and the results in section 4.1, the relationship between changes in GDP per
capita and changes in extreme poverty is not statistically signiﬁcant. Accord-
ing to the results in column 2 of Table 4.5, there seems to be a negative
and statistically signiﬁcant elasticity between extreme poverty and unemploy-
ment (in contrast with the regression in changes instead of percentage
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Table 4.5 Cross-country poverty elasticities with respect to GDP per capita, unemployment rate, and labour earnings during the 2000s
Dependent variable: %Δ 2.5 dollars-a-day poverty
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
%Δ GDP per capita 0.778 0.381 0.438 0.469
(0.407) (0.616) (0.254) (0.306)
%Δ Unemployment rate 0.320 0.265 0.046 0.024
(0.14)* (0.196) (0.076) (0.091)
%Δ Labour earnings 1.550 1.489 1.496 1.513
(0.286)** (0.294)** (0.342)** (0.376)**
R-squared 0.098 0.173 0.638 0.191 0.668 0.640 0.668
Observations 16 16 16 16 16 16 16
Dependent variable: %Δ 4 dollars-a-day poverty
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
%Δ GDP per capita 0.890 0.553 0.608 0.625
(0.338)** (0.505) (0.181)** (0.189)**
%Δ Unemployment rate 0.305 0.225 0.080 0.014
(0.113)** (0.156) (0.08) (0.071)
%Δ Labour earnings 1.319 1.234 1.225 1.247
(0.185)** (0.198)** (0.233)** (0.249)**
R-squared 0.183 0.223 0.656 0.278 0.739 0.669 0.739
Observations 16 16 16 16 16 16 16
Note: Poverty elasticities are calculated using the percentage change in the poverty rates, GDP per capita, the unemployment rate, and mean labour earnings between the initial and the ﬁnal
years in each country. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
** signiﬁcant at 1% level, * signiﬁcant at 5% level.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on SEDLAC (CEDLAS and World Bank 2014).
changes in unemployment in Figure 4.9) of about 0.32, with a relatively low R-
squared of 0.17. However, these relationships do not seem to be very robust:
when including both variables in the same regression (column 4), the two are
not statistically signiﬁcant. Finally, and as expected from previous results, the
labour earnings extreme-poverty elasticity is strongly signiﬁcant, with a
regression coefﬁcient of 1.55 and R-squared of about 0.64 (column 3). The
results in columns 5 to 7 in the top panel of Table 4.5 conﬁrm the robustness
of this elasticity: controlling for percentage changes in GDP per capita (col-
umn 5), for percentage changes in unemployment (column 6), or for both,
none of the additional variables is statistically signiﬁcant, and the labour
earnings elasticity remains virtually unchanged around 1.5, and still
strongly signiﬁcant (which is all the more remarkable again with the limited
number of observations available).
The corresponding results for themoderate poverty elasticities are presented
in the bottom panel of Table 4.5. The elasticity with respect to labour earnings
is again strongly signiﬁcant but somewhat lower in absolute value (between
1.22 and 1.32), and also robust to the inclusion of percentage changes in
GDP per capita and unemployment as conditioning variables. The elasticity
between moderate poverty and unemployment is again signiﬁcant when
unconditional (column 2), but not statistically signiﬁcant when either change
in GDP per capita or change in labour earnings or both are included (columns
4, 6, and 7). The main difference with respect to the results for the extreme-
poverty elasticities is the elasticity coefﬁcient between moderate poverty and
GDP per capita: the coefﬁcient for this variable is signiﬁcant when included on
its own (column 1), but also when controlling for labour earnings (column 5)
and labour earnings and unemployment (column 7). The unconditional elas-
ticity is 0.890, and it is reduced to 0.625 when including the additional
controls. The elasticity with respect to labour earnings also falls (although
only slightly) when including the additional controls. The fact that the two
variables are jointly statistically signiﬁcant in the conditional regression pre-
sented in column 7 suggests that while related, the two operate also through
separate channels. In other words, poverty seems to fall when labour earnings
increase over and above the effect of GDP per capita growth, and vice versa.
Besides the robustness of the effect of the percentage change in labour earn-
ings on moderate and extreme poverty, the pattern of results suggests that
GDP per capita growth reaches the bottom of the distribution through its
effect on mean labour earnings but not through other channels.
4.3.2 Response of Poverty to Inequality Indicators
Moving now to the inequality indicators, there is a strong positive cross-
country correlation between changes in poverty rates and changes in income
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and labour earnings inequality. Figures 4.9 and 4.10 present the scatter plots
of changes in extreme and moderate poverty and percentage changes in the
Gini coefﬁcient of household per capita income and in the Gini coefﬁcient of
labour earnings. Both correlations appear to be stronger for the Gini of labour
earnings (R-squared of 0.60 for extreme poverty and 0.57 for moderate pov-
erty) than for the Gini of household per capita income (R-squared of 0.49 and
0.38, respectively). While there is a mechanical component, which implies
that other incomes remaining equal, reductions in poverty imply reductions
in inequality, the strong associations illustrate the overall improvement in the
income distribution (besides poverty only) in Latin America during the 2000s.
4.4 In Summary
In this chapter, we looked at the cross-country link between growth, employ-
ment, and poverty. First, we found that faster growth is associated with larger
improvements in employment and earnings indicators and in poverty and
inequality indicators, but the relationships were in general weak. For only
three out of sixteen indicators did we obtain a strong relationship between the
rate of improvement of the indicator and the rate of economic growth. These
three indicators were the share of low-earnings occupations, the share of high-
earnings occupations, and the share of registered workers, all of which moved
in the welfare-improving direction signiﬁcantly more in countries that experi-
enced higher rates of growth.
Second, we looked at four correlates of cross-country changes in labour
market indicators beyond economic growth. The ﬁrst question was, were the
changes in labour market indicators across countries related to initial GDP per
capita? We found no substantial relationship between either the share of
labour market indicators that improved or the change in individual labour
market indicators on the one hand and initial GDP per capita on the other.
The second was whether other macroeconomic factors could help explain the
differences across countries in labour market indicators. We found that
increases in seven macroeconomic factors were related to changes in labour
market indicators, some in the welfare-improving direction (exports as a per-
centage ofGDP, terms of trade, revenues fromnatural resources as a percentage
of GDP, and the share of industry in GDP) and some in the welfare-reducing
direction (stock of public debt as a percentage of GDP, domestic consumption
as a percentage of GDP, and the share of services in GDP). The third issue was
whether changes in individual labour market indicators were related to their
initial level. For ﬁve indicators (the unemployment rate, the share of unpaid
family workers, the poverty and extreme poverty rates, and the inequality of
household per capita income), we found that worse initial levels were
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associated with larger improvements. For the other indicators, no relationship
surfaced. The fourth issue was whether some labour market indicators tended
to move together with others and, if so, in which direction. We found that 59
per cent of the pairs improved signiﬁcantly together and no signiﬁcant rela-
tionship appeared between the other 41 per cent of the pairs; no indicator
improved while another one worsened.
Finally, we studied the cross-country relationship between improvements
in employment and earnings indicators and poverty changes. Our evidence
revealed a generally strong and consistent cross-country pattern of association
between reductions in poverty and extreme poverty on the one hand, and
improvements in earnings and employment indicators on the other. From a
multivariate analysis we concluded: (1) poverty, measured by the 4 dollars-a-
day poverty line, fell when labour earnings increased over and above the effect
of GDP per capita growth, and vice versa; and (2) GDP per capita growth did
not reach the bottom of the distribution beyond its effects on labour earnings.
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5Within-Country Analysis of the
Growth–Employment–Poverty Nexus
Additional Evidence
5.1 Assessing the Response of Labour Market Indicators
to Growth using Growth Elasticities
During the 2000s, there was a clear correlation over time between poverty
and GDP per capita, labour earnings, and unemployment in the Latin
American region: in general, poverty fell when GDP per capita increased,
labour earnings increased, and unemployment decreased. This is clearly
apparent in Figure 3.1 in Chapter 3, which shows the evolution of the
unweighted averages for sixteen Latin American countries of the sixteen
labour market indicators and GDP per capita over the period 2000–12.
Average GDP per capita in the region was stagnant from 2000 to 2003,
but then increased every year afterwards except for the 2008 international
crisis. Mean labour earnings among the employed decreased from 2000 to
2003 but then increased every year after that, even during the international
crisis, ending about 10 per cent higher in 2012 than in 2000. Unemployment
increased from 2000 to 2002 and then fell every year afterwards except for an
increase during the international crisis. Other employment indicators follow
a similar improving pattern over the period. The 4 dollars-a-day poverty rate
at ﬁrst increased from 40.4 per cent in 2000 to 43.0 per cent in 2002, but then
poverty declined in every year, reaching 25.4 per cent in 2012. Notably, the
average poverty rate among Latin American countries did not increase during
the international crisis of 2008, which is consistent with our previous ﬁnding
of an increase in poverty in only ﬁve out of the sixteen countries during
the crisis, while poverty fell during the crisis in eight countries (Table 3.3
in Chapter 3).
In this section, we analyse in more detail the nexus between growth, on the
one hand, and labour market indicators—employment and earnings indica-
tors and poverty and inequality indicators—on the other. Our analysis is
based on the estimation of labour market indicators’ elasticities with respect
to GDP per capita growth for each country in our sample and for the Latin
American region as a whole.
We use year-by-year data for each country in contrast to Chapters 2–4 where
we used the annualized changes between the initial and the ﬁnal years for each
country. This procedure means moving from using sixteen data points (one for
each country) to 169 data points (an average of eleven per country) when we
compute the average year-by-year elasticities for the region. This calls for a note
on interpretation of the results from these different procedures. For instance, we
might ﬁnd with the year-by-year results a negative and statistically signiﬁcant
poverty–growth elasticity, which might seem to contradict our previous evi-
dence ofweak cross-country association betweenGDPgrowth rates and changes
in the poverty rate between the initial and the ﬁnal year. However, the two
results are complementary. In our calculations in Chapter 4, the question we
answeredwas: across countries, were differences in progress in reducing poverty
between 2000 and 2012–13 linked to differences in economic growth rates?Our
answer, according to the evidence in that chapter, was that countries with
higher economic growth rates experienced larger reductions in poverty but the
relationship was weak. On the other hand, the calculation of poverty–growth
elasticities in this section answers a different question: if a country grows faster,
what is the effect of faster growth on the change in its poverty rate? Our answer,
based on the year-by-year regressions presented in section 5.1.2, is that eco-
nomic growth reduces poverty but at different rates in different countries.
The literature on this topic has mainly focused on the effect of economic
growth on poverty by estimating poverty–growth elasticities. In a recent
review of poverty–growth elasticities, Alvaredo and Gasparini (2015: 784)
present evidence on these elasticities for 114 developing countries over the
period 1981–2010. They ﬁnd that the change in poverty is closely and nega-
tively related to economic growth, either in per capita gross national income
(from national accounts) or per capita consumption/income growth (as meas-
ured in household surveys). Their estimations of the poverty elasticities with
respect to per capita gross national income over the period 1999–2010 are
(in absolute value) 1.2 and 1.9 for moderate and extreme poverty respectively.
In other recent papers, Fosu (2011) and the World Bank (2011) estimate
poverty–growth elasticities for Latin America for extreme and moderate pov-
erty, based on regressions over the period 1980–2007 in the case of Fosu
(2011) and 2003–10 in the case of the World Bank (2011). Estimates from
Fosu’s study are 0.8 and 1.2 for moderate and extreme poverty rate, while the
World Bank’s estimates are 1.6 and 2.0 respectively. These ﬁndings are
Within-Country Analysis: Additional Evidence
105
consistent with previous studies, which ﬁnd that poverty generally falls when
economic growth takes place, and that poverty tends not to fall in countries
where economic growth has not taken place (Fields 2001).
Regarding the elasticity of other labour market indicators with respect to
growth, the previous evidence for the region is more scattered. One example
isWeller (2014) who estimates elasticities of the share of wage/salaried workers
and share of self-employed with respect to GDP growth during the period
1995–2012 for fourteen Latin American countries. The study ﬁnds that a
1 per cent increase in GDP is associated with an increase in the share of wage/
salaried employees of 0.5 per cent and a reduction in the share of self-employed
by 0.27 per cent.
We compute the elasticities by regressing the year-by-year percentage change
in the relevant dependent variable on the year-by-year percentage change in
GDP per capita. Let%ΔYikt be the year–by-year percentage change in indicator k
for country i in period t. LetGDPit beGDPper capita for country i at time t. LetCi
be country-ﬁxed effects which are included only in aggregate regressions ηk for
the region, but not in country-speciﬁc regressions; we call these aggregate
regressions ‘stacked regressions’ which means that all the observations for all
the countries are stacked. And let eit be the error term. We estimate the growth
elasticity ηk for indicator k in the stacked regressions as follows:
Δ% Yikt ¼ Ci þ ηk Δ% GDPit þ eit; ð13Þ
with i = {AR, BO, . . . , VE}
k = {labour earnings, unemployment rate, etc.}
t = 2001, . . . , 2012/2013.
For country i (i = {AR, BO, . . . , VE}) we estimate the country-speciﬁc growth
elasticity ηk for indicator k as:
Δ% Ykt ¼ Cþ ηk Δ% GDPt þ et; ð14Þ
with k = {labour earnings, unemployment rate, etc.}
t = 2001, . . . , 2012/2013.
We present the results from these growth elasticities in Table 5.1, with the
aggregate elasticity from the stacked regression in the ﬁrst column (for a total of
169 country–year observations from sixteen countries), and then in the remain-
ing columns, we present the time series regression for each country, with amore
limited number of observations (eleven on average for each country).
5.1.1 Response of Employment and Earnings to Growth
We start by analysing the aggregate elasticity of labour earnings with respect
to GDP per capita (stacked regression column in Table 5.1 and mean labour
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Table 5.1 Labour market indicators’ elasticities with respect to GDP per capita during the 2000s by country and for the Latin American region
Indicator Stacked
regression
AR BO BR CL CO CR DO EC HN MX PA PE PY SV UY VE
Unemployment
Elasticity coefﬁcient 1.953 1.340 1.921 2.790 6.659 0.385 6.694 3.790 1.284 2.270 5.609 1.893 0.396 1.001 3.301 1.704 1.663
(0.331)** (0.786) (2.507) (0.755)** (2.718)* (0.654) (1.858)** (1.704)* (2.388) (1.609) (1.732)** (1.435) (0.434) (0.979) (1.356)* (0.312)** (0.404)**
Share of low-earnings
occupations
Elasticity coefﬁcient 0.118 0.086 0.102 0.517 1.311 0.163 0.213 0.007 0.130 0.020 0.014 0.041 0.083 0.075 0.003 0.195
(0.111) (0.517) (0.096) (0.719) (0.203)** (0.161) (0.218) (0.285) (0.184) (0.471) (0.237) (0.33) (0.181) (0.128) (0.116) (0.146)
Share of high-earnings
occupations
Elasticity coefﬁcient 0.208 0.995 0.493 1.047 0.299 0.005 0.421 0.431 2.077 2.352 0.053 0.134 2.039 0.043 0.097
(0.231) (4.026) (0.321) (2.339) (0.482) (0.271) (0.487) (1.205) (0.265)** (0.761)** (0.375) (0.655) (0.982)* (0.172) (0.488)
Share of wage/salaried
employees
Elasticity coefﬁcient 0.156 0.055 1.601 0.226 0.179 0.469 0.257 0.105 0.485 0.474 0.267 0.407 0.074 0.594 0.495 0.195 0.237
(0.055)** (0.062) (0.92) (0.049)** (0.081)* (0.135)** (0.225) (0.266) (0.647) (0.205)* (0.647) (0.177)* (0.172) (0.095)** (0.467) (0.05)** (0.026)**
Share of self-employment
Elasticity coefﬁcient 0.337 0.328 1.190 0.087 0.013 0.953 0.851 0.322 0.298 1.547 1.036 0.814 0.353 0.755 0.823 0.633 0.343
(0.096)** (0.24) (0.714) (0.3) (0.224) (0.153)** (0.585) (0.306) (0.832) (0.435)** (1.072) (0.358)* (0.225) (0.179)** (0.672) (0.151)** (0.071)**
Share of unpaid family
workers
Elasticity coefﬁcient 0.399 0.012 0.478 0.962 0.065 1.504 1.464 3.434 0.783 0.641 0.442 0.285 1.046 0.467 0.542 1.094 0.865
(0.309) (0.787) (2.15) (0.572) (3.549) (0.447)** (0.81) (3.13) (2.659) (0.906) (2.035) (0.999) (0.411)* (0.631) (1.107) (0.512)* (0.593)
Share of workers in
low-earnings sectors
Elasticity coefﬁcient 0.019 0.468 0.299 0.661 0.098 0.633 0.081 0.318 0.061 0.348 0.591 0.047 0.145 0.395 0.617 0.266 0.208
(0.091) (0.12)** (0.738) (0.299)* (0.318) (0.101)** (0.278) (0.364) (0.233) (0.354) (0.727) (0.321) (0.248) (0.101)** (0.219)** (0.121)* (0.048)**
Share of workers in
high-earnings sectors
Elasticity coefﬁcient 0.005 0.570 1.890 0.005 1.217 0.696 0.200 0.167 0.663 1.520 0.333 0.503 0.475 0.394 0.228 0.303 0.004
(0.11) (0.168)** (0.99) (0.197) (0.85) (0.104)** (0.178) (0.492) (0.794) (0.216)** (0.554) (0.34) (0.24)* (0.214) (0.324) (0.112)** (0.114)
Share of low-educated
workers
Elasticity coefﬁcient 0.046 0.072 0.749 0.142 0.824 0.612 0.140 0.174 0.032 0.346 0.187 0.010 0.236 0.004 0.196 0.364 0.094
(0.057) (0.047) (0.369)* (0.098) (0.204)** (0.167)** (0.091) (0.139) (0.285) (0.093)** (0.384) (0.264) (0.205) (0.27) (0.112) (0.29) (0.079)
(continued )
Table 5.1 Continued
Indicator Stacked
regression
AR BO BR CL CO CR DO EC HN MX PA PE PY SV UY VE
Share of high-educated
workers
Elasticity coefﬁcient 0.250 0.103 2.758 1.188 1.242 1.007 0.167 0.030 0.394 2.144 0.003 0.090 0.080 1.142 0.258 0.764 0.108
(0.152) (0.169) (1.998) (0.756) (0.411)** (0.255)** (0.299) (0.345) (0.207) (0.561)** (1.659) (0.446) (0.423) (0.72) (0.641) (0.487) (0.138)
Share of workers registered
with SS
Elasticity coefﬁcient 0.541 0.402 6.716 0.574 0.625 1.592 0.096 2.582 0.053 3.625 0.757 0.061 1.124 0.655 1.175 0.307 0.180
(0.157)** (0.181)* (4.752) (0.311) (0.143)** (0.438)** (0.193) (0.687)** (1.084) (3.125) (0.513) (0.282) (1.325) (0.358) (0.171)** (0.106)** (0.128)
Mean labour earnings
Elasticity coefﬁcient 1.133 1.597 1.521 0.616 1.176 0.912 0.181 1.741 0.319 1.361 1.238 0.555 0.128 1.265 0.306 1.055 1.232
(0.155)** (0.43)** (0.634)* (0.409) (1.109) (0.331)** (0.673) (0.716)* (1.093) (0.494)** (0.526)* (0.41) (0.728) (0.251)** (0.528) (0.256)** (0.258)**
2.5 dollars-a-day poverty
Elasticity coefﬁcient 2.100 3.866 0.036 0.904 1.910 0.233 2.329 0.436 0.703 0.480 0.209 0.551 0.006 1.758 1.623 3.576 2.030
(0.354)** (0.167)** (2.898) (0.597) (0.605)** (0.332) (1.404) (1.11) (0.772) (1.739) (0.946) (0.962) (0.907) (0.933) (2.139) (0.549)** (0.613)**
4 dollars-a-day poverty
Elasticity coefﬁcient 1.427 2.578 0.655 0.603 0.210 0.430 1.471 0.175 1.014 0.344 0.004 0.289 0.106 0.719 0.341 2.954 1.315
(0.261)** (0.234)** (1.583) (0.41) (1.292) (0.221) (1.006) (0.762) (0.534) (0.979) (0.555) (0.699) (0.44) (0.69) (0.999) (0.483)** (0.419)**
Gini of household per
capita income
Elasticity coefﬁcient 0.082 0.253 0.233 0.093 0.594 0.191 0.096 0.144 0.588 0.516 0.947 0.036 0.107 0.317 0.485 0.292 0.058
(0.074) (0.074)** (1.268) (0.031)** (0.075)** (0.116) (0.381) (0.669) (0.446) (0.625) (0.241)** (0.223) (0.423) (0.205) (0.124)** (0.12)* (0.127)
Gini of labour earnings
Elasticity coefﬁcient 0.123 0.363 0.387 0.251 0.059 0.247 0.202 0.004 0.595 0.418 0.965 0.443 0.234 0.053 0.247 0.383 0.001
(0.069) (0.058)** (0.774) (0.064)** (0.036) (0.159) (0.271) (0.174) (0.768) (0.471) (0.56) (0.485) (0.358) (0.193) (0.188) (0.131)** (0.167)
Note: Labour market indicators’ elasticities are calculated using the year-by-year percentage change in labour market indicators and GDP per capita within each country. The ﬁrst column shows the results of the
regression for the sample of all countries including country-ﬁxed effects. The country-speciﬁc regressions do not include extra controls. Robust standard errors in parentheses. ** signiﬁcant at 1% level,* signiﬁcant at
5% level.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on SEDLAC (CEDLAS and World Bank 2014).
earnings row). We ﬁnd that mean labour earnings increased more than pro-
portionately as GDP per capita grew. The labour earnings elasticity with
respect to GDP per capita is 1.13: a 1 per cent increase in GDP per capita
from one year to the next is associated with an average increase of 1.13 per cent
in mean labour earnings. This relationship is also statistically signiﬁcant for
nine countries in the region (columns 2 to 17 in Table 5.1 and mean labour
earnings row): Argentina, Bolivia, Colombia, Dominican Republic, Honduras,
Mexico, Paraguay, Uruguay, and Venezuela. For all but one of these nine
countries the elasticities are higher than 1, whereas the elasticities for the
countries for which we ﬁnd no signiﬁcant coefﬁcients are all below 0.6 but
still positive (with the exception of Chile, with a negative coefﬁcient).
We ﬁnd a strong negative and signiﬁcant aggregate year-by-year elasticity of
unemployment with respect to GDP per capita of around 2 (stacked regres-
sion column in Table 5.1 and unemployment row). We ﬁnd again, however, a
high degree of heterogeneity when looking at the country-speciﬁc elasticities
(columns 2 to 17 in Table 5.1 and unemployment row). While the estimated
coefﬁcients are all negative, they are signiﬁcant and about 3 or larger in
absolute value in Brazil, Chile, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Mexico, and
El Salvador, substantially closer to the aggregate elasticity and signiﬁcant for
Uruguay and Venezuela, and not signiﬁcant but still negative and large for the
remaining countries except for Colombia and Peru where the estimates are
closer to zero.
We also ﬁnd signiﬁcant aggregate year-by-year elasticities of labour market
indicators broadly associated with the job mix and quality of employment
with respect to GDP per capita (stacked regression column in Table 5.1 and
corresponding indicator row): the share of workers registered with social
security, the share of wage/salaried employees (both positive), and the share
of self-employment (negative). Speciﬁcally, these results indicate that the share
of registered workers increased by 0.54 per cent for each 1 per cent increase in
GDP per capita, whereas the elasticity for the share of wage/salaried employees
is substantially smaller (0.16). At the same time, an increase of 1 per cent inGDP
is related to a decrease in the share of self-employment of about 0.34 per cent.
As with the previously discussed indicators, there is a large degree of heterogen-
eity when looking at the estimates by country (columns 2 to 17 in Table 5.1 and
corresponding indicator row).
We found insigniﬁcant aggregate year-by-year growth elasticities for a series
of labour market indicators (stacked regression column in Table 5.1 and corres-
ponding indicator row). Some of these results were not as expected ex ante: for
instance, the lack of a signiﬁcant aggregate relationship between percentage
changes in GDP per capita and percentage changes in the share of high- and
low-earnings occupations, in the share of workers in low- and high-earning
sectors, and in the share of unpaid family workers.
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5.1.2 Response of Poverty and Inequality to Growth
Now we turn to the analysis of the poverty and inequality indicators’ elastici-
ties with respect to GDP per capita. The aggregate year-by-year changes in
poverty and in extreme poverty are found to be strongly negatively correlated
with changes in GDP per capita (stacked regression column in Table 5.1, and
2.5 and 4 dollars-a-day poverty rows). This means that for each 1 per cent
increase in GDP per capita from one year to the next, poverty decreases, on
average, by 1.43 per cent, and extreme poverty decreases by 2.1 per cent.
Expressing these estimates in terms of percentage points rather than percent-
ages, we ﬁnd that an increase of GDP per capita of 1 per cent implies a fall of
about 0.58 percentage points in moderate poverty, and of about 0.50 percent-
age points in extreme poverty (with respect to the unweighted average of the
moderate and extreme poverty rates of the year 2000 in Figure 3.1 in
Chapter 3). These values are in line with those obtained in the literature for
developing countries.1
Table 5.1 also includes poverty–growth elasticities country by country (col-
umns 2 to 17 in Table 5.1, and 2.5 and 4 dollars-a-day poverty rows). We ﬁnd a
large degree of heterogeneity across countries. In only four of the sixteen
countries in our sample do we ﬁnd a statistically signiﬁcant (at 5 per cent
level) moderate poverty–growth or extreme poverty–growth elasticity (Argen-
tina, Chile, Uruguay, and Venezuela). It should be noted that all but three of
the estimated elasticities for all countries are negative, and that the country
analysis is less robust since we only have between six and thirteen observa-
tions in each case. The larger (in absolute value) andmost signiﬁcant elasticities
are those found for countries which suffered domestic crisis at the beginning of
the 2000s, and then have larger variability in their year-by-year data. That was
the case for Argentina (elasticities of 3.87 for extreme poverty and 2.58 for
poverty), Uruguay (3.58 and 2.95 respectively), and Venezuela (2.03 and
1.32 respectively).
With respect to inequality indicators, we ﬁnd small negative and not signiﬁ-
cant aggregate growth elasticities for the Gini of household per capita income
(HPCI) and the Gini of labour earnings (LI) (stacked regression column in
Table 5.1 and Gini of household per capita income and Gini of labour earnings
rows) because of great heterogeneity in country experiences (columns 2 to 17 in
Table 5.1 and Gini of household per capita income and Gini of labour earnings
rows). The country elasticities are negative and signiﬁcant for Argentina (HPCI
1 These values are similar to the poverty–growth elasticities estimated by Alvaredo and Gasparini
(2015) for the period 1999–2010, andWorld Bank (2011) for the period 2003–10. Estimations from
Fosu (2011) for the period 1980–2007 are smaller than our estimates, which is consistent with the
increase in the level of inequality that took place in the 1980s but especially in the 1990s in the
majority of the countries in the region.
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and LI), Brazil (HPCI and LI), Chile (HPCI), El Salvador (HPCI), and Uruguay
(HPCI and LI), and positive and signiﬁcant only for Mexico (HPCI).
To ﬁnalize this section, we illustrate in Figure 5.1 some of the country-speciﬁc
elasticities with respect to GDP per capita showing the year-by-year changes
for some selected labour market indicators (mean labour earnings, extreme
and moderate poverty rates) for some illustrative countries: Honduras, the
Dominican Republic, Bolivia, and Brazil. The four countries experienced posi-
tive GDP per capita growth rates in most of the years and had relatively similar
annualized growth rates: 2.1 per cent for Honduras, 3.6 for the Dominican
Republic, 2.2 for Bolivia, and 2.4 for Brazil. However, their labour market
experiences were dissimilar. Honduras and the Dominican Republic are rela-
tively bad performers in terms of the evolution of poverty and labour market
indicators in the 2000s, while Bolivia and Brazil present much better patterns
for these variables over time (see section 5.3).With this exercise wewant to look
deeper into the year-by-year changes that underlie our elasticities estimations.
The top row in Figure 5.1 presents the relationship between annual percent-
age changes in mean labour earnings and annual percentage changes in GDP
per capita. The elasticities of labour earnings with respect to GDP per capita
(slope coefﬁcient of the regression line in the bottom of each ﬁgure) are quite
similar in Honduras, the Dominican Republic, and Bolivia (between 1.36 and
1.74). However, the ﬁgure allows us to discern the different evolution of
labour earnings over time in each country. For both Honduras and the Domin-
ican Republic, we observe negative percentage changes in mean labour earn-
ings with respect to the previous year for most of the years (evidenced by the
fact that many of the points are below the zero horizontal line). Moreover,
these losses in average earnings occurred even in years with positive GDP per
capita growth rates. On the contrary, the ﬁgure indicates that average earnings
in Bolivia and Brazil increased with respect to the previous year for most of the
years we analyse (e.g. most of the points are above the zero horizontal line),
even in periods with no growth in GDP per capita. In conclusion, Bolivia and
Brazil were more effective than Honduras and the Dominican Republic in
translating GDP per capita growth into labour earnings increases. This can
be clearly seen by comparing the height of the regression lines in the top row
of Figure 5.1 which we reproduce for Honduras and Bolivia in the ﬁrst graph
of Figure 5.2.
Turning now from labour earnings to poverty, in the second row of
Figure 5.1, we observe that the extreme poverty–growth elasticities were very
similar in Honduras and the Dominican Republic (slope coefﬁcient of the
regression lines at the bottom of each ﬁgure: 0.48 and 0.44 respectively),
but while in the Dominican Republic the poverty rate measured by the 2.5
dollars-a-day line fell in most of the years (most of the points are below the
zero horizontal line), in Honduras it increased most of the time, even in times
Within-Country Analysis: Additional Evidence
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Figure 5.1 Mean labour earnings, 2.5 and 4 dollars-a-day poverty rates elasticity with
respect to GDP per capita for illustrative countries
Note: The points in each ﬁgure represent year-by-year percentage changes in the labour market
indicator indicated in the vertical axes and GDP per capita. The line represents the linear regression
speciﬁed at the bottom of the ﬁgure. Robust standard error of the slope coefﬁcient between
parentheses.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on SEDLAC (CEDLAS and World Bank 2014) and World
Development Indicators (World Bank 2014).
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Figure 5.1 Continued
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of positive GDP per capita growth rates. In Bolivia, the percentage changes in
the extreme poverty rate were not signiﬁcantly associated with GDP per capita
growth. Bolivia exhibited similar reductions in the extreme poverty rate in
years of low and high GDP per capita growth. Finally, in Brazil the extreme
poverty rate fell most of the time and the reductions were larger the higher the
GDP per capita growth, producing an estimated elasticity of0.9. The Domin-
ican Republic, Bolivia, and Brazil were more successful than Honduras in
reducing extreme poverty (the regression lines were always below the zero
horizontal line for the Dominican Republic, Bolivia, and Brazil, and always
above zero for Honduras). While the Dominican Republic and Brazil seem to
have translated GDP per capita growth into lower extreme poverty rates,
Bolivia managed to reduce extreme poverty in both high-growth and low-
growth years. The second graph in Figure 5.2 provides a clear comparison of
the regression lines for Honduras and Bolivia.
Turning to moderate poverty (third row of Figure 5.1), the ﬁgures for mod-
erate poverty elasticity are very similar to the ones of extreme poverty–growth,
Bolivia being the only exception. In Bolivia, the moderate poverty rate fell
most of the time and the reductions were larger when the GDP per capita grew
the most.
To sum up, in the Latin American region, the year-by-year percentage
changes in some employment and earnings indicators (unemployment,
share of wage/salaried employees, share of self-employed, mean earnings)
and poverty indicators (2.5 and 4 dollars-a-day poverty rates) were related in
the welfare-improving direction to GDP per capita growth (stacked regression
column of Table 5.1). The same was true for most of the countries, but the
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Figure 5.2 Relationship between percentage changes in mean labour earnings, 2.5 and
4 dollars-a-day poverty rates, and percentage changes in GDP per capita for illustrative
countries
Note: Linear regression of the year-by-year percentage changes in each labour market indicator on
year-by-year percentage changes in GDP per capita.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on SEDLAC (CEDLAS and World Bank 2014) and World
Development Indicators (World Bank 2014).
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magnitudes of the effect and the patterns over time varied substantially from
country to country (remaining columns of Table 5.1). The heterogeneity
among countries explains why in section 4.1 we found a weak relationship
across countries between improvements in the labour indicators and the rate
of economic growth. It is not the case that economic growth was unimportant
for improvements in labour market indicators. It is the case that more rapid
economic growth improved labour market indicators in all the countries, but
at a different rate in each one of them.
5.2 Response of Poverty to Employment, Earnings,
and Inequality Changes
In this section, we analyse in more detail the link between employment and
earnings indicators and poverty. Our analysis is based on the estimation of
moderate and extreme poverty elasticities with respect to employment and
earnings indicators. We compute these elasticities using year-by-year data for
each country in our sample as in section 5.1 and in contrast to Chapter 4
where we used the annualized changes between the initial and the ﬁnal years
for each country.
There is a limited literature on the elasticities of poverty with respect to
employment, earnings, and inequality indicators. Fosu (2011), Olinto et al.
(2014) and Alvaredo and Gasparini (2015) have focused on the poverty elas-
ticity with respect to inequality in household per capita income. Both papers
use data from Povcalnet, which is the World Bank’s computational tool
available online to estimate absolute poverty and other distributional indica-
tors (e.g. the Gini coefﬁcient) in developing countries. Povcalnet provides an
estimate of poverty and inequality indicators for each country every three
years since 1981. Fosu (2011) ﬁnds a positive poverty elasticity with respect to
inequality (measured by the Gini of per capita household income) for the
world as a whole and in particular for the stacked data from countries of Latin
American and the Caribbean for the period 1981–2007. Similar results are
obtained by Olinto et al. (2014) and Alvaredo and Gasparini (2015) for a
group of 100 developing countries, including those from the Latin American
region for the period 1981–2010. These papers use a similar data structure to
ours (stacked data for each country with many countries included), but they
implement different econometric techniques than ours (e.g. instrumenting
for the increase on inequality) and also use a different period of time.
An example of a study analysing the response of poverty to employment
indicators is Damill and Frenkel (2014), who estimate that poverty tends to
increase 0.7 percentage points for each one percentage point increase in the
unemployment rate in Latin America for the period 1990–2010.
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Since we are focused on the employment and poverty nexus, below we
estimate poverty elasticities with respect to the mean of individuals’ labour
earnings. However, the previous literature—for example, Fosu (2011), Olinto
et al. (2014), and Alvaredo and Gasparini (2015)—has mainly estimated the
elasticity of poverty with respect to mean household per capita income,
ﬁnding that poverty tends to fall with increases in mean household per
capita income.
Let P(l)it be the poverty rate measured using the poverty line l, for country i
in period t. Let Kit be either labour earnings, the unemployment rate, or any
other employment and earnings indicator for country i at time t. Let Ci be
country-ﬁxed effects which are included only in aggregate regressions for the
region, but not in country-speciﬁc regressions; as in section 5.1, we call these
aggregate regressions ‘stacked regressions’ which means that observations of
each country are stacked. And let eit be the error terms. We estimate the
elasticity of poverty with respect to the labour market indicator k (δk) in the
stacked regression as follows:
Δ% PðlÞit ¼ Ci þ δk Δ% Kit þ eit; ð15Þ
with l = 2.5 or 4 dollars-a-day poverty lines
i = {AR, BO, . . . , VE}
t = 2001, . . . , 2012/2013
k = {labour earnings, unemployment rate, etc.}.
For country i (i = {AR, BO, . . . , VE})we estimate the country-speciﬁc elasticity of
poverty with respect to the labour market indicator k (δk) as follows:
Δ% PðlÞt ¼ Cþ δk Δ% Kt þ et; ð16Þ
with l = 2.5 or 4 dollars-a-day poverty lines
t = 2001, . . . , 2012/2013
k = {labour earnings, unemployment rate, etc.}.
We present the results from these estimations in Tables 5.2 (for extreme
poverty) and 5.3 (for moderate poverty).
We start by analysing poverty–labour earnings elasticities. We see in the
stacked regressions (stacked regression column in Tables 5.2 and 5.3 andmean
labour earnings row) that the percentage changes in poverty and in extreme
poverty are strongly correlated with the evolution of labour earnings in the
expected direction, i.e. higher increases in labour earnings being associated
with larger poverty reductions. The aggregate extreme poverty–labour earn-
ings elasticity is 1.23, and the elasticity for moderate poverty is 0.95 (both
signiﬁcant at the 1 per cent level). These poverty–labour earnings elasticities
are substantially smaller in absolute magnitude than the poverty–growth
elasticities we estimated in section 5.1.2 (see Table 5.1). This could be expected
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Table 5.2 2.5 dollars-a-day elasticity with respect to employment and earnings indicators and inequality indicators during the 2000s by country and for the Latin
American region
Indicator Stacked
regression
AR BO BR CL CO CR DO EC HN MX PA PE PY SV UY VE
Unemployment
Elasticity coefﬁcient 0.332 1.164 0.391 0.425 0.171 0.314 0.363 0.077 0.206 0.073 0.158 0.192 0.743 0.867 0.077 1.217 1.138
(0.096)** (0.212)** (0.266) (0.137)** (0.095) (0.445) (0.143)* (0.04) (0.118) (0.166) (0.186) (0.261) (0.418) (0.164)** (0.281) (0.848) (0.227)**
Share of low-earnings
occupations
Elasticity coefﬁcient 0.318 0.565 3.808 0.900 0.185 1.102 3.172 0.919 0.373 1.232 1.028 1.449 4.292 2.986 0.217 2.063
(0.419) (1.235) (2.235) (1.041) (0.173) (1.492) (0.706)** (1.464) (2.292) (1.564) (1.279) (1.573) (3.503) (5.64) (3.202) (1.472)
Share of high-earnings
occupations
Elasticity coefﬁcient 0.132 0.093 1.035 0.001 0.226 0.050 1.096 0.223 0.288 0.308 1.456 0.420 0.758 0.725 0.335
(0.177) (0.271) (0.396)** (0.336) (0.486) (0.441) (0.393)** (0.254) (0.671) (0.565) (1.088) (0.57) (0.401) (1.424) (1.239)
Share of wage/salaried
employees
Elasticity coefﬁcient 1.501 7.447 0.966 4.035 9.594 0.772 3.990 0.217 0.117 0.411 0.347 1.081 1.443 2.716 1.105 12.378 6.124
(0.368)** (4.677) (0.786) (1.715)* (0.761)** (0.386)* (1.976)* (1.502) (0.437) (0.624) (1.079) (1.909) (1.416) (1.371)* (0.933) (2.673)** (1.842)**
Share of self-employment
Elasticity coefﬁcient 1.115 2.492 0.765 0.951 2.723 0.368 1.127 0.878 0.089 0.321 0.156 0.504 1.367 1.724 0.655 4.174 3.349
(0.259)** (0.777)** (0.706) (1.193) (4.172) (0.182)* (0.712) (0.576) (0.594) (0.445) (0.561) (1.089) (1.15) (1.042) (0.713) (0.896)** (1.172)**
Share of unpaid family
workers
Elasticity coefﬁcient 0.227 0.115 0.087 0.775 0.149 0.233 1.031 0.136 0.040 0.567 0.258 0.093 0.103 1.234 0.217 0.703 0.274
(0.079)** (0.292) (0.424) (0.257)** (0.278) (0.202) (0.556) (0.033)** (0.157) (0.337) (0.33) (0.187) (0.438) (0.302)** (0.197) (0.419) (0.154)
Share of workers in
low-earnings sectors
Elasticity coefﬁcient 0.005 4.864 0.914 1.134 1.224 0.592 0.018 1.558 2.193 1.292 0.425 0.870 1.950 2.034 2.288 2.968 7.115
(0.581) (1.457)** (1.012) (0.373)** (1.632) (0.259)* (0.858) (1.518) (1.427) (0.697) (0.446) (0.724) (2.126) (1.606) (2.071) (1.556) (1.6)**
Share of workers in
high-earnings sectors
Elasticity coefﬁcient 0.183 4.131 0.222 0.390 0.553 0.404 0.386 0.549 0.179 0.522 0.536 0.738 1.151 0.031 1.164 1.738 1.772
(0.252) (0.899)** (0.361) (0.792) (0.321) (0.427) (0.954) (0.844) (0.495) (0.766) (1.077) (0.564) (0.863) (0.315) (1.004) (1.908) (1.628)
Share of low-educated
workers
elasticity coefﬁcient 0.264 4.290 0.151 3.614 2.323 0.645 1.972 0.441 2.334 2.669 0.307 1.099 1.159 1.910 1.211 2.020 4.051
(0.558) (4.61) (1.606) (0.9)** (0.376)** (0.781) (1.057) (2.013) (1.16)* (2.261) (1.024) (0.87) (1.536) (1.176) (3.828) (1.249) (2.7)
(continued )
Table 5.2 Continued
Indicator Stacked
regression
AR BO BR CL CO CR DO EC HN MX PA PE PY SV UY VE
Share of high-educated
workers
Elasticity coefﬁcient 0.065 2.869 0.058 0.150 1.208 0.207 2.738 0.912 1.114 0.147 0.046 0.264 0.245 0.823 0.698 1.211 3.655
(0.187) (5.79) (0.348) (0.189) (0.562)* (0.394) (1.719) (0.152)** (1.398) (0.292) (0.29) (0.953) (0.883) (0.353)* (0.541) (0.66) (2.084)
Share of workers registered
with SS
Elasticity coefﬁcient 0.114 2.457 0.138 0.829 2.576 0.112 3.503 0.112 0.132 0.144 0.616 2.810 0.208 0.744 1.027 4.944 1.513
(0.186) (2.265) (0.141) (0.193)** (1.202)* (0.505) (2.799) (0.338) (0.365) (0.185) (1.031) (1.388)* (0.26) (0.401) (1.294) (1.405)** (1.321)
Mean labour earnings
Elasticity coefﬁcient 1.236 1.835 0.231 1.298 0.265 0.452 0.544 0.654 0.267 0.905 0.342 0.413 0.534 1.427 0.960 2.184 1.536
(0.171)** (0.139)** (0.732) (0.156)** (0.432) (0.274) (1.213) (0.424) (0.337) (0.497) (0.505) (0.283) (0.621) (0.718)* (1.347) (0.487)** (0.29)**
Gini of household
per capita income
Elasticity coefﬁcient 2.083 8.333 2.095 0.717 2.848 0.618 1.669 1.041 0.061 2.334 1.235 3.517 1.186 2.818 2.867 3.573 1.394
(0.378)** (2.631)** (0.291)** (2.908) (0.812)** (0.991) (1.271) (0.611) (0.829) (0.719)** (1.175) (1.632)* (0.847) (1.414)* (1.435)* (2.263) (1.411)
Gini of labour earnings
Elasticity coefﬁcient 1.266 7.405 3.053 0.397 6.059 0.836 0.257 2.060 0.360 1.481 0.395 0.354 0.860 2.014 0.409 3.529 0.519
(0.391)** (1.55)** (0.428)** (2.043) (13.147) (0.573) (1.239) (0.703)** (0.5) (0.338)** (0.54) (1.362) (0.903) (1.614) (0.507) (1.702)* (0.846)
Note: Labour market indicators’ elasticities are calculated using the year-by-year percentage change in the 2.5 dollars-a-day poverty rate and in employment and earnings indicators and inequality indicators within
each country. The ﬁrst column shows the results of the regression for the sample of all countries including country-ﬁxed effects. The country-speciﬁc regressions do not include extra controls. Robust standard errors in
parentheses. ** signiﬁcant at 1% level, * signiﬁcant at 5% level.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on SEDLAC (CEDLAS and World Bank 2014).
Table 5.3 4 dollars-a-day elasticity with respect to employment and earnings indicators and inequality indicators during the 2000s by country and for the Latin
American region
Indicator Stacked
regression
AR BO BR CL CO CR DO EC HN MX PA PE PY SV UY VE
Unemployment
Elasticity coefﬁcient 0.193 0.673 0.214 0.224 0.100 0.168 0.188 0.072 0.120 0.063 0.033 0.260 0.633 0.546 0.091 1.181 0.724
(0.066)** (0.191)** (0.137) (0.115) (0.11) (0.158) (0.116) (0.027)** (0.076) (0.106) (0.098) (0.135) (0.284)* (0.156)** (0.138) (0.465)* (0.14)**
Share of low-earnings
occupations
Elasticity coefﬁcient 0.587 0.080 2.080 1.360 0.249 0.325 1.939 0.823 0.115 0.766 0.699 1.514 3.276 1.512 3.260 1.608
(0.295)* (0.605) (1.533) (0.474)** (0.142) (0.911) (0.381)** (0.916) (1.451) (0.617) (0.734) (0.918) (2.281) (2.487) (2.478) (1.08)
Share of high-earnings
occupations
Elasticity coefﬁcient 0.159 0.012 0.578 0.173 0.325 0.368 0.434 0.108 0.304 0.075 1.311 0.534 0.491 0.901 0.017
(0.112) (0.134) (0.308) (0.094) (0.304) (0.488) (0.303) (0.187) (0.457) (0.299) (0.743) (0.357) (0.291) (1.089) (0.852)
Share of wage/salaried
employees
Elasticity coefﬁcient 0.972 4.215 0.375 3.289 4.521 0.227 3.637 0.500 0.001 0.321 0.320 1.961 1.026 1.488 0.438 11.149 4.449
(0.259)** (3.59) (0.498) (1.055)** (3.059) (0.458) (1.201)** (0.894) (0.347) (0.375) (0.316) (1.025) (0.863) (1.006) (0.435) (1.642)** (1.175)**
Share of self-employment
Elasticity coefﬁcient 0.802 1.415 0.176 0.306 5.546 0.082 1.190 0.317 0.089 0.228 0.066 0.960 0.581 0.906 0.329 3.835 2.301
(0.181)** (0.648)* (0.477) (0.689) (0.552)** (0.263) (0.355)** (0.475) (0.407) (0.245) (0.178) (0.581) (0.841) (0.747) (0.32) (0.601)** (0.735)**
Share of unpaid family
workers
Elasticity coefﬁcient 0.169 0.059 0.099 0.570 0.361 0.230 0.710 0.106 0.016 0.295 0.135 0.111 0.242 0.814 0.060 0.388 0.207
(0.053)** (0.216) (0.192) (0.193)** (0.028)** (0.157) (0.363) (0.015)** (0.089) (0.184) (0.088) (0.075) (0.197) (0.246)** (0.089) (0.334) (0.098)*
Share of workers in
low-earnings sectors
Elasticity coefﬁcient 0.098 3.596 0.262 0.746 1.631 0.095 0.064 0.864 1.313 0.621 0.481 1.240 1.710 1.046 1.110 0.458 4.181
(0.379) (0.979)** (0.597) (0.261)** (1.059) (0.334) (0.801) (1.175) (1.145) (0.392) (0.174)** (0.28)** (1.273) (0.997) (0.898) (1.398) (1.151)**
Share of workers in
high-earnings sectors
Elasticity coefﬁcient 0.024 2.846 0.207 0.004 0.676 0.092 0.481 0.781 0.093 0.409 0.004 0.666 0.891 0.016 0.305 0.066 1.028
(0.173) (0.69)** (0.206) (0.533) (0.224)** (0.375) (1.08) (0.439) (0.332) (0.473) (0.523) (0.252)** (0.567) (0.204) (0.415) (1.648) (1.142)
Share of low-educated
workers
Elasticity coefﬁcient 0.521 2.314 0.031 2.262 0.388 0.745 0.088 0.238 1.822 1.505 0.067 1.038 1.305 1.309 1.067 0.489 2.141
(0.409) (3.323) (0.998) (0.65)** (1.405) (0.39) (1.691) (1.8) (1.048) (1.226) (0.741) (0.315)** (0.968) (0.729) (1.564) (1.163) (2.109)
(continued )
Table 5.3 Continued
Indicator Stacked
regression
AR BO BR CL CO CR DO EC HN MX PA PE PY SV UY VE
Share of high-educated
workers
Elasticity coefﬁcient 0.119 2.044 0.006 0.026 0.346 0.264 1.396 0.466 0.778 0.047 0.024 0.276 0.557 0.503 0.254 0.440 2.382
(0.125) (4.064) (0.212) (0.15) (0.745) (0.163) (1.566) (0.166)** (0.792) (0.17) (0.218) (0.792) (0.564) (0.241)* (0.213) (0.652) (1.304)
Share of workers registered
with SS
Elasticity coefﬁcient 0.104 1.618 0.039 0.760 0.548 0.064 1.745 0.051 0.065 0.054 0.343 2.154 0.074 0.484 0.203 4.358 0.738
(0.116) (1.638) (0.094) (0.151)** (1.784) (0.239) (2.378) (0.181) (0.27) (0.135) (0.444) (0.921)* (0.199) (0.242)* (0.646) (1.327)** (0.87)
Mean labour earnings
Elasticity coefﬁcient 0.950 1.250 0.203 0.955 0.694 0.445 0.791 0.626 0.180 0.538 0.086 0.323 0.626 0.825 0.611 2.015 1.078
(0.111)** (0.123)** (0.415) (0.094)** (0.227)** (0.166)** (0.751) (0.211)** (0.261) (0.268)* (0.256) (0.227) (0.384) (0.489) (0.578) (0.275)** (0.137)**
Gini of household
per capita income
Elasticity coefﬁcient 1.244 5.885 1.140 0.762 0.547 0.704 0.684 0.495 0.149 1.301 0.574 2.283 0.298 1.976 1.090 3.416 0.685
(0.261)** (2.016)** (0.217)** (2.027) (1.966) (0.809) (1.047) (0.419) (0.539) (0.386)** (0.551) (1.441) (0.55) (0.977)* (0.698) (1.306)** (1.016)
Gini of labour earnings
Elasticity coefﬁcient 0.891 5.457 1.753 0.783 7.159 0.499 1.111 1.179 0.319 0.967 0.266 0.875 0.099 1.511 0.025 3.613 0.192
(0.288)** (0.953)** (0.325)** (1.171) (13.986) (0.615) (1.309) (0.449)** (0.312) (0.257)** (0.314) (0.933) (0.691) (1.128) (0.235) (1.091)** (0.636)
Note: Labour market indicators’ elasticities are calculated using the year-by-year percentage change in the 4 dollars-a-day poverty rate and in employment and earnings indicators and inequality indicators within each
country. The ﬁrst column shows the results of the regression for the sample of all countries including country-ﬁxed effects. The country-speciﬁc regressions do not include extra controls. Robust standard errors in
parentheses.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on SEDLAC (CEDLAS and World Bank 2014).
from the trends observed in Figure 3.1 in Chapter 3, which shows that labour
earnings and GDP per capita followed similar trends, but changes in labour
earnings were more attenuated than those in GDP per capita.
The poverty–labour earnings elasticities differ between countries (columns 2
to 17 in Table 5.2 and Table 5.3 and mean labour earnings row). The magni-
tudes of themoderate poverty–earnings elasticities go from2.0 inUruguay to
0.09 in Mexico, while the values of the extreme poverty–earnings elasticities
vary from2.2 in Uruguay to 0.23 in Bolivia. At least one of the two elasticities
(poverty or extreme poverty) is statistically signiﬁcant at standard levels for
nine out of sixteen countries (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Dominican
Republic, Honduras, Paraguay, Uruguay, and Venezuela). As in the case of the
poverty–growth elasticities, the poverty–labour earnings elasticities are large
andhighly signiﬁcant for Argentina (1.10 formoderate poverty and1.55 for
extreme poverty), Uruguay (1.92 and 2.14 respectively), and Venezuela
(1.20 and 1.75 respectively). The results are also large and signiﬁcant for
Brazil (1.07 for moderate poverty and 1.74 for extreme poverty), for which
the poverty–growth elasticities were not statistically different from zero.
Turning now to the elasticity of poverty with respect to unemployment in
the stacked regression, we ﬁnd a strong and signiﬁcant correlation between
reductions in the unemployment rate and reductions in poverty and
extreme poverty. Earlier we found a clear positive correlation between
the unweighted averages of the unemployment rate and the poverty rates
(Figure 3.1 in Chapter 3). Consistent with this, we ﬁnd here signiﬁcant and
positive aggregate elasticities ofmoderate and extremepoverty rateswith respect
to unemployment (stacked regression column in Tables 5.2 and 5.3 and
unemployment row) of 0.19 for moderate poverty (Table 5.3) and 0.33 for
extreme poverty (Table 5.2), both signiﬁcant at the 1 per cent level. This implies
that, on average, for each 10 per cent reduction in the unemployment rate (for
example, from approximately 9 per cent, the average for all sixteen countries at
the beginning of the period, to 8.1 per cent), poverty falls by 1.9 per cent and
extreme poverty by 3.3 per cent. Looking at the country level, as with the other
elasticities discussed above, the poverty–unemployment elasticities are highly
variable between countries (columns 2 to 17 in Table 5.2 and Table 5.3 and
unemployment row). One or both of these elasticities (poverty or extreme
poverty) are signiﬁcant for Argentina, Brazil, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic,
Peru, Paraguay, Uruguay, and Venezuela. The magnitudes of the elasticities
are large and strongly signiﬁcant for Argentina (0.67 for moderate poverty and
1.16 for extreme poverty), Paraguay (0.55 and 0.87 respectively), and Venezuela
(0.72 and 1.14 respectively).
We also ﬁnd a strong correlation between percentage changes in moderate
and extreme poverty and percentage changes in the three labour market
indicators related to the occupational position in the stacked regression
Within-Country Analysis: Additional Evidence
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(stacked regression column in Tables 5.2 and 5.3 and the corresponding indi-
cator row). First, we ﬁnd a negative and signiﬁcant aggregate elasticity
between extreme and moderate poverty and the share of wage/salaried
employees, with a substantially higher coefﬁcient (in absolute terms) for
extreme poverty (1.50) than for moderate poverty (about 0.97). The elasti-
cities of poverty with respect to the occupational positions that we identiﬁed
as signals of worse labour market outcomes, the share of self-employment
(second) and the share of unpaid family workers (third), are positive, and
substantially larger for the share of self-employment (1.12 for extreme poverty
and 0.80 for moderate poverty), than for the share of unpaid workers (0.23 for
extreme poverty and 0.17 for moderate poverty). As with the previous indica-
tors, there is a high degree of heterogeneity in the magnitude of the elasticities
between countries, although the signs seem to be mostly consistent among
them (columns 2 to 17 in Table 5.2 and Table 5.3 and the corresponding
indicator row). We did not ﬁnd a signiﬁcant average year-by-year poverty
elasticity for the remaining employment and earnings indicators and inequal-
ity indicators, such as the share of high- and low-earnings occupations, the
share of workers registered with social security, the share of workers in low-
and high-earnings sectors, and the Gini coefﬁcient of household per capita
income and labour earnings.
As in section 5.1, we present in Figures 5.3 and 5.4 some of the elasticities of
poverty with respect to mean labour earnings and unemployment for four
countries in our sample: Honduras, the Dominican Republic, Bolivia, and
Brazil. In Honduras, the extreme and moderate poverty rates increased in
about half of the years under study, and the increases took place even with
reductions in the unemployment rate (top row of Figure 5.3 for the extreme
poverty rate and Figure 5.4 for the moderate poverty rate). That determines
very small positive elasticities of moderate and extreme poverty (0.06 and 0.07
respectively) with respect to the unemployment rate, and very small
R-squareds (0.02 and 0.01 respectively) (regression details in the bottom of
each ﬁgure). The Dominican Republic is the only country among the four
where the poverty–unemployment elasticities are negative (slope coefﬁcient
of the regression line in the bottom of each ﬁgure:0.08 for moderate poverty
and 0.07 for extreme poverty). This result is determined mainly by one year
that had a large increase in the unemployment rate jointly with a large
reduction in the poverty rates. In Bolivia and Brazil, both poverty rates fell
most of the time, and continued to decline when the unemployment rate
increased (most of the points are below the zero horizontal line). The poverty–
unemployment elasticities are similar in magnitude in both countries (about
0.4 for moderate poverty and 0.2 for extreme poverty).
The analysis of the relationship between percentage changes in poverty
and percentage changes in mean earnings (second row of Figure 5.3 for the
Cross-Country Analysis
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Figure 5.3 2.5 dollars-a-day poverty rates elasticity with respect to unemployment and
mean earnings for illustrative countries
Note: The points in each ﬁgure represent year-by-year percentage changes in the 2.5 dollars-a-day
poverty rate, and the labour market indicator indicated in the horizontal axes. The line represents
the linear regression speciﬁed at the bottom of the ﬁgure. Robust standard error of the slope
coefﬁcient between parentheses.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on SEDLAC (CEDLAS and World Bank 2014).
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Figure 5.4 4 dollars-a-day poverty rates elasticity with respect to unemployment and
mean earnings for illustrative countries
Note: The points in each ﬁgure represent year-by-year percentage changes in the 2.5 dollars-a-day
poverty rate, and the labourmarket indicator indicated in thehorizontal axes. The line represents the
linear regression speciﬁed at the bottom of the ﬁgure. Robust standard error of the slope coefﬁcient
between parentheses.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on SEDLAC (CEDLAS and World Bank 2014).
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extreme poverty rate and Figure 5.4 for the moderate poverty rate) reveals that
in Honduras and the Dominican Republic mean earnings fell most of the time
(most of the points are to the left of the zero vertical line). In Honduras, the
moderate and extreme poverty rates tended to increase when mean earnings
fell and to decrease when mean earnings grew, determining a negative elasti-
city (slope coefﬁcient of the regression line in the bottom of each ﬁgure:0.54
for moderate poverty and 0.91 for extreme poverty). In the Dominican
Republic, the poverty–earnings elasticities were also negative, but in this
country the poverty rates continued to decrease when labour earnings fell.
This speciﬁcity of the Dominican Republic case determined a regression line
that is below the one for Honduras. In Bolivia, mean earnings increased most
of the time, but in some of the years the poverty rates increased. This deter-
mined a negative and small moderate poverty–earnings elasticity (0.2) and a
very small R-squared (0.02). The extreme poverty–earnings elasticity was
positive (0.2) with an R-squared of zero. Finally, in Brazil both poverty rates
fell most of the time and mean earnings increased. The poverty reductions
were larger the larger the increases in mean labour earnings. Thus, the
poverty–earnings elasticities are negative (0.96 for moderate poverty and
1.3 for extreme poverty) and the relationships very tight (R-squareds of
0.73 for extreme poverty and 0.89 for moderate poverty).
To sum up, in the Latin American region and in most of the countries, the
year-by-year percentage changes in both poverty measures (2.5 and 4 dollars-
a-day poverty rates) were related in the welfare-improving direction with
percentage changes in some employment and earnings indicators (unemploy-
ment, share of wage/salaried employees, share of self-employed, share of
unpaid workers, mean earnings), but the magnitude of the effect and the
pattern over time varied substantially from country to country.
5.3 Assessing Changes of Labour Earnings across the
Earnings Distribution within each Country
Using Growth Incidence Curves
In this section we extend the analysis of the within-country growth–
employment–poverty nexus, focusing on proportional and dollar changes in
labour earnings along the earnings distribution in each country. The reason
for having a section completely devoted to the analysis of labour earnings
changes is that earnings are the main source of income for Latin American
households, and increases in the earnings at the bottom of the income distri-
bution have been shown to be themost important contributor to the observed
decline in household per capita income inequality in the region (Azevedo
et al. 2013).
Within-Country Analysis: Additional Evidence
127
We base our analysis on the construction of growth incidence curves (GICs)
for labour earnings. GICs show the change in an income variable (labour
earnings in our case) in percentage terms or in dollars, between two years
(initial and ﬁnal year in our case) by quantiles of the distribution of that
income variable (deciles in our case). The purpose of this section to show the
changes in labour earnings over all deciles of each country’s income distribu-
tion during the 2000s.2
There is a limited literature on GICs of monthly labour earnings in Latin
America during the 2000s. One example is Brambilla and Tortarolo (2015),
who look at GICs of hourly wages and monthly incomes for six countries in
Latin America (Brazil, Chile, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Honduras, and Mexico) for
the period 1998–2009. They ﬁnd that there was growth in labour earnings
across the whole income distribution for each country and the percentage
growth rate was larger for lower-income percentiles.
Most of the previous literature has looked into GICs of household per capita
income. Lustig, Lopez-Calva, and Ortiz-Juarez (2013) calculated GICs for
household per capita income during the period 2000–10 for Argentina, Brazil,
and Mexico, while Tsounta and Osueke (2014) estimated GICs for the same
sixteen Latin American countries and the same period (2000–12) studied in
this book. The authors ﬁnd that the incomes of all deciles increased during
this period, and the poorer the decile the greater the percentage increase in
household per capita income. If the reader is interested in GICs, the World
Bank offers an online tool to calculate the growth incidence curves for each
country in Latin America (and for the region as a whole) between any two
years from 2000 to 2013.3
We found earlier that mean real earnings grew in most of the countries in
our sample. Here, we uncover two additional ﬁndings: that the percentage
gain tended to be larger for the poorer deciles, while the gain in dollars tended
to be larger for the richest deciles.
Figures 5.5 and 5.6 display, for each country, the GICs for employed workers
with positive earnings between the initial year and the ﬁnal year. Figure 5.5
presents the percentage changes of labour earnings, while Figure 5.6 shows
the dollar changes. Four main results emerge from these ﬁgures. First, as
observed in section 5.3, comparing the earliest survey year with the latest,
mean real labour earnings (the change in this variable is displayed as the
2 For more on the GIC approach, see Ravallion and Chen (2003), Bourguignon (2011), and the
references cited therein. As is most common in the literature, we are presenting here anonymous
GICs: that is, changes in earnings for whichever individuals are in the bottom 10 per cent of the
earnings distribution, next 10 per cent, and so on. We do this because so-called non-anonymous
GICs require panel data, which we do not have.
3 Available at <http://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/poverty/lac-equity-lab1/economic-growth/
growth-incidence-curve>.
Cross-Country Analysis
128
Pe
rc
en
ta
ge
 c
ha
ng
e 
in
 la
bo
ur
 e
ar
ni
ng
s
Argentina 2000–12 Bolivia 2000–12
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Colombia 2000–11 Costa Rica 2000–9
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Honduras 2001–12 Mexico 2000–12
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
–50
0
50
100
150
–50
0
50
100
150
–50
0
50
100
150
–50
0
50
100
150
–50
0
50
100
150
–50
0
50
100
150
–50
0
50
100
150
Paraguay 2001–13
–50
0
50
100
150
El Salvador 2000–12
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Decile of labour earnings
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Figure 5.6 Growth incidence curves of labour earnings by country. Dollar changes for
the sample of employed workers with positive labour earnings
Source: Authors’ calculations based on SEDLAC (CEDLAS and World Bank 2014).
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dashed horizontal line in the ﬁgures) increased in eleven countries and
decreased in ﬁve (with very similar patterns for median labour earnings).
Second, for more than half the countries (Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa
Rica, Ecuador, Panama, Peru, Paraguay, and Venezuela), the GICs based on
percentage earnings change are always above zero: that is, all deciles register
positive earnings changes. For Argentina and Bolivia, all deciles except the top
ones in each case are above zero. For Mexico and Uruguay, most deciles did
not experience changes in average incomes, with reductions in the top and
bottom deciles in both countries. For the remaining three countries—
Dominican Republic, Honduras, El Salvador—all or nearly all of the deciles
are below zero. Overall, then, most deciles in most countries experienced an
increase in labour earnings. From the 160 deciles under study (ten deciles by
sixteen countries), 113 (70 per cent) presented increases in labour earnings
from the initial year to the ﬁnal year. Note that forty-seven (30 per cent) of the
country-decile cells did not experience positive earnings growth, of which
forty-ﬁve belong to the ﬁve countries wheremean labour earnings fell, and the
remaining two to the top decile in Argentina and Bolivia. Labour earnings did
not fall for the ﬁrst nine deciles in any country that experienced increases in
mean labour earnings. Third, in more than half of the countries, the changes
in labour earnings in percentage terms were largest for the poorer deciles.
In most of the remaining countries, the changes in labour earnings beneﬁted
the middle deciles the most. In only one case (Costa Rica), the percentage
changes in labour earnings were largest for the richest deciles. Finally, in ten
out of sixteen countries, the largest dollar increases in labour earnings took
place either in the ninth or the tenth decile (i.e. the two richest). In ﬁve of the
sixteen, there were losses in dollars overall, and the largest losses were in the
richest decile. In one country (Argentina), the largest increase in dollars took
place in the middle of the distribution. At the low end of the earnings distri-
bution, earnings were essentially unchanged in dollars for the poorest decile
in all sixteen countries. What makes these minimal dollar changes for the
poor consistent with the higher percentage changes for the poor than for
others is that the poor have so few dollars of earnings to begin with.
5.4 In Summary
In this chapter, we analysed the within-country growth–employment–pov-
erty nexus in three parts. First, we studied the response of labour market
indicators to economic growth. Second, we investigated the response of pov-
erty to employment and earnings changes. Finally, we presented evidence on
changes of labour earnings across the earnings distribution within each
country.
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The ﬁrst part of the section used year-by-year data to examine whether
employment and earnings indicators and poverty and inequality indicators
changed in the welfare-improving direction when GDP per capita grows. We
found that in the Latin American region as a whole and in most of the
countries, the year-by-year percentage changes in some employment and
earnings indicators (unemployment, share of wage/salaried employees, share
of self-employed, mean earnings) and poverty indicators (2.5 and 4 dollars-a-
day poverty rates) improved with increases in GDP per capita, but the magni-
tude of the effect and the pattern over time varied substantially from country
to country.
In the second part of the section, we examined the year-by-year response of
the moderate and extreme poverty rates to changes in employment and
earnings indicators and to changes in inequality indicators. We found that
in the Latin American region and in most of the countries, the year-by-year
percentage changes in both poverty measures (2.5 and 4 dollars-a-day poverty
rates) were related in the welfare-improving direction to percentage changes
in some employment and earnings indicators (unemployment, share of wage/
salaried employees, share of self-employed, share of unpaid workers, mean
earnings). Again, the poverty rates were differentially responsive to changes in
employment and earnings indicators in different countries. The pattern of
poverty changes over time was also different across countries.
Finally, we analysed the patterns of earnings changes across different deciles
of the earnings distributions in each of the countries. We used anonymous
GICs to compare initial earnings (typically 2000) with ﬁnal earnings (typically
2012) by decile, calculating both percentage changes and dollar changes. We
found that 70 per cent of the country-decile cells exhibited positive earnings
changes while the other 30 per cent either stagnated or decreased. The largest
percentage increases were for the lowest deciles but the highest increases in
dollars took place in the richest deciles.
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6Conclusions from the Cross-Country
Analysis
In the 2000s, the Latin American region has witnessed an unprecedented
period of growth with poverty and inequality reduction (Alvaredo and
Gasparini 2015). The region also suffered from the 2008 economic crisis in
Europe and the United States.
In Part II, we have synthesized the results from individual studies of sixteen
Latin American countries (see the chapters in Part III) and conducted exten-
sive new analysis, both across countries and within them. We have aimed to
answer the following broad questions: Has economic growth (deﬁned as
increased output of goods and services) resulted in economic development
(deﬁned as widespread improvements in standards of living) via improved
conditions in labour markets? Have these improvements halted or been
reversed since the Great Recession? How do the rate and character of economic
growth, changes in the various labour market indicators, and changes in
poverty relate to each other?
When we embarked upon this research project, we were optimistic that we
would be able to answer a wide range of questions, but we were sceptical about
what the results would show. Latin America, jointly with sub-Saharan Africa,
are the most unequal regions in the world, with inequality levels well above
the level for East Asia and the Paciﬁc, the Middle East and North Africa, South
Asia, and Eastern Europe and Central Asia (Alvaredo and Gasparini 2015). The
literature offers ample evidence that high inequality often begets even higher
income inequality, possibly leading to stagnation of incomes for all but those
at the very top—see, for example, Stiglitz (2015), Atkinson (2015), and
Bourguignon (2015). Nor is the experience of countries such as the United
States at all reassuring: economic growth took place in the 2000s except for the
Great Recession and yet a wide range of indicators have not improved. The
ofﬁcial poverty rate, median household income in real dollars, and median
labour earnings in real dollars have stagnated or worsened. The ofﬁcial
unemployment rate has only now (2015) fallen to what it was seven years ago
before the Great Recession, but, of course, the ofﬁcial unemployment rate
excludes discouraged workers and workers working part-time involuntarily,
the numbers of which are at record highs in the United States. And so it
seemed plausible to hypothesize that at least some Latin American countries
would have followed a similar course: stagnating or worsening labour market
conditions and constant or rising poverty rates despite economic growth
taking place.
The positive result is that labour market conditions in ﬁfteen of the sixteen
Latin American countries followed a much more positive course from 2000 to
the latest year for which data were available, typically 2012. In thirteen of the
sixteen countries, 75 per cent or more of the labour market indicators
improved, and in two other countries, 62.5 per cent of the labour market
indicators improved. Only in Honduras did the great majority of labour
market indicators not improve.
In all Latin American countries, economic growth rates fell as a conse-
quence of the international crisis of 2008, some turning negative. A number
of key labour market indicators—the unemployment rate, the share of wage/
salaried workers in total employment, and the extent of self-employment—
changed in the worsening direction for the most part. Remarkably, though,
poverty rates increased in only ﬁve of the sixteen countries and extreme
poverty rates in only one during the international crisis. But then, as their
economies recovered, so too did these labour market indicators, so that by
2012–13, most countries’ labour market indicators had recovered at least in
part and in some cases in full. This newfound resilience of labour market
conditions contrasts sharply with the experience of the region in the second
half of the twentieth century, during which the process of ‘stop and go’
implied that labour markets deteriorated and economies lost most of the
gains from the growth periods in the aftermath of the crises (Edwards 2008).
Looking across countries, we investigated whether the number of improve-
ments in labour market indicators was related to the rate of economic growth,
and we found a positive but weak relationship. When economic growth takes
place, labour market conditions tend to improve, but at different rates in
different countries. Some of the countries exhibited rapid economic growth
over the 2000s when compared to the average of the region and an improve-
ment in labour market indicators. One other country also experienced rapid
economic growth, but the performance of its labour market indicators was
mixed. Other countries improved their labour market indicators despite hav-
ing moderate economic growth. Other countries experienced slow economic
growth with mixed results in the labour market.
Continuing with the cross-country analysis, we then investigated the role of
other potential correlates of changing labour market indicators beyond the
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rate of economic growth. First, we examined whether initial GDP per capita
makes an important difference for the rate of change of any of the labour
market indicators and found that it did not. Second, we asked for each labour
market indicator whether its rate of improvement is related to its initial level.
We found that ﬁve of the sixteen indicators converged in the sense that those
countries with the worst initial values of these indicators experienced larger
subsequent improvements than did countries with better initial values; the
ﬁve convergent indicators were the unemployment rate, the share of unpaid
family workers, the moderate poverty rate, the extreme poverty rate, and the
inequality of household per capita income. Third, we studied a number of
macroeconomic variables and found that improvements in labour market
indicators were related to better external factors—speciﬁcally, improving
terms of trade, increasing exports, increasing revenues from natural resources,
and an increase in the share of industry in GDP—and to countries’ success in
translating those changes into export-led improvements in labour market
conditions. And ﬁnally, we explored whether the changes in labour market
indicators are linked systematically to other indicators across countries—for
example, whether real earnings and employment move together, and if so, in
which direction. We found that 59 per cent of the pairs moved together in the
positive direction (for example, real earnings rising and unemployment fall-
ing), 41 per cent of the pairs did not move together in a signiﬁcant way, and
not even one pair of indicators moved in such a manner that one improved
while the other worsened.
Our last step in the cross-country study of the growth–employment–poverty
nexus was the analysis of the relationship between improvements in employ-
ment and earnings indicators and poverty changes. Our evidence revealed a
generally strong and consistent cross-country pattern of association between
reductions in poverty and extreme poverty on the one hand, and improve-
ments in earnings and employment indicators on the other.
Looking within countries, we generated additional ﬁndings on the growth–
employment–poverty nexus. We ﬁrst used year-to-year data and found that in
the Latin American region as a whole and in most of the countries, some
employment and earnings indicators (unemployment, share of wage/salaried
employees, share of self-employed, and mean earnings) and poverty indica-
tors (2.5 and 4 dollars-a-day poverty rates) improved as GDP per capita
increased, but the magnitudes of the effect and the pattern over time varied
substantially from country to country. Second, year-by-year percentage
changes in both poverty measures (2.5 and 4 dollars-a-day poverty rates)
were related in the welfare-improving direction with percentage changes in
some employment and earnings indicators (unemployment, share of wage/
salaried employees, share of self-employed, share of unpaid workers, and
mean earnings). Again, the poverty rates were differentially responsive to
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changes in employment and earnings indicators in different countries.
Finally, we analysed the patterns of earnings changes across different deciles
of the earnings distributions in each of the countries. We used anonymous
GICs to compare initial earnings (typically 2000) with ﬁnal earnings (typically
2012) by decile, calculating both percentage changes and dollar changes. We
found that 70 per cent of the country-decile cells exhibited positive earnings
changes while the other 30 per cent either stagnated or decreased. The largest
percentage increases were for the lowest deciles but the highest increases in
dollars took place in the richest deciles.
In brief, these results produce two main ﬁndings: ﬁrst, changes in labour
market conditions are related to economic growth but they are related tomore
than economic growth. Second, improvements in labour market conditions
are strongly related to reductions in poverty. These ﬁndings suggest that on
the margin, for the anti-poverty objective, research should focus less on the
rate of economic growth and more on improving employment and earnings
conditions in jobs where the poor are or where the poor might move to.
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Part III
Individual Country Analysis

7Argentina
7.1 Introduction
This chapter on labour markets and growth in Argentina since 2000 is one of
sixteen studies of Latin American countries, each of which analyses the
growth–employment–poverty nexus and aims to answer the following broad
questions: Has economic growth resulted in economic development via
improved labour market conditions in Latin America in the 2000s, and have
these improvements halted or been reversed since the Great Recession? How
do the rate and character of economic growth, changes in the various labour
market indicators, and changes in poverty relate to each other?
To answer these questions, we analyse the growth experience of Argentina
during the 2000s and a wide set of labour market indicators that we assign to
one of two different categories: employment and earnings indicators, and
poverty and income inequality indicators. More speciﬁcally, for the group of
employment and earnings indicators we construct statistics on the following
variables: the unemployment rate; the employment structure by employment
position, economic sector, registration of workers with the social security
system, and educational level; and mean labour earnings and hourly wages.
We present all these indicators for the employed population as a whole and for
different population groups (youth, adults, men, and women). For the group
of poverty and income inequality indicators, we compute poverty rates using
the ofﬁcial moderate and extreme poverty lines and the international lines of
2.5 and 4 dollars a day. We also calculate the Gini coefﬁcient of household per
capita income and labour earnings.
All the statistics in this chapter are obtained using microdata from the
Encuesta Permanente de Hogares (EPH) for the years 2000–2, and Encuesta
Permanente de Hogares-Continua (EPH-C) for the years 2003–12. In the year
2003, Argentina implemented a change in its household surveys as it moved
from the EPH to the EPH-C; the two surveys—both of which are urban in
scope and represent approximately two thirds of the population—are fully
comparable. From 2000 to 2002we use the October wave of the EPH, and from
2003 to 2012 we use data from the second semester with the exception of the
year 2007 which has data only for the fourth quarter. The surveys were
processed following a harmonization methodology and incorporated into
the SEDLAC—Socio-Economic Database for Latin America and the Caribbean
(CEDLAS andWorld Bank 2014).1 The resulting labour market indicators were
compiled into a large number of tables and ﬁgures, which are available in an
earlier version of this study (henceforth, Cruces et al. 2015). Chapter 1 of this
book provides the deﬁnition for each of the indicators we analyse here, while
Cruces et al. (2015) includes details on deﬁnitions and classiﬁcation systems
used by Argentina’s household surveys, and on comparability issues of these
surveys over time.
7.2 Economic Growth
Argentina experienced rapid economic growth during the 2000s overall,
despite a devastating crisis at the beginning of the 2000s. The country
underwent a mild recession following the international crisis of 2008, but
it had completely recovered by 2010. (Cruces et al. 2015: ﬁgures 1 and 2)
From 2000 to 2012, the Argentine economy grew at an above average rate by
Latin American standards. GDP per capita increased by 52.3 per cent, while
the average for the region’s eighteen countries was 36.2 per cent during the
same period. GDP (measured in 2005 PPP dollars) grew by 69.6 per cent, and
GDP per employed person rose by 17.5 per cent. While GDP per capita grew at
an annual rate of 3.3 per cent, the progress of that indicator was erratic, with a
minimum of 11.7 per cent in 2002 and a maximum of 8.2 per cent in 2005
and 2010 (Table 7.1).
The evolution of GDP in Argentina had amarked U-shape. At the beginning
of the 2000s, Argentina underwent a major recession that ended in a severe
economic, banking, and ﬁnancial crisis in December 2001. Prior to the crisis,
Argentina was suffering a deep recession, large levels of debt, and deﬁcits in
the ﬁscal and current accounts. The peso was overvalued, but devaluation was
not an option without breaking the convertibility law that pegged the peso to
the dollar. The country tried to restore its competitiveness through domestic
deﬂation and by improving its ﬁscal accounts, but none of the efforts worked.
The trigger for the crisis in Argentina was a run on the banking system which
functioned mainly in dollars but lacked a lender of last resort. In the end, the
1 See Cruces et al. (2015: table 1) for details on the size of the Argentina household surveys.
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ﬁxed exchange rate regime collapsed and the country defaulted on its sover-
eign debt (Kiguel 2011). GDP per capita diminished by 16.3 per cent from
2000 to 2002. In 2002, a newmacroeconomic scheme was put into effect; that
scheme included a high and stable real exchange rate, ﬁscal and current
account surpluses, and a monetary policy that kept the exchange rate at
high levels and re-established the health of the banking system (Cetrángolo
et al. 2007). As a consequence, the Argentine economy grew substantially.
Following Argentina’s crisis of 2000–2, the economy grew rapidly, regis-
tering a GDP per capita growth rate of 82.3 per cent between 2002 and 2012.
The bulk of this increase took place before 2008. The years from 2002 to 2008
were characterized by rapid economic growth, with an average annual rate of
8.6 per cent. In 2007, the economic situation started to deteriorate due to the
increase in the inﬂation rate and the expansionary ﬁscal policy that progres-
sively reduced the primary surplus. The government failed to put into effect a
programme of price stabilization. On the contrary, through several discre-
tionary interventions, the government changed the way the consumer
price index was calculated, damaging the credibility of its statistics (World
Bank 2014a).
The Argentine economy was affected by the international crisis of 2008.
GDP per capita grew by 5.8 per cent in 2008 but stopped growing completely
in 2009 (0.0 per cent). At the time of the international crisis, the Argentine
economy had a relatively large level of international reserves, a trade surplus,
and a ﬁscal surplus. Additionally, the country was in a situation of ﬁnancial
isolation with a small volume of domestic ﬁnancial intermediation. All these
factors contributed to mitigate the impacts of the international crisis. How-
ever, the country suffered some negative effects from the Great Recession.
First, Argentina was affected by the reduction in the international demand for
its products. This impacted mainly the industrial sector, which had been the
driving force of the growth period 2002–8. Second, the country suffered from
the ﬂight of capital generated by the inﬂationary pressures, the uncertainty
resulting from the conﬂict between the government and the agricultural
sector with regard to export taxes, and the manipulation of the ofﬁcial inﬂa-
tion statistics (Damill and Frenkel 2009). The space to apply countercyclical
policies was limited after the international crisis because of the weakening of
the economy. The government decided to apply trade and exchange rate
restrictions to control the weakening of external balances and to nationalize
the pension system in order to increase its resources. The government also
raised its resources through increases in overall tax collection, which repre-
sented 18.1 per cent of GDP in 2008 and 20.8 per cent in 2012 (CEPALSTAT
2015). That allowed for increases in social expenditure, like the creation (and
subsequent rise in levels) of the Asignación Universal por Hijo cash transfer
programme, reductions in the tax burden for medium- and high-income
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earners, and public works (Damill and Frenkel 2009). It also allowed for an
increase in public employment. The number of people employed in the public
sector grew by 3.5 per cent annually between 2008 and 2012 (INDEC 2015).
The pre-crisis upward growth trend resumed in 2010 and 2011, though there
was a slowdown in 2012. After the crisis, annual GDP per capita growth rates
were 8.2 per cent, 7.9 per cent, and 1.0 per cent in 2010, 2011, and 2012
respectively.
7.3 Unemployment
The 2000–12 period witnessed a signiﬁcant drop in the aggregate
unemployment rate and in the unemployment rate for all population
groups. Within this period, the unemployment rate increased in the early
years of the period and diminished until 2007. It remained constant
afterwards, except for a brief rise in 2009 and an equal drop in 2010.
(Cruces et al. 2015: ﬁgure 3)
The unemployment rate (measured as the ratio of unemployment to labour
force) decreased overall over this period, dropping from 14.8 per cent in
2000 (1,473,288 unemployed persons) to 7.3 per cent in 2012 (856,754
unemployed persons) (Table 7.1). Initially, the unemployment rate increased
in conjunction with a fall in GDP from 2000 to 2002. During the economic
crisis of 2001–2, unemployment increased substantially, peaking at 18.4 per
cent (1,835,698 unemployed persons). The unemployment rate then fell
steadily from 2002 to 2007, when it stood at 7.5 per cent. It remained at
that level until 2008. The reduction in the unemployment rate was marked
both by a drop in the average duration of unemployment spells and by a
reduction in the rate of entry into unemployment (Beccaria and Maurizio
2008). During the Great Recession, and as GDP growth slowed, the unemploy-
ment rate increased to 8.6 per cent in 2009 (127,778 new unemployed
persons). Both the number of persons in the labour force and the number of
employed persons increased between 2008 and 2009 by 194,723 and 66,945
respectively. These ﬁgures suggest that the increase in the unemployment
rate during the international crisis was brought about by the entry of new
people into the labour market who could not ﬁnd a job. A full recovery took
place by 2010, when the unemployment rate returned to its pre-crisis level
(7.4 per cent), where it remained in 2011 and 2012.
Looking at the disaggregated patterns and comparing 2000 with 2012, the
unemployment rate decreased for youth, adults, men, and women, though it
peaked in 2001–2. All groups of workers were affected negatively by the
international crisis. However, the effect of the crisis on the unemployment
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rate was generally short-lived. The unemployment rates of all workers, regard-
less of age and gender, began declining in 2010, though at different paces. The
rate for adults and women had returned to pre-crisis levels by 2010, whereas
the rate for men did not return to pre-crisis levels until 2011; full recovery for
young workers did not take place until 2012.
7.4 Job Mix
The employment structure by occupational position improved. The per-
centage of paid employees in total employment increased overall, for
youth, adults, men, and women. In aggregate and for all population
groups, the share of paid employees diminished during the recessionary
years of the early 2000s, and increased during the period of rapid economic
growth which followed. The international crisis of 2008 negatively
affected the composition of employment by occupational position, but
that setback proved short-lived. (Cruces et al. 2015: ﬁgure 4)
The share of wage/salaried employees—the largest employment category—
grew by 5.1 percentage points over the period, rising from 72.1 per cent in
2000 to 77.2 per cent in 2012. The share of the self-employed, on the other
hand, decreased by 4.0 percentage points, dropping from 22.1 per cent in
2000 to 18.1 per cent in 2012. The shares of employers and of unpaid workers
in total employment were small (around 4.3 and 0.9 per cent respectively) and
neither one changed substantially during the 2000–12 period (Table 7.1).
During the economic crisis of 2001–2, the share of wage/salaried employees
hit its lowest point (71.3 per cent) and the share of self-employed workers
reached its maximum (23.4 per cent). In a context of increasing and high
unemployment, economic necessity may have compelled workers to take up
free-entry self-employment activities. Afterwards, as the economy recovered,
the share of wage/salaried employees increased steadily, reaching 76.7 per cent
in 2007, almost the same level as in 2012. The share of self-employed workers
decreased by up to 18.0 per cent in 2007 and kept around that level until the
end of the period.
The employment structure by occupational position improved from 2000 to
2012 for youth and adult workers, men, and women, as the share of paid
employees grew and the shares of self-employed and unpaid workers dropped.
Within the period, the employment structure by occupational position deteri-
orated in the early years of the 2000s when the share of paid employees
decreased for all groups. It improved in the following years until 2007–8,
when it suffered a slight deterioration during the international crisis. However,
the recovery was quick for all population groups.
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Table 7.1 Argentina: Evolution of growth and labour market indicators over the 2000s
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Growth Indicators
GDP per capita 10,290 9,739 8,596 9,271 10,019 10,843 11,658 12,556 13,288 13,285 14,376 15,515 15,672
GDP per capita
growth rate
1.83 5.36 11.73 7.85 8.07 8.22 7.52 7.71 5.83 0.03 8.21 7.92 1.01
Employment and
Earnings Indicators
Employment-to-
population ratio
49.50 46.44 47.60 52.67 54.35 55.36 56.06 55.85 56.25 55.68 55.89 56.58 56.49
Unemployment rate 14.78 18.40 17.88 15.41 12.58 10.60 9.30 7.53 7.61 8.60 7.41 7.17 7.25
Share of employers 4.60 4.38 3.98 3.76 4.13 4.14 4.19 4.41 4.60 4.33 4.46 4.35 4.17
Share of wage/salaried
employees
72.13 71.29 72.07 74.06 74.24 74.40 75.79 76.70 76.28 75.88 76.97 77.08 77.25
Share of self-employed
workers
22.07 23.41 22.98 20.78 20.46 20.36 19.01 17.99 18.50 19.07 17.79 17.93 18.04
Share of unpaid family
workers
1.19 0.92 0.98 1.40 1.17 1.10 1.02 0.90 0.62 0.73 0.78 0.64 0.54
Share of workers in
low-earnings sectors
39.7 39.0 35.4 38.3 39.3 39.7 41.0 39.8 40.4 39.9 39.6 39.9 39.5
Share of workers in
mid-earnings sectors
42.0 42.5 43.8 42.3 42.2 41.8 40.6 41.1 40.4 40.2 40.5 40.4 40.0
Share of workers in
high-earnings sectors
18.3 18.5 20.8 19.5 18.4 18.5 18.4 19.0 19.2 19.9 19.9 19.6 20.5
Share of low educated
workers
37.04 36.17 35.51 34.55 33.59 32.76 31.18 29.09 28.37 27.58 26.38 26.13 24.93
Share of medium
educated workers
38.78 37.94 39.25 39.38 39.51 39.44 40.36 42.39 42.31 42.44 42.78 42.38 43.94
Share of high educated
workers
24.18 25.89 25.24 26.07 26.90 27.80 28.46 28.52 29.33 29.98 30.83 31.49 31.13
Share of workers
registered with SS
61.59 61.40 55.95 50.62 52.01 54.42 57.27 60.59 62.96 64.11 65.40 65.55 65.01
Mean labour earnings 761.7 736.0 497.8 … 578.4 646.1 705.8 732.6 718.5 747.4 756.8 799.0 781.0
Poverty and
Inequality Indicators
Ofﬁcial extreme poverty
rate
12.86 17.21 33.18 24.71 18.81 15.06 11.01 8.43 5.30 4.28 2.88 1.89 1.77
Ofﬁcial moderate
poverty rate
39.58 44.86 64.54 52.53 45.05 39.33 32.76 27.55 18.04 15.50 12.00 8.37 6.88
Poverty rate 2.5
dollars-a-day
14.16 18.64 29.17 22.02 16.96 13.32 10.32 8.75 8.21 8.04 6.14 4.60 4.69
Poverty rate 4
dollars-a-day
27.46 32.86 45.54 36.44 30.96 25.80 20.62 19.54 17.26 16.31 14.07 11.55 10.84
GINI of household
per capita income
0.504 0.522 0.533 0.526 0.496 0.488 0.475 0.469 0.459 0.449 0.442 0.433 0.423
GINI of labour earnings 0.459 0.476 0.498 0.481 0.463 0.459 0.440 0.434 0.416 0.412 0.403 0.400 0.388
Note: The shaded labour market indicators’ ﬁgures represent statistical signiﬁcant improvements at 5 per cent between the initial and ﬁnal years for all the employment and earnings indicators and poverty and
inequality indicators. The only exceptions are the share of mid-earnings sectors and share of medium-educated workers for which we did not assign welfare evaluation criteria.
Source: SEDLAC (CEDLAS and World Bank 2014), and World Development Indicators (World Bank 2014).
The employment composition by economic sector exhibited a slight improve-
ment overall, as the share of high-earning sectors increased, the share of middle-
earning sectors fell, and the share of low-earning sectors remained largely
unchanged. The pattern of improvement in the sectoral composition of employ-
ment was not interrupted by the international crisis of 2008, but impacted on the
relative shares of low- and mid-earning sectors. (Cruces et al. 2015: ﬁgure 5)
The period 2000–12 witnessed a stable pattern in the share of workers in
low-earning sectors (domestic service, construction, and commerce) around
39.6 per cent both in 2000 and 2012. The share of workers in middle-
earning sectors (low- and high-tech industry, utilities and transportation,
and education and health) decreased from 42.0 to 40.0 per cent. Among
middle-earning sectors, the share of the low-tech industry sector—the driv-
ing force of the growth period 2003–8—exhibited an increase in its share of
total employment up to 2008 that was undone during the international
crisis. Finally, the share in high-earning sectors (primary activities, skilled
services, and public administration) rose from 18.3 to 20.5 per cent
(Table 7.1).
From 2000 to 2012, the changes in the employment composition by eco-
nomic sector resulted in a slight improvement for youth, adults, and men
(increases in the shares of low- and high-earnings sectors coupled with reduc-
tions in the share of mid-earnings sector), while there was a full improvement
for women (increase in the share of high-earnings sectors and reductions in
the shares of low- and mid-earnings sectors).
The international crisis of 2008 did not affect the improving or slightly
improving trend in the composition of employment by economic sector, but
led to a change in the relative shares of low- and mid-earning sectors.
Between 2008 and 2009, the share of low-earning sectors exhibited a larger
reduction compared to the share of mid-earning sectors in the aggregate, for
young workers, and for women, while the share of high-earning sectors
continued to increase. For adults, the share of low-earning sectors stopped
increasing and had a small reduction. For men, the pre-crisis trends in
their employment composition by sector were not impacted by the inter-
national crisis.
The educational level of the Argentine employed population improved steadily
over the period, overall and for all population groups. The international crisis of
2008 had no effect on this upward trend. (Cruces et al. 2015: ﬁgure 6)
The share of employed workers with low educational levels (eight years of
schooling or less) dropped from 37.0 per cent in 2000 to 24.9 per cent in 2012,
while the shares of workers with medium and high educational levels (nine to
thirteen years of schooling and over thirteen years of schooling) grew from
38.8 per cent in 2000 to 43.9 per cent in 2012 and from 24.2 per cent to 31.1
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per cent respectively (Table 7.1).2 We interpret this result as an improvement
for the employed population as the level of education is an important pre-
dictor of labour earnings. Consequently, these changes in the employment
structure by educational level implied an increase in the share of workers that
tend to have high levels of earnings and a decline in the share of workers with
low earnings levels.3
The educational level of the employed population improved between 2000
and 2012 for all population groups, although with some differences between
them. For the young and adult population, the reduction in the shares of
workers with low educational levels was similar, but the corresponding
increase in the share of high-educated workers was larger among adults.
Disaggregating by gender, the reduction in the share of workers with low
levels of education was larger among men, while in the increase in the share
of workers with high levels of education was larger among women.
The pattern of improvement in the educational level of the employed
population in Argentina was not abated on the aggregate or on the population
group level by the international crisis of 2008.
The overall share of wage/salaried employees registered with the social security
system increased between 2000 and 2012. While this indicator improved for adults,
men, and women, it deteriorated for youth. Within this period, the registration rate
fell in the early years of the period studied but increased in the later years. This
upward trend, which started in 2004, held for all population groups; it was not
interrupted by the international crisis of 2008. (Cruces et al. 2015: ﬁgure 7)
As detailed in ISSA (2014), the social security system in Argentina consists of a
set of beneﬁts covering health risks, old age pensions, unemployment insur-
ance, family allowances, and job risks; these beneﬁts are managed by agencies
of the Ministerio de Trabajo, Empleo y Seguridad Social and the Ministerio de
Desarrollo Social. There exist both contributory and non-contributory
schemes. The contributory scheme is mandatory for wage/salaried employees
and self-employed persons. For other workers, like persons insured under
professional provincial systems and housewives, participation is voluntary.
The non-contributory scheme covers persons with income below a subsist-
ence level who are not receiving any social security beneﬁt or support from
2 The most frequent value of years of education for employed workers in Argentina was seven
during 2000–3 (around 24.7 per cent of employed workers had seven years of education) and
twelve during 2004–12 (around 26.1 per cent of employed workers had twelve years of education).
3 The improvement in the employment structure by educational level is related to changes in
the relative demand and supply of workers with high educational levels with corresponding
implications for the wage gap by educational group and the unemployment rate of each
educational level. We introduce a discussion about the role of these factors in Argentina in
section 7.5.
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family members. The non-contributory scheme is funded fully by the
government.
Social security records show an increase in the percentage of wage/salaried
employees registered with the contributory schemes of the system from 2000
to 2012, which rose from 61.6 per cent in 2000 (3,769,596 registered workers)
to 65.1 per cent in 2012 (5,504,925 registered workers) (Table 7.1). The
change, though, was not smooth. From 2000 to 2003, a period that included
the severe crisis of 2001–2, the percentage of workers registered with the social
security system dropped from 61.6 per cent to 50.6 per cent. The share of
wage/salaried employees who were registered with the social security system
then increased steadily from 2003 to 2011. This upward trend was related to
several factors such as: the proﬁtability and productivity increases of local
ﬁrms driven by the high real exchange rate of the macroeconomic scheme
established after the 2001–2 crisis; the set-up of a labour inspection system
with the objective of monitoring compliance with labour and social security
regulations; the simpliﬁcation of the administrative procedures needed to
register workers with the social security system; the reduction in the social
security contributions paid by employers; and the implementation of speciﬁc
policies for those workers most affected by unregistered employment, such as
domestic workers (Novick et al. 2008; Bertranou et al. 2013). Finally, the
period 2011–12 witnessed a slight decrease in the share of registered wage/
salaried employees.
The rate of registration with the social security system decreased for youths
and increased for adults, men, and women over the period. All population
groups reached the lowest rate of registration during the period in 2003.
The international crisis did not immediately slow down the upward trend
in the share of wage/salaried employees registered with the social security
system among youth or adults, or among men or women. The number of
registered workers increased in the aggregate by 104,751 between 2008 and
2009, while the number of unregistered workers contracted by 82,881 over
the same period. However, the share of workers registered with the social
security system dropped slightly from 2010 to 2012 due to the increase in
the number of unregistered workers, which climbed by 135,979 workers.
7.5 Labour Earnings
Two years of falling labour earnings from 2000 to 2002 were followed by
ten years of rising labour earnings from 2002 to 2012. The increases were
large enough so that labour earnings were slightly higher in 2012 than in
2000 in real terms. The pattern of falling labour earnings during 2000–02
and rising labour earnings during 2002–12 held for all population groups,
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but youth and female workers were the ones who beneﬁted the most. In
general, workers in low-earning categories experienced a larger increase in
labour earnings than did workers in high-earning categories, whose labour
earnings even fell for some groups. Labour earnings were not affected
negatively by the 2008 crisis. (Cruces et al. 2015: ﬁgure 8)
Average monthly earnings expressed in dollars at 2005 PPP increased by
2.5 per cent, climbing from 761.7 in 2000 to 781.0 in 2012 (Table 7.1).
However, the experiences within the period varied substantially. Argentina
suffered an inordinate decline in average real labour earnings (5.6 per cent)
during the economic recession at the beginning of the period—that is, from
2000 to 2002; this drop was brought about by a large increase in domestic
prices after the devaluation of the peso coupled with the lack of adjustment of
nominal earnings in a context of high unemployment and weak unions
(Gasparini and Cruces 2010). After that period, a long and steady recovery
set in that brought with it an increase in labour earnings during most of the
subsequent years. Starting in 2003, the government favoured successive
increases in the minimum wage, and labour earnings continued to increase
in a context of employment growth; by 2011, the level of labour earnings
surpassed the 2000 level. The upward trend post-2002 was interrupted in
2008 when labour earnings fell by 2.0 per cent. In 2009, real earnings
resumed their upward trend until 2011. Finally, labour earnings fell by 2.3
per cent in 2012.
When the analysis is broken down by population groups, women and
young workers are found to be the ones who beneﬁted the most during
2000–12. Other groups whose earnings increased substantially were wage
employees, mid-earning economic sectors, and workers with low educational
levels. Employers and the self-employed, workers in high-earning sectors, and
workers with high educational levels experienced a drop in their labour earn-
ings over the period.
The evidence of falling labour earnings for workers with high educational
levels and increasing labour earnings for those with low and medium educa-
tional levels can be interpreted in light of previous ﬁndings of slight improve-
ment in the employment structure by economic sector and improvement in
the educational level of the employed population over the period. Changes in
the employment structure by economic sector implied a reduction in the total
share of sectors that can be expected to use workers with low and medium
educational levels such as utilities and transportation, domestic service, high-
tech industry, and commerce, and an increase in the total share of sectors that
employ workers with high educational levels, such as skilled services and
public administration. This evidence indicates that the demand for workers
with high educational levels relative to those with low and medium educa-
tional levels increased during 2000–12. On the other hand, the educational
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level of people in the labour force improved over the same period, leading to
an increase in the relative supply of workers with high and medium levels of
education (Cruces et al. 2015: table 7). The prediction of a supply and demand
analysis is that the relativewages of workers with high educational levels
relative to those with low and medium educational levels will rise or fall
depending on which effect dominates (increase in the relative demand versus
increase in the relative supply). In the Argentinean labour market the relative
wages of workers with high and medium educational levels relative to those
with low educational levels fell over the period, and the relative wages of
workers with high educational levels relative to those with medium educa-
tional levels also decreased (Cruces et al. 2015: table 6). The adjustment pro-
cess also led to a reduction in the unemployment rate of all educational
groups, with a larger reduction for workers with low levels of education
(Cruces et al. 2015: table 8).
During the international crisis of 2008, and after they experienced a small
decrease in 2008, labour earnings continued to grow overall and for all popu-
lation groups. Some workers in speciﬁc economic sectors were negatively
affected by the crisis. Labour earnings rose, on average, by 4.0 per cent during
2008–9, the year of the crisis. Increases were similar among most groups
analysed, except for workers in high-tech industry (no change) and in the
utilities and transportation sector (3.5 per cent decline). The crisis, then, had a
mild effect on labour earnings.
7.6 Poverty and Inequality
Despite large increases in the early 2000s, the poverty rate and the rate of
working poor households decreased substantially from 2000 to 2012.
(Cruces et al. 2015: ﬁgure 9)
The 4 dollars-a-day poverty rate fell from 27.5 per cent in 2000 to 10.8 per cent
in 2012, after climbing to 45.5 per cent in 2002; the 2.5 dollars-a-day poverty
rate dropped from 14.2 per cent to 4.7 per cent from 2000 to 2012, with a peak
of 29.2 per cent in 2002; the percentage of the working poor (deﬁned as the
proportion of persons in the population living in poor households, according
to the 4 dollars-a-day poverty line, where at least one member works)
decreased from 14.8 to 5.7 per cent over the same period, with the highest
point equal to 27.0 per cent in 2002 (Table 7.1). The downward trend in all
poverty indicators was not affected by the international crisis of 2008.
Thus, poverty rates increased substantially from 2000 to 2002, a period that
included the local crisis, and then decreased steadily until 2012, even during
the international crisis. The poverty patterns exhibited by Argentina can
Individual Country Analysis
154
be understood by examining incomes from various sources as well as govern-
ment programmes. Household labour earnings, pensions, government trans-
fers, and capital income fell substantially between 2000 and 2002 (Cruces
et al. 2015: ﬁgure 10). The reduction in real earnings after the devaluation of
the domestic currency at the beginning of the decade is the most important
factor to explain the increase in the poverty rates to unprecedented levels for
the country between 2000 and 2002 (Gasparini and Cruces 2010). The reduc-
tion in poverty indicators from 2002 to 2011 was related mainly to increases
in labour earnings and employment levels. Higher labour earnings and
employment levels accounted for nearly 70 per cent of the decline in the
poverty rate based on the 4 dollars-a-day poverty line from 2004 to 2012.
The remaining 30.0 per cent of the decline in the poverty rate was accounted
for by the increase in non-labour incomes like pensions and private and public
transfers (World Bank 2014a). Pensions increased steadily from 2002 to 2012,
while the number of beneﬁciaries from government transfers exhibited a
substantial increase with the implementation of the Asignación Universal por
Hijo targeted cash transfer programme in 2008. Indeed, it is estimated that
poverty measured by the 2.5 dollars-a-day poverty line in 2009 was nearly half
what it would have been in the absence of progressive social spending (World
Bank 2014a).
Household per capita income inequality and labour earnings inequality increased
at the beginning of the period and then started a sustained downward trend, with
the result that inequality was much lower at the end of the period (2012) than it
had been at the beginning (2000). The international crisis of 2008 did not affect
the downward trend in inequality indices that was observed in the last ten years of
the period. (Cruces et al. 2015: ﬁgure 11)
The Gini coefﬁcient of household per capita income increased from 2000 to
2002, reaching a maximum of 0.533, and then decreased steadily to 0.423 in
2012, a much lower value than in the year 2000 (0.504). Throughout the
period, the Gini coefﬁcient of labour earnings among employed workers was
lower than that of household per capita income. Its evolution mirrored the
changes in the Gini coefﬁcient of household per capita income, going from
0.459 in 2000 to 0.498 in 2002 and falling every year after, reaching 0.388 in
2012 (Table 7.1). The overall reduction in labour earnings inequality is in
accord with the evidence presented in section 7.5, showing larger income
increases for workers in low-earning employment categories compared to
workers in high-earning categories, whose labour incomes even fell for some
groups. Consequently, the reduction in labour earnings inequality in Argen-
tina occurred at the expense of income losses for some categories.
Considering that labour earnings are themain source of income for Argentine
households, its evolution could be behind the decline in household per capita
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income inequality. That is conﬁrmed by Bergolo et al. (2011), who used a non-
parametric decomposition method to ﬁnd that the reduction in labour income
inequality accounted for around three quarters of the decline in household
per capita income inequality between 2001 and 2009, and the remaining 25.0
per cent was accounted for by the decline in non-labour income inequality. The
decline in non-labour income inequality was caused by amore progressive ﬁscal
policy. The initially negative (and disequalizing) effect of the devaluation of the
domestic currency on real wages was in part compensated for by the expansion
of progressive export taxes, which were used to ﬁnance large anti-poverty
programmes like Jefes y Jefas de Hogar Desocupados in 2002 (Gasparini and
Cruces 2010). The excise taxes also had an indirect redistributive impact
because they kept domestic prices of traded goods below their international
level; this was particularly important for food prices. Within the period
2002–12, the contribution of the increase in the size and progressivity of social
spending to the reduction in household income inequality wasmore important
between 2006 and 2009 compared to the period 2003–6. The reason was the
introduction of a new non-contributory pension programme, the pension
moratorium, in 2004 (Lustig and Pessino 2013).4
The literature on labour earnings inequality in Argentina provides some
explanations for its decline during the 2000s. Gasparini and Cruces (2010)
argue that the fall in labour income inequality over the 2000s can be
accounted for by: the expansion of employment generated by the fast eco-
nomic recovery; the shift of the employment structure in favour of more low-
skilled labour-intensive sectors as a result of the devaluation of the Argentine
peso at the beginning of the decade; the fading out of the effect of skill-based
technical change on the demand for labour in the 1990s; and the rise in the
inﬂuence of labour unions. All these factors caused the skills premium, meas-
ured as relative returns to tertiary education by the authors, to fall. Gasparini
et al. (2011) found evidence consistent with the conclusions of Gasparini and
Cruces (2010). Their analysis indicates that during the 2000s, demand and
institutional factors like the minimum wage were more important for the
decline in the skill premium in Argentina than the increase in the relative
supply of skilled workers. Other papers analysed the contribution to the
declining earnings inequality of changes in the distribution of workers’ char-
acteristics and changes in the returns to those characteristics. Azevedo et al.
(2013) applied a parametric decomposition method and found that between
2000 and 2010, the changes in the distribution of workers’ characteristics like
4 The Moratoria Previsional, which has been translated into English as ‘pension moratorium’,
allowed workers of retirement age to receive a pension regardless of whether they had completed
the full thirty years of required social security contributions through formal employment (Lustig
and Pessino 2013).
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education and experience (or the ‘quantity effect’) and the changes in the
returns to those characteristics (or the ‘price effect’) were inequality-reducing.
However, the results of Battistón et al. (2014), who used a microsimulation
approach for the period 2004–9, indicate that the quantity effect was equaliz-
ing only when levels of education are used but inequality-increasing when
education is measured by years of schooling, as in Azevedo et al. (2013).
7.7 Conclusions
By Latin American standards, Argentina experienced high economic growth
during the 2000s. Within the period, the pattern of economic growth was
U-shaped: GDP fell dramatically during 2000–2 and then grew rapidly during
2003–12. Though the economy of Argentina stopped growing during the
international crisis of 2008, it recovered the previous growth pattern by 2010.
Most labour market indicators followed the U-shaped pattern of economic
growth over the period. The unemployment rate exhibited an increase in the
early years of the period and a downward trend in the later years, falling
overall between 2000 and 2012. The employment structure by occupational
position deteriorated at the beginning of the period and then improved
steadily as the share of wage/salaried employees increased and the share
of self-employed and unpaid workers decreased. The educational level of
the employed population increased steadily between 2000 and 2012.
A reduction in the percentage of registered workers at the beginning of the
period was followed by a steady upward trend after 2003. The sectoral com-
position of employment exhibited small changes that can be interpreted as a
slight improvement. Labour earnings fell dramatically in the early years of the
period and then started an upward trend. The increases were large enough in
2012 to raise labour earnings above where they had been in 2000. Workers in
low-earning categories were the ones who beneﬁted the most, while labour
earnings even fell for some high-earning categories.
In accordance with the pattern of GDP growth, poverty indicators grew by a
large amount at the beginning of the period and then started a downward
trend. This fall was large enough to bring about a substantial reduction in
poverty rates from 2000 to 2012. The Gini coefﬁcients of household per capita
income and of labour earnings decreased over the period. Inequality indices
increased in the early years of the period and fell in the later years.
Some labour market indicators were affected negatively by the inter-
national crisis of 2008: the unemployment rate increased and the compos-
ition of employment by occupational position worsened. Both indicators
had returned to pre-crises levels by 2010. The comparison between the
effects of the international crisis of 2008 on labour market indicators and
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the effects generated by the 2001–2 crisis reveals that the crisis at the begin-
ning of the 2000s impacted Argentina more strongly. The crisis of 2001–2
generated a larger reduction in GDP, a larger increase in the unemployment
rate, and a larger decrease in labour earnings compared to the Great Reces-
sion. Moreover, the poverty rates measured by the international poverty
lines increased during the ﬁrst recessionary episode, while they continued
to decrease after the international crisis of 2008. The reasons behind the
smaller negative impacts of the international crisis compared to the reces-
sion at the beginning of the decade were that at the time of the international
crisis, the Argentine economy had a relatively high amount of international
reserves, a trade and a ﬁscal surplus, and the country was in a situation of
ﬁnancial isolation.
Young workers and women had worse labour market outcomes over the
period compared to adults and men respectively, and while young workers
seem to be more vulnerable to macroeconomic crises compared to adults,
men were more negatively affected by the crises compared to women. The
unemployment rate was higher for young compared to adult workers, the
share of young employed workers in low-earning economic sectors was larger
than the share of adult workers, the percentage of young workers registered
with the social security system was lower when compared to adults, and
labour earnings of young workers were below those of adults. On the other
hand, the share of young workers in low-earning occupational positions was
lower compared to adults. In addition to the generally inferior situation of
young workers in the labour market compared to adults, youth labour mar-
ket indicators were more adversely affected by the episodes of crises. Disag-
gregating by gender, we found that men had better labour market outcomes
than women, with the only exception being the share of workers in low-
earning positions which was larger among men. However, men were hit
hardest by both crises in most labour market indicators, with the labour
earning reduction during the crisis at the beginning of the period being the
only exception to this pattern.
In summary, notwithstanding Argentina’s massive downturn from 2000
to 2002 and the international crisis of 2008, Argentine labour market con-
ditions were in a better state in 2012 than they were at the start of the
millennium.
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8Bolivia
8.1 Introduction
This chapter on labour markets and growth in Bolivia since 2000 is one of
sixteen studies of Latin American countries, each of which analyses the
growth–employment–poverty nexus and aims to answer the following broad
questions: Has economic growth resulted in economic development via
improved labour market conditions in Latin America in the 2000s, and have
these improvements halted or been reversed since the Great Recession? How
do the rate and character of economic growth, changes in the various labour
market indicators, and changes in poverty relate to each other?
To answer these questions, we analyse the growth experience of Bolivia
during the 2000s and a wide set of labour market indicators that we assign to
one of two different categories: employment and earnings indicators, and
poverty and income inequality indicators. More speciﬁcally, for the group of
employment and earnings indicators we construct statistics on the following
variables: the unemployment rate; the employment structure by occupa-
tional group, employment position, economic sector, registration of workers
with the social security system, and educational level; and mean labour
earnings and hourly wages. We present all these indicators for the employed
population as a whole and for different population groups (youth,
adults, men, and women). For the group of poverty and income inequality
indicators, we compute poverty rates using the ofﬁcial moderate and
extreme poverty lines and the international lines of 2.5 and 4 dollars a day.
We also calculate the Gini coefﬁcient of household per capita income and
labour earnings.
All the statistics in this chapter are obtained using microdata from the
Encuesta Continua de Hogares (ECH) for the years 2000 and 2003–4 and
the Encuesta de Hogares (EH) for the years 2001, 2002, and 2005 to 2012.
The nationwide surveys were processed following a harmonization method-
ology and incorporated into the SEDLAC—Socio-Economic Database for Latin
America and the Caribbean (CEDLAS and World Bank 2014).1 The resulting
labour market indicators were compiled into a large number of tables and
ﬁgures, which are available in an earlier version of this study (henceforth,
Cruces et al. 2015). Chapter 1 of this book provides the deﬁnition for each of
the indicators we analyse here, while Cruces et al. (2015) includes details on
deﬁnitions and classiﬁcation systems used by Bolivia’s household surveys, and
on comparability issues of these surveys over time.
8.2 Economic Growth
Bolivia experienced moderate economic growth from 2000 to 2012.
The economy suffered a slowdown as a consequence of the international
crisis of 2008, but GDP and GDP per capita growth rates were nonetheless
positive in 2009. (Cruces et al. 2015: ﬁgures 1 and 2)
During the period 2000–12, Bolivia experienced moderate economic growth
by Latin American standards. GDP per capita increased by 30.5 per cent, while
the average for the eighteen Latin American countries was 36.2 per cent
during the same period. GDP (measured in PPP dollars of 2005) grew by
61.2 per cent, and GDP per employed person rose by 16.8 per cent. The
annual growth rate of GDP per capita was 2.1 per cent, and it varied from a
minimum of 0.4 per cent in 2001 to a maximum of 4.6 per cent in 2008
(Table 8.1).
Most of the GDP growth took place in the second half of the period. At the
beginning of the 2000s, Bolivia experienced low economic growth. Between
2000 and 2002, economic activity was sluggish due to a real exchange rate
appreciation and a series of negative shocks such as the intensiﬁed coca
eradication, the devaluation in Brazil, and the crisis in Argentina (IMF 2006).
GDP growth averaged 2.2 per cent a year and GDP per capita growth rate was
only 0.2 per cent annually. Starting in 2003, economic activity recovered, led
by hydrocarbon and mineral exports. There was an increase in both export
volumes—the result of large investments in hydrocarbon and mining
sectors—and commodities prices. The royalty rate paid on hydrocarbon pro-
duction also increased due to the new Hydrocarbon Law of 2005, which led to
a large increase in ﬁscal revenues. Moreover, Bolivia beneﬁted from a signiﬁ-
cant reduction in its external public debt and the increase of remittances by
Bolivian nationals who hadmigrated abroad (Cali and Jemio 2010).2 The large
1 See Cruces et al. (2015: table 8.1) for details on the size of Bolivia household surveys.
2 Bolivia was part of the joint IMF/World BankHeavily Indebted Poor Countries programme that
provided 100 per cent debt relief in 2006.
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Table 8.1 Bolivia: Evolution of growth and labour market indicators over the 2000s
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Growth Indicators
GDP per capita 3,488 3,476 3,492 3,518 3,596 3,688 3,799 3,907 4,081 4,151 4,252 4,400 4,552
GDP per capita growth rate 0.42 -0.35 0.47 0.74 2.24 2.56 3.01 2.85 4.45 1.71 2.45 3.46 3.45
Employment and Earnings Indicators
Employment-to-population
ratio
66.95 70.51 68.94 70.02 … 66.38 69.47 67.53 69.94 69.97 … 70.27 67.08
Unemployment rate 5.90 6.50 5.76 5.80 … 7.05 6.53 6.85 4.62 4.81 … 4.12 3.91
Share of low-earnings
occupations
61.77 63.90 63.61 60.56 … 59.48 56.03 57.33 58.11 55.91 … 56.43 56.01
Share of mid-earnings
occupations
33.53 29.43 29.75 33.85 … 33.20 34.54 33.32 33.90 35.39 … 32.50 32.33
Share of high-earnings
occupations
4.71 6.67 6.64 5.58 … 7.32 9.42 9.35 7.99 8.70 … 11.07 11.66
Share of employers 2.06 2.41 4.79 5.16 … 5.70 4.81 5.82 6.18 5.13 … 5.79 6.79
Share of wage/salaried
employees
33.10 34.89 33.04 37.39 … 36.06 36.61 39.28 38.96 41.78 … 39.50 40.67
Share of self-employed
workers
44.74 39.52 39.43 38.99 … 38.13 37.48 36.04 35.58 35.36 … 36.53 38.34
Share of unpaid family
workers
20.11 23.18 22.74 18.45 … 20.11 21.10 18.85 19.29 17.73 … 18.19 14.20
Share of workers in
low-earnings sectors
62.12 65.31 63.47 60.18 … 59.35 55.75 56.62 57.00 54.19 … 55.71 55.54
Share of workers in
mid-earnings sectors
26.97 23.84 26.64 28.97 … 28.58 28.95 29.56 28.09 31.35 … 29.03 28.10
Share of workers in
high-earnings sectors
10.91 10.85 9.89 10.86 … 12.07 15.31 13.82 14.91 14.46 … 15.26 16.36
(continued )
Table 8.1 Continued
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Share of low educated
workers
60.05 59.64 61.33 59.36 … 55.94 56.04 50.84 50.26 48.15 … 45.91 43.17
Share of medium educated
workers
26.60 26.35 26.84 28.86 … 29.81 30.84 31.86 34.95 35.08 … 33.59 35.07
Share of high educated
workers
13.35 14.02 11.83 11.78 … 14.25 13.12 17.30 14.79 16.77 … 20.50 21.76
Share of workers registered
with SS
12.29 11.85 9.66 10.47 … 19.83 18.73 13.65 13.03 14.89 … 17.44 18.06
Mean labour earnings 447.3 415.4 435.7 443.6 … 471.0 498.9 466.1 503.6 530.9 … 573.8 589.3
Poverty and Inequality Indicators
Ofﬁcial extreme
poverty rate
42.2 30.8 36.3 27.4 … 32.4 29.1 31.1 26.0 22.6 … 17.8 18.7
Ofﬁcial moderate
poverty rate
65.0 56.4 60.0 53.6 … 56.4 53.1 55.2 52.5 47.1 … 40.8 39.1
Poverty rate 2.5
dollars-a-day
43.25 34.72 39.70 30.50 … 34.81 32.00 30.29 22.84 20.64 … 16.19 17.05
Poverty rate 4 dollars-a-day 59.90 53.61 57.75 51.43 … 53.58 48.52 47.43 40.41 35.14 … 29.16 29.49
GINI of household per
capita income
0.619 0.549 0.600 0.549 … 0.583 0.567 0.553 0.514 0.494 … 0.462 0.465
GINI of labour earnings 0.594 0.559 0.574 0.529 … 0.563 0.539 0.536 0.508 0.495 … 0.454 0.467
Note: The shaded labour market indicators’ ﬁgures represent statistical signiﬁcant improvements at 5 per cent between the initial and ﬁnal years for all the employment and earnings indicators and poverty and inequality
indicators. The only exceptions are the share of mid-earnings occupations, share of mid-earnings sectors and share of medium-educated workers for which we did not assign welfare evaluation criteria.
Source: SEDLAC (CEDLAS and World Bank 2014) and World Development Indicators (World Bank 2014).
accumulation of international reserves and signiﬁcant ﬁscal surpluses contrib-
uted to turn Bolivia into a net external creditor (IMF 2010).
The international crisis of 2008 led to an important reduction in export
prices, causing a drop in export incomes, ﬁscal revenues, and economic
activity (Jemio and Nina 2010). However, the impact of the Great Recession
on Bolivia was milder than in other Latin American countries. In fact, Bolivia
was one of few countries in Latin America that sustained positive growth
during the global crisis of 2008. GDP growth slowed from 6.2 per cent in
2008 to 3.4 per cent in 2009, and GDP per capita growth from 4.5 per cent to
1.7 per cent. Prudent ﬁscal policies during the boom allowed a sizable portion
of the hydrocarbon revenue to be saved, improving the resilience of the
economy to adverse external shocks (IMF 2014). The government imple-
mented a moderately countercyclical policy to support domestic demand
during the international crisis. Moreover, the ﬁnancial system was barely
affected due to its limited integration with international capital markets
(IMF 2010). The reduction in commodity prices was only temporary, allowing
the recovery of the growth rates. By 2011, GDP and GDP per capita growth
rates surpassed their pre-crisis levels.
8.3 Unemployment
The 2000–12 period witnessed a drop in the unemployment rate, which
was not tightly correlated to GDP growth. The unemployment rate fell
for all population groups over the period. The international crisis of 2008
led to an interruption of the overall downward trend in the unemploy-
ment rate. (Cruces et al. 2015: ﬁgure 3)
The unemployment rate (measured as the ratio of unemployment to labour
force) decreased from 5.9 per cent in 2000 to 3.9 per cent in 2012 (Table 8.1).
The decline in the unemployment rate was explained both by the entry of
persons into the labour market (the number of persons in the labour force
grew by 1,199,094 from 2000 to 2012) which mimicked the upward trend of
the working-age population, and by the reduction in the number of
unemployed people (reduction of 24,909 persons). The reduction in the
unemployment rate was not monotonic over the period. The unemployment
rate suffered an initial increase followed by a reduction between 2001 and
2003–4, while GDP was increasing, increased, and remained at the highest
level of the period between 2005 and 2007 (around 6.8 per cent) when GDP
was growing rapidly, and declined in the following years with a small inter-
ruption during the international crisis of 2008 (17,122 new unemployed
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people between 2008 and 2009). The increase in the unemployment rate
between 2005 and 2007 was related to the export-based growth process of
Bolivia, as the mining and hydrocarbon sectors—main export products of the
country—are capital-intensive (Muriel and Jemio 2010).
Between 2000 and 2012, the unemployment rate decreased for all popula-
tion groups. Young workers, adults, men, and women suffered an increase in
their unemployment rates between 2005 and 2007. All population groups
recovered the downward trend in the following years with an interruption
during the international crisis of 2008 only for adult workers and men.
8.4 Job Mix
The composition of employment by occupational group improved
between 2000 and 2012 as workers moved from elementary and agricul-
tural, forestry and ﬁshery occupations to better paying occupations like
management and professional jobs. All demographic groups—young and
adult workers, men and women—beneﬁted from the improvement in the
occupational composition of employment over the period. The inter-
national crisis of 2008 did not affect the improving trend.
(Cruces et al. 2015: ﬁgure 4)
The share of the following occupations shrank between 2000 and 2012:
agricultural occupations (drop of 9.6 percentage points); crafts and trades
occupations (drop of 2.9 percentage points); and technical and associate
professional occupations (drop of 1.7 percentage points). The share of the
following occupations grew: professional (increase of 6.7 percentage points);
services and sales workers (increase of 4.3 percentage points); and plant and
machine operators (increase of 3.1 percentage points). The share of the other
occupational groups remained largely unchanged. These changes in the occu-
pational composition of employment can be interpreted as an improvement
since low-earning occupations (agricultural, elementary, and services and
sales occupations) reduced their share in total employment by 5.8 percentage
points between 2000 and 2012, while high-earning occupations (manage-
ment, armed forces, and professionals) gained share in total employment
(increase of 7.0 percentage points). These changes resulted in a slight reduc-
tion in the share of mid-earning occupations (technicians and associate
professionals, plant and machine operators, clerical, and craft and related
trade jobs) in total employment (Table 8.1).
Improvements in the occupational composition of employment between
2000 and 2012 were observed for young and adult workers, and for men and
women.
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The international crisis of 2008 did not affect adversely the improvement in
the composition of employment by occupational group. Between 2008 and
2009 the share of low-earning occupations fell in the aggregate and for all
population groups, while the share of high-earning occupations increased
overall and for young, adult workers, and women. For men, though, a reduc-
tion in the share of high-earning occupations resulted in an increase in the
share of mid-earning occupations during the international crisis. That share
reached and surpassed the pre-crisis level by 2011.
The employment structure by occupational position improved from 2000 to 2012
as the share of wage/salaried employees and employers in total employment
increased and the share of self-employed and unpaid workers decreased. The
improving trend in the employment structure by occupational position was
experienced by all population groups. The international crisis of 2008 did not
affect adversely the improvement in the structure of employment by occupational
position overall, for adult workers, men, and women, but led to a worsening for
youth. (Cruces et al. 2015: ﬁgure 5)
The structure of employment by occupational position changed over the
period. In 2000 the largest category was the self-employed (44.7 per cent of
total employment) followed by wage/salaried employees (33.1 per cent).
By 2012, the position of these categories reversed and the largest was wage/
salaried employees (40.7 per cent of total employment) followed by the self-
employed (38.3 per cent) (Table 8.1). The share of unpaid workers decreased
over the period from 20.1 per cent of employed persons in 2000 to 14.2
per cent in 2012, while the share of employers increased from 2.1 per cent
in 2000 to 6.8 per cent in 2012. These changes in the structure of employment
by occupational position can be interpreted as an improvement due to the fall
in the share of low-earning categories (self-employment and unpaid workers)
and the increase in the share of high-earning categories (wage/salaried
employees and employers). The employment structure by occupational pos-
ition improved during 2000–12 for all population groups (young and adult
workers, men and women).
The international crisis of 2008 did not reverse the improvements that had
been taking place for the employed labour force overall, and for adults, men,
and women, but led to a worsening for young workers. The share of wage/
salaried employees increased between 2008 and 2009 while the share of
unpaid workers and self-employed fell. Only one occupational position
indicator—the share of employers in total employment—moved in the
worsening direction in 2009, but it immediately began to improve again.
When we disaggregate, we ﬁnd that the improving trend in the structure of
employment by occupational position continued without pause in 2009 for
adult workers, men, and women. For young workers, though, there was a
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break in the tendency described before. An increase in the share of self-
employed workers and a decrease in the share of wage/salaried employees
took place between 2008 and 2009. In the context of a slowdown in the
economic activity, young workers in Bolivia resorted to self-employment as a
strategy to continue being employed. The share of self-employed workers
was again declining by 2012.
The employment composition by economic sector improved over the course of
the period studied overall and for all population groups. The international crisis of
2008 did not interrupt the decreasing trend in the share of employment in low-
earning sectors, but led to a reduction in the share of high-earning sectors in total
employment and an increase in the share of employment in mid-earning sectors.
(Cruces et al. 2015: ﬁgure 6)
The period 2000–12 witnessed a reduction (from 62.1 per cent to 55.5 per
cent) in the share of workers in low-earning sectors (domestic service, primary
activities, and commerce). Workers employed in the mining and hydrocarbon
subsectors are included in the primary activities sector in our classiﬁcation.
The increase in the employment share of the capital-intensive mining and
hydrocarbon subsectors over the period in Bolivia was counteracted by the
reduction in the employment share of the labour-intensive agricultural sub-
sector. Interestingly, besides the reduction in the share of low-earning sectors
in total employment over the period, these sectors accounted for more than
half of the total employed population of the country by 2012. There was,
during the same period, an increase (from 10.9 per cent to 16.4 per cent) in the
share of high-earning sectors (public administration, skilled services, and
utilities and transportation) in the total. These changes resulted in a slight
increase in the share of mid-earning sectors (industry, construction, educa-
tion, and health) in total employment (Table 8.1).
The employment composition by economic sector improved between 2000
and 2012 for young and adult workers, men and women, as they moved from
low-earning sectors to high-earning sectors.
The international crisis of 2008 did not halt the downward trend in the
share of low-earning sectors overall and for all population groups, but led to a
reduction in the share of high-earning sectors in total employment that
impacted mainly young workers and resulted in an increase in the share of
mid-earning sectors in total employment. Adults andmen surpassed their pre-
crisis share of high-earning sectors in total employment by 2011, while for
young workers and women that happened in 2012.
The educational level of the Bolivian employed population improved steadily over
the period for all population groups, and especially among young workers. The
improving trend was not impacted adversely by the international crisis of 2008.
(Cruces et al. 2015: ﬁgure 7)
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The share of employed workers with low educational levels (eight years of
schooling or less) dropped from 60.1 per cent in 2000 to 43.2 per cent in 2012,
while the share of workers with medium and high educational levels (nine to
thirteen years of schooling and over thirteen years of schooling) grew from
26.6 per cent in 2000 to 35.1 per cent in 2012 and from 13.4 per cent to 21.8
per cent respectively (Table 8.1).3 We interpret this result as an improvement
for the employed population as the level of education is an important pre-
dictor of labour earnings. Consequently, the changes in the employment
structure by educational level implied an increase in the share of workers
that tend to have high levels of earnings and a decline in the share of workers
with low earnings levels.4 The educational level of the employed population
improved between 2000 and 2012 for all groups and especially for young
workers. The pattern of improvement in the level of education of the
employed population in Bolivia continued even during the international crisis
of 2008, overall and for all population groups.
The overall share of workers registered with the social security system increased
between 2000 and 2012, though erratically. The improvement also took place
among all population groups, especially adult workers and women. The inter-
national crisis of 2008 did not affect the upward trend of the registration rate.
(Cruces et al. 2015: ﬁgure 8)
The social security system in Bolivia is composed of the short-termMandatory
Social Insurance (Seguro Social Obligatorio) and the Long-Term Social Insurance
(Seguro Social de Largo Plazo). The short-term Mandatory Social Insurance
covers health, life, and work contingencies. It providesmedical services (atten-
tion for the afﬁliated members and their families), as well as in-kind and cash
transfers. The Long-Term Social Insurance covers disability, old age, and
death, and it is an individual capitalization system. The afﬁliation to this
insurance is mandatory for all dependent workers and voluntary for inde-
pendent workers. Besides the individual capitalization system, a non-
contributory universal pension—Bonosol—was implemented in the 1990s for
all Bolivians aged 65 or more. In 2008, the Bonosol was replaced by the Renta
Dignidad, which covers all Bolivians aged 60 or more with reduced beneﬁts for
those receiving any other pension (Monterrey Arce 2013).
3 The most frequent value of years of education for employed workers in Bolivia was ﬁve
between 2000 and 2002 (around 12.4 per cent of employed workers had ﬁve years of education)
and twelve between 2003 and 2012 (around 16.5 per cent of employed workers had twelve years of
education).
4 The improvement in the employment structure by educational level is related to changes in
the relative demand and supply of workers with high educational levels with corresponding
implications on the wage gap by educational groups and the unemployment rate of each
educational level. We introduce a discussion about the role of these factors in section 8.5.
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Social security records show an increase in the percentage of employed
workers registered with the contributory scheme of the system between
2000 and 2012, from 12.3 per cent in 2000 (452,194 registered workers) to
18.1 per cent in 2012 (542,843 registered workers) (Table 8.1). The changes
were erratic. From 2000 to 2002 the percentage of workers registered with the
social security system decreased; it increased between 2002 and 2005 and fell
again up to 2008. From 2009 onwards, the share of employed workers regis-
tered with the social security system increased steadily. Thus, the employed
population in Bolivia has been largely informal (unregistered)—just 14.5 per
cent registered over the period. Among the reasons for workers not contribut-
ing to the individual capitalization system, ignorance about how the system
works and lack of economic resources are the most important (Wanderley
2009). The rate of registration with the social security system increased for all
population groups (young and adult workers, men, and women).
The overall percentage of workers registered with the social security system
continued to grow during the international crisis of 2008. Disaggregating, the
rate of registration also continued to increase for adult workers, men, and
women. For young workers, though, the rate of registration slightly decreased
in 2009. This fact is in accordwith our previous evidence of increase in the share
of self-employment—an employment category where the registration with
social security is typically low—among young workers during the international
crisis.5 By 2011 it recovered the pre-crisis level and resumed the upward trend.
8.5 Labour Earnings
Labour earnings increased between 2000 and 2012. Within the period,
there was a reduction in the early years of the period, a steady increase
during 2002–06, a fall in 2007, and an upward trend in the following years.
Workers were not affected negatively by the 2008 crisis. Labour earnings
increased overall, for young and adult workers, and for men and women.
The evidence of earning changes by employment categories over the
period indicates that labour earnings increased for low-earning categories
and tended to decrease for high-earning categories.
(Cruces et al. 2015: ﬁgure 9)
Average monthly earnings, expressed in dollars at 2005 purchasing power
parity (PPP), increased by 31.8 per cent, from US$447 in 2000 to US$589 in
2012 (Table 8.1). Labour earnings fell at the beginning of the period—
2000–1—and rose in most years after that. The upward trend was interrupted
5 The average registration rate of self-employed workers during the period 2000–12 was only
2.51 per cent, while it was 32.8 per cent for wage/salaried employees.
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in 2007 when labour earnings fell by 10.1 per cent. In 2008, real earnings
resumed their upward trend. Starting in 2006, the government implemented
continuous increases in the minimum monthly earning. Real earnings
increased even more than the growth in minimum wages and the percentage
of workers earning less than the minimummonthly earnings decreased, while
the percentage of workers earning more than three times the minimum
monthly earnings increased (Canavire-Bacarreza and Rios-Avila 2015). Disag-
gregating, we ﬁnd that men and women, and young and adult workers all
increased their labour earnings between 2000 and 2012. The trend in their
labour earnings reﬂected the erratic overall time path.
Mean earnings rose between 2000 and 2012 in low-earning categories and
tended to fall in high-earning categories. Among occupational groups, agri-
cultural, forestry, and ﬁshery workers, workers in elementary occupations, and
services and sales workers had an average increase in their labour earnings.
Workers in management, armed forces, and professionals suffered an earning
reduction. When the working population is broken down by occupational
positions, the self-employed had an increase in labour earnings, while
employers and paid employees slightly increased their labour earnings over
the period. Domestic workers and workers from primary activities and com-
merce increased their labour earnings over the period. On the other hand,
workers in public administration, skilled services, and utilities and transpor-
tation suffered an earnings loss. Finally, labour earnings of workers with high
educational levels fell, while workers with medium and low levels of educa-
tion had an increase in their labour earnings.
The evidence of falling labour earnings for workers with high educational
levels and labour earnings increases for workers with medium and low educa-
tional levels can be interpreted in light of previous ﬁndings of improving
employment structure by occupational group and economic sector over the
period, and improving educational level of the employed population. The
improving employment structure by occupational group and economic sector
implied an increase in the share of occupations and sectors that can be
expected to employ workers with high and medium educational levels, such
as management and professional occupations, public administration, skilled
services, and utilities and transportation sectors, and a reduction in the share
of occupations and sectors that employ workers with low educational levels,
such as elementary and agricultural occupations, and domestic workers and
primary activities sectors. This evidence indicates that the demand for workers
with high and medium educational levels relative to those with low educa-
tional levels increased between 2000 and 2012. On the other hand, the
educational level of people in the labour force improved over the same period,
indicating an increase in the relative supply of workers with high andmedium
levels of education (Cruces et al. 2015: table 8). The prediction of a supply and
Bolivia
171
demand analysis is that the relative wages of workers with high and medium
educational levels relative to those with low educational levels will rise or fall
depending on which effect dominates (increase in the relative demand versus
increase in the relative supply). In the Bolivian labour market the relative
wages of workers with high and medium educational levels relative to those
with low educational levels fell over the period, and the relative wages of
workers with high educational levels relative to those with medium educa-
tional levels also decreased (Cruces et al. 2015: table 7). The adjustment
process also led to a reduction in the unemployment rate of all educational
levels, with a larger reduction for workers with medium levels of education
(Cruces et al. 2015: table 9).
Even during the international crisis of 2008, labour earnings continued to
grow overall and for all demographic groups. However, some employment
categories were impacted adversely by the 2008 crisis. Among occupational
groups, workers in the armed forces, agricultural, forestry, and ﬁshery workers,
professionals, management workers, and workers in elementary occupations
were affected negatively by the international crisis of 2008. Among economic
sectors, workers from skilled services, public administration, primary activ-
ities, domestic workers, and workers from education and health were affected
negatively by the international crisis of 2008. Among educational groups,
workers with high educational levels were the only ones affected adversely
by the international crisis of 2008.
8.6 Poverty and Inequality
Poverty indicators exhibited important reductions between 2000 and 2012
for all poverty lines used, with ups and downs over the period. The down-
ward trend was not affected by the international crisis of 2008.
(Cruces et al. 2015: ﬁgure 10)
The moderate poverty rate (measured by the country’s ofﬁcial poverty line)
fell from 65.0 per cent in 2000 to 39.1 per cent in 2012 (drop of 945,498 in the
number of moderately poor persons); the extreme poverty rate dropped from
42.2 per cent to 18.7 per cent (drop of 1,332,796 in the number of extremely
poor persons); the percentage of working poor (deﬁned as the proportion of
persons in the population living in poor households where at least one
member works) decreased from 56.2 per cent to 31.6 per cent over the same
period (Table 8.1). The analysis of trends based on the 2.5 and 4 dollars-a-day
PPP international poverty lines shows the same trends. All of these indicators
moved with ups and downs in the ﬁrst half of the period analysed and
decreased steadily from 2007 onwards in the case of the ofﬁcial poverty
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lines, and from 2005 onwards using the international poverty lines. The
downward trends in the rates of poverty and working poor were not inter-
rupted by the international crisis of 2008. In 2012 the moderate poverty rate
and the percentage of working poor continued to decrease but at a slower
pace, while the extreme poverty rate and the measures calculated using the
international poverty lines showed a slight increase.
The erratic evolution of poverty indicators in the ﬁrst half of the period
studied has been attributed to high income inequality—high inequality
slowed poverty reduction in good years and accelerated poverty in the bad
years—and to the growth process based on hydrocarbons, a sector with a small
share of total employment (Weisbrot and Sandoval 2007; Gray Molina and
Yañez 2009). In the second half of the 2000s, labour incomes and incomes
from government transfers during the international crisis explained the
increase in household total income (Cruces et al. 2015: ﬁgure 11). The large
availability of resources from hydrocarbon rents allowed the government to
expand the social safety net through cash transfer programmes such as Bono
Juancito Pinto, Bono Juana Azurduy, the non-contributory pension Renta Digni-
dad, as well as other social programmes, such as the undernourishment pro-
gramme Desnutrición Cero, and the literacy programme Yo si puedo. However,
Bolivian cash transfer programmes had only a small impact on poverty reduc-
tion (Vera Cossio 2011; Yañez et al. 2011). Some of the reasons for this include
that: the programmes are not targeted to the poor (they are universal), gener-
ating signiﬁcant leakages to the non-poor (Paz Arauco et al. 2013); the trans-
fers are too small—only 4.0 per cent of the average annual consumption of a
Bolivian household—(McGuire 2013); and they are poorly complemented by
effective public provision of health and education, and implemented by a
state with low administrative capacity (McGuire 2013).
Household per capita income and labour earning inequality decreased between
2000 and 2012 but moved erratically over the period. The reducing trend was not
interrupted by the international crisis of 2008. (Cruces et al. 2015: ﬁgure 12)
Household per capita income and labour earning inequality decreased while
GDP increased over the period. The Gini coefﬁcient of household per capita
income fell from 0.619 in 2000 to 0.465 in 2012. This indicator moved
erratically from 2000 to 2005 and then decreased steadily until 2011, when
it stabilized at around 0.463. Throughout the period, the Gini coefﬁcient of
labour earnings among employed workers was slightly lower than that of
household per capita income. Its evolution mirrored the movement of the
Gini coefﬁcient of household per capita income and fell from 0.594 in 2000 to
0.467 in 2012 (Table 8.1). The evolution of the Gini coefﬁcient of labour
earnings over the period is not surprising given the previous evidence of rising
incomes for low-earning categories and decreasing incomes for high-earning
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categories. Consequently, the reduction in labour-earning inequality in
Bolivia occurred at the expense of income losses for some categories.
Changes in household per capita income inequality in Bolivia in the ﬁrst
half of the 2000s have been explained mainly by factors associated with the
labour market: (1) the level of education of the household head; (2) labour
activity of the household (proportion of household members who are
unemployed, proportion in each occupational position, and proportion in
each occupational group); and to a lesser extent (3) demographic characteris-
tics (Gray Molina and Yañez 2009). On the other hand, ﬁscal policy had a
small effect on income inequality in the second half of the period studied.
Between 2007 and 2009, social spending in Bolivia increased through a new
wave of cash transfer programmes. However, none of the programmes was
designed with a targeted mechanism to the poor since eligibility is not condi-
tional on being poor. As a result, the inequality reduction in Bolivia is small
once direct transfers and indirect taxes are accounted for (Lustig et al. 2011;
Paz Arauco et al. 2013). Changes in labour earnings inequality between 2000
and 2010 have been explained through the reduction in the education wage
premium in the labour market (or ‘price effect’) and changes in the distribu-
tion of the stock of education (or ‘quantity effect’) (Azevedo et al. 2013). The
reductions in the education wage premium between 2000 and 2007 were
consistent with a robust increase in the relative supply of workers with high
educational levels (those with complete or incomplete college education) and
a concurrent fall in its relative demand (Gasparini et al. 2011). Institutional
factors have also played a role in changes in labour earnings inequality.
Canavire-Bacarreza and Rios-Avila (2015) analysed the evolution of labour
income inequality in Bolivia from 2000 to 2012 and reported a faster earnings
growth in the lower quintiles of the earnings distribution compared to the
highest quintiles. The authors associated this ﬁnding with increases in the
minimummonthly earnings as well as anti-discriminatory policies. They also
found that changes in demographic characteristics explain only a small por-
tion of the observed inequality decline, while the fall in the returns to educa-
tion and changes in the occupational structure of employment are the main
contributors to the decline in earnings inequality over the period.
8.7 Conclusions
From 2000 to 2012, Bolivia experienced moderate economic growth by Latin
American standards. The economy suffered a slowdown as a consequence of
the international crisis of 2008, but Bolivia was one of the few countries in
Latin America to have sustained positive growth during that episode.
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All labour market indicators improved between 2000 and 2012, and that
trend was, in general, not affected by the international crisis of 2008. The
unemployment rate was always low and fell over the period. The compos-
ition of the employed population by occupational group improved between
2000 and 2012 as workers moved from elementary and agricultural, forestry
and ﬁshery occupations to better-paying occupations, such as management
and professional jobs. The employment structure by occupational position
also improved through the reduction in the share of self-employed and
unpaid workers in total employment and the increase in the share of wage/
salaried employees and employers. Workers moved from low-earning eco-
nomic sectors like domestic service and primary activities to high-earning
sectors such as public administration, skilled services, and utilities and trans-
portation. The educational level of the Bolivian employed population
improved steadily over the period, the overall share of workers registered
with the social security system increased, and labour earnings grew between
2000 and 2012. Moreover, the moderate and extreme poverty rates and the
rate of working poor households showed important reductions between
2000 and 2012, as did the Gini coefﬁcient of per capita household income
and labour earnings.
The international crisis of 2008 led to an interruption in the downward
trend of the unemployment rate, but the pre-crisis trajectory was recovered
immediately. The remaining labour market indicators were not affected by
the crisis.
Young workers and women had worse labour market outcomes over the
period compared to adults and men respectively, and while the effects of the
international crisis were negligible in general, young workers suffered some
adverse impacts. The unemployment rate was higher for young compared to
adult workers, the shares of young employed workers in low-earning occupa-
tions and sectors were larger than the shares of adult workers, the percentage
of young workers registered with the social security system was lower when
compared to adults, and labour earnings of young workers were below those of
adults. On the other hand, the share of young workers in low-earning occu-
pational positions was below that share for adults. In addition to the generally
inferior situation of young workers in the labour market, youth suffered an
increase in the share of workers in low-earning positions and a decrease in the
percentage of workers registered with the social security system during the
international crisis. Disaggregating by gender, we found that men outper-
formed women in all labour market indicators over the period, and none of
them suffered any adverse effect of the crisis.
In summary, notwithstanding the international crisis of 2008, Bolivian
labour market conditions were in a better state in 2012 than they were at
the start of the millennium.
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9Brazil
9.1 Introduction
This chapter on labour markets and growth in Brazil since 2000 is one of
sixteen studies of Latin American countries, each of which analyses the
growth–employment–poverty nexus and aims to answer the following broad
questions: Has economic growth resulted in economic development via
improved labour market conditions in Latin America in the 2000s, and have
these improvements halted or been reversed since the Great Recession? How
do the rate and character of economic growth, changes in the various labour
market indicators, and changes in poverty relate to each other?
To answer these questions, we analyse the growth experience of Brazil
during the 2000s and a wide set of labour market indicators that we assign
to one of two different categories: employment and earnings indicators, and
poverty and income inequality indicators. More speciﬁcally, for the group of
employment and earnings indicators we construct statistics on the following
variables: the unemployment rate; the employment structure by occupa-
tional group, employment position, economic sector, registration of workers
with the social security system, and educational level; and mean labour
earnings and hourly wages. We present all these indicators for the employed
population as a whole and for different population groups (youth, adults,
men, and women). For the group of poverty and income inequality indica-
tors, we compute poverty rates using the ofﬁcial moderate and extreme
poverty lines and the international lines of 2.5 and 4 dollars a day. We
also calculate the Gini coefﬁcient of household per capita income and
labour earnings.
All the statistics in this chapter are obtained using microdata from the
Pesquisa Nacional por Amostra de Domicílios (PNAD) for the years 2001–9,
2011, and 2012. The nationwide surveys were processed following a harmon-
ization methodology and incorporated into the SEDLAC—Socio-Economic
Database for Latin America and the Caribbean (CEDLAS and World Bank
2014).1 The resulting labour market indicators were compiled into a large
number of tables and ﬁgures, which are available in an earlier version of this
study (henceforth, Cruces et al. 2015). Chapter 1 of this book provides the
deﬁnition for each of the indicators we analyse here, while Cruces et al. (2015)
includes details on deﬁnitions and classiﬁcation systems used by Brazil’s
household surveys, and on comparability issues of these surveys over time.
9.2 Economic Growth
Brazil exhibited slow economic growth from 2000 to 2012. The economy
stagnated from 2000 to 2003 but then experienced rapid economic growth
until 2008, when it was affected by the international economic crisis. It
recovered quickly in 2010, but slowed down over the next two years.
(Cruces et al. 2015: ﬁgures 1 and 2)
From 2000 to 2012, Brazil’s economic growth was lower than the average for
the Latin American region. GDP per capita increased by 29.8 per cent, while
the average for the eighteen Latin American countries was 36.2 per cent
during the same period. GDP (measured in 2005 PPP dollars) grew by 47.8
per cent, and GDP per employed person experienced a 12.0 per cent rise.
The annual growth rate of GDP per capita was 2.2 per cent, and it varied
from 1.2 per cent in 2009 to 6.6 per cent in 2010 (Table 9.1).
In just twelve years, the Brazilian growth experience can be separated into
four different stages. First, from 2000 to 2003 the economy was characterized
by a volatile external environment along with concerns about the continuity
of macroeconomic policies following the change in government in 2003.
These factors led to a sharp decline in external capital ﬂows, a depreciation
of the local currency, and some inﬂationary pressures (IMF 2003). GDP per
capita increased by only 1.0 per cent between 2000 and 2003, with two years
in which it actually shrunk (0.1 per cent in 2001 and 0.2 per cent in 2003).
Second, rapid economic growth occurred from 2003 to 2008, with GDP
per capita increasing by 19.9 per cent, equivalent to an annual growth of
3.7 per cent. The increased domestic demand (consumption and investment)
was the driving force of the growth process between 2003 and 2008. Redis-
tributive policies jointly with credit expansion encouraged the consumption
of durable goods (Ferraz et al. 2010). To increase growth further, the govern-
ment announced in 2007 the Growth Acceleration Program, which contains
steps to increase public and private investment (IMF 2007). The country also
managed to reduce the GDP volatility (a historical feature of Brazilian growth),
1 See Cruces et al. (2015: table 1) for details on the size of Brazil household surveys.
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Table 9.1 Brazil: Evolution of growth and labour market indicators over the 2000s
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Growth Indicators GDP per capita 7,906 7,898 7,998 7,985 8,338 8,502 8,745 9,187 9,573 9,456 10,079 10,264 10,264
GDP per capita
growth rate
2.81 0.10 1.27 0.17 4.42 1.97 2.85 5.06 4.20 1.22 6.59 1.83 0.00
Employment and
Earnings Indicators
Employment-to-
population ratio
. . . 60.76 61.66 61.23 62.46 62.88 63.21 63.02 63.69 62.89 . . . 61.73 61.84
Unemployment rate . . . 9.34 9.10 9.72 8.89 9.30 8.39 8.09 7.09 8.28 . . . 6.69 6.15
Share of low-earnings
occupations
. . . . . . 57.83 58.00 58.09 57.39 57.22 57.20 56.51 56.48 . . . 56.75 55.55
Share of mid-earnings
occupations
. . . . . . 28.49 28.29 28.61 28.79 28.31 28.59 28.89 28.43 . . . 27.97 28.01
Share of high-earnings
occupations
. . . . . . 13.68 13.71 13.30 13.82 14.47 14.20 14.59 15.09 . . . 15.28 16.45
Share of employers . . . 4.33 4.35 4.28 4.20 4.32 4.53 3.83 4.55 4.36 . . . 3.43 3.80
Share of wage/salaried
employees
. . . 63.00 62.90 62.93 63.66 63.65 64.36 65.51 66.39 66.87 . . . 68.44 68.89
Share of self-employed
workers
. . . 22.72 22.63 22.67 22.27 21.95 21.49 21.41 20.44 20.66 . . . 21.20 20.76
Share of unpaid family
workers
. . . 9.95 10.12 10.12 9.87 10.09 9.62 9.25 8.63 8.11 . . . 6.93 6.55
Share of workers in low-
earnings sectors
. . . 36.15 34.72 34.66 35.05 34.78 33.71 32.34 31.53 31.51 . . . 28.52 27.59
Share of workers in mid-
earnings sectors
. . . 40.84 40.24 40.30 39.82 40.43 40.37 41.58 41.83 41.69 . . . 44.06 44.36
Share of workers in high-
earnings sectors
. . . 23.01 25.04 25.04 25.13 24.80 25.92 26.08 26.65 26.80 . . . 27.42 28.05
Share of low-educated
workers
. . . 63.79 61.96 59.97 58.56 56.83 54.69 53.05 50.72 48.93 . . . 46.38 44.95
Share of medium-
educated workers
. . . 27.53 28.99 30.64 31.88 33.24 34.67 33.73 36.23 37.15 . . . 38.17 40.51
Share of high-educated
workers
. . . 8.68 9.05 9.39 9.56 9.93 10.65 13.23 13.04 13.93 . . . 15.45 14.55
Share of workers
registered with SS
. . . 46.90 46.27 47.36 47.50 48.44 49.60 51.64 52.86 54.27 . . . 59.13 60.22
Mean labour earnings . . . 539.9 533.6 503.8 498.4 515.8 546.4 569.1 580.3 593.9 641.3 680.1
Poverty and Inequality
Indicators
Poverty rate 2.5 dollars-a-
day
. . . 27.35 26.02 26.66 24.87 22.88 19.59 18.11 15.59 14.88 . . . 12.60 10.37
Poverty rate 4 dollars-a-
day
. . . 43.05 42.13 42.78 40.81 38.37 34.81 31.84 29.14 27.44 . . . 24.46 21.49
(continued )
Table 9.1 Continued
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
GINI of household per
capita income
. . . 0.588 0.583 0.576 0.566 0.564 0.559 0.549 0.542 0.536 . . . 0.527 0.523
GINI of labour earnings . . . 0.563 0.560 0.552 0.544 0.540 0.538 0.525 0.518 0.515 . . . 0.499 0.496
Note: The shaded ﬁgures for labour market indicators represent statistical signiﬁcant improvements at 5 per cent between the initial and ﬁnal years for all the employment and earnings indicators
and poverty and inequality indicators. The only exceptions are the share of mid-earnings occupations, share of mid-earnings sectors, and share of medium-educated workers for which we did not
assign welfare evaluation criteria.
Source: SEDLAC (CEDLAS and World Bank 2014) and World Development Indicators (World Bank 2014).
making the economy more resilient to external shocks. That was possible
through several transformations (Ferraz et al. 2010). First, the stock of public
external debt was reduced. Second, the historical ﬁscal deﬁcit was reversed to
a surplus position. Third, export growth underpinned sustained external
current account surpluses which, together with strong private capital inﬂows,
allowed the authorities to build a cushion of foreign exchange reserves (IMF
2007; Blyde et al. 2010). Fourth, prices were stabilized. The third stage in the
growth experience of Brazil during the 2000s was between 2008 and 2009,
when the economy suffered the impact of the international crisis. GDP per
capita fell by 1.2 per cent that year. The government implemented some
countercyclical measures to mitigate the negative impacts of the crisis, includ-
ing an increase in wages of public-sector employees, an increase in social
expenditures and in transfers to the private sector, and a reduction in taxes
levied on certain goods (Mendonça de Barros 2010). Finally, the post-crisis
period was characterized by a fast recovery, followed by a slowdown. In 2010,
GDP per capita rose by 6.6 per cent, largely surpassing its pre-crisis level of
2008. Then, the GDP per capita growth rate slowed to 1.8 per cent in 2011 and
experienced no change in 2012.
9.3 Unemployment
The unemployment rate decreased overall, for youth and adults, and for
both men and women. The unemployment rate increased during the
international crisis but quickly dropped when the crisis receded, falling
below its pre-crisis level by 2010. (Cruces et al. 2015: ﬁgure 3)
The unemployment rate (measured as the ratio of unemployment to labour
force) fell from 9.3 per cent in 2001 (7,578,615 unemployed people) to
6.2 per cent in 2012 (6,149,025 unemployed people) (Table 9.1). This reduc-
tion was not monotonic. Unemployment stood at 9.3 per cent on average
between 2001 and 2005, decreased to 7.1 per cent in 2008, went up to 8.3 per
cent during the international crisis (1,299,282 new unemployed people
between 2008 and 2009), and fell to 6.2 per cent in 2012, the year in which
it reached its lowest level during the period of analysis. The rise in the
unemployment rate during the international crisis took place in a context of
an increasing number of persons in the labour force and an increasing number
of employed people (1,654,748 and 355,466 persons respectively). Lay-offs
grew more than hiring in 2009, leading to an increase in the number of
unemployed persons and leaving new entrants into the labour market with-
out a job (Pochmann 2009). The recovery following the international crisis
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was very quick and by 2011 (no data were available for 2010) the unemploy-
ment rate had dropped below its pre-crisis level.
The unemployment rate dropped for youth and adults and for both men
and women. However, all groups were affected by the international crisis. By
2011, unemployment rates were lower than they had been before the crisis for
all population groups.
9.4 Job Mix
The composition of employment by occupational group improved over
the period as workers moved from low-paid occupations such as elemen-
tary jobs to better paying occupations, such as professional jobs. Young
and adult workers and women beneﬁted from the improving trend, while
men suffered a slight worsening. The international crisis of 2008 did not
affect the improving trend in the employment structure by occupation,
but impacted on the relative shares of low- and mid-paid occupations.
(Cruces et al. 2015: ﬁgure 4)
From 2002 (the ﬁrst year for which occupational breakdowns are available) to
2012, the share of low-earning occupations (elementary, plant and machine
operators, and services and sales occupations) fell by 2.3 percentage points,
while there was an increase of 2.8 percentage points in the share of high-paid
occupations (management, professional, and armed forces) and a small
change in the share of mid-paid occupations (technical jobs, clerical, agricul-
tural, forestry and ﬁshery occupations, and crafts and related trades) which
declined by 0.5 percentage points (Table 9.1). The occupations that exhibited
the largest reduction of shares over the period were: elementary occupations
which shrank steadily from 25.8 to 18.3 per cent (7.5 percentage points), and
agricultural, forestry, and ﬁshery workers (a middle-paid occupation in Brazil)
which fell from 6.8 per cent to 4.7 per cent (2.1 percentage points). On the
other hand, the occupations whose shares increased were professionals (3.0
percentage points), services and sales workers (2.8 percentage points), plant
and machine operators (2.4 percentage points), and clerical (2.2 percentage
points). The international crisis led to a pause in the downward trend of the
share of low-paid occupations in total employment. The share of mid-paid
occupations continued to decrease, while the share of high-paid occupations
exhibited a small increase between 2008 and 2009. The previous conﬁgur-
ation, with a downward trend in the share of low-paid sectors, an upward
trend in the share of high-paid sectors, and a share of mid-paid sectors with
small annual changes, was recovered in 2012.
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The improvements in occupational composition were especially large for
youth and women, but there was also an improvement for adults and a slight
worsening for men. The downward trend in the share of low-paid occupations
stalled during the international crisis for young and adult workers and for
women, the share of middle-paid occupations suffered a small reduction, and
consequently the share of high-paid occupations increased for them. On the
other hand, the pre-crisis trends in themale occupational structure of employ-
ment were not affected by the international crisis. Young and adult workers
and women recovered the pre-crisis trends in 2012.
The employment structure by occupational position improved, with workers
moving from unpaid jobs to paid ones. This occurred for all population groups,
especially among youth and women. The international crisis impacted negatively
on the downward trend of the share of self-employed workers.
(Cruces et al. 2015: ﬁgure 5)
From 2001 to 2012, there were changes in the employment structure by
occupational position, especially in the shares of unpaid workers and wage/
salaried employees. The share of the largest category—wage/salaried
employees—increased from 63.0 per cent to 68.9 per cent, while the share of
unpaid workers decreased from 10.0 per cent to 6.6 per cent. The share of the
self-employed also dropped from 22.7 per cent in 2001 to 20.8 per cent in
2012, while the share of employers shrank from 4.3 per cent to 3.8 per cent
(Table 9.1). These changes in the structure of employment by occupational
position can be interpreted as an improvement as the share of high-earning
positions (wage/salaried employees and employers) increased (rise of 5.4 per-
centage points) and the share of low-earning positions (self-employed and
unpaid workers) fell. The international crisis negatively affected the down-
ward trend of the share of self-employed workers in total employment.
Between 2008 and 2009, the share of self-employed workers stopped decreas-
ing and suffered a slight increase that was counterbalanced by a smaller
increase in the share of wage/salaried employees and a small reduction in
the share of employers. That could be explained by the absence of a guaran-
teed income system for all the new unemployed persons that emerged during
the crisis and led some of them to develop activities as self-employed workers
(Pochmann 2009). By 2012, the downward trend was recovered but the share
of self-employed workers was still above the pre-crisis level.
The employment structure by occupational position improved for all popu-
lation groups over the period. The international crisis of 2008 led to a tem-
porary increase in the share of self-employed workers for all of them. By 2012,
all groups recovered the previous downward trend but for adult workers and
men the shares of self-employed were still above their pre-crisis levels. Young
workers and women recovered their pre-recessionary levels.
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The employment composition by economic sector improved over the course of
the period studied. Youth particularly beneﬁted, but so did women, adults, and
men. The international crisis brought this trend to a standstill.
(Cruces et al. 2015: ﬁgure 6)
The period from 2001 to 2012 was marked by major changes in the sectoral
composition of employment in Brazil. The share of workers in low-earning
sectors (domestic service, primary activities, and low-tech industry) dimin-
ished by 8.6 percentage points from 2001 to 2012. On the other hand, there
were increases in the shares of mid-earning sectors (high-tech industry, con-
struction, commerce, and utilities and transportation) and high-earning sectors
(public administration, skilled services, and education and health) of 3.5 and
5.0 percentage points respectively (Table 9.1). The sectors that registered the
largest reductions over the period were primary activities and domestic workers
(drop of 5.8 percentage points and 3.4 percentage points respectively), while
skilled services showed the largest increase (5.0 percentage points). During the
international crisis of 2008, the trends described above stalled, but they re-
sumed during the post-crisis period. Consistent with evidence showing that the
industry sector suffered the largest negative impact on its value added during
the international crisis (compared to the agricultural and service sectors)
(Cruces et al. 2015: table 2), low- and high-tech industry sectors exhibited
among the largest declines in their shares in total employment during that
episode. This impact was counteracted by the increase in the share of com-
merce in total employment. The different situation of the commerce sector in
comparison to the industry sectors was due to increases in real wages and
expenditure, and led consequently to a small total change in the share of
mid-earning sectors in total employment during the international crisis.
Turning now to demographic disaggregation, youth was the group that
most beneﬁted from the reduction in the share of low-earning sectors, fol-
lowed by women, men, and adults. The international crisis of 2008 affected all
groups equally by bringing the reducing trend in the share of low-earning
sectors to a standstill, but the previous trends resumed for all groups after
the crisis.
The educational level of the employed population improved over the period for all
population groups, especially young workers. The economic crisis did not have an
effect on this trend. (Cruces et al. 2015: ﬁgure 7)
The share of employed workers with low educational levels (eight years of
schooling or less) dropped from 63.8 per cent in 2001 to 45.0 per cent in 2012,
while the share of employed workers with middle and high educational levels
(nine to thirteen years of schooling and over thirteen years of schooling) grew
from 27.5 per cent in 2001 to 40.5 per cent in 2012 and from 8.7 per cent to
14.6 per cent respectively (Table 9.1). This improving trend in the educational
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level of the employed population was not affected by the international crisis.2
We interpret this result as an improvement for the employed population as
the level of education is an important predictor of labour earnings. Conse-
quently, the changes in the employment structure by educational level
implied an increase in the share of workers that tend to have high levels of
earnings and a decline in the share of workers with low earnings levels.3
All population groups beneﬁted from the increase in the educational level of
the employed population over the period. None of them was affected by the
international crisis.
The overall share of employed workers registered with the social security system
increased as a whole and for all population groups. The international crisis did not
affect this upward trend. (Cruces et al. 2015: ﬁgure 8)
The social security system in Brazil is composed of three contributory regimes,
one semi-contributory scheme for rural workers, and non-contributory bene-
ﬁts (Robles andMirosevic 2013). The contributory regimes are the Regime Geral
de Previdência Social (RGPS), Regime Próprio de Previdência Social (RPPS), and the
complementary social security. The RGPS is mandatory for private workers,
while the RPPS is mandatory for public workers and the military. Both are
publicly administered and ﬁnanced with contributions made by employers,
employees, and the state. The complementary social security is voluntary and
privately administered by for-proﬁt and not-for-proﬁt entities which invest
the contributions made by the afﬁliated members. The semi-contributory
scheme for rural workers appeared to guarantee an equal treatment between
urban and rural workers. In order to receive its beneﬁts, it is not necessary to
have made prior contributions. Finally, the non-contributory beneﬁts include
the Benefício de Prestação Continuada da Assistência Social. This programme is an
unconditional cash transfer targeted at poor families (family income below a
fourth of the minimum wage) with an elderly or disabled member, and sets
the household income at the level of the minimum wage.
The social security records show a major increase in the percentage of
workers registered with the contributory regimes over the period. The share
of employed workers registered with social security grew steadily from 46.9 per
cent in 2001 (34,481,096 registered workers) to 60.2 per cent in 2012
(56,554,251 registered workers) (Table 9.1). The upward trend continued
2 Themost frequent value of years of education for employed workers in Brazil was eleven for the
entire period under study (around 23.4 per cent of employed workers had eleven years of
education).
3 The improvement in the employment structure by educational level is related to changes in
the relative demand and supply of workers with high educational levels with corresponding
implications for the wage gap by educational group and the unemployment rate of each
educational level. We introduce a discussion about the role of these factors in Brazil in section 9.5.
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even during the international crisis of 2008. Several factors have been pre-
sented as determinants of the sustained increase in the share of registered
workers in Brazil during the 2000s (Berg 2010; ILO 2011; Maurizio 2014). First,
the sustained economic growth process allowed for a more foreseeable func-
tioning of the labour market, favouring the growth of long-term contracts,
and reducing the expected probability of lay-offs and consequently the prob-
ability of employers having to face relatively higher costs when ﬁring a formal
worker compared to an informal one. Second, the implementation of pro-
grammes and incentives for formalization. The Individual Entrepreneur Law
of 2009 enabled self-employed workers to access the social security system at
an affordable cost, and gave them a tax identiﬁcation number to access credit
and business transactions in the formal economy. Third, the cost of non-
registration faced by employers increased as a result of the strengthening of
labour inspections in the country.
The aggregate pattern of increased enrolment in social security also
applies when the employed population is broken down by age and gender.
That was especially true for young workers, who increased their share
of registered workers by more than adult workers. Besides the reasons
presented above, another explanation for the increase in the registration
rate for young workers lies in the process of demographic transition that
Brazil is experiencing. The decrease in the number of youths in the overall
population and in the labour market, coupled with the incentives to poor
families to keep their adolescent children in school through the Bolsa
Familia programme, resulted in a labour market with less supply pressure
from youths and fewer precarious jobs (Berg 2010). The upward trend in the
share of registered workers continued even during the international crisis for
all population groups.
9.5 Labour Earnings
Real labour earnings increased steadily from 2001 to 2012, with only a
slowdown during the 2008 international crisis. This applied to almost all
groups, especially themost disadvantaged ones. (Cruces et al. 2015: ﬁgure 9)
Average monthly earnings, expressed in dollars at 2005 PPP, increased by
26.0 per cent, from US$540 in 2001 to US$680 in 2012 (Table 9.1). This
increase was not even throughout this period. Labour earnings decreased by
7.7 per cent between 2001 and 2004 and increased by 36.5 per cent during
2004–12, with an average annual increase of 4.6 per cent. The years of the
international crisis (2008 and 2009) were marked by a slowdown in yearly
growth, but it was still positive and above 2.0 per cent (labour earnings
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increased by 2.0 per cent and 2.3 per cent in 2008 and 2009 respectively). The
continuous adjustments in the minimum wage over the period were respon-
sible for the increase in labour earnings. In the ﬁrst half of the 2000s, the
minimum wage increased in real terms by 3.8 per cent annually. Between
2005 and 2011, the increases were 3.0 per cent a year (Robles and Mirosevic
2013). In 2007, a policy was set in place to adjust the minimum wage accord-
ing to both the variation of GDP and inﬂation (IPEA 2011). In 2009, as part of
the efforts to alleviate the impacts of the crisis, the minimum wage was also
nominally adjusted by 12.0 per cent (Berg 2009).
When broken down by population groups and employment categories,
labour earnings increased for almost all groups. The only groups that experi-
enced a drop in their earnings were workers with high educational levels and
workers in the skilled services sector. The groups with the largest increase in
earnings were: women among gender groups; youth among age groups; self-
employed workers among employment positions; workers in the primary
activities sector and construction among economic sectors; workers with low
educational levels among educational groups; and workers in elementary
occupations, workers in armed forces, plant and machine operators and
assemblers, workers in crafts and related trades, agricultural, forestry, and
ﬁshery workers, and services and sales workers among occupational groups.
The evidence of falling labour earnings for workers with high educational
levels and labour earnings increases for workers with medium and low levels
of education can be interpreted in light of previous ﬁndings of improving
employment structure by occupational group and economic sector over the
period and improving educational level of the employed population. The
improving employment structure by occupational group and economic sector
implied an increase in the share of occupations and sectors that can be
expected to use workers with high and medium educational levels, such as
professional and clerical occupations, and public administration and skilled
services sectors, and a reduction in the share of occupations and sectors that
employ workers with low educational levels, such as elementary, agricultural,
and craft and trades occupations, and domestic service and primary activity
sectors. This evidence indicates that the demand for workers with high and
medium educational levels relative to those with low educational levels
increased during 2001–12. On the other hand, the educational level of people
in the labour force improved over the same period, indicating an increase in
the relative supply of workers with high and medium levels of education
(Cruces et al. 2015: table 8). The prediction of a supply and demand analysis
is that the relative wages of workers with high and medium educational levels
relative to those with low educational levels will rise or fall depending on
which effect dominates (increase in the relative demand versus increase in the
relative supply). In the Brazilian labour market, the relative wages of workers
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with high and medium educational levels relative to those with low
educational levels fell over the period, and the relative wages of workers
with high educational levels relative to those with medium educational
levels also decreased (Cruces et al. 2015: table 7). The adjustment process
also led to a reduction in the unemployment rate of all educational groups
that was larger for workers with medium and low levels of education com-
pared to the reduction for workers with high levels of education (Cruces
et al. 2015: table 9).
The international crisis led to a drop in labour earnings of some speciﬁc
groups, but earnings increased for the great majority. Those who were nega-
tively affected by the international crisis recovered their pre-crisis level of
income by 2011.
9.6 Poverty and Inequality
The poverty rate and the rate of working poor households decreased sub-
stantially between 2001 and 2012. (Cruces et al. 2015: ﬁgure 10)
The poverty rate based on the 4 dollars-a-day international line fell from 43.1
per cent in 2001 to 21.5 per cent in 2012; the poverty rate based on the 2.5
dollars-a-day line went from 27.4 per cent to 10.4 per cent, and the percentage
of the working poor (deﬁned as the proportion of persons in the population
living in poor households, according to the 4 dollars-a-day poverty line, where
at least one household member works) decreased from 29.1 to 12.3 per cent
over the same period (Table 9.1). These poverty indicators decreased steadily
between 2001 and 2012, even during the international crisis. The downward
trend of all poverty indicators during the Great Recession is consistent with
the previous ﬁnding of increasing labour earnings during that episode due to
minimum wage and nominal wage increases, and with the use of the min-
imum wage as a reference value for social security beneﬁts and anti-poverty
programme adjustments. Pochmann (2009) also highlighted that the recession
was concentrated in the industrial sector where, in general, work conditions
are better. As such, the increase in unemployment during the international
crisis affected mainly non-poor families.
Cash transfer programmes have played an important role from the late
1990s in poverty reduction in Brazil (Ravallion 2009). They included a series
of programmes, which were later consolidated under Bolsa Familia—the main
conditional cash transfer programme—and the unconditional cash transfer
Benefício de Prestação Continuada. Both seem to be extraordinarily well-targeted
and have helped decisively to reduce income inequality and poverty (Ferreira
de Souza 2012). Ferreira et al. (2010) estimated that in the absence of these
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transfer policies the poverty rate in Brazil would have been about 5.0 percent-
age points higher in 2004. Soares et al. (2010) showed that Bolsa Familia was
responsible for a reduction of 16.0 per cent and 33.0 per cent in extreme and
moderate poverty between 2003 and 2010.
The pattern of reducing poverty in Brazil over the 2000s can be understood
by examining incomes from various sources. Household labour earnings,
pensions, and government transfers all increased substantially over the period
studied (Cruces et al. 2015: ﬁgure 11). Within the period, the increase in
labour earnings and pensions started in 2004. Incomes from government
transfers increased especially during the international crisis of 2008, and
incomes from capital were erratic.
Inequality of household per capita income and labour earnings diminished sub-
stantially over the period studied, and this trend did not change with the inter-
national crisis. (Cruces et al. 2015: ﬁgure 12)
The Gini coefﬁcient of household per capita income fell from 0.588 in 2001 to
0.523 in 2012, dropping with each consecutive year. The Gini coefﬁcient of
labour earnings among employed workers declined from 0.563 in 2001 to
0.496 in 2012 (Table 9.1). It also decreased with each passing year and was
always below the Gini for household per capita income. This reduction in
labour earnings inequality is in keeping with the fact that earnings increased
more for most disadvantaged employment categories such as self-employed
workers, workers with low educational levels, and workers in the primary
activity sector and in elementary jobs. However, it is interesting to notice
that earnings declined for some high-earning employment categories. Conse-
quently, the reduction in labour earnings inequality over the period in Brazil
occurred at the expense of income losses for some categories. The crisis did not
alter the downward trend: during the international crisis, inequality fell for
both household per capita income and labour earnings at the same rates as
they had before.
Changes in household per capita income inequality in Brazil during
the 2000s have been explained by changes in both labour and non-labour
incomes at the household level, with both having approximately equal
weight. Barros et al. (2010) found that 51.0 per cent of the decline in house-
hold per capita income inequality between 2001 and 2006 was explained by
the growth in average labour income per adult worker and a small decline in
its inequality. The remaining 49.0 per cent was due to a reduction in the
inequality of household non-labour incomes. Among non-labour incomes,
government transfers had an equalizing and large effect, while changes in
the distribution of incomes from assets and private transfers were unequal-
izing. Bergolo et al. (2011) conﬁrmed the equalizing effect of government
transfers for the period 2001–8 that stemmed primarily from the expansion
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in their coverage. Azevedo et al. (2013b) extended the analysis of the
decline in household per capita income inequality for the 2001–11 period.
Through a decomposition approach they found an equalizing effect of labour
incomes, incomes from transfers, incomes from pensions, and other non-
labour incomes, along with an equalizing effect of the share of adults in the
household.
The literature on labour earnings inequality in Brazil provides some explan-
ations for its decline during the 2000s. Barros et al. (2010) for the period
2001–6 and Azevedo et al. (2013a) for the period 2001–9 used decomposition
approaches and found: (1) a reduction in the wage differential between work-
ers of different educational levels (‘price effect’); and (2) a fall in the inequality
of the distribution of educational levels (‘quantity effect’). Gasparini et al.
(2011) explained the fall in the skill premium during 2001–9 through the
increase in the relative supply of skilled workers, combinedwith a reduction in
their relative demand and institutional factors, such as increases in the min-
imum wage. Maurizio (2014) added the increase in the registration rate of
workers as an inequality-reducing factor. Regarding the ﬁnding of a more
equal distribution of educational levels, there is a discrepancy in the literature.
Battistón et al. (2014), who used a microsimulation approach for the period
2002–9, found an inequality-increasing quantity effect.
9.7 Conclusions
During the 2000s, Brazil has exhibited a rare mix: slow economic growth
accompanied by substantial improvements in labour market indicators. Dur-
ing the period 2001 to 2012, Brazil achieved less economic growth than the
average Latin American country: GDP per capita increased by 29.8 per cent
while the average growth for the eighteen Latin American countries was 36.2
per cent.
The labour market exhibited a marked improvement from 2001 to 2012.
The unemployment rate decreased while the composition of jobs improved
for all of the indicators used in this chapter. The distribution of employment
by occupational group showed a decline in the share in elementary occupa-
tions and an increase in the share in better-paying occupations. There was an
increase in the share of wage/salaried employees and a reduction in the share
of self-employed and unpaid workers. The share of workers in low-earning
sectors diminished, while the share of workers in mid- and high-paid sectors
rose. Moreover, the educational composition of the employed population
improved steadily. The share of workers registered with the social security
system increased. Average labour earnings rose. Poverty and inequality dimin-
ished substantially.
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The Brazilian economy was affected by the international economic crisis of
2008, fromwhich it recovered quickly. During this period, the unemployment
rate increased, the employment structure by occupational position deterior-
ated slightly, the improving trend in the composition of employment by
economic sector hit an impasse, and the upward trend in labour earnings
slowed down. However, all labour market indicators had recovered either
their pre-crisis level or were heading in that direction by 2011.
Young workers and women had worse labour market outcomes over the
period compared to adults and men respectively, but all population groups
were evenly affected by the international crisis. The unemployment rate was
higher for young compared to adult workers, the shares of young employed
workers in low-earning economic occupations and sectors were larger than the
shares of adult workers, the percentage of young workers registered with the
social security system was lower when compared to adults, and labour earn-
ings of young workers were below those of adults. On the other hand, the
share of low-earning positions among young workers was below the share for
adult workers. The international crisis of 2008 impactedmore adversely on the
unemployment rate of young workers compared to adults, but the temporary
worsening in the employment structure by occupational position was larger
for adults compared to youths. Disaggregating by gender, we found that men
had better labour market outcomes than women, with the exceptions of the
share of workers in low-earning positions that was larger among men and the
share of registered workers that was similar for both gender groups. Men and
women were evenly affected by the international crisis. While the unemploy-
ment rate suffered a larger increase for women, the worsening in the structure
of employment by occupational position was larger for men.
In summary, notwithstanding the slow economic growth exhibited by
Brazil during the 2000s and the international crisis of 2008, Brazilian labour
market conditions were in a better state in 2012 than they were at the start of
the millennium.
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Chile
10.1 Introduction
This chapter on labour markets and growth in Chile since 2000 is one of
sixteen studies of Latin American countries, each of which analyses the
growth–employment–poverty nexus and aims to answer the following broad
questions: Has economic growth resulted in economic development via
improved labour market conditions in Latin America in the 2000s, and have
these improvements halted or been reversed since the Great Recession? How
do the rate and character of economic growth, changes in the various labour
market indicators, and changes in poverty relate to each other?
To answer these questions, we analyse the growth experience of Chile
during the 2000s and a wide set of labour market indicators that we assign
to one of two different categories: employment and earnings indicators, and
poverty and income inequality indicators. More speciﬁcally, for the group of
employment and earnings indicators we construct statistics on the following
variables: the unemployment rate; the employment structure by occupational
group, employment position, economic sector, registration of workers with
the social security system, and educational level; and mean labour earnings
and hourly wages. We present all these indicators for the employed popula-
tion as a whole and for different population groups (youth, adults, men, and
women). For the group of poverty and income inequality indicators, we
compute poverty rates using the ofﬁcial moderate and extreme poverty lines
and the international lines of 2.5 and 4 dollars a day. We also calculate the
Gini coefﬁcient of household per capita income and labour earnings.
All the statistics in this chapter are obtained using microdata from the
Encuesta de Caracterización Socioeconómica Nacional (CASEN). The CASEN
is a nationwide and regionally representative household survey conducted
every three or four years. The information in this chapter is derived from all
the surveys conducted in the 2000s, that is, surveys from the years 2000, 2003,
2006, 2009, and 2011. The nationwide surveys were processed following a
harmonization methodology and incorporated into the SEDLAC—Socio-Eco-
nomic Database for Latin America and the Caribbean (CEDLAS and World
Bank 2014).1 The resulting labour market indicators were compiled into a
large number of tables and ﬁgures, which are available in an earlier version
of this study (henceforth, Cruces et al. 2015). Chapter 1 of this book provides
the deﬁnition for each of the indicators we analyse here, while Cruces et al.
(2015) includes details on deﬁnitions and classiﬁcation systems used by
Chile’s household surveys, and on comparability issues of these surveys
over time.
10.2 Economic Growth
Chile experienced rapid economic growth from 2000 to 2012. The econ-
omy underwent a recession as a consequence of the international crisis of
2008 but returned to pre-recession GDP and GDP per capita levels in 2010.
(Cruces et al. 2015: ﬁgures 1 and 2)
From 2000 to 2012, Chile experienced rapid economic growth by Latin
American standards. GDP per capita increased by 44.2 per cent, while the
average for the region’s eighteen countries was 36.2 per cent during the
period. GDP (measured in PPP dollars of 2005) grew by 62.9 per cent, and
GDP per employed person rose by 17.4 per cent. Annual GDP per capita grew
in real terms by an average of 3.1 per cent, ranging from a low of2.0 per cent
in 2009 to a high of 4.9 per cent in 2004 and 2011 (Table 10.1).
Chile has adhered since the 1980s to a policy framework based on trade
openness, inﬂation targeting, and achievement of a structural surplus in the
accounts of the central government (IMF 2004). These policies were successful
at fostering growth and macroeconomic stability despite the high exposure of
Chile to external shocks. The vulnerability of Chile to external shocks is
explained by the signiﬁcant degree of trade openness and ﬁnancial integra-
tion, and the large participation of commodities—mainly minerals—in its
exports (De Gregorio and Labbé 2011; IMF 2012). From 2000 to 2002, Chile
faced a weak domestic demand and an adverse external environment charac-
terized by the Argentine crisis of 2001–2 and a fall in terms of trade. GDP and
GDP per capita growth rates slowed down between 2000 and 2002 but were
nonetheless positive. From 2003 to 2008, Chile’s GDP grew at an annual
rate of 4.7 per cent, while GDP per capita grew at a rate of 3.7 per cent.
1 See Cruces et al. (2015: table 1) for details on the size of Chile household surveys.
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Table 10.1 Chile: Evolution of growth and labour market indicators over the 2000s
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Growth
Indicators
GDP per capita 10,990 11,224 11,337 11,655 12,228 12,773 13,201 13,746 14,061 13,784 14,443 15,149 15,848
GDP per capita growth rate 3.22 2.13 1.00 2.81 4.91 4.46 3.35 4.12 2.30 1.97 4.78 4.89 4.61
Employment
and Earnings
Indicators
Employment-to-population
ratio
49.92 . . . . . . 51.41 . . . . . . 53.11 . . . . . . 50.04 . . . 51.62 . . .
Unemployment rate 10.37 . . . . . . 9.98 . . . . . . 7.32 . . . . . . 10.22 . . . 7.73 . . .
Share of low-earnings
occupations
42.81 . . . . . . 41.64 . . . . . . 44.45 . . . . . . 45.57 . . . 44.13 . . .
Share of mid-earnings
occupations
40.53 . . . . . . 42.20 . . . . . . 42.14 . . . . . . 40.68 . . . 38.79 . . .
Share of high-earnings
occupations
16.65 . . . . . . 16.17 . . . . . . 13.42 . . . . . . 13.75 . . . 17.08 . . .
Share of employers 4.13 . . . . . . 3.88 . . . . . . 3.07 . . . . . . 3.11 . . . 1.90 . . .
Share of wage/salaried
employees
74.39 . . . . . . 74.28 . . . . . . 75.67 . . . . . . 76.28 . . . 77.42 . . .
Share of self-employed
workers
20.00 . . . . . . 20.40 . . . . . . 20.34 . . . . . . 20.13 . . . 20.29 . . .
Share of unpaid family
workers
1.48 . . . . . . 1.45 . . . . . . 0.91 . . . . . . 0.47 . . . 0.40 . . .
Share of workers in
low-earnings sectors
35.15 . . . . . . 35.15 . . . . . . 34.93 . . . . . . 34.78 . . . 36.17 . . .
Share of workers in mid-
earnings sectors
39.59 . . . . . . 39.43 . . . . . . 39.77 . . . . . . 36.85 . . . 36.48 . . .
Share of workers in
high-earnings sectors
25.25 . . . . . . 25.42 . . . . . . 25.30 . . . . . . 28.37 . . . 27.35 . . .
Share of low-educated
workers
31.29 . . . . . . 28.02 . . . . . . 27.01 . . . . . . 24.47 . . . 23.55 . . .
Share of medium-educated
workers
48.01 . . . . . . 49.98 . . . . . . 50.96 . . . . . . 51.13 . . . 52.33 . . .
Share of high-educated
workers
20.69 . . . . . . 21.99 . . . . . . 22.03 . . . . . . 24.40 . . . 24.12 . . .
Share of workers registered
with SS
62.77 . . . . . . 63.65 . . . . . . 66.66 . . . . . . 66.03 . . . 68.76 . . .
Mean labour earnings 702.6 . . . . . . 686.6 . . . . . . 685.0 . . . . . . 780.0 756.8 . . .
Poverty and
Inequality
Indicators
Ofﬁcial extreme poverty
rate
4.67 . . . . . . 3.90 . . . . . . 2.63 . . . . . . 3.11 . . . 2.43 . . .
Ofﬁcial moderate
poverty rate
18.9 . . . . . . 17.1 . . . . . . 12.7 . . . . . . 14.1 . . . 13.5 . . .
Poverty rate 2.5 dollars-
a-day
8.89 . . . . . . 7.64 . . . . . . 5.12 . . . . . . 4.09 . . . 2.88 . . .
Poverty rate 4 dollars-a-day 22.99 . . . . . . 20.58 . . . . . . 15.62 . . . . . . 11.56 . . . 9.88 . . .
GINI of household per
capita income
0.552 . . . . . . 0.547 . . . . . . 0.517 . . . . . . 0.519 . . . 0.508 . . .
GINI of labour earnings 0.560 . . . . . . 0.546 . . . . . . 0.532 . . . . . . 0.522 . . . 0.510 . . .
Note: The shaded ﬁgures for labour market indicators represent statistical signiﬁcant improvements at 5 per cent between the initial and ﬁnal years for all the employment and earnings indicators and
poverty and inequality indicators. The only exceptions are the share of mid-earnings occupations, share of mid-earnings sectors, and share of medium-educated workers for which we did not assign welfare
evaluation criteria.
Source: SEDLAC (CEDLAS and World Bank 2014) and World Development Indicators (World Bank 2014).
The international crisis of 2008 led to an important reduction in export
prices, export volumes, and domestic aggregate demand (Contreras and
Ffrench-Davis 2012). GDP and GDP per capita contracted by 1.0 per cent and
2.0 per cent respectively in 2009. Notwithstanding, the Chilean economy
recovered rapidly and, by 2010, the 2008 levels of GDP and GDP per capita
had been reached. The quick recovery of the Chilean economy from the inter-
national crisis was based on its strong policy frameworks such as a ﬁscal rule
and inﬂation targeting, a sound banking system, and a strong policy response
(IMF 2011). The policy response included the implementation of anticyclical
measures by the Central Bank of Chile and a stimulus plan funded by a ﬁscal
buffer (Fondo de Estabilización Económico y Social). From 2010 to 2012, the aggre-
gate GDP grew at an annual rate of 5.7 per cent and GDP per capita at a rate of
4.8 per cent.
10.3 Unemployment
The unemployment rate fell between 2000 and 2011, overall and for all
population groups. The downward trend was affected negatively by the
international crisis of 2008, and the unemployment rate did not return in
2011 to its pre-crisis level in the aggregate and for any of the population
groups. (Cruces et al. 2015: ﬁgure 3)
The unemployment rate (measured as the ratio of unemployment to labour
force) fell from 10.4 per cent in 2000 (618,066 unemployed persons) to 7.7 per
cent in 2011 (579,050 unemployed persons) (Table 10.1). This reduction was
not monotonic. The unemployment rate decreased from 2000 to 2006 by 3.1
percentage points. It increased from 2006 to 2009, a period that included the
Great Recession, when it reached 10.2 per cent (235,895 new unemployed
persons). Both the number of people in the labour force and the number of
employed persons increased over the same period by 294,451 and 58,556
respectively. These ﬁgures suggest that the increase in the unemployment
rate in Chile between 2006 and 2009 was explained by the new entrants
into the labour market that could not ﬁnd a job. In 2011, it dropped once
again to 7.7 per cent, though that does not represent a full recovery since that
ﬁgure is higher than the pre-crisis level.
Between 2000 and 2011, the unemployment rate decreased for all popula-
tion groups following the aggregate trend. All groups were negatively affected
by the international crisis. Despite the reduction in the unemployment rate
for all population groups at the end of the period, none of them returned to its
pre-crisis level by 2011.
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10.4 Job Mix
The composition of employment by occupational group exhibited a slight
worsening between 2000 and 2011. This trend held for adult workers and
women, while young workers experienced an improvement in their
employment structure by occupational group and men exhibited little
changes. The international crisis of 2008 did not have an effect on the
occupational composition of the employed population overall, and for
young and adult workers, but led to a worsening for men and an improve-
ment for women. (Cruces et al. 2015: ﬁgure 4)
The share of the following occupations shrank between 2000 and 2011:
agricultural, forestry, and ﬁshery occupations (drop of 1.9 percentage points);
management (drop of 1.6 percentage points); clerical (drop of 0.8 percentage
points); and plant and machine operators (drop of 0.8 percentage points). The
share of the following occupations grew: professionals (increase of 2.3 per-
centage points); elementary (increase of 1.7 percentage points); and services
and sales workers (increase of 1.5 percentage points). The share of the other
occupational groups remained largely unchanged. These changes in the occu-
pational composition of employment can be interpreted as a slight worsening
since low-earning occupations (elementary, agricultural, forestry and ﬁshery
occupations, and services and sales occupations) increased their share in
total employment by 1.3 percentage points between 2000 and 2011, while
high-earning occupations (professionals, management, and armed forces)
exhibited a smaller increase (increase of 0.4 percentage points). As a conse-
quence, mid-earning occupations reduced their share in total employment
(Table 10.1).
Disaggregating, between 2000 and 2011 the composition of employment by
occupational group improved for young workers, exhibited a slight worsening
for adult workers and women, and remained essentially unchanged for men.
The international crisis of 2008 did not affect the pre-crisis trends in the
employment structure by occupational group overall and for young and adult
workers, but led to a worsening for men and an improvement for women. By
2011, men recovered the pre-crisis structure of employment by occupational
group.
The employment structure by occupational position improved overall and for
young, adult workers, and men between 2000 and 2011, while it remained
unchanged for women. The international crisis of 2008 did not affect the improv-
ing trend in the aggregate and for young workers, adults, and men, and led to a
reduction in the share of low-earning positions in total employment for women.
(Cruces et al. 2015: ﬁgure 5)
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The share of wage/salaried employees—the largest category in Chile—
increased from 74.4 per cent in 2000 to 77.4 per cent in 2011. The share of
employers, on the other hand, fell from 4.1 per cent to 1.9 per cent over the
same period, and the share of unpaid workers decreased from 1.5 per cent to
0.4 per cent. The share of self-employment barely changed over the period
(increase of 0.3 percentage points) (Table 10.1). These changes in the structure
of employment by occupational position can be interpreted as an improve-
ment due to the fall in the share of low-earning categories (self-employment
and unpaid workers) and the increase in the share of high-earning categories
(employers and wage/salaried employees).
The composition of employment by occupational position improved for
youth, adults, and men, while it remained unchanged for women during
2000–11.
The international crisis of 2008 did not affect the previously improving
trend in the employment structure by occupational position overall and for
youth, adults, and men, and led to an improvement for women. Despite the
increase in the unemployment rate during the Great Recession, the share of
low-earning positions in total employment kept on decreasing in the aggre-
gate and for young, adult workers, and men between 2006–9. Economic
necessity may compel workers to take up free-entry self-employment activities
in a context of increasing unemployment. However, the unemployment
insurance in Chile allowed unemployed workers to look for a new job avoid-
ing low-remunerated activities.2 For women, the share of low-earning categor-
ies fell from 2006 and 2009 and continued with that trend in 2011.
The employment composition by economic sector improved slightly over the
period studied. All population groups beneﬁted from the improvement in the
employment structure by economic sector, and young workers and women
beneﬁted more than adults and men. The international crisis did not have an
adverse effect on the composition of employment by economic sector in the
aggregate or for any of the population groups. (Cruces et al. 2015: ﬁgure 6)
The period 2000–11 witnessed an increase (from 25.3 per cent to 27.3 per cent)
in the share of workers in high-earning sectors (skilled services, public adminis-
tration, education, and health). There was, during the same period, an increase
(from 35.2 per cent to 36.2 per cent) in the share of low-earning sectors in total
employment (domestic service, commerce, low-tech industry). Consequently,
the share of mid-earning occupations (primary activities, construction, high-
tech industry, utilities, and transportation) in total employment decreased
2 The unemployment insurance is part of the contributory schemes of the social security system
in Chile which covered around 65.0 per cent of the employed population during the period
studied. Employees and employers contribute on a monthly basis to an individual account
which activates if the event of unemployment occurs (Robles 2011).
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(Table 10.1). Workers employed in the mining subsector are included in the
primary activities sector in our classiﬁcation. An increase in the employment
share of the mining subsector over the period in Chile was counteracted by the
reduction in the employment share of the agricultural and ﬁshing subsectors.
These changes in the employment structure by economic sector can be inter-
preted as a slight improvement since the increase in the share of high-earning
sectors over the period was larger than the increase in the share of low-earning
sectors in total employment.
The employment composition by economic sector improved between 2000
and 2011 for young workers and women, and exhibited a slight improvement
for adults and men.
The international crisis of 2008 did not negatively affect the structure of
employment by economic sector overall or for all population groups. Between
2006 and 2009, the share of high-earning sectors in total employment kept on
increasing, while the shares of low- and mid-earning sectors exhibited a
decrease. The sectors that led to the reduction in the shares of low- and mid-
earning sectors were the low-tech industry sector, and the primary activities and
high-tech industry sectors respectively. This result is in accord with evidence
showing that the agricultural and industry sectors were hit hardest by the
international crisis compared to the service sector (Cruces et al. 2015: table 2).
The educational level of the Chilean employed population improved steadily over
the period for all population groups, and especially among young workers. The
improving trend was not impacted adversely by the international crisis of 2008.
(Cruces et al. 2015: ﬁgure 7)
The share of employed workers with low educational levels (eight years of
schooling or less) dropped from 31.3 per cent in 2000 to 23.6 per cent in 2011,
while the share of employed workers with medium and high educational
levels (nine to thirteen years of schooling and over thirteen years of schooling)
grew from 48.0 per cent in 2000 to 52.3 per cent in 2011 and from 20.7 per
cent to 24.1 per cent respectively (Table 10.1).3 We interpret this result as an
improvement for the employed population as the level of education is an
important predictor of labour earnings. Consequently, the changes in the
employment structure by educational level implied an increase in the share
of workers that tend to have high levels of earnings and a decline in the share
of workers with low earnings levels.4 The improvement in the educational
3 Themost frequent value of years of education for employed workers in Chile was nine over the
entire period (around 31.9 per cent of employed workers had nine years of education).
4 The improvement in the employment structure by educational level is related to changes in
the relative demand and supply of workers with high educational levels with corresponding
implications for the wage gap by educational group and the unemployment rate of each
educational level. We introduce a discussion about the role of these factors in Chile in section 10.5.
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level of the employed population in Chile is associated with the reform to the
education system implemented in 1994. The reform led to an increase in the
basic and medium education enrolment rates and a reduction in drop-out
rates, and it was accompanied by an improvement in the education infrastruc-
ture (Robles 2011).
The educational level of the employed population improved between 2000
and 2011 for all groups and especially for young workers. The pattern of
improvement in the level of education of the employed population in Chile
continued even during the international crisis of 2008, overall and for all
population groups.
The share of employed workers registered with the social security system increased
between 2000 and 2011 overall and for all population groups. While the rate
diminished during the international crisis, the pre-crisis level had been exceeded
by 2011. (Cruces et al. 2015: ﬁgure 8)
The Chilean pension system was reformed in 2008. Up to 2008, the system
had a contributory scheme and a non-contributory scheme. The contributory
scheme was ﬁnanced by workers who contributed to individual accounts,
while the government funded the pensions of those who were afﬁliated to
the old public pay-as-you-go pension system.5 The non-contributory scheme
comprised two programmes which aimed to assure a minimum pension
(Pensión Mínima Garantizada and Programa de Pensiones Asistenciales). The
reform of 2008 established three components of the pension system: a con-
tributory component which is mandatory, a voluntary component, and a
non-contributory component. The non-contributory component is the Sis-
tema de Pensiones Sociales which replaced the previous two non-contributory
programmes (Pensión Mínima Garantizada and Programa de Pensiones Asisten-
ciales). The health system in Chile comprises three components: (1) the public
system (FONASA), which covers the majority of Chilean workers; (2) the private
system (ISAPRE); and (3) the Armed Forces system. Wage/salaried workers and
self-employed are obligated to contribute to the health system, which also
receives funding from the government. Finally, the unemployment insurance
works as a contributory scheme in theChilean social security system.Dependent
workers and their employers contribute on a monthly basis to individual
accounts which activate if the event of unemployment occurs (Robles 2011).
Social security records show an increase between 2000 and 2011 in the
percentage of registered workers with the contributory scheme of the system.
The share of workers registered grew from 62.8 per cent (3,411,843 registered
workers) in 2000 to 68.8 per cent in 2011 (5,068,291 registered workers)
5 The Chilean public pension system was replaced in 1981 by a private capitalization accounts
system.
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(Table 10.1). Before the onset of the international crisis, the percentage of
workers registered with the social security system had increased, reaching
66.7 per cent in 2006. During the crisis the rate dropped slightly to 66.0 per
cent in 2009. Interestingly, between 2006 and 2009, both the number of
registered and unregistered workers increased by 114,941 and 352,821 respect-
ively. The upward trend resumed as registered employment increased by 2.7
percentage points from 2009 to 2011, surpassing the pre-crisis level. This
upward trend in the share of registered workers over the period was related
to several policies designed to improve working conditions. Those measures
included the simpliﬁcation of procedures to register workers with the social
security system; the replacement of labour inspection ﬁnes with information
and education about labour regulations (Multas por capacitación); the improv-
ing access to formal ﬁnancial services for micro and small ﬁrms with a result-
ing increase in their ability to comply with labour regulations; the passing of
the Law of Subcontracting which obligates all the companies in the subcon-
tracting chain to meet labour regulations (ILO 2014).
The aggregate pattern of increased enrolment in the social security system
over the period held for all population groups. While young workers were the
least likely to be registered with the social security system, they were the group
that experienced the largest increase in the registration rate. Male workers
were more likely to be registered with the social security system than women,
and they beneﬁted more than women from the upward trend.
The international crisis led to a small reduction in the percentage of
registered workers overall and for all population groups. By 2011, the
share of registered workers surpassed the pre-crisis level overall and for all
population groups.
10.5 Labour Earnings
Labour earnings increased between 2000 and 2011. Within the period,
labour earnings fell from 2000 to 2006, grew from 2006 to 2009, and
decreased once again in 2011. Workers were not affected negatively by
the 2008 crisis. Disaggregating, the increase in labour earnings between
2000 and 2011 held for young and adult workers, and for men andwomen.
The evidence of earning changes for different employment categories over
the period indicates that labour earnings tended to increase more for low-
earning categories compared to high-earning categories.
(Cruces et al. 2015: ﬁgure 9)
Average monthly earnings, expressed in dollars at 2005 PPP, increased by
7.7 per cent, fromUS$703 in 2000 to US$757 in 2012 (Table 10.1). The increase
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in labour earnings was far below the increase in GDP per capita over the period
which was 44.2 per cent. Labour earnings fell at the beginning of the period—
between 2000 and 2006—while GDP was growing, rose between 2006 and
2009—a period that included the Great Recession and duringwhichGDP fell—
and increased once again in 2011. The rise in labour earnings over the period
was due mostly to the increase of 27.7 per cent in real hourly wages between
2000 and 2011 (Cruces et al. 2015: table 7). The increase in hourly wages over
the period was related to Chile’s wage policy, which included regular adjust-
ments in the minimum wage (Castex and Sepúlveda 2014).
Disaggregating, we ﬁnd that men, women, and young and adult workers all
increased their labour earnings between 2000 and 2011. The trend in their
labour earnings followed the erratic path for the aggregate, with reductions in
2000–6, gains from 2006 to 2009, and a decrease in 2011.
Mean earnings rose between 2000 and 2011 for workers employed in low-
earning categories, and their earning gains tended to be larger than labour
income increases for workers employed in high-earning categories. Among
occupational groups, elementary occupations, agricultural, forestry and ﬁsh-
ery workers, and workers in services and sales jobs had an average increase in
their labour earnings larger than the one exhibited by professionals, and
workers in management and armed forces. When the working population is
broken down by occupational position, the self-employed experienced an
increase in labour earnings, while employers and paid employees slightly
decreased their labour incomes over the period. Domestic workers andworkers
from commerce and low-tech industries increased their labour earnings over
the period by a lower magnitude compared to workers in skilled services,
public administration, and education and health. Finally, labour earnings of
workers with high educational levels fell, while workers with low andmedium
levels of education experienced an increase in their labour earnings.
The evidence of falling labour earnings for workers with high educational
levels, and labour earnings increases for workers with medium and low levels
of education can be interpreted in light of previous ﬁndings of improving
educational levels of the Chilean employed population, slight worsening in
the employment structure by occupational group, and slight improvement in
the employment structure by economic sector over the period. The slight
improvement in the composition of employment by economic sector implied
an increase in the share of sectors that can be expected to employ workers with
high and medium educational levels, such as skilled services, public adminis-
tration, and education and health, and a smaller increase in the share of
sectors that employ workers with low educational levels, such as commerce.
On the other hand, the slight worsening in the employment structure by
occupational group implied an increase in the share of occupations that are
expected to employ workers with low educational levels, such as elementary,
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and services and sales occupations, and a smaller increase in the share of
occupations that are expected to employ workers with high and medium
educational levels, such as professional jobs. This evidence indicates that
the direction of the change in the demand for workers with high and
medium educational levels relative to those with low educational levels
was ambiguous between 2000 and 2011. On the labour supply side, the
educational level of people in the labour force improved over the same
period, indicating an increase in the relative supply of workers with high
and medium educational levels (Cruces et al. 2015: table 8). The prediction
of a supply and demand analysis is that the relative wages of workers with
high and medium educational levels relative to those with low educational
levels will rise or fall depending on which effect dominates (increase/
decrease in the relative demand versus increase in the relative supply). In
the Chilean labour market the relative wages of workers with high and
medium educational levels fell over the period relative to the wages of
workers with low educational levels, and the relative wages of workers with
high educational levels relative to those with medium educational levels also
decreased (Cruces et al. 2015: table 7). The adjustment process also led to a
reduction in the unemployment rates of workers with medium and low
educational levels and no change for workers with high educational levels
(Cruces et al. 2015: table 9).
The international crisis of 2008 did not have a negative effect on labour
earnings in the aggregate or for any of the population groups and employment
categories. Between 2006 and 2009, labour earnings increased overall, for
young and adult workers, men, and women, and for all employment categor-
ies. The period from 2006 to 2009 is the only one in which labour incomes
increased in Chile.
10.6 Poverty and Inequality
The poverty rates, regardless of the poverty lines used and the rate of
working poor households, decreased substantially between 2000 and
2011. The moderate and extreme poverty rates based on ofﬁcial poverty
lines increased during the international crisis and recovered their down-
ward trend in 2011. The poverty rates based on international poverty lines
and the rate of working poor households diminished even during the Great
Recession (Cruces et al. 2015: ﬁgure 10)
The moderate poverty rate (measured by the country’s ofﬁcial poverty line)
fell from 19.0 per cent in 2000 to 13.5 per cent in 2011; the extreme poverty
rate decreased from 4.7 per cent to 2.4 per cent; the percentage of working
Chile
207
poor (deﬁned as the proportion of persons in the population living in poor
households where at least one member works) decreased from 11.3 per cent to
7.1 per cent over the same period (Table 10.1). The moderate poverty rate fell
by 6.2 percentage points from 2000 to 2006, increased by 1.3 percentage
points from 2006 to 2009 (328,158 new poor persons), a period that included
the international crisis, and declined again, by 0.5 percentage points, during
the post-crisis period. By 2011, moderate poverty remained above its 2006
level. The pattern for the extreme poverty rate was similar. Part of the increase
in the moderate and extreme poverty rates between 2006 and 2009 can be
explained by the rise in food prices (Contreras and Ffrench-Davis 2012).When
the analysis is based on the 2.5 and 4 dollars-a-day PPP international poverty
lines, the trends show that the poverty rates decreased steadily over the
period. The same pattern of steadily decreasing trend held for the percentage
of working poor households. These differing patterns of poverty indicators
between 2006 and 2009 can be explained by the different procedure applied to
adjust the poverty lines over time. International lines are constant in real
terms using the CPI. Ofﬁcial poverty lines are constant in real terms using
the FPI. In Chile, inﬂation began to accelerate in 2007 due to increases in
international food and energy prices, and also due to domestic supply shocks
of these products (IMF 2008). The increase in food prices determined a more
rapid increase in the ofﬁcial poverty lines compared to the international lines
in current pesos. Consequently, poverty rates measured by the ofﬁcial poverty
lines increased between 2006 and 2009, while poverty indicators based on
international poverty lines decreased.
The poverty patterns reported in the last paragraph can be interpreted by
examining incomes from various sources. The analysis of sources of household
total income indicates that labour income and government transfers increased
between 2000 and 2011 (Cruces et al. 2015: ﬁgure 11). On the other hand,
income from pensions decreased over the period. The largest increase in labour
earnings occurred between 2003 and 2006, when all poverty indicators exhib-
ited the largest reductions. Government transfers surged between 2006 and
2009, a period that included the Great Recession. The government of Chile
implemented an extraordinary cash transfer in 2009 as a consequence of the
international crisis (Bono de Apoyo a la Familia) (Robles 2011).
The inequality of household per capita income fell over the period studied, as did
the inequality of labour earnings. The inequality of household per capita income
stopped decreasing during the international crisis, but recovered its downward
trend by the end of the period. The downward trend of the inequality of labour
earnings was not affected by the international crisis. (Cruces et al. 2015: ﬁgure 12)
The Gini coefﬁcient of household per capita income fell from 0.552 in 2000 to
0.508 in 2011. Between 2006 and 2009, it stopped decreasing, but recovered
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the falling trend in 2011. Throughout the period, the Gini coefﬁcient of
labour earnings among employed workers was slightly higher than that of
per capita household income. The Gini coefﬁcient of labour earnings
decreased from 0.560 in 2000 to 0.510 in 2011 (Table 10.1). This reduction
in labour earnings inequality is in keeping with the fact that earnings tended
to increase more for low-earning employment categories compared to high-
earning categories. However, it is interesting to notice that earnings declined
for some high-earning groups. Consequently, the reduction of labour earning
inequality in Chile occurred at the expense of income losses for some
categories.
Changes in household per capita income inequality in Chile have been
related mainly to changes in labour income. Azevedo et al. (2013b) decom-
posed the change in the Gini coefﬁcient of household per capita income for
the period 2003–9 and found that changes in labour incomes contributed the
most to inequality reduction over this period (the Gini coefﬁcient of house-
hold per capita income decreased from 0.547 to 0.519 between 2003 and
2009). On the other hand, changes in non-labour incomes, such as govern-
ment transfers, and demographic changes, such as the share of adults per
household, were also inequality-reducing. Larrañaga and Herrera (2008) and
more recently Contreras and Ffrench-Davis (2012) have found that the
decrease in inequality of household per capita income is a consequence of
less inequality in labour earnings, which represent nearly 80 per cent of total
family incomes. Other studies have analysed the factors behind the evolution
of labour income inequality. Azevedo et al. (2013a) used a decomposition
approach and found that changes in the education wage premium (or the
‘price effect’) and in the distribution of the stock of education (the ‘quantity
effect’) were inequality-reducing in Chile between 2000 and 2009. Gasparini
et al. (2011) found a reduction in the gap between the wages of skilled workers
(those with complete or incomplete college education) and unskilled workers
(those who have completed secondary education or less) in Chile between
2000 and 2011. The shrinking educational earnings gap can be explained by
factors related to supply and demand: the relative supply of skilled workers
increased steadily while the relative demand for those workers fell according
to the authors.
10.7 Conclusions
From 2000 to 2012, Chile experienced rapid economic growth by Latin
American standards. The economy suffered a recession as a consequence of
the international crisis of 2008, but Chile returned to the pre-recession GDP
and GDP per capita levels in 2010.
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Most labour market indicators improved between 2000 and 2011. The
unemployment rate fell. The employment structure by occupational position
improved through the reduction in the share of self-employed and unpaid
workers in total employment and the increase in the share of paid employees
and employers. The employment composition by economic sector also
improved as the share of higher-paying sectors like skilled services, public
administration, and education and health in total employment increased by
more than the share of lower-paying sectors like domestic service, commerce,
and low-tech industry. The educational level of the Chilean employed popu-
lation and the percentage of workers registered with the social security system
in total employment improved over the period. Labour earnings increased
between 2000 and 2011, and the evidence of earning changes by employment
categories over the period indicated that labour income tended to increase
more for low-earning categories compared to high-earning categories. The
only labour market indicator that did not improve over the period was the
employment structure by occupational group, which suffered a slight worsen-
ing. All poverty indicators fell between 2000 and 2011, and the Gini coefﬁ-
cient of per capita household income and labour earnings also decreased.
The labour market indicators that were affected negatively by the inter-
national crisis of 2008were the unemployment rate, the percentage of workers
registered with the social security system, the poverty rates based on ofﬁcial
poverty lines, and the Gini coefﬁcient of household income. The unemploy-
ment rate increased during the crisis and did not return to its pre-recession
level by 2011. The share of registered workers fell during the crisis, but
exceeded its pre-recession level in 2011. The moderate and extreme poverty
rates based on ofﬁcial poverty lines increased in 2009, but resumed the down-
ward trend in 2011. Finally, the inequality of per capita household income
measured by the Gini coefﬁcient stopped decreasing during the international
crisis, but resumed its falling trend in 2011.
Young workers and women had worse labour market outcomes over the
period compared to adults and men respectively, but they have not been
more vulnerable to the international crisis. The unemployment rate was
higher for young compared to adult workers, the shares of young employed
workers in low-earning occupational groups and economic sectors were
larger than the shares of adult workers, the percentage of young workers
registered with the social security system was lower when compared to
adults, and labour earnings of young workers were below those of adults.
On the other hand, the share of young workers in low-earning occupational
positions was lower when compared to adults. Despite the generally inferior
situation of young workers in the labour market in comparison to adult
workers, both age groups were equally affected by the international crisis
of 2008. The increases in the unemployment rate and in the share of workers
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in low-earning sectors were larger for young workers, while the increases in
the shares of unregistered workers and workers employed in low-earning
occupational groups were larger for adults. Disaggregating by gender, we
found that men were better than women in most labour market indicators,
e.g. the male unemployment rate was lower, the share of male workers in
low-earning occupational groups and sectors were lower compared to
women, the share of unregistered workers was lower for men compared
to women, and labour earnings of men were higher than labour earnings
of women. However, the negative impacts of the crisis affected men more
than women.
In summary, notwithstanding the international crisis of 2008, Chilean
labour market conditions were in general in a better state in 2011 than they
were at the start of the millennium.
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Colombia
11.1 Introduction
This chapter on labour markets and growth in Colombia since 2000 is
one of sixteen studies of Latin American countries, each of which analyses
the growth–employment–poverty nexus and aims to answer the following
broad questions: Has economic growth resulted in economic development via
improved labour market conditions in Latin America in the 2000s, and have
these improvements halted or been reversed since the Great Recession? How do
the rate and character of economic growth, changes in the various labourmarket
indicators, and changes in poverty relate to each other?
To answer these questions, we analyse the growth experience of Colombia
during the 2000s and a wide set of labour market indicators that we assign
to one of two different categories: employment and earnings indicators, and
poverty and income inequality indicators. More speciﬁcally, for the group of
employment and earnings indicators we construct statistics on the following
variables: the unemployment rate; the employment structure by occupa-
tional group, employment position, economic sector, registration of workers
with the social security system, and educational level; and mean labour
earnings and hourly wages. We present all these indicators for the employed
population as a whole and for different population groups (youth, adults,
men, and women). For the group of poverty and income inequality indica-
tors, we compute poverty rates using the ofﬁcial moderate and extreme
poverty lines and the international lines of 2.5 and 4 dollars a day. We
also calculate the Gini coefﬁcient of household per capita income and labour
earnings.
All the statistics in this chapter are obtained using microdata from the
Encuesta Continua de Hogares (ECH) from 2001 to 2005 and Gran Encuesta
Integrada de Hogares (GEIH) from 2008 to 2013. The nationwide surveys were
processed following a harmonization methodology and incorporated into
the SEDLAC—Socio-Economic Database for Latin America and the Caribbean
(CEDLAS andWorld Bank 2014).1 The resulting labour market indicators were
compiled into a large number of tables and ﬁgures, which are available in an
earlier version of this study (henceforth, Cruces et al. 2015). Chapter 1 of this
book provides the deﬁnition for each of the indicators we analyse here, while
Cruces et al. (2015) includes details on deﬁnitions and classiﬁcation systems
used by Colombia’s household surveys, and on comparability issues of these
surveys over time.
11.2 Economic Growth
Colombia experienced rapid economic growth between 2000 and 2013.
The economy suffered a slowdown as a consequence of the international
crisis of 2008, but GDP and GDP per capita growth rates were nonetheless
positive in 2009. (Cruces et al. 2015: ﬁgures 1 and 2)
Between 2000 and 2012, Colombia experienced rapid economic growth by
Latin American standards. GDP per capita increased by 42.4 per cent overall,
while the average for the eighteen Latin American countries was 36.2 per cent
during the same period. GDP (measured in PPP dollars of 2005) grew by 72.5
per cent, and GDP per employed person rose by 23.9 per cent. The annual
growth rate of GDP per capita was 2.8 per cent, and it was never negative,
oscillating from a minimum of 0.0 per cent in 2001 to a maximum of 5.3 per
cent in 2007 (Table 11.1).
At the beginning of the 2000s, Colombia was immersed in a phase of
GDP contraction that was initiated with the Asian crisis in 1997 and which
led to a severe ﬁnancial and banking crisis. Some other factors continued to
affect the country negatively in 2000 and 2001, such as a weakening in
external demand, a fall in coffee prices to historically low levels, a high level
of private debt that subdued consumption, and a lack of progress in resolving
internal conﬂicts related to the guerrilla activities (IMF 2002). In 2001, GDP
and GDP per capita growth rates reached their lowest levels for the period
analysed, but even then, they remained non-negative (1.7 per cent and
0.0 per cent respectively).
Starting in 2003, Colombia beneﬁted from some external factors that con-
tributed to the recovery of the economy (Mesa 2007). First, the increase in
external demand and in the terms of trade led to a rapid growth of mineral
and hydrocarbon exports. Second, remittances from abroad exhibited an
unprecedented increase. Third, the reduction in the risk premium of emerging
1 See Cruces et al. (2015: table 1) for details on the size of Colombia household surveys.
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Table 11.1 Colombia: Evolution of growth and labour market indicators over the 2000s
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Growth
Indicators
GDP per capita 6,597 6,598 6,655 6,808 7,060 7,280 7,651 8,059 8,223 8,241 8,450 8,890 9,143 9,395
GDP per capita
growth rate
2.68 0.02 0.87 2.29 3.71 3.12 5.10 5.32 2.05 0.21 2.53 5.21 2.85 2.76
Employment
and
Earnings
Indicators
Employment-to-
population ratio
. . . 57.25 56.81 58.42 57.71 58.15 . . . . . . 56.83 58.56 60.40 61.35 62.30 62.92
Unemployment
rate
. . . 13.58 14.33 13.57 12.06 11.08 . . . . . . 10.88 11.63 10.86 9.92 9.78 9.00
Share of
low-earnings
occupations
. . . 46.15 45.34 46.00 45.20 45.36 . . . . . . 39.40 42.64 42.42 41.72 41.47 41.02
Share of
mid-earnings
occupations
. . . 43.36 43.17 42.62 43.06 42.48 . . . . . . 47.99 45.99 45.63 45.88 45.80 45.37
Share of
high-earnings
occupations
. . . 10.50 11.49 11.37 11.74 12.16 . . . . . . 12.62 11.36 11.95 12.41 12.73 13.62
Share of employers . . . 4.41 4.61 4.58 5.16 5.30 . . . . . . 4.67 4.98 5.01 5.04 4.95 4.58
Share of wage/
salaried employees
. . . 50.00 50.77 49.58 49.35 52.00 . . . . . . 49.06 48.50 47.36 47.07 47.28 48.25
Share of self-
employed workers
. . . 40.89 40.15 40.54 40.94 38.48 . . . . . . 42.55 42.60 43.07 43.74 43.33 42.79
Share of unpaid
family workers
. . . 4.70 4.47 5.30 4.55 4.22 . . . . . . 3.72 3.91 4.56 4.16 4.44 4.37
(continued)
Table 11.1 Continued
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Share of workers in
low-earnings
sectors
. . . 54.03 52.79 52.18 50.58 51.94 . . . . . . 48.08 49.01 49.07 48.40 48.45 48.39
Share of workers in
mid-earnings
sectors
. . . 24.59 25.41 25.11 26.48 25.56 . . . . . . 27.47 26.85 27.56 27.49 27.41 26.18
Share of workers in
high-earnings
sectors
. . . 21.39 21.79 22.71 22.94 22.50 . . . . . . 24.45 24.14 23.37 24.11 24.14 25.43
Share of low-
educated workers
. . . 56.11 54.36 54.24 52.70 51 . . . . . . 47.09 48.36 48.00 45.30 45.37 42.60
Share of medium-
educated workers
. . . 31.10 32.31 32.14 32.87 34.07 . . . . . . 36.03 35.68 36.40 38.19 38.45 39.57
Share of high-
educated workers
. . . 12.79 13.34 13.62 14.43 15.12 . . . . . . 16.88 15.97 15.60 16.51 16.18 17.83
Share of workers
registered with SS
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33.22 31.87 30.92 32.00 32.61 34.60
Mean labour
earnings
. . . 402.0 469.3 408.1 452.6 464.9 . . . . . . 516.9 537.1 543.5 546.0 545.6 573.5
Poverty and
Inequality
Indicators
Ofﬁcial extreme
poverty rate
. . . . . . 16.09 15.61 14.62 12.80 . . . . . . 15.46 12.97 10.86 9.09 9.56 8.34
Ofﬁcial moderate
poverty rate
. . . . . . 46.94 47.11 47.17 43.71 . . . . . . 40.93 38.87 35.49 31.70 31.74 29.13
Poverty rate 2.5
dollars-a-day
. . . 39.04 29.84 31.05 28.37 25.30 . . . . . . 24.45 21.92 19.56 16.97 17.50 15.16
Poverty rate 4
dollars-a-day
. . . 60.33 49.55 51.96 49.41 45.24 . . . . . . 41.64 39.61 36.51 33.14 32.92 30.75
GINI of household
per capita
income
. . . 0.565 0.574 0.543 0.560 0.550 . . . . . . 0.558 0.557 0.553 0.535 0.534 0.533
GINI of labour
earnings
. . . 0.517 0.551 0.510 0.530 0.519 . . . . . . 0.502 0.514 0.516 0.504 0.506 0.499
Note: The shaded ﬁgures for labour market indicators represent statistical signiﬁcant improvements at 5 per cent between the initial and ﬁnal years for all the employment and earnings indicators and
poverty and inequality indicators. The only exceptions are the share of mid-earnings occupations, share of mid-earnings sectors, and share of medium-educated workers for which we did not assign
welfare evaluation criteria. The vertical lines indicate that series are not fully comparable before and after that line. For mean labour earnings and poverty and inequality indicators, the comparison was
made between 2002 and 2013.
Source: SEDLAC (CEDLAS and World Bank 2014) and World Development Indicators (World Bank 2014).
economies encouraged the arrival of foreign direct investment, while lower
interest rates and increased liquidity stimulated local investment (Núñez and
González 2011). On the domestic side, macroeconomic stability was achieved
with prudent ﬁscal management, inﬂation targeting, a ﬂexible exchange rate,
and effective ﬁnancial supervision and regulation (IMF 2013). From 2003 to
2008, the economy grew rapidly at 5.2 per cent a year, while GDP per capita
increased at 3.5 per cent annually.
The international crisis led to a slowdown of the economy, but even then
GDP andGDP per capita growth rates were positive. The policy response to the
international crisis comprised countercyclical measures mainly related to
interest rates management, prioritization of already planned government
spending on infrastructure, and precautionary securing of public debt ﬁnan-
cing (Argüello 2011). The growth rate of GDP was 3.6 per cent in 2008 and
1.7 per cent in 2009, and those ﬁgures for GDP per capita were 2.1 and 0.2 per
cent respectively. The economy recovered previous growth rates quickly,
based on the boom of mineral exports and despite the severe ﬂoods of 2010
and the loss of Venezuela as an export market (OECD 2013). The country
surpassed the pre-crisis growth rates by 2010 and kept on growing up to the
end of the period.
11.3 Unemployment
The 2001–13 period witnessed a reduction in the aggregate unemployment
rate and in the unemployment rate for all population groups. Within this
period, the unemployment rate increased in the early years and during the
international crisis of 2008, but otherwise decreased.
(Cruces et al. 2015: ﬁgure 3)
The unemployment rate (measured as the ratio of unemployment to labour
force) dropped from 13.6 per cent in 2001 (2,433,367 unemployed people) to
9.0 per cent in 2013 (2,070,065 unemployed people) (Table 11.1). Initially,
the unemployment rate increased in conjunction with the slowdown of
GDP from 2001 to 2002, growing from 13.6 to 14.3 per cent. In 2002, the
unemployment rate began a downward trend. The reduction that took place
between 2002 and 2004 was related to changes in labour market regulations,
such as the reduction in payment of overtimes and the lack of any obligation
to pay pension contributions for learning contracts (Núñez 2005). The redu-
cing trend was interrupted by the international crisis of 2008, when the
aggregate unemployment rate increased from 10.9 per cent in 2008 to 11.6
per cent in 2009 (279,599 new unemployed people). Both the number of
people in the labour force and the number of employed persons increased
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between 2008 and 2009 by 1,147,974 and 868,375 respectively. These ﬁgures
suggest that the increase in the unemployment rate during the international
crisis was brought about by the entry of new people into the labour market
who could not ﬁnd a job. The unemployment rate resumed a falling trend in
2010 and kept on decreasing through the end of the period studied, reaching
9.0 per cent in 2013. Even when the unemployment rate fell over the period
analysed, the reduction was small compared to economic growth of the
country (Núñez and González 2011). The reasons are: the increasing hiring
costs of labour over the decade (minimum wage and non-salaried costs)
despite the reduction in some components of labour costs in the ﬁrst years;
the decreasing costs of capital; and the growth process based on mineral and
hydrocarbon exports, which is typically a capital-intensive activity.
Between 2001 and 2013, the unemployment rate decreased for young and
adult workers, men and women. The international crisis led to an increase in
the unemployment rate of all population groups, but it recovered the down-
ward trend in 2010 for all of them.
11.4 Job Mix
The composition of employment by occupational group improved
between 2001 and 2013 as workers moved from agricultural, forestry and
ﬁshery occupations, and craft and trade jobs to better paying occupations
like professional, armed forces, and management. All population groups—
young and adult workers, men and women—beneﬁted from the improve-
ment in the composition of employment by occupational group over the
period. The international crisis of 2008 led to a worsening in the structure
of employment by occupational groups from which the labour market did
not completely recover by 2013. (Cruces et al. 2015: ﬁgure 4)
The share of the following occupations shrank between 2001 and 2013:
agricultural, forestry and ﬁshery occupations (drop of 4.4 percentage points);
plant and machine operators (drop of 1.4 percentage points); and craft and
trade occupations (drop of 0.8 percentage points). The share of the following
occupations grew: elementary (increase of 3.0 percentage points); armed
forces (increase of 2.3 percentage points); technicians (increase of 0.8 percent-
age points); and professionals (increase of 0.7 percentage points). The share of
the other occupational groups changed only a little (Cruces et al. 2015: table 3).
These changes in the occupational composition of employment can be inter-
preted as an improvement since low-earning occupations (agricultural, forestry
and ﬁshery occupations, craft and trade jobs, and service and sales occupa-
tions) reduced their share in total employment by 5.1 percentage points
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between 2001 and 2013, while high-earning (professional, armed forces, and
management) and mid-earning occupations (technical occupations, clerical
jobs, plant andmachine operators, and elementary occupations) gained shares
in total employment (increases of 3.1 and 2.0 percentage points respectively)
(Table 11.1). The improvements in the occupational composition of employ-
ment between 2001 and 2013 were observed for young and adult employed
workers and for men and women.
The international crisis of 2008 adversely affected the composition of
employment by occupational group in the aggregate and for all population
groups. Between 2008 and 2009, the share of low-earning occupations in total
employment grew, while the share of high-earning occupations fell. The share
of low-earning occupations began a downward trend in the aggregate and for
all population groups in 2010. Young workers and men returned to their pre-
crisis shares of low-earning occupations in 2012 and 2013 respectively, while
the shares in the aggregate and for adults and women never recovered their
pre-crisis level. The share of high-earning occupations began an upward trend
in 2010 for all population groups, and while young workers, adults and men
returned to their pre-crisis shares in 2010, 2012, and 2011 respectively,
women never recovered. In the aggregate, the share of high-earning occupa-
tions in total employment recovered the pre-crisis level in 2012.
The employment structure by occupational position deteriorated between 2001
and 2013 for the employed population as a whole and for youth, adults, and
women. The worsening trend in the employment structure by occupational pos-
ition continued during the international crisis of 2008 in the aggregate and for
young, adult workers, and women, while men experienced a slight improvement.
(Cruces et al. 2015: ﬁgure 5)
Between 2001 and 2013, the share of wage/salaried employees in total
employment—the largest category—dropped from 50.0 to 48.3 per cent. The
share of unpaid workers also decreased, from 4.7 to 4.4 per cent. On the
other hand, the shares of the self-employed and employers increased from
40.9 to 42.8 per cent and from 4.4 to 4.6 per cent respectively (Table 11.1).
These changes can be characterized as a deterioration of the employment
structure by occupational position, as the share of low-earning categories
(self-employment and unpaid employment) increased by a total of 1.6 per-
centage points and the share of high-earning categories (paid employees and
employers) decreased.
Between 2001 and 2013, the employment structure by occupational position
deteriorated for young and adult workers, and women. For men, the structure
of employment by occupational position remained essentially unchanged over
the period. The worsening in the structure of employment by occupational
position is striking in a growing economy where the unemployment rate is
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declining. However, the reduction in the unemployment rate during the 2000s
was small compared to economic growth in Colombia, and that was related to
increasing labour costs and a growth process based on capital-intensive sectors
(Núñez and González 2011). In this context, the rise in the share of self-
employment can be understood as a response to the rigidities in the creation/
preservation of wage/salaried jobs.
The international crisis of 2008 did not affect the worsening trend in the
employment structure by occupational position in the aggregate and for
young, adult workers, and women, while a slight improvement for men took
place during the crisis. Between 2008 and 2009, the share of low-earning
positions in total employment continued to increase in the aggregate and
for youth, adults, and women. Men, on the other hand, experienced an
increase in the share of employers in total employment and a decrease in
the share of the self-employed, which can be interpreted as a slight improve-
ment. Men kept the share of low-earning positions in total employment below
the pre-crisis value up to the end of the period studied.
The employment composition by economic sector improved over the course of
the period studied overall and for young and adult workers, men, and women. The
international crisis of 2008 led to a worsening in the structure of employment by
economic sector in the aggregate and for all population groups fromwhich young,
adult workers, and men recovered completely, but women did not.
(Cruces et al. 2015: ﬁgure 6)
The share of the following sectors fell between 2001 and 2013: primary
activities (drop of 4.3 percentage points); domestic workers (drop of 2.7 per-
centage points); and low-tech industries (drop of 1.5 percentage points). The
mining and hydrocarbon subsector, the main driving force of the Colombian
economy during the period analysed, is included in the primary activities
sector in our classiﬁcation. The mining and hydrocarbon subsector is
capital-intensive and does not employ a large share of workers. The increase
in its share of total employment over the period was counteracted by the
reduction in the employment share of the agricultural subsector. The share
of the following sectors grew: skilled services (increase of 3.4 percentage
points); construction (increase of 1.7 percentage points); commerce (increase
of 1.4 percentage points); utilities and transportation (increase of 1.4 percent-
age points); and education and health (increase of 0.6 percentage points). The
share of the other sectors changed only a little. These changes in the employ-
ment composition by economic sector can be interpreted as an improvement,
since low-earning sectors (domestic service, primary activities, and commerce)
reduced their share in total employment by 5.6 percentage points between
2001 and 2013, while high-earning (public administration, skilled services,
and education and health) andmid-earning sectors (high-tech industry, utilities
Colombia
221
and transportation, construction, and low-tech industry) gained share in
total employment (increase of 4.0 and 1.6 percentage points respectively)
(Table 11.1). Broken down by population groups, the employment compos-
ition by economic sector improved between 2001 and 2013 for young and
adult workers, men, and women, as they moved from low-earning sectors to
high-earning sectors.
The international crisis of 2008 led to a worsening in the employment
structure by economic sector overall and for all population groups. Between
2008 and 2009, the share of low-earning sectors in total employment increased,
while the share of employed workers in high-earning sectors fell. Young work-
ers, adult workers, and men recovered their pre-crisis shares of employment
in low- andhigh-earning sectors in the following years, whilewomen recovered
the share of working in high-earning sectors, but not the share of working in
low-earning sectors.
The educational level of the employed population in Colombia improved from
2001 to 2013 for the entire population and for youth, adults,men, andwomen. The
international crisis of 2008 led to a worsening in the employment structure by
educational level in the aggregate and for all population groups, but all of them
recovered the pre-crisis structure in the following years.
(Cruces et al. 2015: ﬁgure 7)
The share of employed persons with low educational levels (eight years of
schooling or less) dropped from 56.1 per cent in 2001 to 42.6 per cent in 2013,
while the share of employed persons with medium and high educational
levels (nine to thirteen years of schooling and over thirteen years of schooling)
grew from 31.1 per cent in 2001 to 39.6 per cent in 2013 and from 12.8 per
cent to 17.8 per cent respectively (Table 11.1).2 We interpret this result as an
improvement for the employed population as the level of education is an
important predictor of labour earnings. Consequently, the changes in the
employment structure by educational level implied an increase in the share
of workers that tend to have high levels of earnings and a decline in the share
of workers with low earnings levels.3 The improvement in the educational
level of the employed population reﬂects the improvement in access to educa-
tion for the entire populationofColombia.However, the quality of education is
low; the enrolment rates in tertiary education are low and the inequality high;
2 The most frequent value of years of education for employed workers in Colombia was eleven
for the entire period under study (around 23.8 per cent of employed workers had eleven years of
education).
3 The improvement in the employment structure by educational level is related to changes in
the relative demand and supply of workers with high educational levels with corresponding
implications for the wage gap by educational group and the unemployment rate of each
educational level. We introduce a discussion about the role of these factors in Colombia in
section 11.5.
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and a substantial gap between education levels of the poor and the rest of the
population exists (World Bank 2009). The educational level of the employed
population improved between 2001 and 2013 for all population groups, and
especially for young workers.
The pattern of improvement in the educational level of the employed
population in Colombia was affected by the international crisis of 2008. The
share of employed persons with low educational levels increased in 2009 in
the aggregate and for all population groups, with a corresponding reduction in
the share of employed workers with medium and high educational levels.
A possible explanation for this worsening in the employment structure by
educational level can be found in the previous evidence of increasing
unemployment and worsening employment structure by occupational pos-
ition during the international crisis. Better-educated workers could afford to
remain unemployed during the crisis, while the less-educated workers were
compelled by economic necessity to take up free-entry self-employment activ-
ities or unpaid family work. By 2011, the share of employed workers with low
educational levels recovered the pre-crisis value in the aggregate and for all
population groups. The share of workers with medium levels of education
returned to its pre-crisis level in 2010 overall and for all groups, while the share
of the employed population with high educational levels reached its pre-crisis
level in 2013.
The share of workers registered with the social security system increased from
2008 (the earliest year with data on this indicator) to 2013 in the aggregate and for
adults and male workers, while it decreased for young workers and women.
Within this period, the registration rate fell from 2008 to 2010, a period that
included the Great Recession, and increased from 2010 to 2013.
(Cruces et al. 2015: ﬁgure 8)
The social security system in Colombia is comprised of a contributory scheme
and a non-contributory scheme. The contributory pension scheme contains
two different regimes: the Régimen Solidario de Prima Media con Prestación
Deﬁnida (a deﬁned contributions regime) and the Régimen de Ahorro Individual
con Solidaridad (an individual accounts regime). Afﬁliation to the pension
system is compulsory for both dependent and independent workers, although
they may choose their preferred regime and change it once every ﬁve years.
The contributory pension scheme is ﬁnanced through contributions made by
employees and employers. The non-contributory pension scheme, Fondo de
Solidaridad Pensional, provides pension subsidies to those persons who cannot
afford to make contributions, and is ﬁnanced by the government. The non-
contributory pension scheme covers informal workers, and disabled and
unemployed workers. Cash or in-kind transfers are also provided for the
protection of elders, such as Programa de Protección Social al Adulto Mayor and
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Programa Nacional de Alimentación al Adulto Mayor. The contributory health
scheme is available to persons with greater payment capacity, including for-
mal and independent workers, employers, and pensioners. The non-contributory
health scheme provides attention to persons lacking payment capacity. The
ﬁnancing of the contributory regime is made through contributions charged
to the employers and employees (Mina Rosero 2013).
The percentage of workers registered with the contributory scheme of
the social security system increased by 1.4 percentage points between 2008
and 2013 (Table 11.1). From 2008 to 2010, a period that included the Great
Recession, the share of registered workers fell from 33.2 per cent to 30.9 per
cent. Interestingly, the number of registered workers increased between 2008
and 2010, from 5,644,701 to 5,818,439. The fall in the registration rate was
explained by the more rapid increase in the number of employed persons
compared to the increase in the number of registered workers during this
period. From 2010 to 2013, the share of registered employment grew steadily,
reaching 34.6 per cent in 2013 (1,298,793 new registered workers between
2010 and 2013). Despite the Colombian growth in the last years of the period
analysed, the registration rate is still very low. Non-salary labour costs in the
formal sector are very high in Colombia, even when compared to OECD
standards (OECD 2013). The increased labour costs, along with the universal
coverage of basic public services like health, discouraged the registration of
workers (Parra Torrado 2010).
The Colombian government implemented somemeasures aimed at increas-
ing the registration rate, especially in the last years of the period analysed. In
2010, it decreased social security contributions for new ﬁrms and for those
who create employment for young workers, women aged 40 years or more,
and disabled workers (OECD 2013; ILO 2014). In 2013, the government
implemented deductions for taxes that ﬁrms pay on salaries and social security
contributions for workers they formalize; it created the protectionmechanism
for dismissed workers which guarantees social protection of workers in the
event of unemployment, including continued health and pension coverage;
and it increased the number of inspectors (ILO 2014).
The percentage of workers registered with the social security system increased
for adult employed workers and men, and fell for young workers and women
between 2008 and 2013. For all population groups, the percentage of registered
workers decreased at the beginning of the analysed period, from 2008 to 2010,
and increased in the later years.
The decreasing trend in the share of registered workers that took place at the
beginning of the analysed period continued during the international crisis of
2008 in the aggregate and for all population groups. Young workers and
women never returned to their pre-crisis share of registered employment,
while adults and men surpassed their pre-crisis level in 2012.
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11.5 Labour Earnings
Real labour earnings increased between 2002 (the earliest year for which
we can compare earnings from the ECH with earnings from the GEIH) and
2013 in the aggregate, for all population groups, and for almost all employ-
ment categories. Labour earnings fell in the ﬁrst year (during which eco-
nomic growth was zero) and then began an almost steady upward trend
that continued as the economy grew even during the international crisis of
2008 and its aftermath. The upward trend held overall, for all population
groups and for almost all employment categories.
(Cruces et al. 2015: ﬁgure 9).
Average monthly earnings, expressed in dollars at 2005 PPP, grew by
22.2 per cent, from US$469 in 2002 to US$574 in 2013 (Table 11.1). Labour
earnings fell between 2002 and 2003 and rose in the following years for the
employed population as a whole. The upward trend in real labour earnings is
partly explained by increases in the minimum wage. The minimum wage has
been used as a political instrument sometimes, in pre-electoral years for
instance, leading to increases larger than the inﬂation rate (Parra Torrado
2010; OECD 2013). However, it is worth noticing that a large percentage of
employed workers are unregistered and do not beneﬁt from the minimum
wage legislation.
Labour earnings grew between 2002 and 2013 for all population groups, and
for employed workers in almost all employment categories. All of them suf-
fered a reduction between 2002 and 2003 (a time of non-growth) and an
upward trend after that (during which economic growth was positive and
above the Latin American average). Labour earnings gains were larger for
low-earning categories compared to high-earning categories. The only
employment categories that suffered a reduction of labour earnings between
2002 and 2013 were workers in the armed forces, employers, workers in the
skilled services sector, and workers with high educational levels. All other
employment categories enjoyed increases in their labour incomes between
2002 and 2013.
The evidence of falling labour earnings for workers with high educational
levels and increasing labour earnings for workers with low and medium
educational levels can be interpreted in light of previous ﬁndings of improve-
ments in the employment structure by occupational group, economic sector,
and educational level over the period. The improving employment structure
by occupational group and economic sector implied an increase in the
share of occupations and sectors that can be expected to employ workers
with high and medium educational levels, like management, professional
occupations, and armed forces, skilled services, education, and health, and
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public administration sectors, and a reduction in the share of occupations
and sectors that employ workers with low educational levels, like agricul-
tural, and craft and trades occupations, and domestic service and primary
activities sectors. This evidence indicates that the demand for workers with
high and medium educational levels relative to those with low educational
levels increased between 2001 and 2013. On the other hand, the educational
level of people in the labour force improved over the same period, indicating
an increase in the relative supply of workers with high and medium educa-
tional levels (Cruces et al. 2015: table 8). The prediction of a supply and
demand analysis is that the relative wages of workers with high and medium
educational levels relative to those with low educational levels will rise or fall
depending on which effect dominates (increase in the relative demand ver-
sus increase in the relative supply). In the Colombian labour market, the
relative wages of workers with high and medium educational levels relative
to those with low educational levels fell over the period, and the relative
wages of workers with high educational levels relative to those with medium
educational levels also decreased (Cruces et al. 2015: table 7). The adjustment
process also led to a reduction in the unemployment rate of all educational
groups with a larger decrease for workers with medium levels of education
(Cruces et al. 2015: table 9).
The international crisis of 2008 did not have a negative effect on the upward
trend in labour earnings that began in 2003, a trend that held true in the
aggregate and for all population groups. Some employment categories, how-
ever, were adversely affected by the 2008 crisis. Among occupational groups,
earnings fell for workers in craft and trade occupations and for agricultural and
forestry and ﬁshery workers. Among economic sectors, workers from primary
activities were affected by a reduction in their labour earnings during the
international crisis. Agricultural, forestry, and ﬁshery workers, and workers
from primary activities recovered their pre-crisis levels of labour income in
2010, while craft and trade workers never recovered their pre-crisis level.
11.6 Poverty and Inequality
The moderate and extreme poverty rates based on the country’s ofﬁcial
line and on international poverty lines fell between 2002 and 2013, as did
the rate of working poor households. Within this period, poverty indica-
tors experienced a small increase in the ﬁrst year (from 2002 to 2003), a
reduction in the following years (from 2003 to 2011), and a slight increase
at the end of the period (from 2011 to 2012). The international crisis of
2008 did not affect negatively the poverty indicators.
(Cruces et al. 2015: ﬁgure 10)
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The moderate poverty rate (measured by the country’s ofﬁcial poverty line)
fell from 46.9 per cent in 2002 to 29.1 per cent in 2013; the extreme poverty
rate decreased from 16.1 per cent to 8.3 per cent; the percentage of working
poor (deﬁned as the proportion of persons in the population living in poor
households where at least one member works) dropped from 35.0 per cent to
19.5 per cent over the same period. When the poverty rate is analysed on the
basis of the 2.5 and 4 dollars-a-day PPP international poverty lines, there is
also a drop in poverty between 2002 and 2013. When the 2.5 dollars-a-day
poverty line is used, the poverty rate drops from 29.8 per cent in 2002 to
15.2 per cent in 2013; when poverty is calculated using the 4 dollars-a-day
poverty line, the drop is from 49.6 per cent to 30.8 per cent over the same
period (Table 11.1). The ﬁgures for all these indicators increased between 2002
and 2003 (except for the extreme poverty rate based on the ofﬁcial line) and
then began a downward trend that was interrupted in 2012 when all the
indicators increased (except for the poverty rate based on the 4 dollars-a-day
international line). In 2013, all the indicators resumed the downward trend.
The poverty patterns reported in the last paragraph can be interpreted by
examining incomes from various sources. The analysis of sources of house-
hold total income indicates that labour income, pensions, and income from
capital increased between 2002 and 2013 (Cruces et al. 2015: ﬁgure 11). On
the other hand, remittances declined from 2008 (the earliest we have data on
this variable) to 2013. Colombia has experienced strong ﬂows of emigration
and remittances in the last two decades (UNFPA 2011). However, during the
international crisis, the amount of remittances received by the country has
been falling and a change is expected in the pattern of migration, with
emigrants returning to Colombia and fewer persons leaving the country.
Data on income from poverty alleviation programmes is not available in
Colombia’s national household surveys. There is evidence indicating they
have been successful in increasing school enrolment and attendance, and
health and nutritional status mainly among children (Attanasio et al. 2005;
Attanasio and Mesnard 2006). Moreover, coverage of these programmes has
increased during the international crisis of 2008 (Núñez and González 2011).
Household per capita income inequality and labour earnings inequality decreased
between 2002 and 2013, though erratically. The international crisis of 2008 led to
an increase in the inequality of labour earning, while the inequality of household
per capita income remained unchanged. (Cruces et al. 2015: ﬁgure 12)
From 2002 to 2013, the Gini coefﬁcient of household per capita income fell
from 0.574 to 0.533. The Gini coefﬁcient of labour earnings among employed
workers decreased from 0.551 in 2002 to 0.499 in 2013 (Table 11.1); this
reduction in labour earnings inequality is in keeping with the fact that earn-
ings increased more for low-earning employment categories compared to
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high-earning categories. However, it is interesting to note that earnings
declined for some high-earning employment categories. Consequently, the
reduction in labour earning inequality in Colombia occurred at the expense
of income losses for some categories. The reduction in household per capita
income and labour earnings inequality was not steady. The Gini coefﬁcient
moved erratically over the period for both income variables. During the inter-
national crisis of 2008, the Gini coefﬁcient of labour earnings increased from
0.502 in 2008 to 0.516 in 2010 and returned in 2011 to its pre-crisis level. The
Gini coefﬁcient of household per capita income held steady during the crisis.
Changes in household per capita income inequality in Colombia have been
related to changes in labour and non-labour incomes. Azevedo et al. (2013b)
decomposed the change in the Gini coefﬁcient of household per capita
income for the period 2002–10 and found that changes in labour incomes
contributed the most to the inequality reduction over this period (the Gini
coefﬁcient of household per capita income decreased from 0.574 to 0.553
between 2002 and 2010). Demographical factors, such as the share occupied
by adults and the share of adults, and incomes from transfers also contributed
to the reduction in household per capita income inequality. On the other
hand, incomes from pensions and capital were inequality-increasing. Other
studies have analysed the factors behind the evolution of labour income
inequality. Azevedo et al. (2013a) used a decomposition approach and found
that changes in the education wage premium (or the ‘price effect’) were
inequality-reducing in Colombia between 2002 and 2010 (the Gini coefﬁcient
of labour earnings decreased from 0.551 to 0.516 between 2002 and 2010),
while changes in the distribution of the stock of education (the ‘quantity
effect’) were inequality-increasing although the effect was small. Gasparini
et al. (2011) found a reduction in the gap between the wages of skilled workers
(those with complete or incomplete college education) and unskilled workers
(those who have completed secondary education or less) in Colombia between
2001 and 2007. The shrinking educational earnings gap can be explained
mainly by the increase in the relative supply of skilled workers, while the
relative demand remained unchanged.
11.7 Conclusions
By Latin American standards, Colombia experienced rapid economic growth
between 2000 and 2013. The economy suffered a slowdown at the beginning
of the period and after the international crisis of 2008. During both slow-
downs, the growth rates were nonetheless positive.
Most labour market indicators improved between 2001 and 2013. Most of
them followed the pattern of economic growth over the period, with a
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worsening in the early years and an improvement in the following years,
interrupted by the international crisis of 2008. The unemployment rate fell
between 2001 and 2013. Within this period, the unemployment rate
increased in the ﬁrst year of the series and during the international crisis of
2008, from which it fully recovered. The composition of employment by
occupational group improved between 2001 and 2013 as workers moved
from agricultural, forestry and ﬁshery occupations, and craft and trade jobs
to better-paying occupations like professional, armed forces, and manage-
ment. The international crisis of 2008 adversely affected the structure of
employment by occupational group, from which the labour market only
partially recovered by 2013. The employment composition by economic sec-
tor also improved over the course of the period studied but was negatively
impacted by the international crisis of 2008. The sectoral composition of
employment did not completely recover by 2013. The educational level of
the Colombian employed population improved from 2001 to 2013. Even
though the international crisis of 2008 led to a worsening in the employment
structure by educational level, the labour market recovered the pre-crisis
structure in the following years. The share of workers registered with the social
security system increased from 2008 to 2013 (the earliest year with data on
this indicator) but was negatively affected by the international crisis of 2008.
Real labour earnings increased between 2002 (the earliest year for which we
can compare earnings from the ECH with earnings from the GEIH) and 2013.
They fell during the ﬁrst year and then began an almost steady upward trend
that was not interrupted by the international crisis of 2008.
The moderate and extreme poverty rates, the poverty rates based on inter-
national poverty lines, and the rate of working poor households all fell
between 2002 and 2013. Within this period, poverty indicators exhibited a
small increase at the beginning, a reduction in the following years, and a small
increase by the end of the period. Household per capita income inequality and
labour earnings inequality also decreased between 2002 and 2013, though
erratically. The international crisis of 2008 did not negatively affect the pov-
erty indicators, nor the inequality of household per capita income, but led to
an increase in the inequality of labour earnings.
The only labour market indicator that did not improve between 2002 and
2013 is the employment structure by occupational position, as the share of
low-paying positions in total employment increased and the share of high-
earning positions fell. The worsening trend in the employment structure by
occupational position continued during the international crisis of 2008.
Young workers and women had worse labour market outcomes over the
period compared to adults andmen respectively, but they have not beenmore
vulnerable to the international crisis. The unemployment rate was higher for
young compared to adult workers, the shares of young employed workers in
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low-earning occupational groups and economic sectors were larger than the
shares of adult workers, the percentage of young workers registered with the
social security system was lower when compared to adults, and labour earn-
ings of young workers were below those of adults. On the other hand, the
share of young workers in low-earning occupational positions was lower when
compared to adults. Despite the generally inferior situation of young workers
in the labour market in comparison to adult workers, both age groups were
equally affected by the international crisis of 2008. The increases in the
unemployment rate and in the shares of workers in low-earning positions
and occupations were larger for adult workers, while the increase in the share
of unregistered workers and workers employed in low-earning sectors was
larger for youth. Disaggregating by gender, we found that men were better
than women in most labour market indicators, e.g. the male unemployment
rate was lower, the share of male workers in low-earning occupational groups
and positions was lower compared to women, and labour earnings of men
were higher than labour earnings of women. On the other hand, the share of
workers in low-earning sectors was larger among men, while the share of
unregistered workers was similar among both gender groups. The negative
impacts of the crisis affected men and women similarly. Women suffered a
larger increase in their unemployment rate and in the share of workers in low-
earning positions; men exhibited a larger increase in the share of workers in
low-earning sectors; and both groups suffered a similar increase in the shares
of unregistered workers and workers in low-earning occupations.
In summary, notwithstanding the international crisis of 2008, Colombian
labour market conditions were in a better state in 2013 than they were at the
start of the millennium.
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12
Costa Rica
12.1 Introduction
This chapter on labour markets and growth in Costa Rica since 2000 is one of
sixteen studies of Latin American countries, each of which analyses the
growth–employment–poverty nexus and aims to answer the following broad
questions: Has economic growth resulted in economic development via
improved labour market conditions in Latin America in the 2000s, and have
these improvements halted or been reversed since the Great Recession? How
do the rate and character of economic growth, changes in the various labour
market indicators, and changes in poverty relate to each other?
To answer these questions, we analyse the growth experience of Costa
Rica during the 2000s and a wide set of labour market indicators that we
assign to one of two different categories: employment and earnings indica-
tors, and poverty and income inequality indicators. More speciﬁcally, for
the group of employment and earnings indicators we construct statistics on
the following variables: the unemployment rate; the employment structure
by occupational group, employment position, economic sector, registration
of workers with the social security system, and educational level; and mean
labour earnings and hourly wages. We present all these indicators for the
employed population as a whole and for different population groups (youth,
adults, men, and women). For the group of poverty and income inequality
indicators, we compute poverty rates using the ofﬁcial moderate and
extreme poverty lines and the international lines of 2.5 and 4 dollars a
day. We also calculate the Gini coefﬁcient of household per capita income
and labour earnings.
All the statistics in this chapter are obtained using microdata from the
Encuesta de Hogares de Propósitos Múltiples (EHPM) from 2001 to 2009,
and Encuesta Nacional de Hogares (ENAHO) from 2010 to 2012. The nation-
wide surveys were processed following a harmonization methodology and
incorporated into the SEDLAC—Socio-Economic Database for Latin America
and the Caribbean (CEDLAS and World Bank 2014).1 The resulting labour
market indicators were compiled into a large number of tables and ﬁgures,
which are available in an earlier version of this study (henceforth, Cruces et al.
2015). Chapter 1 of this book provides the deﬁnition for each of the indicators
we analyse here, while Cruces et al. (2015) includes details on deﬁnitions
and classiﬁcation systems used by Costa Rica’s household surveys, and on
comparability issues of these surveys over time.
12.2 Economic Growth
Costa Rica achieved moderate and sustained economic growth in the
2000s, except for the international crisis of 2008, from which it quickly
recovered, surpassing pre-crisis GDP levels by 2010.
(Cruces et al. 2015: ﬁgures 1 and 2)
From 2000 to 2012, the Costa Rican economy grew at an average rate by Latin
American standards. GDP per capita (measured in 2005 PPP dollars) increased
by 37.4 per cent, while the average for the region’s eighteen countries was 36.2
per cent during the same period. GDP (measured in 2005 PPP dollars) grew by
68.1 per cent, and GDP per employed person rose by 21.1 per cent. The annual
growth rate of GDP per capita was 2.5 per cent, and it varied from a minimum
of 2.5 per cent in 2009 to a maximum of 7.0 per cent in 2006 (Table 12.1).
The early part of the period was marked by minimal growth in the Costa
Rican economy. GDP growth rates were 1.8 and 1.1 per cent in 2000 and 2001,
while GDP per capita fell by 0.5 and 1.0 per cent during the same period. The
poor performance of the Costa Rican economy reﬂected the deterioration in
the terms of trade, the end of the construction phase of a large foreign direct
investment project by INTEL, and the effect of high real interest rates on
domestic demand (IMF 2002). The economy gained momentum quickly.
Exports, mainly those from offshore manufacturing and service activities
with high technological content, led the rise in output, followed by domestic
demand, which increased through a substantial acceleration of private invest-
ment and consumption, and by the boom in construction (IMF 2006, 2008).
The average annual growth rate of GDP per capita was 4.2 per cent from 2002
to 2007, while GDP increased by 6.0 per cent a year during the same period.
The international crisis of 2008, referred to below as theGreat Recession, had
an impact on the Costa Rican economy. There was a slowdown in 2008, when
GDP per capita grew by just 1.2 per cent, and negative growth rates in 2009,
when GDP per capita fell by 2.5 per cent and overall GDP by 1.0 per cent.
1 See Cruces et al. (2015: table 1) for details on the size of Costa Rica household surveys.
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Table 12.1 Costa Rica: Evolution of growth and labour market indicators over the 2000s
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Growth Indicators GDP per capita 8,116 8,032 8,102 8,462 8,666 9,019 9,649 10,250 10,369 10,110 10,456 10,763 11,156
GDP per capita growth rate 0.48 1.04 0.88 4.43 2.41 4.08 6.99 6.22 1.16 2.49 3.42 2.94 3.65
Employment and
Earnings
Indicators
Employment-to-population ratio . . . 56.62 56.01 56.06 55.09 57.19 57.09 58.65 57.90 55.75 54.79 56.02 55.42
Unemployment rate . . . 6.04 6.39 6.65 6.44 6.63 5.92 4.55 4.93 7.82 7.29 7.66 7.77
Share of low-earnings occupations . . . 47.48 48.26 47.86 47.17 47.51 46.58 45.98 43.95 44.27 47.46 48.15 . . .
Share of mid-earnings occupations . . . 28.79 28.34 27.66 28.46 28.03 28.55 28.75 28.53 27.89 26.50 25.20
Share of high-earnings occupations . . . 23.73 23.40 24.48 24.37 24.46 24.87 25.26 27.52 27.85 26.04 26.65 . . .
Share of employers . . . 8.03 7.93 8.65 8.16 7.50 7.75 7.26 7.52 7.22 3.37 3.72 3.56
Share of wage/salaried employees . . . 69.06 68.53 69.58 68.84 71.56 70.85 73.17 72.95 72.77 76.11 76.00 76.09
Share of self-employed workers . . . 20.38 20.80 19.35 20.77 18.90 19.42 17.93 18.06 18.52 18.87 18.77 18.69
Share of unpaid family workers . . . 2.54 2.74 2.42 2.24 2.04 1.97 1.64 1.46 1.49 1.65 1.50 1.66
Share of workers in low-earnings sectors . . . 28.96 28.75 27.52 27.40 28.94 27.71 26.45 24.72 24.14 28.00 27.10 26.44
Share of workers in mid-earnings sectors . . . 44.83 44.91 45.66 46.32 45.28 46.28 46.98 47.22 47.04 43.79 44.44 43.30
Share of workers in high-earnings sectors . . . 26.21 26.34 26.82 26.28 25.78 26.01 26.57 28.06 28.82 28.21 28.46 30.26
Share of low-educated workers . . . 57.32 55.40 53.23 53.27 53.38 52.25 51.06 49.08 47.55 50.03 48.80 46.53
Share of medium-educated workers . . . 27.00 28.15 29.63 29.45 29.03 29.10 30.27 30.90 31.68 30.81 31.47 32.61
Share of high-educated workers . . . 15.68 16.45 17.14 17.28 17.59 18.64 18.67 20.02 20.77 19.16 19.73 20.85
Share of workers registered with SS . . . 50.70 50.53 50.35 51.31 50.68 51.23 53.47 54.69 55.26 55.65 54.58 56.06
Mean labour earnings . . . 749.7 736.3 740.3 694.7 675.3 703.5 764.7 784.8 832.2 794.1 812.0 833.0
Poverty and
Inequality
Indicators
Ofﬁcial extreme poverty rate 7.1 7.0 6.7 6.7 5.6 5.6 3.5 4.3 5.1 5.7 5.9 5.9
Ofﬁcial moderate poverty rate 20.3 20.6 18.8 20.3 20.5 19.1 15.8 17.0 18.5 25.9 25.3 24.0
Poverty rate 2.5 dollars a day . . . 13.78 13.55 13.07 12.26 10.76 10.58 7.27 6.87 7.46 4.53 5.09 4.73
Poverty rate 4 dollars a day . . . 26.72 26.45 24.87 25.93 23.07 22.98 17.88 17.01 17.42 12.70 13.01 2.18
GINI of household per capita income . . . 0.501 0.500 0.492 0.482 0.473 0.489 0.492 0.486 0.504 0.480 0.485 .485
GINI of labour earnings . . . 0.464 0.463 0.454 0.435 0.440 0.454 0.459 0.455 0.459 0.466 0.477 0.471
Note: The shaded labour market indicators’ ﬁgures represent statistical signiﬁcant improvements at 5 per cent between the initial and ﬁnal years for all the employment and earnings indicators and poverty and
inequality indicators. The only exceptions are the share of mid-earnings occupations, share of mid-earnings sectors, and share of medium-educated workers for which we did not assign welfare evaluation criteria.
The vertical lines indicate that the series 2001–9 and 2010–12 are not comparable due to changes in the household survey.
Source: SEDLAC (CEDLAS and World Bank 2014) and World Development Indicators (World Bank 2014).
GDP contraction was driven by a sharp fall in exports and incomes from
tourism, the sectors most dependent on external conditions (ECLAC 2009).
However, Costa Rica recovered quickly. In response to the downturn, the
authorities implemented a ﬁscal stimulus plan (Plan Escudo) which included
the coverage expansion of the cash transfer programme Avancemos, interest
rate reductions in the housing sector, increases in non-contributory pensions,
andpublicworks stimulus (ILO2013). Between 2010 and 2012, the rate ofGDP
per capita growth stabilized at around 3.3 per cent.
The sectoral composition of GDP changed signiﬁcantly from 2000 to 2012 as
the share of the service sector grew and the shares of agricultural and industry
sectors decreased. The service sectorwas by far the largest in terms of share of the
GDP over the period, followed by the industrial and agricultural sectors. The
share of services in GDP increased from 58.5 per cent in 2000 to 68.6 per cent in
2012 (Cruces et al. 2015: table 2). The expansion of the service sectorwas related
to the increase in foreign direct investment directed at this sector (for instance,
tourism-related companies are foreign-owned), which led to an important
growth of service exports in total Costa Rican exports (Martinez et al. 2008).
The share of the industrial sector declined from 32.1 per cent in 2000 to 25.1
per cent in 2012. The share of the agricultural sector shrank over the period from
9.5 per cent in 2000 to 6.3 per cent in 2012. The economic crisis of 2008 affected
mainly the industrial and agricultural sectors, which lost 3.2 per cent and 2.8
per cent of their value added respectively from 2008 to 2009. By contrast, the
production of the service sector increased during the crisis. Both the industrial
and agricultural sectors recovered their value-added levels in 2010.
The following labour market and income distribution data for Costa Rica
are analysed separately for the 2001–9 and 2010–12 periods due to compar-
ability problems arising from a change in the household surveys’ sampling
frame, a change in the method for measuring incomes, and a change in the
poverty lines.
12.3 Unemployment
The unemployment rate increased from 2001 to 2009 and remained essen-
tially unchanged from 2010 to 2012 overall and for all population groups.
Within the period, the unemployment rate increased from 2001 to 2005,
diminished between 2005 and 2007, increased during the international
crisis, and barely changed afterwards. (Cruces et al. 2015: ﬁgure 3)
The unemployment rate (measured as the ratio of unemployment to labour
force) increased overall, rising from 6.0 per cent in 2001 (98,684 unemployed
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persons) to 7.8 per cent in 2009 (165,510 unemployed persons), and from
7.3 per cent in 2010 (149,532 unemployed persons) to 7.8 per cent in 2012
(169,490 unemployed persons) (Table 12.1). Both the number of persons in
the labour force and the number of employed persons increased from 2001 to
2009 (an increase of 480,894 and 414,068 persons respectively) and from 2010
to 2012 (a growth of 130,049 and 110,091 persons respectively). These ﬁgures
suggest that the increase in the unemployment rate over the period was
explained by the new entrants into the labour market who could not ﬁnd a
job. Initially, the unemployment rate exhibited an upward trend between 2001
and 2005; it decreased between 2005 and 2007, and peaked at 7.8 per cent
during the international crisis. After the Great Recession, and as GDP growth
slowed relative to the pre-recession years, the unemployment rate oscillated at
around 7.6 per cent in 2010–12.
The unemployment rate increased for youth and adults and for men and
women between 2001 and 2009, and remained largely unchanged between
2010 and 2012 for all population groups except for young workers who
exhibited an increase in their unemployment rate. All population groups
were severely affected by the international crisis and their unemployment
rates increased between 2008 and 2009. Following the crisis, the unemploy-
ment rate stagnated for adult workers, men, and women, and continued to
increase for young workers.
12.4 Job Mix
The composition of employment by occupational group improved from
2001 to 2009, with workers moving from low-earning and middle-earning
occupations to high-earning occupations, and polarized between 2010 and
2011 (the latest we can analyse the series of occupations). Adult workers,
men, and women exhibited similar trends over the period, while young
workers improved their employment structure between 2001 and 2009 but
suffered a worsening between 2010 and 2011. During the international
crisis, the distribution of employment by occupational group changed very
little overall and for adults, men, and women, and deteriorated for young
workers. (Cruces et al. 2015: ﬁgure 4)
Between 2001 and 2009, the structure of employment by occupational group
improved. Speciﬁcally, the share of low-earning occupations in total employ-
ment (elementary, services and sales occupations, and agricultural, forestry,
and ﬁshery jobs) dropped from 47.5 to 44.3 per cent; the share of middle-
earning occupations (clerical, crafts and related trade workers, and plant
and machine operators and assemblers) decreased slightly from 28.8 to
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27.9 per cent; and the share of high-earning occupations (management,
professional, and technicians) rose from 23.7 to 27.9 per cent (Table 12.1).
During the international crisis, between 2008 and 2009, the composition of
employment by occupational group remained essentially unchanged, but
after the Great Recession, some polarization occurred in the occupation
space. The share of middle-earning occupations decreased, while the shares
of low- and high-earning occupations increased by a similar magnitude
between 2010 and 2011.
Adult workers, men, and women beneﬁted from the improvement in the
employment structure by occupational group between 2001 and 2009, exhib-
ited small changes during the international crisis, and experienced a polariza-
tion between 2010 and 2011. Young workers exhibited an improvement in
their employment composition by occupational group between 2001 and
2009, and a deterioration during and after the international crisis.
The employment structure by occupational position improved between 2001 and
2009 overall and for all population groups. The international crisis of 2008 led to
an increase in the share of low-earning positions in total employment in the
aggregate and for young workers and women, but did not affect adversely the
composition of employment for adults and men. The improving trend resumed
between 2010 and 2012 for young workers, while the structure of employment by
occupational position remained unchanged in the aggregate and for adults, men,
and women. (Cruces et al. 2015: ﬁgure 5)
Between 2001 and 2009, the employment structure by occupational position
improved through a reduction in the share of low-earning positions (self-
employed and unpaid workers) in total employment (drop of 2.9 percentage
points) and an increase in the share of high-earning positions (wage/salaried
employees and employers) (Table 12.1). The improvement was explained by
the increase in the share of wage/salaried employees in total employment, the
main occupational position in the Costa Rican labour market. The inter-
national crisis of 2008 led to a slight deterioration in the composition of
employment by occupational position through the reduction in the share of
both employers and wage/salaried employees in total employment (total drop
of 0.5 percentage points) and the increase in the share of self-employment.
The worsening in the employment composition can be understood in the
context of increasing unemployment where economic necessity may have
compelled workers to take up free-entry self-employment activities. Between
2010 and 2012 the structure of employment by occupational position
remained largely unchanged.
The employment structure by occupational position improved from 2001 to
2009 for all population groups and suffered a worsening during the inter-
national crisis, except for adult workers and men whose composition of
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employment remained essentially unchanged. Between 2010 and 2012, the
structure of employment by occupational position barely changed, except for
young workers who exhibited an improvement.
The employment composition by economic sector improved over the course of
the period studied. Youth particularly beneﬁted, but so did adults, men, and
women. The international crisis of 2008 did not affect adversely the improving
trend in the composition of employment by economic sector overall and for all
population groups, but youngworkers andmen suffered an increase in the share of
low-earning sectors. (Cruces et al. 2015: ﬁgure 6)
The share of low-earning sectors in total employment (domestic service,
primary activities, and low-tech industry) diminished by 4.8 and 1.6 percent-
age points from 2001 to 2009 and from 2010 to 2012 respectively. At the other
end of the scale, there were increases in the share of high-earning sectors in
total employment (public administration, education and health, and skilled
services) of 2.6 and 2.1 percentage points over the same periods. The share of
middle-earnings sectors (high-tech industry, construction, commerce, and
utilities and transportation) increased between 2001 and 2009 (rise of 2.2
percentage points) and suffered a slight decrease between 2010 and 2012
(drop of 0.5 percentage points) (Table 12.1). Despite the fact that the growth
process of Costa Rica during the 2000s was mainly based on offshore manu-
facturing and services activities with a high content of technology, the share
of the high-tech industry sector in total employment fell both between 2001
and 2009 and between 2010 and 2012. The reason is that the new jobs created
by offshore activities for skilled workers mainly were not numerous enough to
compensate for the decline of the manufacturing sector as a whole in total
employment (Ernst and Sánchez-Anchorena 2008). The international crisis of
2008 did not impact on the improving trend in the employment structure by
economic sector that was taking place. The share of low-earning sectors fell by
0.6 percentage points between 2008 and 2009, while the share of high-
earning sectors increased by 0.8 percentage points. The continued improving
trend in the employment structure by sector during the international crisis
can be explained by the large impact of the crisis on the agriculture and
industry sectors, which are classiﬁed as low-earning sectors in the Costa
Rican economy. As such, the share of low-earning sectors in total employment
continued to decrease during the crisis episode.
All population groups beneﬁted from the improving trend in the employ-
ment composition by economic sector over the period studied, and young
workers and men beneﬁted more than adult workers and women. The inter-
national crisis of 2008 did not adversely affect the improving trend in the
employment structure by economic sector for adult workers and women.
Young workers and men suffered an increase in the share of low-earning
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sectors in total employment between 2008 and 2009, but that increase was
surpassed by the increase in the share of high-earning sectors.
The educational level of the employed population improved over the period for all
population groups, especially young workers. The economic crisis did not have an
effect on this improving trend. (Cruces et al. 2015: ﬁgure 7)
The share of employed workers with low educational levels (eight years of
schooling or less) dropped from 57.3 per cent in 2001 to 47.6 in 2009, and
from 50.0 per cent in 2010 to 46.5 per cent in 2012. The shares of employed
workers with middle and high educational levels (nine to thirteen years of
schooling and over thirteen years of schooling) grew from27.0 to 31.7 per cent
and from 15.7 to 20.8 per cent between 2001 and 2009 respectively. The
improving trend continued between 2010 and 2012 when the share of
employed workers with medium educational levels increased from 30.8 to
32.6 per cent, and the share of employedworkers with high levels of education
increased from 19.2 to 20.9 (Table 12.1). The improving trend in the educa-
tional level of the employed population was not affected by the international
crisis of 2008.2 We interpret this result as an improvement for the employed
population as the level of education is an important predictor of labour earn-
ings. Consequently, the changes in the employment structure by educational
level implied an increase in the share ofworkers that tend to have high levels of
earnings and a decline in the share of workers with low earnings levels.3
Considering that the Costa Rican growth process during the 2000s was
based on offshore activities in high-technology industries and services that
employ highly educated workers, such as tourism, the increase in the share of
workers with high levels of education in total employment seems to be low
(Sánchez and Sauma 2010). This pattern of slow improvement in the educa-
tional level of the employed population could be related to the small fraction
of workers employed by these activities and to their limited contribution
to technological learning and upgrading in other sectors of the economy
(Ernst and Sánchez-Anchorena 2008). The educational level of the employed
population improved over the period studied for all population groups and
especially for young workers.
The pattern of improvement in the level of education of the employed
population in Costa Rica continued even during the international crisis of
2 The most frequent value of years of education for employed workers in Costa Rica was six over
the entire period (around 29.0 per cent of employed workers had six years of education).
3 The improvement in the employment structure by educational level is related to changes in
the relative demand and supply of workers with high educational levels with corresponding
implications for the wage gap by educational group and the unemployment rate of each
educational level. We introduce a discussion about the role of these factors in Costa Rica in
section 12.5.
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2008, overall and for adult workers and women. The share of employed
workers with high levels of education stopped increasing between 2008 and
2009 for young workers and men, but the upward trend resumed between
2010 and 2012.
The share of wage/salaried employees registered with the contributory schemes of
the social security system increased between 2001 and 2009 in the population as a
whole and for all population groups. Between 2010 and 2012 the share of regis-
tered workers remained largely unchanged overall and for adult workers and
women, and suffered a slight deterioration for young workers and men. The
international crisis of 2008 did not affect the upward trend in the registration
rate. (Cruces et al. 2015: ﬁgure 8)
The social security system in Costa Rica is composed of contributory schemes
and non-contributory schemes which provide pensions and health care as
well as other beneﬁts to workers and their families through the Caja Costarri-
cense de Seguridad Social. The contributory schemes are mandatory for private-
and public-sector employees and voluntary for independent workers. These
schemes are funded by contributions from employers, employees, and the
government. Different contributory pension schemes exist for public-sector
employees, which differ in the amount of the contribution. The non-
contributory schemes are directed at poor people and provide health care
and pensions. They are totally funded by the government (Sánchez and
Sauma 2010).
The social security system records showan increase in the percentage ofwage/
salaried employees registered with the contributory schemes over the period.
The share of wage/salaried employees registered with the social security system
grew from50.7 per cent in 2001 (777,345 registeredwage/salaried employees) to
55.3 per cent in 2009 (1,076,494 registered wage/salaried employees), and it
rose slightly from 55.7 to 56.1 per cent from 2010 to 2012 (69,382 new
registered workers) (Table 12.1). Within the period, the evolution of the
share of registered employees was erratic from 2001 to 2005, and the share
in 2005was equal to its level in 2001. The bulk of this increase took place from
2005 to 2009. The international crisis did not affect the improving trend
in the share of registered employees that increased even between 2008
and 2009.
The share of wage/salaried employees enrolled in the social security system
increased between 2001 and 2009 for all population groups. Between 2010
and 2012, the share of registered workers increased for women, remained
essentially unchanged for adult workers, and deteriorated slightly for youth
andmen. The international crisis of 2008 did not negatively affect the improv-
ing trend in the share of wage/salaried employees registered with the social
security system for any of the population groups.
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12.5 Labour Earnings
Five years of falling labour earnings from 2001 to 2005 were followed by
four years of rising labour earnings from 2006 to 2009. The increase was
large enough to raise labour earnings in 2009 when compared to where
they had started (2001). The upward trend continued between 2010 and
2012. The pattern of falling labour earnings between 2001 and 2005 and
rising labour earnings from 2006 to 2009 and from 2010 to 2012 held for
all population groups. The evidence of earning changes by employment
categories indicates that labour earnings increases between 2001 and 2009
were larger for low-earning categories in some cases (educational position
and educational level) and for high-earning categories in others (occupa-
tional group and economic sector). Labour earning changes between 2010
and 2012 tended to be positive for high-earning categories and negative for
low-earning categories. The international crisis of 2008 did not impact
negatively on labour earnings overall and for any of the population groups,
but led to earnings reductions for some employment categories.
(Cruces et al. 2015: ﬁgure 9)
Average monthly earnings expressed in dollars at 2005 purchasing power
parity (PPP) increased by 11.0 per cent from 2001 to 2009 and by 5.0 per cent
from2010 to 2012, climbing fromUS$750 in 2001 toUS$832 in 2009 and from
US$794 in 2010 to US$833 in 2012 (Table 12.1). However, the experiences
within theperiod varied substantially. From2001 to 2005,Costa Rica suffered a
decline of 10.0 per cent in average labour earnings. This reduction was
explained by the high level of inﬂation, especially in 2004 and 2005, and the
small adjustment in minimum wages (Sánchez and Sauma 2010). After that
period, a long and steady recovery set in that brought with it an increase in
labour earnings during all of the subsequent years; by 2007, the level of labour
earnings surpassed the 2001 level. The international crisis of 2008 did not
affect this upward trend.
The same U-shaped pattern for labour earnings, albeit with different degrees
of intensity, appears to apply to all population groups (young and adult
workers, men and women).
Among employment categories, all of them exhibited earnings increases
between 2001 and 2009 that were larger for low-earning categories in some
cases and for high-earning categories in others. Between 2010 and 2012,
labour earnings tended to increase for high-earning categories and to decrease
for low-earning categories. Among occupational groups, the increase in labour
earnings between 2001 and 2009 was larger for workers in high-earning
occupations (management, professional, and technicians) compared to the
change for workers in low-earning occupations (elementary, agricultural, for-
estry and ﬁshery occupations, and services and sales jobs). From 2001 to 2009,
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labour earnings of workers in low-earning positions (self-employed) exhibited
a larger increase than labour income gains of workers in high-earning posi-
tions (wage/salaried employees and employers). Labour earnings increases
between 2001 and 2009 were larger for workers in high-earning sectors (public
administration, skilled services, education, and health) compared to workers
in low-earning sectors (domestic service, primary activities, low-tech industry).
Between 2001 and 2009, workers with low levels of education exhibited a
larger earnings increase when compared to workers with high levels of educa-
tion, but lower than the earnings gains of workers with medium levels of
education. Between 2010 and 2012, workers in low-earning occupations and
low-earning positions enjoyed larger earnings increases compared to workers
in high-earning occupations and high-earning positions respectively. Labour
earnings fell between 2010 and 2012 for workers in low-earning sectors, and
increased for workers in high-earning sectors. Workers with low educational
levels suffered an earnings reduction between 2010 and 2012, while workers
with medium and high levels of education exhibited earnings increases.
The evidence of increasing labour earnings between 2001 and 2009 for
workers with low and high levels of education and falling labour earnings
for workers with medium levels of education can be interpreted in light of
previous ﬁndings of improving educational levels of the Costa Rican
employed population and improving employment structure by occupational
group and economic sector over that period. The improving employment
structure by occupational group and economic sector implied an increase in
the share of occupations and sectors that can be expected to employ workers
with high and medium educational levels, such as management, professional,
and technical occupations, skilled services, public administration, and educa-
tion and health sectors, and a reduction in the share of occupations and
sectors that employ workers with low educational levels, such as elementary
jobs, agricultural occupations, primary activities, and low-tech industry sec-
tors. This evidence indicates that the demand for workers with high and
medium educational levels relative to those with low educational levels
increased between 2001 and 2009. On the other hand, the educational level
of persons in the labour force improved over the same period, indicating an
increase in the relative supply of workers with high and medium educational
levels (Cruces et al. 2015: table 8). The prediction of a supply and demand
analysis is that the relative wages of workers with high and medium educa-
tional levels relative to those with low educational levels will rise or fall
depending on which effect dominates (increase in the relative demand versus
increase in the relative supply). In the Costa Rican labour market, the relative
wages of workers with high educational levels relative to those with low
educational levels was essentially unchanged from 2001 to 2009; the relative
wages of workers with medium to low educational levels fell over the period;
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and the relative wages of workers with high educational levels relative to those
with medium educational levels increased (Cruces et al. 2015: table 7). The
adjustment process also led to an increase in the unemployment rate of all
educational groups between 2001 and 2009 with a larger increase for workers
with low levels of education (Cruces et al. 2015: table 9). For the period from
2010 to 2012 our evidence indicates an ambiguous change in the relative
demand for workers with high and medium educational levels relative to
those with low educational levels, i.e. the structure of employment by occu-
pational position polarized during those years while the structure by eco-
nomic sector improved together with an increase in the relative supply of
workers with high and medium levels of education. The relative wages of
workers with high educational levels relative to those with low and medium
educational levels increased, and the relative wages of workers with medium
to low educational levels also grew. The unemployment rate increased for all
educational levels with the largest increases for workers with medium and low
levels of education.
The international crisis of 2008 did not impact negatively on the upward
trend of labour earnings overall, for any of the population groups and most of
the employment categories. The only employment category that suffered a
reduction in labour earnings between 2008 and 2009 was workers in low-
earning sectors. Due to the comparability problems between the 2001–9 and
2010–12 series, it is not possible to assess whether workers in low-earning
sectors recovered their pre-crisis earnings level in the following years.
12.6 Poverty and Inequality
The poverty rate and the rate of working poor households decreased from
2001 to 2009 for all poverty lines. From 2010 to 2012 there was a slight
increase in the extreme poverty rate and in the poverty rate measured by
the US$2.5 dollars-a-day international line. All poverty indicators
increased during the international crisis of 2008; because of non-
comparability of the underlying survey instruments, the poverty rates for
2009 cannot be compared with the poverty rates afterwards.
(Cruces et al. 2015: ﬁgure 10)
The moderate poverty rate (measured by the country’s ofﬁcial poverty line)
fell from 20.3 per cent in 2001 to 18.5 per cent in 2009, and from 25.9 per cent
in 2010 to 24.0 per cent in 2012. The extreme poverty rate decreased from 7.1
per cent in 2001 to 5.1 per cent in 2009 and increased slightly from 5.7 per
cent in 2010 to 5.9 per cent in 2012. The percentages of working poor (deﬁned
as the proportion of persons in the population living in poor households
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where at least one member works) decreased from 11.8 to 10.9 per cent
between 2001 and 2009 and from 17.2 to 15.4 per cent between 2010 and
2012 (Table 12.1). Within the period, the poverty indicators decreased from
2001 to 2007, and then increased up to 2009, a period that included the Great
Recession. The number of moderately poor persons increased by 118,321 and
the number of extremely poor persons rose by 48,997 between 2008 and 2009.
The analysis of trends based on the 2.5 and 4 dollars-a-day PPP international
poverty lines shows a reduction in the poverty rates between 2001 and 2009.
The poverty rate based on the 2.5 dollars-a-day international poverty line fell
from 13.8 per cent in 2001 to 7.5 per cent in 2009. The reduction using the
4 dollars-a-day poverty line was from 26.7 per cent in 2001 to 17.4 per cent in
2009. Between 2010 and 2012, both poverty rates changed slightly. There was
a reduction when the poverty rate is measured through the 4 dollars-a-day
poverty line (from 12.7 to 12.2 per cent) and an increase using the 2.5 dollars-
a-day line (from 4.5 to 4.7 per cent). Within the period, both poverty indica-
tors decreased substantially from 2001 to 2007, increased between 2008 and
2009, and stagnated during the post-crisis period.
The poverty patterns reported in the last paragraph can be understood by
examining incomes from various sources. The analysis of sources of house-
hold total income indicates that labour income and pensions increased
between 2001 and 2009 (Cruces et al. 2015: ﬁgure 11). The increase in pen-
sions (21.7 per cent between 2001 and 2008, the latest we can analyse the
series of non-labour incomes over the period 2001–9) was the most important
factor to explain the increase in total household income. Between 2010 and
2012, capital income exhibited the largest increase (a rise of 19.6 per cent),
followed by labour incomes (an increase of 5.6). Income from government
transfers and pensions fell by 4.2 and 1.0 per cent respectively during those
years. However, UNDP (2014) reported that non-contributory pensions,
scholarships, assistance to poor families with children, and cash transfers
from the national welfare ofﬁce reduced moderate poverty by 2.5 percentage
points and extreme poverty by 2.9 percentage points in 2012.
Household per capita income inequality and labour earnings inequality decreased
from 2001 to 2005, and then started an upward trend from 2006 to 2009, that
continued between 2010 and 2012. During the international crisis of 2008,
inequality increased. (Cruces et al. 2015: ﬁgure 12)
From 2001 to 2005, household per capita income inequality measured by the
Gini coefﬁcient decreased from 0.501 in 2001 to 0.473 in 2005. From 2005 to
2009, it increased and reached 0.504 in 2009. The upward trend continued
from 2010 to 2012 when the Gini coefﬁcient of household per capita income
grew from 0.480 to 0.485. The Gini coefﬁcient of labour earnings among
employed workers decreased from 0.464 to 0.440 between 2001 and 2005,
Costa Rica
245
rose to 0.459 in 2009, and continued with the upward trend from 2010 to
2012 when the Gini coefﬁcient increased from 0.466 to 0.471 (Table 12.1).
The increase in labour income inequality between 2010 and 2012 is consistent
with the evidence of rising labour earnings for workers in high-earning
employment categories and reducing labour earnings for workers in low-
earning categories during this period.
Changes in household per capita income inequality in Costa Rica have been
related mainly to changes in labour income. Azevedo et al. (2013b) decom-
posed the change in the Gini coefﬁcient of household per capita income
for the period 2004–8 and found that changes in labour incomes contributed
to the inequality increase over this period (the Gini coefﬁcient of household
per capita income increased from 0.482 in 2004 to 0.492 in 2007 and closed
the subperiod in 0.486). On the other hand, changes in non-labour incomes,
such as government transfers and demographic changes (e.g. the share of
adults per household) were inequality-reducing. Trejos and Oviedo (2012)
analysed the period 2002–9, when inequality of household per capita income
increased, and found through a decomposition approach that changes in
labour incomewere inequality-reducing, while changes in non-labour incomes
were inequality-increasing with the only exception of incomes from govern-
ment transfers. Finally, Sauma and Trejos (2014) reported an inequality-
reducing effect of social spending, taxes, and social security contributions in
Costa Rica in 2010. Other studies have analysed the factors behind the evolu-
tion of labour income inequality. Azevedo et al. (2013a) used a decomposition
approach and found that changes in the educationwage premium (or the ‘price
effect’) and changes in the distribution of the stock of education (the ‘quantity
effect’) were inequality-increasing in Costa Rica between 2000 and 2009.
Gasparini et al. (2011) found a reduction in the wage premium in Costa Rica
between 2000 and 2009 that was associated with an increase in the relative
supply and a small increase in the relative demand of skilled workers. Finally,
the increase in labour earnings inequality between 2004 and 2009 has been
associated with different policy measures implemented by the government of
Costa Rica, such as the liberalization of trade, tax exemption, and promotion
policies for exports, which became more intensive in skilled labour (Sánchez
and Sauma 2010).
12.7 Conclusions
By Latin American standards, Costa Rica experienced moderate economic
growth during the 2000s. The international crisis hurt the economy and
there was a recession in 2009, from which the country quickly recovered,
surpassing pre-crisis GDP levels by 2010.
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Most labourmarket indicators improved from 2001 to 2009 and from2010 to
2012 (the periods for which we could construct comparable statistics). The
employment composition by occupational group improved between 2001 and
2009 as workers moved from elementary and agricultural occupations to better-
paying occupations, such asmanagement, professional, and technical jobs. The
structure of employment by occupational position improved both from 2001 to
2009 and from 2010 to 2012, mainly through the increase in the share of wage/
salaried employees in total employment. The employment composition by
economic sector also improved between 2001 and 2009 and between 2010
and 2012, as workers moved from low-paying sectors such as primary activities
and low-tech industry to better-paying sectors such as skilled services, public
administration, and education and health. The share of wage/salaried employ-
ees registered with the contributory schemes of the social security system
increased from 2001 to 2009. The educational level of the employed population
and labour earnings grew between 2001 and 2009 and between 2010 and 2012.
All poverty diminished from 2001 to 2009, and the moderate poverty rate and
povertymeasuredby the4dollars-a-daypoverty line alsodecreased from2010 to
2012. The Gini coefﬁcient of labour earnings fell from 2001 to 2009.
Some indicators deteriorated during the periods analysed. The unemploy-
ment rate increased from 2001 to 2009 and remained largely unchanged from
2010 to 2012. The employment structure by occupational group polarized
from 2010 to 2011. The share of wage/salaried employees who contributed to
the social security system remained unchanged between 2010 and 2012. The
extreme poverty rate, the poverty rate measured by the 2.5 dollars-a-day
international line, household per capita income, and labour earnings inequal-
ity increased between 2010 and 2012.
The international crisis of 2008 impacted negatively on some of the indica-
tors analysed. The unemployment rate increased, the employment structure
by occupational position deteriorated slightly, and all poverty and inequality
indicators increased between 2008 and 2009. Due to the non-comparability of
the underlying survey instruments, it was not possible to assess whether these
indicators returned to their pre-crisis levels in the following years.
Young workers and women had worse labour market outcomes over the
entire period compared to adults and men respectively, and seemed to be
more vulnerable to the international crisis. The unemployment rate was
higher for young compared to adult workers, the shares of young employed
workers in low-earning occupational groups and economic sectors were larger
than the shares of adult workers, the percentage of young wage/salaried
employees who contributed to the social security system was lower when
compared to adults, and labour earnings of young workers were below those
of adults. On the other hand, the share of young workers in low-earning
occupational positions was lower compared to adults. In addition to the
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generally inferior situation of young workers in the labour market compared
to adults, youth were more affected by the international crisis: the increase in
the unemployment rate between 2008 and 2009 was larger for youth than for
adults, as was the increase in the share of workers in low-earning positions.
Disaggregating by gender, we found that men had better labour market out-
comes than women for all of the indicators analysed. Women were more
affected thanmen by the international crisis of 2008. Women suffered a larger
increase in the unemployment rate and in the share of workers in low-earning
positions between 2008 and 2009.
In summary, most labour market conditions were in a better state in 2009
than they were at the start of the millennium and all population groups were
quite resilient to the international crisis. From 2010 to 2012, labour market
conditions had a general improvement but a larger number of deteriorations
occurred in comparison to the period 2001–9.
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Dominican Republic
13.1 Introduction
This chapter on labour markets and growth in the Dominican Republic since
2000 is one of sixteen studies of Latin American countries, each of which
analyses the growth–employment–poverty nexus and aims to answer the
following broad questions: Has economic growth resulted in economic devel-
opment via improved labourmarket conditions in Latin America in the 2000s,
and have these improvements halted or been reversed since the Great Reces-
sion? How do the rate and character of economic growth, changes in the
various labour market indicators, and changes in poverty relate to each other?
To answer these questions, we analyse the growth experience of the Domin-
ican Republic during the 2000s and a wide set of labour market indicators that
we assign to one of two different categories: employment and earnings indica-
tors, and poverty and income inequality indicators. More speciﬁcally, for the
group of employment and earnings indicators we construct statistics on the
following variables: the unemployment rate; the employment structure by
occupational group, employment position, economic sector, registration of
workers with the social security system, and educational level; andmean labour
earnings and hourly wages. We present all these indicators for the employed
population as a whole and for different population groups (youth, adults, men,
and women). For the group of poverty and income inequality indicators, we
computepoverty rates using the ofﬁcialmoderate and extremepoverty lines and
the international lines of 2.5 and 4 dollars a day. We also calculate the Gini
coefﬁcient of household per capita income and labour earnings.
All of the statistics in this chapter on labour market conditions and income
distribution are obtained using microdata from the October wave of the
Encuesta Nacional de Fuerza de Trabajo (ENFT) for the years 2000–12. In the
years 2005and2008, the country implemented changes in itshousehold surveys.
The pre-2005 and post-2005 surveys are fully comparable except in relation to
non-labour incomes. While the change does not affect comparability in terms
of labour earnings, it does impede seamless comparison of per capita household
income (poverty rates and Gini index). The pre-2008 and post-2008 surveys
differ only in the classiﬁcation of occupations. As a consequence, compar-
ability problems in the analysis of this labour market indicator may arise
between the 2000–7 and 2008–12 periods. The nationwide surveys were
processed following a harmonization methodology and incorporated into
the SEDLAC—Socio-Economic Database for Latin America and the Caribbean
(CEDLAS andWorld Bank 2014).1 The resulting labour market indicators were
compiled into a large number of tables and ﬁgures, which are available in an
earlier version of this study (henceforth, Cruces et al. 2015). Chapter 1 of this
book provides the deﬁnition for each of the indicators we analyse here, while
Cruces et al. (2015) includes details on deﬁnitions and classiﬁcation systems
used by Dominican Republic’s household surveys, and on comparability issues
of these surveys over time.
13.2 Economic Growth
During the 2000s, the Dominican Republic experienced above average
economic growth. Within the period, GDP per capita stagnated through
2004 and, for the most part, grew rapidly from 2005 through 2012. How-
ever, economic growth slowed during the international crisis of 2008 but
remained positive in every year. (Cruces et al. 2015: ﬁgures 1 and 2)
From 2000 to 2012, the Dominican economy grew at an above-average rate
by Latin American standards. GDP per capita increased by 53.3 per cent,
while the average for the region’s eighteen countries was 36.2 per cent
during the same period. GDP (measured at 2005 PPP dollars) grew by 81.8
per cent and GDP per employed person rose by 41.1 per cent. GDP per
capita grew at an annual rate of 3.6 per cent over the period with a min-
imum of 1.7 per cent in 2003 and a maximum of 9.1 per cent in 2006
(Table 13.1).
At the beginning of the 2000s, economic growth was erratic. From 2000 to
2004, GDP per capita increased by only 2.4 per cent due to years of economic
growth (2000 and 2002) followed by years of decline (2003 and 2004). The
export-oriented growth model that had been in place in the Dominican
Republic since the 1990s faced a series of external shocks during this period,
which included a rise in oil prices and the slowdown in the US and Europe in
1 See Cruces et al. (2015: table 1) for details on the size of Dominican Republic household
surveys.
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Table 13.1 Dominican Republic: Evolution of growth and labour market indicators over the 2000s
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Growth
Indicators
GDP per capita 5,737 5,751 5,991 5,886 5,876 6,326 6,901 7,380 7,660 7,818 8,312 8,573 8,794
GDP per capita growth rate 4.00 0.24 4.18 1.75 0.19 7.67 9.08 6.94 3.80 2.05 6.33 3.14 2.58
Employment
and Earnings
Indicators
Employment-to-population
ratio
53.83 52.79 53.24 52.70 53.19 52.74 54.09 54.36 54.51 52.46 53.80 54.75 55.20
Unemployment rate 4.72 5.49 4.11 4.92 4.21 4.25 3.64 3.20 2.07 3.85 3.14 3.94 4.92
Share of low-earnings
occupations
48.77 48.84 49.98 47.81 48.52 48.63 49.84 50.28 50.42 52.54 52.08 53.59 52.96
Share of mid-earnings
occupations
35.89 35.62 34.63 35.13 35.01 35.14 33.42 33.38 32.42 30.44 31.12 30.60 30.27
Share of high-earnings
occupations
15.35 15.53 15.39 17.06 16.47 16.24 16.74 16.34 17.17 17.03 16.81 15.81 16.76
Share of employers 2.59 3.86 3.19 3.49 4.72 4.42 3.87 4.23 4.04 4.86 3.75 3.18 3.12
Share of wage/salaried
employees
56.90 54.30 53.29 54.80 55.18 52.83 53.56 54.23 52.14 51.07 50.62 51.33 53.18
Share of self-employed
workers
38.98 40.26 42.16 40.27 38.57 39.99 40.04 39.14 40.20 42.56 43.36 43.79 41.87
Share of unpaid family
workers
1.53 1.58 1.36 1.44 1.53 2.76 2.52 2.41 3.62 1.51 2.27 1.70 1.82
Share of workers in low-
earnings sectors
31.21 28.51 29.71 27.65 28.66 27.59 27.40 27.55 26.54 25.84 25.55 25.85 25.70
Share of workers in mid-
earnings sectors
53.17 55.73 54.13 55.13 55.60 56.17 56.73 56.25 56.15 57.39 57.17 56.65 57.53
Share of workers in high-
earnings sectors
15.62 15.77 16.16 17.22 15.74 16.24 15.86 16.20 17.30 16.77 17.28 17.51 16.77
Share of low-educated
workers
56.47 57.22 55.21 54.36 53.52 53.69 52.16 50.13 49.63 49.56 48.32 47.27 46.09
Share of medium-educated
workers
27.37 27.67 28.25 28.73 29.21 29.80 31.01 32.66 31.11 31.67 33.16 35.50 35.19
Share of high-educated
workers
16.15 15.11 16.55 16.91 17.27 16.51 16.84 17.20 19.26 18.76 18.52 17.24 18.71
Share of workers registered
with SS
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46.66 53.89 64.07 71.43 71.75 74.72 71.18 70.89
Mean labour earnings 330.0 327.0 307.6 263.1 217.3 257.8 270.2 258.9 251.7 271.3 261.1 248.1 241.8
Poverty and
Inequality
Indicators
Ofﬁcial extreme poverty
rate
7.77 6.79 8.84 10.42 14.50 9.40 8.09 7.31 6.89 5.92 5.25 5.43 5.35
Ofﬁcial moderate poverty
rate
24.68 24.83 25.53 32.91 39.12 31.31 28.60 27.50 28.69 25.89 25.80 24.51 24.22
Poverty rate 2.5 dollars a
day
15.71 15.84 17.61 21.83 27.77 21.08 18.66 17.90 18.44 16.40 16.14 13.97 14.55
Poverty rate 4 dollars a day 32.63 33.27 33.07 41.73 49.50 40.48 37.48 36.41 37.89 34.71 35.12 33.34 33.26
GINI of household per
capita income
0.519 0.504 0.500 0.520 0.519 0.499 0.519 0.487 0.490 0.489 0.472 0.474 0.457
GINI of labour earnings 0.499 0.487 0.483 0.481 0.479 0.476 0.484 0.464 0.457 0.471 0.464 0.468 0.451
Note: The shaded ﬁgures of labour market indicators represent statistical signiﬁcant improvements at 5 per cent between the initial and ﬁnal years for all the employment and earnings indicators and poverty and
inequality indicators. The only exceptions are the share of mid-earnings occupations, share of mid-earnings sectors, and share of medium-educated workers for which we did not assign welfare evaluation criteria. The
vertical lines indicate that the series 2000–4 and 2005–12 are not comparable due to changes in the household survey. For the poverty rates and the Gini coefﬁcient of household per capita income we compared 2005
and 2012.
Source: SEDLAC (CEDLAS and World Bank 2014) and World Development Indicators (World Bank 2014b).
2001 (Agosin 2009; Godínez and Máttar 2009).2 However, the country faced a
bigger shock in 2003 when a banking crisis arose mainly from governance
problems that went undetected for many years (IMF 2003). The banking crisis
contributed to the ﬂight of capital, an increase in the inﬂation rate, a sharp rise
in the public debt, and the devaluation of the currency (IMF 2003; Agosin
2009). GDP per capita fell by 1.8 per cent in 2003.
The government that took ofﬁce in 2004 formulated a programme to
address the weaknesses in macroeconomic policies. The rebound in conﬁ-
dence and activity led to a virtuous cycle of declining inﬂation and interest
rates, and exchange rate stability (IMF 2005). From 2005 to 2008 the Domin-
ican economy exhibited rapid economic growth, with an annual GDP per
capita growth rate of 6.9 per cent and GDP growing at 8.4 per cent a year. The
growth process was based on non-tradable sectors during this period, mainly
communications, commerce, ﬁnancial intermediation, construction, and
transport. In particular, the growth of the communications sector was remark-
able due to important foreign and domestic investments in telecommunica-
tions (Agosin 2009; ILO 2013; ILO 2014). This pattern of growth, based on
non-tradable sectors, was characterized by a high capital–labour ratio, which
differentiates the Dominican Republic from other Latin American countries
over the period studied (Abdullaev and Estevão 2013).
In 2009, the economy suffered a slowdown as a consequence of the inter-
national crisis, with GDP per capita growth falling from 3.8 per cent in 2008 to
only 2.0 per cent in 2009. The deceleration was the result of the global credit
crunch, a weak external demand, and a procyclical ﬁscal policy, such as a
reduction in social spending (IMF 2009; Lavigne and Vargas 2013). The gov-
ernment increased the stock of public debt to address the increasing balance of
payment needs and conducted countercyclical policies (IMF 2011). The pre-
crisis growth rate was surpassed in 2010 (6.3 per cent), though there were
subsequent slowdowns in 2011 (3.1 per cent) and 2012 (2.6 per cent).
13.3 Unemployment
The unemployment rate fell from 2000 to 2008, increased from 2008 to
2012, and ended up slightly higher in 2012 than it had been in 2000. This
V-shaped pattern was also observed for youth and adults, and for men
and women. The unemployment rate was impacted adversely by the
2 The most dynamic sectors since the 1990s had been tourism and export free zones (maquilas)
which beneﬁted from certain incentive policies such as preferential access to US markets, tax
exemptions, and lower labour costs.
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international crisis: it increased between 2008 and 2009, dropped in 2010,
though not to the pre-crisis level, and continued to rise through 2012.
(Cruces et al. 2015: ﬁgure 3)
The unemployment rate (measured as the ratio of unemployment to labour
force) increased from 4.7 per cent in 2000 (146,457 unemployed people) to
4.9 per cent in 2012 (204,390 unemployed people) (Table 13.1). The evolution
of unemployment followed a V-shaped pattern: it fell from 4.7 per cent in
2000 to 2.1 per cent in 2008, the lowest value of the series, and increased to
4.9 per cent in 2012. The international crisis had an impact on unemploy-
ment that rose from 2.1 to 3.8 per cent between 2008 and 2009 (66,862 new
unemployed people). The increase in the rate and number of unemployed
people occurred mainly due to a reduction in the number of employed
persons. From 2008 to 2009, the number of people in the labour force
increased just by 17,090 persons, while the number of employed persons
fell by 49,772. While there was a respite from rising unemployment in
2010, the unemployment rate grew again in 2011 and 2012, when GDP
slowed down, and closed the period at 4.9 per cent, a level that is still above
its pre-crisis value.
While the unemployment rate increased for youth, adults, andmenbetween
2000 and 2012, it decreased for women between those years. The unemploy-
ment rate of all population groups mirrored the aggregate trend, with a low
point in 2008. All population groups—youth, adults, men, and women—were
affected by the rise in unemployment that ensued during the international
crisis, and they all experienced a slight recovery in 2010, followed by further
increases in unemployment in 2011 and 2012.
13.4 Job Mix
In terms of the composition of employment by occupational group, there
was a slight worsening over the period, with an increase in the shares of
low-earning and high-earning occupations and a consequent decrease in
the middle-earnings occupations’ share. The evidence indicates a slight
deterioration over time for youth, adults, men, and women. For the
employed population as a whole, the share of low-earning occupations
continued to increase during the international crisis and the share of high-
earning occupations fell and, as of 2012, the pre-crisis level had not been
reached. (Cruces et al. 2015: ﬁgure 4)
The share of the following occupations shrank between 2000 and 2012: plant
and machine operators (drop of 3.7 percentage points); agricultural occupa-
tions (drop of 2.4 percentage points); and crafts and trades occupations
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(drop of 2.3 percentage points). The share of the following occupations grew:
elementary occupations (increase of 4.9 percentage points); and services and
sales jobs (increase of 1.8 percentage points).3 The share of the other occupa-
tional groups exhibited smaller changes. These changes in the occupational
composition of employment can be interpreted as a slight worsening since the
share of low-earning occupations (elementary, agricultural, forestry and ﬁsh-
ery occupations, and services and sales jobs) increased by 4.2 percentage
points and the share of high-earning occupations (management, professional
jobs, and technicians and associate professionals) also increased but by a
smaller magnitude (rise of 1.4 percentage points). Consequently, the share
of mid-earning occupations declined over the period (clerical, crafts and trades
occupations, and plant and machine operators) (Table 13.1).
The evolution of employment composition by occupational group followed
the aggregate pattern for all population groups who exhibited a slight worsen-
ing over the period.
During the international crisis, the composition of employment deterior-
ated in the aggregate and for young, adult workers, andmen. The share of low-
earning occupations continued to increase, while the share of high-earning
occupations began a downward trend and by 2012 was still below the pre-
crisis level. For women, the previous trend of slight worsening continued
during the international crisis.
The employment structure by occupational position deteriorated; the share of
wage/salaried employees fell and the share of self-employed workers rose. While
this trend holds true for all the population groups studied, it was particularly
dramatic among young workers. The prior negative trend in this indicator con-
tinued during the international crisis. By 2012, though, the share of wage/salaried
employees had surpassed its pre-crisis level. (Cruces et al. 2015: ﬁgure 5)
From 2000 to 2012, the share of wage/salaried employees—the largest occu-
pational category—decreased from 56.9 to 53.2 per cent, while the share of the
self-employed increased from 40.0 to 41.9 per cent. The share of employers
and unpaid workers exhibited small increases, from 2.6 to 3.1 per cent and
from 1.5 to 1.8 per cent respectively (Table 13.1). The evolution of the share of
wage/salaried employees was erratic; it hovered around 55 per cent from 2000
to 2004—when the economy changed its productive structure radically—and
3 The change in the household surveys implemented in 2008 led to a recategorization of
agricultural, forestry, and ﬁshery occupations and of elementary occupations. Of the total
changes experienced by these two occupations over the period (increase in the share of
elementary occupations and fall in the share of agricultural, forestry, and ﬁshery occupations),
2.0 percentage points took place between 2007 and 2008 and are related to the change in the
categorization. Since both of these categories fall into the low-earning occupations group, this
recategorization does not affect our overall conclusions about the evolution of the occupational
composition of the employed population.
Individual Country Analysis
256
then began a downward trend, with some ups and downs over the period. The
worsening in the structure of employment by occupational position is striking
considering that the unemployment rate was low and, up to 2007, exhibited a
declining trend. The change in the productive structure of the economy
following the episode of the banking crisis in 2003 provides an explanation.
The sectors that gained share in the economy (mainly telecommunications,
commerce, construction, and ﬁnancial intermediation) were less labour-
intensive compared to the manufacturing sector that was the driving force
of the economy before the banking crisis. Consequently, economic necessity
may have compelled displaced workers from the industry sectors to look
for free-entry self-employment activities. The effect of the international
crisis is difﬁcult to discern since the negative trend for this indicator began
in 2007, i.e. before the crisis, and continued through 2010, i.e. after the crisis
had subsided.
The share of paid employees in total employment decreased for all popula-
tion groups from 2000 to 2012, and the drop was greater among youth and
men compared to adults and women. The crisis had a greater impact on the
occupational position of adults and men than on youth and women: between
2008 and 2009, the share of wage/salaried workers increased for youth and
women, while it diminished for adults andmen. However, for both adults and
men the decline had started in 2007.
The employment composition by economic sector improved over the course of
the period studied, overall and for all population groups. During the international
crisis, the distribution of employment was squeezed, i.e. the share of mid-earning
sectors increased and the shares of low- and high-earning sectors fell, and this
trend continued up to the end of the period. (Cruces et al. 2015: ﬁgure 6)
The period 2000–12 witnessed major changes in the composition of employ-
ment by sector in the Dominican Republic. The share of workers in low-
earning sectors (domestic service, primary activities, and low-tech industries)
diminished by 5.5 percentage points, from 31.2 per cent in 2000 to 25.7
per cent in 2012. The share of workers in middle-earning sectors (high-tech
industry, commerce, utilities and transportation, and education and health)
increased by 4.4 percentage points, from 53.2 to 57.5 per cent. The share in
high-earning sectors (construction, public administration, and skilled ser-
vices) rose as well, by 1.2 percentage points, from 15.6 to 16.8 per cent
(Table 13.1). Underlying the reduction in the share of low-earning sectors in
total employment was the change in the productive structure of the Domin-
ican economy. Before the severe banking crisis in 2003, the economy’s growth
was based on export-oriented sectors, mainly in the production of textiles by
the maquila or export free zone, captured by the low-tech industry sector
in our statistics. The low-tech industry sector’s share exhibited the largest
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reduction among the low-earning sectors, falling by 5.1 percentage points
over the period. After the episode of the banking crisis, the economy’s growth
switched to non-tradable sectors, mainly telecommunications, commerce,
construction, and ﬁnancial intermediation. But these sectors are less labour-
intensive than the manufacturing sector, and their shares in total employ-
ment showed small increases during the period. The commerce, construction,
and utilities and transportation sectors increased their shares by 0.6, 1.1, and
1.5 percentage points respectively. The reduction in the share of low-earning
sectors in total employment was then offset mainly by the increase in the
share of employment in other services sectors, like education and health, and
domestic service, sectors characterized by their low productivity and low
earning levels (Abdullaev and Estevão 2013; ILO 2013). During the inter-
national crisis of 2008, the distribution of employment by economic sector
was squeezed: the share of mid-earning sectors increased, while the shares of
low- and high-paid sectors declined by a similar magnitude. This trend con-
tinued up to the end of the period.
There was no dramatic difference between population groups (youth and
adults, men and women) in the reduction in the share of low-earning sectors
and in the increase in the share of high-earning sectors in total employment.
The international crisis of 2008 led to an increase in the share of mid-earning
sectors along with a reduction in the shares of both low- and high-earning
sectors for young and adult workers and for men. This trend continued up to
the end of the period for these three population groups. For women, the
improving trend continued even during the international crisis.
The educational level of the employed population improved over the period for all
population groups through the increase in the share of employed workers with
medium levels of educationmainly. The international crisis brought this trend to a
standstill. (Cruces et al. 2015: ﬁgure 7)
The share of employed workers with low educational levels (eight years of
schooling or less) dropped from 56.5 per cent in 2000 to 46.1 per cent in 2012,
while the shares of employed workers withmiddle and high educational levels
(nine to thirteen years of schooling and over thirteen years of schooling)
grew from 27.4 per cent in 2000 to 35.2 per cent in 2012 and from 16.1 to
18.7 per cent respectively (Table 13.1).4 We interpret this result as an improve-
ment for the employed population as the level of education is an important
predictor of labour earnings. Consequently, the changes in the employment
structure by educational level implied an increase in the share of workers that
4 The most frequent value of years of education for employed workers in Dominican Republic
was twelve over the entire period (around 14.4 per cent of employed workers had twelve years of
education).
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tend to have high levels of earnings and a decline in the share of workers with
low earnings levels.5 During the international crisis of 2008, the trends
described above stalled, but they resumed during the post-crisis period.
Along with the improving trend in the educational level of the employed
population, a disproportionate increase in the share of workers with
medium and high educational levels in low-skill jobs, such as sales and
services occupations and elementary jobs, took place in the Dominican
Republic (Abdullaev and Estevão 2013).
The educational level of all population groups (young and adult workers,
men and women) improved signiﬁcantly. During the international crisis of
2008, the educational distribution of employment deteriorated for young
workers (the share of workers with low educational levels grew and the shares
of those with medium and high educational levels declined), while it con-
tinued with the improving trend for adults, especially through a reduction in
the share of workers with low educational levels and an increase in the share of
those withmedium levels of education. A possible explanation for the worsen-
ing in the employment structure of young workers by educational level can be
found in the previous evidence of increasing unemployment and worsening
employment structure by occupational position during the international cri-
sis. Better-educated young workers could afford to remain unemployed during
the crisis, while the less educated young workers were compelled by economic
necessity to take up free-entry self-employment activities or unpaid family
work. For men and women, there were minor changes in their distribution of
employment by educational level. The previous improving trend resumed
during the post-crisis period.
As a result of a concerted effort by the government, the overall share of wage/
salaried employees registered with the social security system increased dramatic-
ally among the population as a whole and among all population groups from 2005
(when data on this variable started becoming available) to 2012. While the inter-
national crisis slowed this upward trend, it resumed following the crisis.
(Cruces et al. 2015: ﬁgure 8)
The social security system in the Dominican Republic includes old-age, dis-
ability and survivorship, family health, and occupational hazard insurance
plans. Since 2001, the system has followed an individual capitalization
account model which comprises three regimes (Lavigne and Vargas 2013).
First, the contributory regime covers wage earners from the public and private
5 The improvement in the employment structure by educational level is related to changes in
the relative demand and supply of workers with high educational levels with corresponding
implications for the wage gap by educational group and the unemployment rate of each
educational level. We introduce a discussion about the role of these factors in the Dominican
Republic in section 13.5.
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sectors and the self-employed. It is funded by workers’ and employers’
contributions. This regime has a solidarity component (Fondo de Solidaridad
Social) funded by employers’ contributions in order to guarantee a minimum
pension for all afﬁliated, especially those with low incomes. Second, the fully
subsidized regime protects self-employed workers with unstable incomes
below the minimum wage, as well as the unemployed, disabled persons,
and indigents. This regime is funded by the government. Finally, the
contributory-subsidized regime aims to protect self-employed professionals
and technicians that receive incomes equal or superior to the minimumwage
through contributions from workers and the government. This regime has
not been put into practice yet.
Social security records show a major increase in the percentage of wage/
salaried employees registered with the contributory regime of the system from
2005 to 2012. The share of wage/salaried employees registered with the system
grew from 46.7 per cent in 2005 (725,970 registered workers) to 70.9 per cent
in 2012 (1,321,044 employed workers) (Table 13.1). Most of the increase in
the percentage of registered wage/salaried employees took place between 2005
and 2008 when this share grew from 46.7 per cent to 71.4 per cent (474,115
newly registered workers). This rise coincides with the system’s health insur-
ance contributory scheme coming into force in 2007. From 2008 to 2010, a
period that included the Great Recession, the upward trend slowed (rising
from 71.4 per cent to 74.7 per cent). Between 2010 and 2012, the percentage
of wage/salaried employees registered with the social security system fell to
70.9 per cent. The registration of workers in the social security system is
expected to continue with the general upward trend of the period 2005–12
when the contributory-subsidized regime comes into force. The population
targeted by this scheme is about 40.0 per cent of the working population
of the country, and consequently, will require a substantial subsidy from
the government. That is the main reason for the delay in the implementation
(ILO 2014).
The aggregate trend towards greater enrolment in the social security system
holds true when the employed population is broken down by age and gender.
13.5 Labour Earnings
Despite above-average economic growth when comparing 2000 and 2012,
real labour earnings decreased at the same time. This is true for almost all
the groups analysed. The effect of the international crisis on labour earn-
ings is difﬁcult to discern: labour earnings fell between 2007 and 2008, rose
between 2008 and 2009, dropped again in 2010, and continued to decrease
up to the end of the period. (Cruces et al. 2015: ﬁgure 9)
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Average monthly earnings, expressed in dollars at 2005 purchasing power
parity (PPP), decreased by 26.7 per cent, from US$330 in 2000 to US$242 in
2012 (Table 13.1). This decrease was not uniform over the course of the period.
Labour earnings decreased by 34.2 per cent between 2000 and 2004, the year
of the economic downturn. They increased by 24.3 per cent from 2004 to
2006, fell again by 6.8 per cent from 2006 to 2008 (the start of the inter-
national crisis), and increased by 7.8 per cent between 2008 and 2009.
A downward trend began in 2009, lasting until the end of the period. The
lack of relationship between GDP per capita and labour earnings in the
Dominican Republic is striking: from 2005 to 2012, GDP per capita increased
by 39.0 per cent, while labour earnings decreased by 6.2 per cent. This phe-
nomenon is explained by two factors. First, minimum wages have declined in
real terms over the period studied. In 2010, real minimum wages were 7.0 per
cent lower than in 2000 (Godínez and Máttar 2009; ILO 2013). Second,
workers’ bargaining power has weakened over time. Labour earnings and
hourly wage reductions were a common trend in all economic sectors, even
in those that exhibited productivity increases such as communications, ﬁnan-
cial services, and transport (Abdullaev and Estevão 2013). Hourly wages in the
sectors that increased their share in total employment, services sectors mainly,
also decreased. This evidence can be interpreted as a sign of the weakened
bargaining power of workers.
Labour earnings dropped overall between 2000 and 2012 for all population
groups and almost all employment categories, and losses for high-earning cat-
egories tended to be larger than earning losses for low-earning categories. The
drop in labour income for high-earning occupations was larger than the loss for
low-earning occupations. Employers suffered the largest labour income loss
among occupational positions, followed by self-employed workers and wage/
salaried employees. The loss in labour income was larger for high-earning eco-
nomic sectors than for low-earning economic sectors. Educational level was not
an important determinant of labour income change: the labour incomes of
workers with low, medium, and high educational levels dropped by a similar
magnitude in percentage terms. The relative wages among educational groups
show a reduction in the wages of workers with high educational levels with
respect to workers with low and medium educational levels, and an increase
in the relative wage of workers with medium educational levels relative to
those with low educational levels (Cruces et al. 2015: table 7). These trends can
be interpreted in light of the increase in the educational level of people in
the labour force (Cruces et al. 2015: table 8), and changes in the productive
structure of the economy. Previous evidence indicated that the sectors that
increased their share in total employment increased their use of workers with
medium and high educational levels despite being mainly low-productivity
sectors (Abdullaev and Estevão 2013). The prediction of a supply and demand
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analysis is that the relative wages of workers with high andmedium educational
levels relative to those with low educational levels will rise or fall depending on
which effect dominates (increase in the relative demand versus increase in the
relative supply). In theDominicanRepublic economy, the increase in the relative
demand for workers with medium educational levels (with respect to workers
with low educational levels) offset the increase in their relative supply, driving up
the wages of workers with medium to low educational levels. The contrary
occurred for workers with high educational levels, for whom their relative
wages (with respect to workers with low educational levels) decreased. The
adjustment process also led to a reduction in the unemployment rate of workers
with high educational levels, an increase for workers with low educational levels,
and no change for workers with medium educational levels (Cruces et al. 2015:
table 9).6
The evidence regarding the effects of the international crisis is mixed. In
general, for all population groups and employment categories, labour earnings
fell from 2007 to 2008, grew between 2008 and 2009, and dropped once again
from 2009 to 2010.
Poverty and Inequality Poverty increased from 2000 to 2004 and decreased from
2005 to 2012. One cannot be certain whether poverty was higher or lower in 2012
than in 2000 owing to data incomparability. (Cruces et al. 2015: ﬁgure 10)7
The moderate and the extreme poverty rates (measured by the country’s
poverty lines) exhibited an upward trend from 2000 to 2004, the year of the
downturn in the Dominican Republic, when the moderate and extreme pov-
erty rates peaked at 39.1 and 14.5 per cent respectively. The percentage of
working poor households (deﬁned as the proportion of persons in the popu-
lation living in poor households where at least one member works) experi-
enced a similar trend and reached 35.7 per cent in 2004. Despite the overall
reduction in labour earnings, those rates dropped almost every year from 2005
to 2012, a period that included the Great Recession. However, poverty did not
decline as much as expected during a period of strong economic growth
(World Bank 2014a). Analysis based on the 2.5 and 4 dollars-a-day PPP inter-
national poverty lines also shows peaks in 2004 followed by a downward trend
after the Dominican crisis in 2003/4 and through 2012 (Table 13.1).
6 These changes in the unemployment rate were obtained by making the comparison between
2000 and 2012. If the year 2010 is considered instead of 2012, which was a year of a slowdown in
the activity level, a reduction in the unemployment rate of all educational groups is observed.
7 Since the year 2005, the survey has included questions geared to better capturing non-labour
incomes. The poverty rates between 2000 and 2004 are overestimated when compared to those of
2005–12. For example, had a similar set of questions been used in the 2005 and the 2004 surveys,
the poverty rate of 4 dollars-a-day would have been 5.7 percentage points higher in 2005. To
indicate the change in the survey instrument, lines are drawn separating the old and new questions
in Cruces et al. (2015: ﬁgure 10).
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The pattern of reducing poverty in the Dominican Republic since 2005 can
be understood by examining incomes from various sources. Household labour
earnings and remittances from abroad suffered a reduction from 2005 to 2012
(Cruces et al. 2015: ﬁgure 11). Despite this reduction, remittances have repre-
sented around 7.0 per cent of GDP during the 2000s, helping to mitigate the
impacts of low wages and a weak social protection net (Ondetti 2012). On the
other hand, pensions and government transfers increased from 2005 to 2012.
Government transfers have improved their design, starting in 2005. Before
2005, most social programmes were poorly targeted, reinforcing the private
transfers pattern, such as remittances, which are directed to non-poor house-
holds mainly. Moreover, the amount of per capita government transfers was
low, limiting their impact on poverty reduction (World Bank and IDB 2006).
Starting in 2005, the number of beneﬁciaries has increased and the target has
improved. However, the funding of social protection interventions has suf-
fered reductions, especially during downturns. During the international crisis
of 2008, the Dominican Republic was the Latin American country that cut
social spending the most (Lavigne and Vargas 2013).
Inequality of labour earnings diminished overall, though erratically. Inequality of
household per capita income remained unchanged between 2000 and 2004,
though the Gini coefﬁcient moved erratically during the period, and diminished
from 2005 to 2012.8 During the international crisis, there was a temporary
increase in labour earnings inequality but no change in the inequality of per capita
household income. (Cruces et al. 2015: ﬁgure 12)
The Gini coefﬁcient of household per capita income was unchanged between
2000 and 2004 (0.519). However, it declined from 0.499 in 2005 to 0.457 in
2012, a period that included the Great Recession. The bulk of the decrease
took place in 2007, 2010, and 2012. The Gini coefﬁcient of labour earnings
among employed workers declined from 0.499 in 2000 to 0.451 in 2012
(Table 13.1). It decreased slightly from 2000 to 2006, when it stood at 0.484;
it went on to decrease rapidly until 2008, dropping as low as 0.457, only to
increase to 0.471 during the international crisis. It has fallen every year since
then. This reduction in labour earnings inequality is in keeping with the fact
that earnings reductions were larger for high-earning employment categories
compared to low-earning categories. As a consequence, the reduction in
labour earning inequality in the Dominican Republic occurred at the expense
of income losses for all employment categories.
Changes in household per capita income inequality in the Dominican
Republic have been related to changes in labour and non-labour incomes.
8 The changes introduced in the household survey in 2005 prevent us frommaking comparisons
between the Gini coefﬁcient of household per capita income before and after that year.
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Azevedo et al. (2013b) decomposed the change in the Gini coefﬁcient of
household per capita income for the period 2000–10 and found that changes
in labour incomes and in incomes from transfers contributed the most
and equally to the inequality reduction over this period.9 Demographical
factors, such as the age structure of the labour force, had an inequality-
increasing effect. Other studies have analysed the factors behind the evolution
of labour income inequality. Azevedo et al. (2013a) used a decomposition
approach and found that changes in the distribution of the stock of education
(the ‘quantity effect’) were inequality-reducing in the Dominican Republic
between 2000 and 2010 (the Gini coefﬁcient of labour earnings decreased
from 0.499 to 0.464 between 2000 and 2010), while changes in the education
wage premium (or the ‘price effect’) were inequality-increasing although the
effect was small.
13.6 Conclusions
By Latin American standards, the Dominican Republic experienced above-
average economic growth during the 2000s. Within the 2000–12 period,
GDP per capita stagnated through 2004 and, for the most part, grew rapidly
from 2005 through 2012. The international crisis of 2008 led to a slowdown,
but growth rates remained positive in every year.
Despite the country’s high rates of economic growth, the evidence regard-
ing the changes in labour market indicators between 2000 and 2012 is mixed.
Some indicators improved while others deteriorated over the period. The
improvements were as follows. The employment composition by economic
sector improved over the course of the period studied: the share of workers
employed in low-earning sectors decreased, and the share of workers in mid-
earning sectors increased due to the change in the productive structure of the
economy that moved from being export-oriented to being based on services
sectors. The educational level of the employed population improved over
the period. The share of wage/salaried employees registered with the social
security system increased dramatically. Inequality of household per capita
income and of labour earnings diminished overall. Given differences in
which incomes are included before 2005 and afterwards, one cannot be
certain about what happened to poverty from 2000 to 2012; what does appear
clearly is that poverty increased from 2000 to 2004 and decreased from 2005
9 The authors analyse the period 2000–10 and report a reduction in the Gini coefﬁcient of
household per capita income. However, they do not indicate if household income was adjusted
to allow the comparability before and after 2005. We consider their result should be interpreted
with caution.
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to 2012. However, not everything improved: the unemployment rate
increased between 2000 and 2012 following a V-pattern; the employment
structure by occupational group exhibited a slight worsening; the compos-
ition of employment by occupational position deteriorated over the period;
and real labour earnings decreased.
The international crisis of 2008 affected most labour market indicators
negatively. The unemployment rate increased during the crisis and then
dropped, though as of 2012 the pre-crisis rate had not been reached. The
share of low-earning occupations continued with its upward trend during
the crisis as well, while the share of high-earning occupations began a down-
ward trend and its pre-crisis level had not been reached as of 2012. The
composition of the employed population by occupational position continued
with the worsening trend, though by 2012 the share of wage/salaried employ-
ees had returned to the pre-crisis level. Inequality of labour earnings increased
between 2008 and 2009, after which inequality returned to its pre-crisis level.
On the other hand, labour earnings did not fall between 2008 and 2009, but
began a downward trend and continued to decrease up to the end of the
period. The comparison between the effects of the international crisis of
2008 on labour market indicators and the effects generated by the banking
crisis of 2003 reveals that the crisis at the beginning of the 2000s impacted the
Dominican Republic more strongly. The crisis of 2003 generated a reduction
in GDP, while economic growth slowed but remained positive during the
international crisis of 2008. Labour earnings suffered a reduction during the
domestic crisis of 2003, which led to an increase in all poverty indicators that
peaked in 2004, and in household per capita income inequality. On the other
hand, the international crisis of 2008 did not have an immediate impact on
labour earnings, which began a downward trend in 2010; all poverty indica-
tors fell and household per capita income inequality remained unchanged.
Young workers had worse labour market outcomes over the period com-
pared to adults, but they do not seem to be more vulnerable to macroeco-
nomic crises. Men and women exhibited a balanced situation in their labour
market outcomes and in the negative impacts of the crises. The unemploy-
ment rate was higher for young compared to adult workers; the share of young
employed workers in low-earning occupations was larger than the share of
adult workers, while the share in high-paid sectors was lower; the percentage
of young workers registered with the social security system was lower when
compared to adults; and labour earnings of young workers were below those of
adults. On the other hand, the share of young workers in low-earning occu-
pational positions was lower compared to adults. Despite the generally infer-
ior situation of young workers in the labour market compared to adults, both
age groups were negatively affected in a similar number of labour market
indicators by the economic crises faced by the country. The banking crisis of
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2003 led to a larger increase in the unemployment rate and in the share of
young workers in low-earning occupations, but the earnings reduction was
larger for adults. The international crisis of 2008 led again to a larger increase
in the unemployment rate of young workers and to a slight reduction in the
share of registered youngworkers. On the other hand, the increase in the share
of low-earning positions, i.e. self-employed workers and unpaid workers, was
larger among adults. Disaggregating by gender, we found that men were better
than women in some cases, e.g. the male unemployment rate was lower, the
share of male workers in low-earning occupations was lower compared to
women, and labour earnings of men were higher than labour earnings of
women; in other cases, the opposite occurred, e.g. the percentage of workers
registered with the social security system was larger for women compared to
men, and the share of workers in low-earning positions and sectors was lower
for women compared to men. The negative impacts of the crises affected men
and women similarly. The unemployment rate increased more for men than
for women during the banking crisis of 2003, but earnings losses were larger
for women. During the international crisis of 2008, the unemployment rate
increased more for women than for men, but the shares of low-earning
occupations and positions increased by more for men.
In summary, despite the above-average economic growth for the Latin
American region, changes in labour market indicators were mixed in the
Dominican Republic, with the fall in real labour earnings being the more
striking result.
References
Abdullaev, U. and M. Estevão (2013). ‘Crecimiento y empleo en la República Domin-
icana: Opciones para un crecimiento generador de empleo’. IMF Working Paper
13/40. Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund.
Agosin, M. (2009). ‘El desarrollo económico y social: Oportunidades y desafíos’, in
M. Agosin, O. Manzano, R. Rodríguez-Balza, and E. Stein (eds), La Ruta Hacia el
Crecimiento Sostenible en la República Dominicana. Washington, DC: Inter-American
Development Bank, 3–20.
Azevedo, J. P., M. E. Dávalos, C. Díaz-Bonilla, B. Atuesta, and R. A. Castañeda (2013a).
‘Fifteen Years of Inequality in Latin America: How Have Labor Markets Helped?’.
Policy Research Working Paper 6384. Washington, DC: World Bank.
Azevedo, J. P., G. Inchauste, and V. Sanfelice (2013b). ‘Decomposing the Recent
Inequality Decline in Latin America’. Policy Research Working Paper 6715. Wash-
ington, DC: World Bank.
CEDLAS and World Bank (2014). SEDLAC—Socio-Economic Database for Latin America
and the Caribbean. Centro de Estudios Distributivos, Laborales y Sociales, Facultad de
Individual Country Analysis
266
Ciencias Económicas, UniversidadNacional de La Plata andWorld Bank PovertyGroup
LCR. Available at <http://sedlac.econo.unlp.edu.ar/eng/index.php>, accessed 2014.
Cruces, G., G. Fields, D. Jaume, and M. Viollaz (2015). ‘The Growth–Employment–
Poverty Nexus in Latin America in the 2000s: Dominican Republic Country Study’.
WIDER Working Paper 2015/075. Helsinki: UNU-WIDER.
Godínez, V. and J. Máttar (eds) (2009). La República Dominicana en 2030: Hacia una
nación cohesionada. Mexico, DF: United Nations.
ILO (2013). ‘Crecimiento, empleo y cohesión social en Republica Dominicana’. In-
forme de la Organización Internacional del Trabajo. Geneva: International Labour
Organization.
ILO (2014). ‘Evolution of Informal Employment in the Dominican Republic’. Notes on
Formalization. Geneva: International Labour Organization.
IMF (2003). ‘IMF Concludes 2003 Article IV Consultation with the Dominican Republic’.
Public Information Notice 03/123. Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund.
IMF (2005). ‘IMF Executive Board Concludes 2005 Article IV Consultation with the
Dominican Republic’. Public Information Notice 05/162. Washington, DC: Inter-
national Monetary Fund.
IMF (2009). ‘IMF Executive Board Concludes First Post-Program Monitoring Review
with the Dominican Republic’. Public Information Notice 09/06. Washington, DC:
International Monetary Fund.
IMF (2011). ‘Dominican Republic: First Review Under the Stand-By Arrangement,
Requests for Waivers of Applicability and Modiﬁcation of Performance Criteria’.
IMF Country Report No. 11/70. Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund.
Lavigne, M. and L. H. Vargas (2013). ‘Social Protection Systems in Latin America
and the Caribbean: Dominican Republic’. ECLAC, Project Documents Collection.
Santiago de Chile: United Nations.
Ondetti, G. (2012). ‘International Migration and Social Policy Underdevelopment in
the Dominican Republic’, Global Social Policy 12 (1): 45–66.
World Bank (2014a). ‘When Prosperity Is Not Shared: TheWeak Links between Growth
and Equity in the Dominican Republic’. Washington, DC: World Bank.
World Bank (2014b). World Development Indicators. Available at <http://data.wor
ldbank.org/data-catalog/world-development-indicators>, accessed April 2014.
World Bank and IDB (2006). ‘Informe sobre la pobreza en la República Dominicana:
Logrando un beneﬁcio económico que beneﬁcie a los pobres’. Washington, DC:
World Bank and Inter-American Development Bank.
Dominican Republic
267
14
Ecuador
14.1 Introduction
This chapter on labour markets and growth in Ecuador since 2000 is one
of sixteen studies of Latin American countries, each of which analyses the
growth–employment–poverty nexus and aims to answer the following
broad questions: Has economic growth resulted in economic development
via improved labour market conditions in Latin America in the 2000s,
and have these improvements halted or been reversed since the Great
Recession? How do the rate and character of economic growth, changes in
the various labour market indicators, and changes in poverty relate to
each other?
To answer these questions, we analyse the growth experience of Ecuador
during the 2000s and a wide set of labour market indicators that we assign to
one of two different categories: employment and earnings indicators, and
poverty and income inequality indicators. More speciﬁcally, for the group of
employment and earnings indicators we construct statistics on the following
variables: the unemployment rate; the employment structure by occupa-
tional group, employment position, economic sector, registration of workers
with the social security system, and educational level; and mean labour
earnings and hourly wages. We present all these indicators for the employed
population as a whole and for different population groups (youth, adults,
men, and women). For the group of poverty and income inequality indica-
tors, we compute poverty rates using the ofﬁcial moderate and extreme
poverty lines and the international lines of 2.5 and 4 dollars a day. We
also calculate the Gini coefﬁcient of household per capita income and
labour earnings.
All the statistics in this chapter are obtained using microdata from the
Encuesta de Empleo, Desempleo y Subempleo (ENEMDU) for the years 2003
to 2012. The nationwide surveys were processed following a harmonization
methodology and incorporated into the SEDLAC—Socio-Economic Database
for Latin America and the Caribbean (CEDLAS and World Bank 2014).1 The
resulting labour market indicators were compiled into a large number of
tables and ﬁgures, which are available in an earlier version of this study
(henceforth, Cruces et al. 2015). Chapter 1 of this book provides the deﬁn-
ition for each of the indicators we analyse here, while Cruces et al. (2015)
includes details on deﬁnitions and classiﬁcation systems used by Ecuador’s
household surveys, and on comparability issues of these surveys over time.
14.2 Economic Growth
Ecuador experienced moderate economic growth during the 2000s. The
country suffered only amild recession as a consequence of the international
crisis of 2008 but the Ecuadorean economy returned to pre-recession GDP
per capita level in 2010. (Cruces et al. 2015: ﬁgures 1 and 2)
During the period 2000–12, Ecuador experienced moderate economic growth
by Latin American standards. GDP per capita increased by 33.9 per cent, while
the average for the eighteen Latin American countries was 36.2 per cent
during the same period. GDP (measured at PPP dollars of 2005) grew by 62.3
per cent, and GDP per employed person exhibited a rise of 24.7 per cent. The
annual growth rate of GDP per capita was 2.4 per cent, and it varied from a
minimum of 1.1 per cent in 2009 to a maximum of 6.2 per cent in 2004
(Table 14.1).
At the beginning of the 2000s, Ecuador’s GDP growth rate was low (1.1 per
cent in 2000) and its GDP per capita growth rate negative (0.9 per cent in
2000) due to the economic and political crisis the country suffered at the end
of the 1990s. That crisis was related to negative external shocks like El Niño,
the sharp decline in the price of oil—Ecuador’s largest export—and the
tightening of international credit following the ﬁnancial crises in Russia
and Brazil. The recovery was fuelled by the adoption of the US dollar as the
ofﬁcial currency in 2000 (IMF 2006), the increasing oil revenues, and by
governmental measures such as the Fiscal Responsibility and Transparency
Law that was passed in 2002, which mandated saving extra resources from
increased petroleum revenues and placed limits on the growth of expend-
itures to provide resources for priority programmes (Giugale et al. 2012).
The government also passed a series of laws that increased the ﬂexibility
of markets and allowed for greater private-sector participation in certain
economic activities. One of these measures was the ﬁnancing of a heavy
1 See Cruces et al. (2015: table 1) for details on the size of Ecuador household surveys.
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Table 14.1 Ecuador: Evolution of growth and labour market indicators over the 2000s
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Growth
Indicators
GDP per capita 6,184 6,307 6,440 6,491 6,895 7,129 7,312 7,344 7,679 7,595 7,692 8,161 8,443
GDP per capita growth rate 0.89 2.00 2.11 0.79 6.22 3.40 2.57 0.44 4.57 1.10 1.27 6.10 3.46
Employment
and Earnings
Indicators
Employment-to-population ratio . . . . . . . . . 61.63 65.41 64.44 65.53 64.66 62.25 61.06 59.41 59.86 59.14
Unemployment rate . . . . . . . . . 13.19 8.50 8.37 6.72 5.48 6.43 6.86 5.22 4.50 4.40
Share of low-earnings occupations . . . . . . . . . 57.88 57.42 56.80 57.12 55.56 56.22 56.75 54.43 52.91 52.42
Share of mid-earnings occupations . . . . . . . . . 34.34 34.07 34.64 34.44 35.48 35.02 34.63 36.15 38.60 37.93
Share of high-earnings occupations . . . . . . . . . 7.78 8.51 8.56 8.44 8.96 8.76 8.61 9.42 8.49 9.65
Share of employers . . . . . . . . . 4.88 6.70 6.29 6.01 5.21 5.29 4.20 3.48 3.52 3.77
Share of wage/salaried employees . . . . . . . . . 55.09 51.19 53.41 53.38 54.10 55.74 54.13 55.30 52.93 54.06
Share of self-employed workers . . . . . . . . . 31.29 30.64 30.53 28.90 29.76 29.08 30.68 31.64 34.82 33.16
Share of unpaid family workers . . . . . . . . . 8.73 11.47 9.77 11.70 10.93 9.89 10.99 9.58 8.72 9.01
Share of workers in low-earnings sectors . . . . . . . . . 42.39 42.61 42.35 41.55 40.68 39.90 40.07 38.76 38.13 37.92
Share of workers in mid-earnings sectors . . . . . . . . . 46.37 46.56 46.43 47.74 48.61 48.10 48.52 49.08 49.27 48.96
Share of workers in high-earnings sectors . . . . . . . . . 11.24 10.83 11.22 10.72 10.70 12.00 11.42 12.16 12.59 13.12
Share of low-educated workers . . . . . . . . . 54.58 55.04 53.52 52.38 51.93 50.99 50.64 48.69 46.92 45.55
Share of medium-educated workers . . . . . . . . . 27.03 26.16 27.74 28.99 28.86 29.46 29.22 29.93 31.78 32.20
Share of high-educated workers . . . . . . . . . 18.39 18.81 18.73 18.63 19.21 19.56 20.14 21.38 21.31 22.24
Share of workers registered with SS . . . . . . . . . 32.97 33.53 33.15 33.30 34.04 36.00 39.95 45.24 53.30 54.67
Mean labour earnings . . . . . . . . . 457.6 511.1 502.6 529.2 575.1 546.8 515.7 559.7 559.0 589.6
Poverty and
Inequality
Indicators
Ofﬁcial extreme poverty rate . . . . . . . . . 23.8 21.8 19.1 14.1 14.5 13.2 13.3 10.9 9.2 8.6
Ofﬁcial moderate poverty rate . . . . . . . . . 46.6 44.2 39.1 33.6 33.6 32.3 32.5 29.0 25.1 23.7
Poverty rate 2.5 dollars a day . . . . . . . . . 31.33 28.81 25.61 20.00 19.81 19.29 18.85 15.88 13.55 12.85
Poverty rate 4 dollars a day . . . . . . . . . 51.44 48.03 43.60 38.34 38.11 36.75 37.11 33.43 29.54 27.76
GINI of household per capita income . . . . . . . . . 0.545 0.536 0.536 0.529 0.539 0.502 0.489 0.489 0.458 0.462
GINI of labour earnings . . . . . . . . . 0.515 0.527 0.501 0.489 0.524 0.482 0.466 0.463 0.436 0.431
Note: The shaded ﬁgures of labour market indicators represent statistical signiﬁcant improvements at 5 per cent between the initial and ﬁnal years for all the employment and earnings indicators and poverty and
inequality indicators. The only exceptions are the share of mid-earnings occupations, share of mid-earnings sectors, and share of medium-educated workers for which we did not assign welfare evaluation criteria.
Source: SEDLAC (CEDLAS and World Bank 2014) and World Development Indicators (World Bank 2014).
crude-oil pipeline that facilitated an increase in oil exports from around
20,000 barrels per day in 1998 to around 350,000 barrels per day in 2005
(Giugale et al. 2012). The strong expansion of the oil sector was not accom-
panied by a similar economic dynamism in the rest of the economy, which
made the economy even more dependent on oil production and exports
than it had been before (León et al. 2010).
Dollarization and supporting policies ushered in a period ofmacroeconomic
stability from2000 to 2004. In 2004, Ecuador exhibited the largest growth rates
of the period: the GDP and GDP per capita growth rates were 8.2 per cent and
6.2 per cent respectively. A slowdown in GDP and GDP per capita growth
ensued between 2004 and 2007 as a result of somemacroeconomic imbalances
led by the dollarization, such as the current account deﬁcit and the lack of
credit (LarreaMaldonado 2007). The average GDP growth rate was 4.0 per cent
during this period, while GDP per capita grew at 2.1 per cent annually. The
economy recovered signiﬁcantly in 2008 with a GDP growth rate of 7.8 per
cent, due in part to high petroleum prices around the world.
The global recession, though, signiﬁcantly diminished Ecuador’s main
sources of foreign earnings, mainly petroleum exports and remittances
from abroad (Ray and Kozameh 2012). Ecuadorian exports are concentrated
on a few commodities and a fewmarkets. Exports of oil, bananas, shrimp and
ﬁsh, and ﬂowers represented approximately three quarters of total exports of
the country between 2004 and 2008. Moreover, over half of total exports
went to developed markets such as the US and the European Union. The
global economic crisis led to an important reduction in the value of total
exports (a fall of 26.0 per cent between 2008 and 2009) through the fall in
oil export prices and the international demand for Ecuadorean products
(Wong 2012). The international crisis also brought about a fall in remit-
tances (drop of 12.0 per cent in 2009). Nonetheless, the country lost only 1.1
per cent of its GDP per capita in 2009, while the GDP growth rate for that
year was 0.6 per cent. Ecuador recovered quickly and returned to pre-
recession output levels in 2010 thanks to the implementation of expansion-
ary ﬁscal policies and the use of the, albeit limited, monetary policy instru-
ments available in a dollarized economy, such as adjusting the interest rate
(Ray and Kozameh 2012). Despite the negative impact of the fall in oil prices
on government ﬁnances, the country saw its budget alleviated due to the
reduction in the world price of fuel as Ecuador imports fuels. That, jointly
with the placement of internal debt with entities such as the Instituto
Ecuatoriano de Seguridad Social (IESS) and the acquisition of new external
credit in the form of prepayment for future oil sales, allowed the government
to keep social programmes, infrastructure spending, and subsidies (Wong 2012;
Naranjo 2013).
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14.3 Unemployment
The unemployment rate decreased substantially from 2003 overall and
for all population groups. The international crisis of 2008 led to a mild
increase, but in 2010 the unemployment rate was below the pre-crisis level.
(Cruces et al. 2015: ﬁgure 3)
The unemployment rate (measured as the ratio of unemployment to labour
force) followed the business cycle and fell from 13.2 per cent in 2003
(805,663 unemployed persons) to 4.4 per cent in 2012 (295,398 unemployed
persons) (Table 14.1). The reduction in the unemployment rate was not
monotonic and occurred jointly with a reduction in the labour force partici-
pation rate. The unemployment rate decreased from 2003 to 2008, increased
slightly during the international crisis (38,796 new unemployed persons
between 2008 and 2009), and recovered the downward trend to reach the
low point of 4.4 per cent in 2012. The recovery was quick, and by 2010 the
unemployment rate was lower than the pre-crisis level. Both the number of
persons in the labour force and the number of employed persons increased
between 2008 and 2009 by 158,637 and 119,841 respectively. These ﬁgures
suggest that the increase in the unemployment rate during the international
crisis was brought about by the entry of new persons into the labour market
who could not ﬁnd a job.
Unemployment trends for men, women, youth, and adults mirror the
behaviour of the aggregate rate and fell over the period. The increase in
unemployment between 2008 and 2009 was small and affected adult workers
more than young workers and men more than women. All population groups
recovered the downward trend immediately and by 2010 had an unemploy-
ment rate below the pre-crisis level.
14.4 Job Mix
The composition of employment by occupational group improved between
2003 and 2012 as workers moved from elementary, and craft and trades
occupations to better paying occupations, like professional jobs. All demo-
graphic groups—young and adult workers, men, and women—beneﬁted
from the improvement in the composition of employment by occupational
group over the period. The international crisis of 2008 led to a worsening
in the employment structure by occupational group in the aggregate and
for adult workers and men, while young workers and women were not
negatively affected. (Cruces et al. 2015: ﬁgure 4)
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The share of the following occupations shrank between 2003 and 2012:
elementary (drop of 4.8 percentage points); crafts and trades occupations
(drop of 0.9 percentage points); technical and associate professional occupa-
tions (drop of 0.8 percentage points); and management (drop of 0.6 percent-
age points). The share of the following occupations grew: professionals
(increase of 2.5 percentage points); clerical (increase of 1.7 percentage points);
services and sales jobs (increase of 1.6 percentage points); and plant and
machine operators (increase of 1.1 percentage points). The share of the other
occupational groups remained largely unchanged. These changes in the occu-
pational composition of employment can be interpreted as an improvement
since low-earning occupations (elementary, agricultural, forestry, and ﬁshery
occupations, and craft and trades occupations) reduced their share in total
employment by 5.5 percentage points between 2003 and 2012, while mid-
earning (technicians, clerical occupations, services and sales, and plant and
machine operators) and high-earning occupations (management, profes-
sionals, and armed forces) gained share in total employment (increase of 3.6
and 1.9 percentage points respectively) (Table 14.1).
The improvements in the occupational composition of employment
between 2003 and 2012 were observed for young and adult workers, men,
and women.
The international crisis of 2008 impacted adversely on the composition of
employment by occupational group overall and for adult workers and men.
Young workers and women continued with the improving trend in their
employment structure by occupational group even during theGreat Recession.
Between 2008 and 2009, the share of low-earning occupations in total employ-
ment increased in the aggregate, for adult workers andmen, while the share of
high-earning occupations fell. The increase in the share of low-earning occu-
pations was driven by the rise in agricultural occupations that overcompen-
sated for the decline of elementary occupations in total employment—the
occupational group where most workers of the oil subsector are employed. By
2010, the composition of employment by occupational group returned to the
pre-crisis structure overall and for adult workers and men.
The employment structure by occupational position deteriorated between 2003
and 2012. The percentage of high-earning categories decreased overall, for youth
and adults, and for both men and women. Most of the change took place during
and after the international crisis of 2008. (Cruces et al. 2015: ﬁgure 5)
The share of wage/salaried employees in total employment—the largest
category—decreased by 1.0 percentage points over the period, from 55.1 per
cent in 2003 to 54.1 in 2012. The share of the self-employed, on the other hand,
increased by 1.9 percentage points, climbing from 31.3 per cent in 2003 to 33.2
per cent in 2012. The share of unpaid workers grew slightly (just 0.3 percentage
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points), while the share of employers decreased by 1.1 percentage points
between 2003 and 2012 (Table 14.1). Insofar as the share of low-earning cat-
egories (self-employment and unpaid employment) increased by a total of 2.1
percentage points and the share of high-earning categories (paid employees and
employers) decreased, these changes can be characterized as a worsening of the
employment structure in terms of occupational position.
The employment structure by occupational position deteriorated for young
workers, men, and women, while it remained unchanged for adult workers.
The deterioration in the employment structure by occupational position in
the aggregate and for youngworkers, men, andwomen occurredmainly during
and after the international crisis of 2008. Adult workers were also affected
negatively by the international crisis but they recoveredquickly. Theworsening
in the structure of employment by occupational position is striking considering
that the unemployment rate suffered a slight increase during the crisis but
recovered the downward trend immediately, and that the labour force partici-
pation rate was falling during the entire period. A closer examination of the
changes indicates an increase in the share of self-employed workers and a
corresponding reduction in the share of employers, with an essentially
unchanged share for wage/salaried employees. These changes can be related
to the changes in the employment structure by occupational groups analysed
previously. Between 2008 and 2012, management was among the occupations
that exhibited the largest shares’ reduction of total employment and employers
have a high relative weight in this occupational group. On the other hand,
services and sales jobs, and agricultural occupations were among the occupa-
tions with the largest shares of increases in total employment, and self-
employed workers have a high relative share of these occupations.
The employment composition by economic sector improved over the course of
the period studied overall and for all population groups. The international crisis of
2008 led to a worsening in the employment structure by economic sector in the
aggregate and for adult workers, men, and women, while young workers were not
negatively affected. (Cruces et al. 2015: ﬁgure 6)
The period 2003–12witnessed a reduction (from42.4 per cent to 37.9 per cent)
in the share of workers in low-earning sectors (domestic service, primary
activities, and low-tech industry). Workers employed in the oil subsector are
included in the primary activities sector in our classiﬁcation. The increase in
the employment share of the oil subsector over the period in Ecuador was
counteracted by the reduction in the employment share of the agricultural
subsector. Therewas, during the sameperiod, an increase (from11.2 per cent to
13.1 per cent) in the share of high-earning sectors (public administration,
skilled services, and high-tech industry) in the total. These changes resulted
in an increase in the share ofmid-earning sectors in total employment (utilities
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and transportation, education and health, construction, and commerce)
which climbed from46.4 per cent in 2003 to 49.0 per cent in 2012 (Table 14.1).
The employment composition by economic sector improved between 2003
and 2012 for young and adult workers, men, and women, as they moved from
low-earning sectors to high-earning sectors. The international crisis of 2008
led to a worsening in the employment structure by economic sector overall
and for adult workers, men, and women. The increase in the share of low-
earning sectors in total employment during the international crisis was
brought about mainly by the increase in the share of the agricultural sub-
sector. The presence of contractual arrangements and the resilience of export
demand for certain Ecuadorean agricultural products explain the increase in
the share in total employment of the agricultural subsector between 2008 and
2009 (Wong 2012). By 2010, the pre-crisis shares were recovered. Young
workers continued with the improving trend in their employment compos-
ition by economic sector even during the international crisis.
The educational level of the employed population in Ecuador improved steadily
between 2003 and 2012 for all population groups, and especially among young
workers. The improving trend continued even during the international crisis of
2008. (Cruces et al. 2015: ﬁgure 7)
The share of employed workers with low educational levels (eight years of
schooling or less) dropped from 54.6 per cent in 2003 to 45.6 per cent in 2012,
while the share of workers with medium and high educational levels (nine to
thirteen years of schooling and over thirteen years of schooling) grew from
27.0 per cent in 2003 to 32.2 per cent in 2012 and from 18.4 per cent to 22.2
per cent respectively (Table 14.1).2 We interpret this result as an improvement
for the employed population as the level of education is an important pre-
dictor of labour earnings. Consequently, the changes in the employment
structure by educational level implied an increase in the share of workers
that tend to have high levels of earnings and a decline in the share of workers
with low earnings levels.3 This pattern of increased educational level of the
employed population continued even during the Great Recession. The
improvements in the educational level of the employed population are closely
related to the recovery of real public spending in education since the 1990s
and the cash transfer programmes of the 2000s, which helped increase access
to education (Ponce and Vos 2012).
2 The most frequent value of years of education for employed workers in Ecuador was six during
the entire period (around 26.8 per cent of employed workers had six years of education).
3 The improvement in the employment structure by educational level is related to changes in the
relative demand and supply of workerswith high educational levels with corresponding implications
for the wage gap by educational group and the unemployment rate of each educational level. We
introduce a discussion about the role of these factors in Ecuador in section 14.5.
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The educational level of the employed population improved between 2003
and 2012 for all groups and especially for young workers. This improvement
in the educational level of young workers can be explained, in part, by the
Bono de Desarrollo Humano, an unconditional cash transfer programme
launched by the government of Ecuador in 2003 and targeted at poor families
with children. Oosterbeek et al. (2008) and Araujo and Schady (2008) found
that this programme had signiﬁcant and positive effects on school enrolment.
The pattern of improvement in the level of education of the employed
population in Ecuador continued even during the international crisis of
2008, overall and for all population groups.
The overall share of wage/salaried employees registered with the social security
system increased signiﬁcantly between 2003 and 2012. The improvement also
took place among all population groups. The international crisis of 2008 did not
affect the upward trend of the registration rate. (Cruces et al. 2015: ﬁgure 8)
Social security in Ecuador is provided by ﬁve types of institutions which serve
different segments of the population. The Ecuadorian Social Security Institute
(IESS) is a decentralized agency and the main provider of social security for
public and private workers in the country; the Social Security Institute of the
Armed Forces (ISSFA) is an autonomous agency of the Armed Forces, which
provides social security for military personnel; the Instituto de Seguridad
Social de la Policía Nacional (ISSPOL) is an autonomous agency of the
National Police, which provides social security for members of the police
force; private clinics which provide emergency medical care that cannot be
handled by the IESS; and private insurance companies (Naranjo 2013). These
institutions provide pension insurance, rural insurance, health insurance, and
occupational hazard insurance. The Ecuadorian social security system com-
bines contributory and non-contributory schemes. Under the contributory
scheme, social security beneﬁts are ﬁnanced through contributions from
employees, employers, and the government. The non-contributory scheme
is implemented through cash and non-cash transfers under speciﬁc pro-
grammes and is totally funded by the government.
Social security records show an increase in the percentage of wage/salaried
workers registered with the system’s contributory scheme between 2003 and
2012, from 33.0 per cent in 2003 to 54.7 per cent in 2012 (Table 14.1). The
number of registered workers increased from 963,452 to 1,899,153 over
the period. Before the onset of the international crisis, from 2003 to 2007,
the percentage of wage/salaried workers registered with the social security
system was stable at around 33.4 per cent. Between 2008 and 2011, the rate
of registration grew annually by 10.0 per cent, though the pace of that
increase dropped to 2.6 per cent in 2012. The sharp increase beginning in
2008 occurred because in 2007, the government of Ecuador instituted a set of
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labour policies designed to improve working conditions. Those measures
included the elimination of several forms of precarious employment, such as
labour subcontracting and hiring by the hour. They also included an active
minimum wage policy and policies to ensure that employers comply with the
obligation to register their workers in the social security system. In addition,
registering with the social security system was made more attractive by
increased beneﬁts (ILO 2014). These incentives included: the expansion of
health insurance for children under the age of eighteen and spouses of regis-
tered workers; the reduction from six to three months of the waiting period to
obtain health insurance beneﬁts related to the social security system; and
changes in management models (health beneﬁts rendered by clinics, hos-
pitals, and private medical centres).
The rate of registration with the social security system increased for all popu-
lation groups (young and adult workers, men, and women) over the period.
The overall percentage of workers registered with the social security system
continued to grow during the international crisis of 2008. Disaggregating by
population group, the rate of registration with the social security system also
continued to increase for young and adult workers, men, and women.
14.5 Labour Earnings
Labour earnings increased between 2003 and 2012. Within the period,
labour earnings moved erratically. Labour earnings increased overall, for
young and adult workers, and for men and women. The evidence of
earning changes by employment categories over the period is mixed,
with low-earning categories having larger earning increases compared
to high-earning categories in some cases (economic sectors and educa-
tional levels), and high-earning categories having larger earning increases
compared to low-earning categories in others (occupational positions and
occupational groups). Labour earnings were negatively affected by the
international crisis of 2008 overall, for adult workers, men, and women,
andmost employment categories, and not all of them recovered their pre-
crisis level of earnings by the end of the period.
(Cruces et al. 2015: ﬁgure 9)
Averagemonthly earnings, expressed in dollars at 2005purchasing power parity
(PPP), increased by 28.8 per cent, from US$458 in 2003 to US$590 in 2012
(Table 14.1). Labour earnings increased between 2003 and 2004, fell between
2004 and 2005, and recovered the upward trend starting in 2005. The period
2007–9 witnessed a decrease in labour earnings, which partly reﬂects the vari-
ations in the country’s economic performance. In 2009, Ecuador had the lowest
GDP and GDP per capita growth rates of the period studied. The following
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years—from 2010 to 2012—witnessed an average annual increase in income
from labour of 4.6 per cent, which meant a return to pre-crisis levels by 2010.
This latter increase in total labour earningswas duemostly to an annual increase
of about 4.5 per cent in average hourly wages from 2010 to 2012. In fact, wage
policy went through two distinct phases over the period. Up to 2006, wage
increases were based solely on inﬂation. Since 2007, the government’s wage
policy has explicitly been aimed at improving workers’ wages by more than
inﬂation in order to achieve a ‘decent’ wage (Naranjo 2013).
All population groups and most employment categories experienced an
increase in labour earnings over the period. Disaggregating by occupational
groups, labour earnings increases were larger for high-earning groups com-
pared to low-earning groups. Among occupational positions, low-earning
categories experienced an average increase in their labour earnings that was
below the gain for workers in high-earning categories. When broken down
by economic sectors, labour income gains were larger for low-earning sectors
compared to high-earning sectors. Among educational levels, earnings
increases were larger for less educated workers.
The evidence of larger labour earnings increases for workers with low edu-
cational levels compared to those with medium and high educational levels
can be interpreted in light of previous ﬁndings of improving employment
structure by occupational group and economic sector over the period, and
improving educational levels of the employed population. The improving
employment structure by occupational group and economic sector implied
an increase in the share of occupations and sectors that can be expected to
employ workers with high and medium educational levels, such as profes-
sional occupations and the skilled services sector, and a reduction in the share
of occupations and sectors that employ workers with low educational levels,
such as elementary, craft and related trade jobs, domestic service, primary
activities, and low-tech industry sectors. This evidence indicates that the
demand for workers with high and medium educational levels relative to
those with low educational levels increased between 2003 and 2012. It is
interesting to notice that workers employed in the oil subsector—the main
economic activity of Ecuador—have 9.8 years of education on average and, as
such, are workers with medium levels of education. On the other hand, the
educational level of people in the labour force improved over the same period,
indicating an increase in the relative supply of workers with high andmedium
levels of education (Cruces et al. 2015: table 8). The prediction of a supply and
demand analysis is that the relative wages of workers with high and medium
educational levels relative to those with low educational levels will rise or fall
depending on which effect dominates (increase in the relative demand versus
increase in the relative supply). In the Ecuadorian labour market, the relative
wages of workers with high and medium educational levels relative to those
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with low educational levels fell over the period, and the relative wages of
workers with high educational levels relative to those with medium educa-
tional levels also decreased (Cruces et al. 2015: table 7). The adjustment pro-
cess also led to a reduction in the unemployment rate of all educational groups
with larger reductions for workers with low and medium levels of education
(Cruces et al. 2015: table 9).
The international crisis of 2008 led to a reduction in labour earnings
overall, for adult workers, men, and women, and for most employment
categories, and not all of them recovered their pre-crisis level of earnings by
the end of the period. Labour earnings of young workers were not impacted
negatively by the international crisis. The aggregate labour earnings level was
recovered in 2012.Women returned to their pre-crisis level of labour earnings
in 2010, and adult workers in 2012. Men, on the other hand, had not
recovered their pre-recession level of earnings by 2012. Among occupational
groups, workers in management, agricultural, and clerical jobs were affected
the most by the international crisis. Workers in agricultural and clerical jobs
recovered their pre-recession levels of earnings in 2011 and 2012 respectively,
while workers in management occupations had not returned to their pre-
crisis level of labour incomes by the end of the period. Disaggregating by
occupational position, employers were hit hardest by the crisis compared to
the self-employed, while wage/salaried employees did not suffer an earnings
reduction. The self-employed recovered their pre-crisis level of earnings in
2011, while employers had not returned to that level by 2012. When broken
down by economic sector, the evidence indicates that workers in skilled
services, construction, and high-tech industry sectors suffered the largest
reduction in labour incomes during the international crisis. Workers in the
high-tech industry sector returned to their pre-crisis level of earnings in 2010,
while workers in the skilled services and construction sectors never recovered
their previous level of earnings. The reductions of labour earnings during the
international crisis were larger for workers with higher educational levels.
Workers with low and medium educational levels returned to their pre-crisis
level of earnings in 2010 and 2011 respectively, while workers with high
levels of education had not fully recovered by 2012.
14.6 Poverty and Inequality
The poverty rate and the rate of working poor households decreased sub-
stantially between 2003 and 2012. Within the period, the poverty indica-
tors fell in the early years of the period, stopped decreasing between 2006
and 2009, and resumed the downward trend in the following years.
(Cruces et al. 2015: ﬁgure 10)
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The moderate poverty rate (measured by the country’s ofﬁcial poverty line)
fell from 46.6 per cent in 2003 to 23.7 per cent in 2012, the extreme poverty
rate dropped from 23.8 per cent to 8.6 per cent, and the percentage of the
working poor (deﬁned as the proportion of persons in the population living
in poor households where at least one member works) decreased from 37.0
per cent to 17.0 per cent over the same period (Table 14.1). A closer look at the
evolution of these indicators reveals a steady downward trend at the begin-
ning of the period, stabilization between 2006 and 2009, a period when the
growth in GDP was slow, and a recovery of the downward trend in the
following years. The analysis of trends based on the 2.5 and 4 dollars-a-day
PPP international poverty lines shows the aforementioned trends. The pov-
erty rate based on those measures decreased from 2003 to 2006, then levelled
off until 2009 when the downward trend resumed.
The poverty patterns exhibited by Ecuador can be understood by examining
incomes fromvarious sources aswell as governmentprogrammes.Between2003
and 2012, income from labour, pensions, and government transfers, all of them
measured at the household level, increased in real terms, while remittanceswere
largely unchanged (Cruces et al. 2015: ﬁgure 11). Incomes from pensions and
government transfers showed the largest increases. In fact, between 2006 and
2010 there was an important increase in social expenditure as a percentage of
GDP, which went from 4.8 to 9.8 per cent. Mideros and O’Donoghue (2014)
estimated that in 2012 the Bono de Desarrollo Humano, a cash transfer targeted at
poor households, reduced the extreme andmoderate poverty rates measured by
the country’s ofﬁcial poverty line by 20.8 per cent and 9.0 per cent respectively.
Similar results were found by Naranjo (2008). Azevedo et al. (2013) provided
additional evidence on the poverty-reducing role of government transfers. The
authors broke down the observed reduction in poverty to ﬁnd that the combin-
ationof cash transfer programmes andhigher pensionswasmore responsible for
the drop in extreme poverty in Ecuador,measured according to the 2.5 dollars-a-
day poverty line, than changes in labour income. Remittances from abroad,
which are an important source of income for poor households, also help to
explain the reduction of poverty between 2003 and2012.During theﬁrst half of
the 2000s, the amount of remittances received by Ecuadorwas comparable to oil
revenues and allowed poor households to recover from the crisis at the end of
the nineties. Emigration also generated scarcity of labour in some economic
sectors, wage increases, and poverty reductions (Larrea Maldonado 2007).4
Household per capita income and labour earnings inequality diminished over the
period studied, although erratically. (Cruces et al. 2015: ﬁgure 12)
4 The cumulated net migration between 1996 and 2004 reached 858,374 individuals, which is
very large compared to the size of the Ecuadorean labour force (Larrea Maldonado 2007).
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Household per capita income and labour earnings inequality decreased as
GDP increased over the period. The Gini coefﬁcient of household per capita
income fell from 0.545 in 2003 to 0.462 in 2012. The Gini increased from
0.529 to 0.539 from 2006 to 2007 as GDP growth slowed. A new, albeit minor,
increase in the Gini was observed from 2011 to 2012. Throughout the period,
the Gini coefﬁcient of labour earnings among employed workers was below
that of household per capita income and the decline occurred from 0.515 in
2003 to 0.431 in 2012 (Table 14.1). There was a signiﬁcant increase in the Gini
of labour earnings from 2006 to 2007 (0.489 to 0.524), though the downward
trend resumed after that period and continued until 2012. This reduction in
labour earnings inequality over the period is in keeping with our previous
evidence of larger earnings gains for workers with low educational levels
compared to those with high educational levels.
The reduction of income inequality during the 2000s is explainedmainly by
the expansion of cash transfer programmes, especially in the second half of
the decade, and by rising real wages and falling unemployment. The Bono de
Desarrollo Humano is a progressive programme and its redistributive effect has
strengthened towards the end of the decade. The role of cash transfer pro-
grammes in reducing income inequality in Ecuador was reinforced by the
pattern of economic recovery based on primary exports, which weakened
the push for greater demand for skilled workers which had existed since the
1990s. The continued growth in the supply of workers with high levels of
education coming out of the schooling system, coupled with a weakened
demand for their skill level, pushed down the wage gap between skilled and
unskilled workers (Ponce and Vos 2012). The same conclusion was reached by
Gasparini et al. (2011), who deﬁned skilled workers as those with some college
education and unskilled workers as those up to complete secondary education,
and used the Katz and Murphy (1992) framework to ﬁnd that the relative
supply of skilled labour increased steadily while, for certain values of elasticity
of substitution between skilled and unskilled workers, the relative demand fell
over the period 2003–10.5 The trend of reducing income inequality during the
2000s was counteracted by the rise of remittances which have tended to
increase income inequality (Olivié et al. 2009).
14.7 Conclusions
By Latin American standards, Ecuador experiencedmoderate economic growth
during the 2000s. The country underwent a mild recession as a consequence of
5 According to the educational level classiﬁcation used by the authors, most workers employed
in the oil sector are unskilled workers.
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the international crisis of 2008, but the Ecuadorean economy returned to pre-
recession GDP per capita level in 2010.
The evidence regarding the changes in labour market indicators indicated
that most of these improved between 2003 and 2012. The unemployment
rate fell. The composition of employment by occupational group improved
between 2003 and 2012 as workers moved from elementary and craft and
trades occupations to better-paying occupations, like professional, clerical,
and services and sales jobs. Employment composition by economic sector
improved over the course of the period studied through a reduction in the
share of workers in low-earning sectors such as domestic service, primary
activities, and low-tech industry, and an increase in the share of high-earning
sectors like skilled services. The educational level of the employed population
improved steadily over the period and the share of wage/salaried employees
registered with the social security system increased. Finally, labour earnings
increased between 2003 and 2012. The only labour market indicator that did
not improve over the period studied is the employment structure by occupa-
tional position which deteriorated between 2003 and 2012. Themoderate and
extreme poverty rates, the rate of working poor households, and the Gini
coefﬁcient of per capita household income and labour earnings all decreased
over the period.
Looking speciﬁcally at the international crisis of 2008, most labour market
indicators were affected negatively by the crisis. The unemployment rate
increased but then fell, recovering the pre-recession level by 2010. The
employment composition by occupational group and economic sector wor-
sened during the crisis but the pre-recession structures were recovered in 2010.
Most of the worsening in the employment structure by occupational position
took place after the international crisis. Labour earnings fell during the crisis
overall and for most population groups and employment categories, and not
all of them recovered the pre-crisis level of earnings by the end of the period.
The poverty indicators stopped decreasing during the international crisis, but
recovered the downward trend immediately.
Young workers had worse labour market outcomes over the period com-
pared to adults, but they do not seem to be more vulnerable to macroeco-
nomic crises. Men and women exhibited a balanced situation in their labour
market outcomes, but men were most affected by the negative impacts of
the crisis. The unemployment rate was higher for young compared to adult
workers, the shares of young employed workers in low-earning occupational
groups and economic sectors were larger than the shares of adult workers,
the percentage of young workers registered with the social security system
was lower when compared to adults, and labour earnings of young workers
were below those of adults. On the other hand, the share of young workers
in low-earning occupational positions was lower compared to adults and
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their educational level improved more than that of adults. Despite the
generally inferior situation of young workers in the labour market compared
to adults, adult workers were more affected by the international crisis of
2008 in all labour market indicators. Disaggregating by gender, we found
that men were better than women in some cases, e.g. the male unemploy-
ment rate was lower, the share of male workers in low-earning positions was
lower compared to women, and labour earnings of men were higher than
labour earnings of women; in other cases, the opposite occurred, e.g. the
percentage of workers registered with the social security system was larger
for women compared to men, and the share of workers in low-earning
occupations and sectors was lower for women compared to men. The nega-
tive impacts of the crisis affected men more than women in all labour
market indicators.
In summary, labour market conditions in Ecuador were generally in a better
situation in 2012 than they were in 2003 despite the international crisis of
2008. All population groups were affected negatively by the international
crisis, but adult workers and men were more vulnerable than young workers
and women.
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15
El Salvador
15.1 Introduction
This chapter on labour markets and growth in El Salvador since 2000 is one of
sixteen studies of Latin American countries, each of which analyses the
growth–employment–poverty nexus and aims to answer the following broad
questions: Has economic growth resulted in economic development via
improved labour market conditions in Latin America in the 2000s, and have
these improvements halted or been reversed since the Great Recession? How
do the rate and character of economic growth, changes in the various labour
market indicators, and changes in poverty relate to each other?
To answer these questions, we analyse the growth experience of El Salvador
during the 2000s and a wide set of labour market indicators that we assign
to one of two different categories: employment and earnings indicators,
and poverty and income inequality indicators. More speciﬁcally, for the
group of employment and earnings indicators we construct statistics on
the following variables: the unemployment rate; the employment structure
by occupational group, employment position, economic sector, registration
of workers with the social security system, and educational level; and
mean labour earnings and hourly wages. We present all these indicators for
the employed population as a whole and for different population groups
(youth, adults, men, and women). For the group of poverty and income
inequality indicators, we compute poverty rates using the ofﬁcial moderate
and extreme poverty lines and the international lines of 2.5 and 4 dollars a
day.We also calculate the Gini coefﬁcient of household per capita income and
labour earnings.
All the statistics in this chapter are obtained using microdata from the
Encuesta de Hogares de Propósitos Múltiples (EHPM) from 2000 to 2012.
The nationwide surveys were processed following a harmonization method-
ology and incorporated into the SEDLAC—Socio-Economic Database for Latin
America and the Caribbean (CEDLAS and World Bank 2014).1 The resulting
labour market indicators were compiled into a large number of tables and
ﬁgures, which are available in an earlier version of this study (henceforth,
Cruces et al. 2015). Chapter 1 of this book provides the deﬁnition for each of
the indicators we analyse here, while Cruces et al. (2015) includes details on
deﬁnitions and classiﬁcation systems used by El Salvador’s household surveys,
and on comparability issues of these surveys over time.
15.2 Economic Growth
El Salvador experienced slow economic growth during the 2000s. The
country underwent a recession as a consequence of the international crisis
of 2008. The economy of El Salvador returned to its pre-recession GDP level
in 2011. (Cruces et al. 2015: ﬁgures 1 and 2)
During the period 2000 to 2012, El Salvador experienced slow economic growth
by Latin American standards. GDP per capita increased by 18.8 per cent, while
the average for the eighteen Latin American countries was 36.2 per cent during
the same period. GDP (measured in PPP dollars of 2005) grew by 25.6 per cent,
and GDP per employed person rose by 3.1 per cent. GDP per capita grew at an
average annual rate of 1.5 per cent, with a minimum rate of 3.6 per cent in
2009 and a maximum rate of 3.5 per cent in 2006 (Table 15.1).
The growth experience of El Salvador was sluggish at the beginning of
the decade, from 2000 to 2004, when the average GDP growth rate was
2.1 per cent. Previous crises characterized by high inﬂation rates and income
stagnation led to the dollarization of the economy in 2001 (IMF 2005; Castillo
Ponce and Rodríguez Espinosa 2009). However, the country was affected by
several negative shocks during these years: the decline in the international
prices of its main agricultural products, such as coffee and sugar; the compe-
tition of Chinesemanufacturing products, mainly textiles; the recession in the
US, its main trade partner; and some natural disasters like hurricanes and
earthquakes (Monge-Naranjo and Rodríguez-Clare 2009).
From 2005 to 2007, the economy of El Salvador accelerated its growth based
on the recovery of agricultural prices, government support of agricultural
producers, and private consumption funded by remittances (Osorio 2009;
IMF 2015). The average GDP growth rate was 3.8 per cent during this period.
The Salvadoran economy was negatively affected by the international
crisis of 2008 due to its strong ties to the US economy (IMF 2010). Remittances,
1 See Cruces et al. (2015: table 1) for details on the size of El Salvador household surveys.
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Table 15.1 El Salvador: Evolution of growth and labour market indicators over the 2000s
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Growth Indicators GDP per capita 5,155 5,220 5,322 5,425 5,506 5,682 5,880 6,080 6,129 5,906 5,953 6,048 6,125
GDP per capita
growth rate
1.64 1.26 1.95 1.94 1.50 3.18 3.50 3.39 0.80 3.63 0.80 1.60 1.26
Employment and
Earnings
Indicators
Employment-to-
population ratio
55.92 56.05 54.96 56.76 55.52 55.37 56.38 56.98 57.61 56.76 56.69 57.16 58.09
Unemployment rate 6.86 7.00 6.20 6.95 6.78 7.19 6.50 6.39 5.92 7.34 7.04 6.64 6.06
Share of low-earnings
occupations
57.32 56.97 55.78 54.94 55.73 55.11 55.19 54.76 55.86 55.56 55.21 55.54 55.86
Share of mid-earnings
occupations
30.09 30.84 31.45 32.22 32.29 31.50 31.96 32.32 31.41 31.81 32.95 33.13 32.37
Share of high-earnings
occupations
12.59 12.19 12.77 12.84 11.98 13.39 12.85 12.91 12.73 12.63 11.83 11.34 11.78
Share of employers 5.54 4.76 4.75 4.78 4.38 4.53 4.46 4.49 4.33 4.27 4.06 3.70 4.17
Share of wage/salaried
employees
57.35 58.15 56.49 59.26 60.42 57.67 61.17 59.88 58.90 56.88 57.75 57.88 57.65
Share of self-employed
workers
30.58 28.78 31.10 28.86 28.65 29.93 27.12 28.15 29.22 30.82 30.42 30.22 29.48
Share of unpaid family
workers
6.54 8.32 7.66 7.10 6.55 7.87 7.25 7.48 7.54 8.04 7.78 8.20 8.70
Share of workers in
low-earnings sectors
38.97 38.39 36.54 34.99 35.47 35.00 34.32 33.78 35.98 36.52 35.92 36.76 36.28
Share of workers in
mid-earnings
sectors
46.46 47.89 50.09 51.42 50.90 50.98 52.17 52.27 50.21 49.79 50.06 48.56 49.28
Share of workers in
high-earnings
sectors
14.57 13.72 13.38 13.60 13.63 14.01 13.51 13.95 13.80 13.69 14.03 14.69 14.44
Share of low-educated
workers
60.88 59.21 57.68 56.92 55.89 55.65 54.05 53.49 53.63 53.58 52.46 53.27 51.69
Share of medium-
educated workers
28.55 30.36 31.14 31.97 33.06 31.97 33.92 34.62 34.18 34.10 35.64 35.37 36.36
Share of high-
educated workers
10.57 10.43 11.19 11.11 11.04 12.38 12.03 11.89 12.19 12.32 11.90 11.36 11.95
Share of workers
registered with SS
31.07 30.81 31.17 31.28 30.32 30.41 31.50 31.33 30.72 28.65 28.03 28.03 27.65
Mean labour earnings 549.5 523.6 527.6 . . . 476.9 487.4 482.7 486.2 464.0 461.2 440.5 423.0 426.3
Poverty and
Inequality
Indicators
Poverty rate 2.5
dollars-a-day
23.78 25.32 25.16 . . . 22.34 22.29 18.68 15.16 20.21 18.72 19.75 16.57 14.68
Poverty rate 4 dollars-
a-day
41.35 42.29 42.76 . . . 41.57 41.77 38.84 35.66 40.99 38.85 39.31 37.87 34.84
GINI of household per
capita income
0.513 0.510 0.515 . . . 0.473 0.478 0.454 0.452 0.466 0.459 0.445 0.424 0.418
GINI of labour
earnings
0.504 0.502 0.520 . . . 0.472 0.489 0.475 0.471 0.466 0.498 0.480 0.462 0.470
Note: The shaded ﬁgures of labour market indicators represent statistical signiﬁcant improvements at 5 per cent between the initial and ﬁnal years for all the employment and earnings indicators and poverty
and inequality indicators. The only exceptions are the share of mid-earnings occupations, share of mid-earnings sectors, and share of medium-educated workers for which we did not assign welfare evaluation
criteria.
Source: SEDLAC (CEDLAS and World Bank 2014) and World Development Indicators (World Bank 2014).
consumption, and exports fell sharply in 2009, leading to a reduction in GDP
and GDP per capita of 3.1 and 3.6 per cent respectively. The government
implemented some expansionary ﬁscal measures (Plan Global Anti-Crisis)
such as cash and in-kind transfers and ﬁnancial support to local producers
(Ministerio de Hacienda 2011). The country began a recovery in 2010, reaching
the pre-crisis GDP level in 2011 and the pre-recession level of GDP per capita
in 2012.
The share of the agricultural and service sectors in the economy increased
between 2000 and 2012, while the share of the industrial sector dimin-
ished. The share of the service sector—the country’s largest economic
sector—increased from 58.1 per cent in 2000 to 61.0 per cent in 2012
(Cruces et al. 2015: table 2). The share of the agricultural sector also grew
during that period, climbing from 10.5 per cent to 11.8 per cent. Within
the period, the share of the agricultural sector fell from 2000 to 2004 due to
the decline in the international prices of the main agricultural products of
the country. In the following years, the sector recovered, based on govern-
ment support to producers and increases in international prices. The share
of the industrial sector, on the other hand, diminished during the same
period, dropping from 31.4 per cent in 2000 to 27.2 per cent in 2012. The
industry sector was affected negatively by the competition from Chinese
textile products which led to the decline of the maquila subsector in El
Salvador (Monge-Naranjo and Rodríguez-Clare 2009). All three sectors were
hit by the international crisis. In 2009, the value added of the industrial
sector dropped by 3.3 per cent; the ﬁgures for the agricultural and service
sectors were 2.9 and 3.1 per cent respectively. The industrial and service
sectors returned to pre-recession value-added levels in 2011. The agricul-
tural sector recovered more quickly, reaching the pre-crisis value-added
level in 2010.
15.3 Unemployment
The unemployment rate dropped slightly from 2000 to 2012. It decreased
for youths, adults, andmen, but increased for women.While the unemploy-
ment rate increased during the international crisis, it had returned to the
pre-crisis level by 2012. Throughout the period analysed, the unemploy-
ment rate varied within a narrow band of 6.0 to 7.0 per cent.
(Cruces et al. 2015: ﬁgure 3)
The unemployment rate (measured as the ratio of unemployment to labour
force) decreased from 6.9 per cent in 2000 to 6.1 per cent in 2012 (Table 15.1).
The number of unemployed people exhibited an increase over the period, from
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124,314 in 2000 to 167,515 in 2012. The reduction in the unemployment rate
was then explained by the more rapid increase in the number of people in the
labour force. The evolution of the unemployment rate was erratic from 2000 to
2005 with an average level of 6.8 per cent; it decreased from 2006 to 2008 and
rose by 0.8 percentage points during the international crisis. Both the number
of persons in the labour force and the number of employed persons increased
between 2008 and 2009 by 55,488 and 15,519 respectively. These ﬁgures
suggest that the increase in the unemployment rate during the international
crisis was explained by the new entrants into the labour market who could not
ﬁnd a job. In 2010, the unemployment rate began a downward trend, and by
2012 it had returned to its pre-recession level.
From 2000 to 2012, the unemployment rate decreased for youth, adults,
and men, while it increased slightly for women. The unemployment rate
increased for all population groups during the international crisis. The rise
between 2008 and 2009 was larger for young workers compared to adults,
and for men compared to women. Adult workers and men had returned to
their pre-recession unemployment rates by the end of the period studied,
while young workers and women had yet to reach their pre-crisis unemploy-
ment levels.
15.4 Job Mix
The composition of employment by occupational group improved slightly
from 2000 to 2012, shifting overall from low-earning occupations such as
agricultural, forestry and ﬁshery, and craft and trade jobs to mid-earning
occupations such as service and sales jobs. The employment composition
by occupational group worsened for young workers and for men over the
period, while it improved for adult workers and for women. The trend
in employment composition by occupational group was not affected by
the international crisis of 2008. This holds true on an aggregate level and
when the ﬁgures are broken down by population groups.
(Cruces et al. 2015: ﬁgure 4)
The occupational structure of employment improved slightly from 2000
to 2012. The share of workers in low-earning occupations (agricultural, for-
estry and ﬁshery, elementary, and craft and trade occupations) decreased by
1.5 percentage points and the share of workers in high-earning occupa-
tions (management, professionals, and technicians) fell by 0.8 percentage
points, which yielded an increase in the share of mid-earning occupations
(clerical, services and sales jobs, plant and machine operators, and armed
forces) (Table 15.1). Speciﬁcally, the share of services and sales jobs in total
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employment increased by 4.9 percentage points over the period (Cruces
et al. 2015: table 3).
From 2000 to 2012, the employment composition by occupational group
worsened for young workers and for men, while it improved for adult workers
and for women.
The overall trend in the composition of employment by occupational group
was not affected by the international crisis of 2008. This holds true when the
analysis is broken down by population groups.
The employment structure by occupational position deteriorated between 2000
and 2012 for the employed population as a whole, for young workers, and for
men, while it improved for adult workers and remained unchanged for women.
During the international crisis of 2008, the employment structure by occupational
position worsened for adult workers and for women; the deterioration already
underway for young workers and men at the onset of the crisis continued during
the episode. (Cruces et al. 2015: ﬁgure 5).
During 2000–12, the share of paid employees in total employment—the
largest category in El Salvador—was essentially unchanged, increasing slightly
from 57.4 to 57.7 per cent. The share of unpaid workers increased from 6.5 to
8.7 per cent. The share of employers and of the self-employed, though, fell from
5.5 to 4.2 per cent and from 30.6 to 29.5 per cent respectively (Table 15.1).
These changes can be characterized as a deterioration of the employment
structure by occupational position: the share of low-earning categories (self-
employment and unpaid employment) increased by a total of 1.1 percentage
points while the share of high-earning categories (paid employees and employ-
ers) decreased.
Over the period 2000–12, the employment structure by occupational pos-
ition deteriorated for young workers and for men, improved for adult workers,
and remained essentially unchanged for women.
Among adult workers and women, a deterioration in their employment
structure by occupational position set in with the international crisis of
2008. In the case of young workers and men, the crisis simply meant a
continuation of pre-existing worsening trends. The increase in the share of
low-earning positions for adult workers and women can be understood in the
context of increasing unemployment during the Great Recession. Economic
necessity may have compelled adult workers and women to take up free-entry
self-employment activities. The share of low-earning positions in total employ-
ment began a downward trend in 2010 and 2011 for adult and womenworkers
respectively, and these low-earning shares reached their pre-crisis levels by
2012. Among young workers and men, the pre-existing worsening trend
in employment structure by occupational position continued during the
international crisis of 2008.
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The employment composition by economic sector improved slightly over the
period studied overall and for adult workers and men, while there was a slight
deterioration for young workers and an improvement for women. The inter-
national crisis of 2008 brought these trends to a standstill.
(Cruces et al. 2015: ﬁgure 6)
During 2000–12, the share of workers in low-earning sectors (primary activ-
ities, domestic service, and low-tech industries) dropped from 39.0 per cent to
36.3 per cent. This reduction was driven by the decline in the share of the low-
tech industry sector (a drop of 3.4 percentage points over the period), which
was affected negatively by the competition fromChinese textiles. The primary
activities sector exhibited a decline in its share of total employment from 2000
to 2003, when the international prices of Salvadoran agricultural products
were falling. In the following years, the primary activities sector recovered and
ended the period with a slight increase in its share of total employment. The
share of workers in high-earning sectors (public administration, skilled ser-
vices, and utilities and transportation) also decreased, though only slightly
during the period, from 14.6 per cent in 2000 to 14.4 per cent in 2012
(Table 15.1). As a result, the share of workers in mid-earning sectors like
education and health and commerce grew during 2000–12.
The composition of the employed population by economic sector improved
over the period for women, improved slightly for adults andmen, and suffered
a slight deterioration for young workers. During the international crisis of
2008 the trends described above stalled. Between 2008 and 2009, the share of
low-earning sectors in total employment stopped decreasing in the aggregate,
for young and adult workers and for men, while it continued with the
downward trend for women. Construction and low-tech industry, mid- and
low-earning sectors respectively, were the sectors that suffered the largest
reductions in their shares of total employment during the international crisis.
The increase in the share of the primary activities sector driven by the increase
in international food prices kept the share of low-earning sectors in total
employment unchanged. The share of high-earning sectors was largely
unchanged for all population groups. Women resumed the improving trend
in their employment composition by economic sector in the post-crisis
period. Young and adult workers and men had not recovered their pre-
recession shares of low- and high-earning sectors by 2012.
The educational level of the employed population improved over the period,
overall and for all population groups, though the improvement was particularly
dramatic among young workers. The educational levels of young workers and of
men deteriorated during the international crisis. (Cruces et al. 2015: ﬁgure 7)
The share of employed workers with low educational levels (eight years of
schooling or less) dropped from 60.9 per cent in 2000 to 51.7 per cent in 2012,
El Salvador
293
while the share of employed workers with medium and high educational
levels (nine to thirteen years of schooling and over thirteen years of schooling)
grew from 28.6 per cent in 2000 to 36.4 per cent in 2012 and from 10.6 per
cent to 12.0 per cent respectively (Table 15.1).2 We interpret this result as an
improvement for the employed population as the level of education is an
important predictor of labour earnings. Consequently, the changes in the
employment structure by educational level implied an increase in the share
of workers that tend to have high levels of earnings and a decline in the share
of workers with low levels of earnings.3
While the educational level of the employed population improved for
all population groups, that improvement was particularly dramatic among
young workers.
The international crisis of 2008 had a negative effect on the educational
levels of young and male employed workers, but no effect on the educational
levels of adult or female workers. The shares of young and male employed
workers with low educational levels increased between 2008 and 2009, the
shares with medium educational levels declined, and the shares with high
levels of education remained essentially unchanged. A possible explanation
for this worsening in the employment structure by educational level can be
found in the previous evidence of increasing unemployment and worsening
employment structure by occupational position during the international cri-
sis. Better-educated workers could afford to remain unemployed during the
crisis, while the less educated workers were compelled by economic necessity
to take up free-entry self-employment activities or unpaid family work. In
2010, both population groups returned to their pre-crisis levels of education.
The international crisis did not have an adverse effect on the educational
levels of adult or women employed workers.
The overall share of workers registered with the social security system fell between
2000 and 2012. While this decline held for all population groups, it was particu-
larly large among young workers and women. The bulk of the drop took place in
the wake of the international crisis of 2008. (Cruces et al. 2015: ﬁgure 8)
The social security system in El Salvador comprises both contributory and non-
contributory schemes. Speciﬁcally, the pension system is organized under four
regimes (Martínez Franzoni 2013). First, the Sistema Público de Pensiones is
2 The most frequent value of years of education for employed workers in El Salvador was twelve
over the entire period under study (around 16.5 per cent of employed workers had twelve years of
education).
3 The improvement in the employment structure by educational level is related to changes in
the relative demand and supply of workers with high educational levels with corresponding
implications for the wage gap by educational group and the unemployment rate of each
educational level. We introduce a discussion about the role of these factors in El Salvador in
section 15.5.
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ruled by the Instituto Salvadoreño de Seguridad Social (ISSS). Currently, it only
covers public workers who decided to remain in the public system after the
reform that privatized the pension system in 1998 (Rubio and Valencia 2010).
Second, the individual capitalization system is mandatory for wage/salaried
employees and voluntary for self-employed workers. It is funded by employers’
and employees’ contributions. Third, the Bienestar Magisterial regime provides
mandatory insurance to teachers of private and public schools and it is funded
by the Ministry of Education and teachers’ contributions. Fourth, the Instituto
de Previsión Social de la Fuerza Armada ismandatory formembers of the armed
forces. A non-contributory pension scheme was introduced in 2008 with the
Pensión Básica Universal that is granted to people aged 70 and above living in
extremepoverty. This pension is also combinedwith the ProgramadeAtención
Integral a la Persona Adulta Mayor that grants health care for elders living in
poverty. The health system in El Salvador is organized in three parts: public
health, social insurance, and private services. The beneﬁts that each system
provides are highly stratiﬁed. Social security provides better-quality services
than those run by the public health system, while private services are reserved
for high-income earners.
Social security records show a reduction in the percentage of employed
workers registered with the contributory scheme of the system during
2000–12, from 31.1 per cent in 2000 to 27.7 per cent in 2012 (Table 15.1).
The bulk of the reduction took place during the international crisis of 2008.
Between 2000 and 2008, the share of workers registered with the social secur-
ity system was essentially unchanged. In 2009 alone, the share declined by
2.1 percentage points; this decreasing trend continued through the end of the
period studied.
While the rate of registration with the social security system dropped for all
population groups, the decline was greater for young workers and women.
For all population groups, the downward trend in the share of workers
registered with the social security system started during the international
crisis of 2008.
15.5 Labour Earnings
Labour earnings decreased from 2000 to 2012. The decrease in earnings
holds true overall and for all population groups and employment categor-
ies. The percentage drop in income earnings was in general larger in high-
earning categories than in low-earning categories. The pre-existing
decrease in labour incomes continued during the international crisis of
2008 for all population groups and for most employment categories.
(Cruces et al. 2015: ﬁgure 9)
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Average monthly earnings, expressed in dollars at 2005 purchasing power
parity (PPP), decreased by 22.4 per cent, dropping from US$549.5 in 2000 to
US$426.3 in 2012 (Table 15.1). The declining pattern occurred despite the
positive growth rates in most of the years analysed and was more accentuated
in the second half of the period under study. The reduction in labour earnings
was 0.4 per cent annually between 2000 and 2007 and 2.6 per cent a year
from 2008 to 2012. Hourly wages followed a similar declining pattern over the
period (Cruces et al. 2015: table 7). The reduction in hourly wages can be
explained by the low level of minimum wages in El Salvador and their slow
adjustment in comparison with the inﬂation rate. In 2008, the cost of a basic
basket of food could not be covered by two minimum wages (Rubio and
Valencia 2010). Our previous evidence of increasing share of low-earning occu-
pations in total employment, increasing share of unregistered workers, and
decreasing shares of high-earning occupations and sectors provides a possible
explanation for the pattern of declining average labour incomes over the
period. As the employment categories that typically obtain low levels of earn-
ings gain share in total employment, average labour income decreases. How-
ever, as explained below, labour incomes fell for each employment category.
Labour earnings of all population groups and employment categories
decreased between 2000 and 2012, with greater percentage losses in labour
earnings for high-earning than for low-earning categories. The loss of labour
income for workers in low-earning occupational groups was lower than the
earning loss for workers in high-earning occupations. The average reduction
in labour income was similar between low- and high-earning occupational
positions. The reduction in labour income during 2000–12 for high-earning
economic sectors was twice as large as the earnings reduction for workers in
low-earning economic sectors. When broken down by educational level, the
reduction in labour incomewas larger for workers with high educational levels
when compared to workers with medium and low levels of education. The
evidence of larger labour earnings reductions for workers with high educa-
tional levels compared to those with medium and low educational levels can
be interpreted in light of previous ﬁndings of slight improvement in the
employment structure by occupational group and economic sector over the
period. In El Salvador, the slight improvement in the employment structure
by occupational group and economic sector implied an increase in the share of
occupations and sectors that can be expected to employ workers withmedium
educational levels, such as services and sales, armed forces occupations, com-
merce, and education and health sectors, and a reduction in the share of
occupations and sectors that employ workers with low educational levels,
such as craft and related trades jobs, agricultural, forestry, and ﬁshery occupa-
tions, and low-tech industry sectors. This evidence indicates that the demand
for workers with medium educational levels relative to those with low and
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high educational levels increased over the period 2000–12. On the other hand,
the educational level of people in the labour force improved over the same
period, indicating an increase in the relative supply of workers with high and
medium levels of education (Cruces et al. 2015: table 8). The prediction of a
supply and demand analysis is that the relative wages of workers withmedium
educational levels relative to those with low and high educational levels will
rise or fall depending on which effect dominates (increase in the relative
demand versus increase in the relative supply). In the Salvadoran labour
market, the relative wages of workers with high and medium educational
levels relative to those with low educational levels fell over the period, and
the relative wages of workers with high educational levels relative to those
with medium educational levels also decreased (Cruces et al. 2015: table 7).
The adjustment process also led to an increase in the unemployment rate of all
educational groups that was larger among workers with high levels of educa-
tion (Cruces et al. 2015: table 9).
For all population groups and most employment categories, the pre-existing
downward trend in labour earnings continued in the wake of the international
crisis of 2008.
15.6 Poverty and Inequality
The poverty rate fell, albeit erratically, over the period studied for all
poverty lines used. The rate of working poor households also decreased.
Poverty rates increased in 2008, perhaps as an early effect of the crisis.
(Cruces et al. 2015: ﬁgure 10)
The poverty rate measured by the 4 dollars-a-day international line fell from
41.4 per cent in 2000 to 34.8 per cent in 2012; the poverty rate based on the
2.5 dollars-a-day line dropped from 23.8 per cent to 14.7 per cent over the
same period (Table 15.1). The percentage of working poor households (deﬁned
as the proportion of persons in the population living in poor households,
according to the 4 dollars-a-day international line, where at least one member
works) also decreased from 29.7 per cent in 2000 to 25.1 per cent in 2012.
These indicators increased during the period of sluggish economic growth
(between 2000 and 2003), dropped between 2003 and 2007, increased again
in 2008 (perhaps as an early effect of the crisis), and then began a downward
trend that continued through 2010. In 2011, all poverty indicators increased
once again only to fall in 2012.
The poverty patterns reported in the last paragraph can be interpreted by
examining incomes from various sources. The analysis of sources of household
total income indicates that labour and capital income fell during 2000–12
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(Cruces et al. 2015: ﬁgure 11). Income from pensions exhibited small changes
over the period. Finally, remittances increased from 2000 to 2003 when a
steady downward trend began. A closer examination of the evolution of remit-
tances indicates that the number of households receiving money from abroad
grew between 2000 and 2006, fell in the following years, especially during the
international crisis of 2008, and stabilized starting in 2009. Income from
remittances is important in the Salvadoran economy. They represented 16.6
per cent of GDP in 2004 and are assigned to consumption, education and
health mainly (Cáceres and Saca 2006). Rivera Campos and Lardé de Palomo
(2002) have estimated that remittances helped to reduce the poverty rate by 4.2
per cent in 2000. Finally, government transfers from anti-poverty programmes
(not available in the EHPM’s surveys) have had a reducing impact on poverty
(IFPRI-FUSADES 2010; Martínez et al. 2014).
Household per capita income and labour earnings inequality decreased between
2000 and 2012. While the international crisis of 2008 led to an increase in labour
earnings inequality, the country recovered in the following years.
(Cruces et al. 2015: ﬁgure 12)
Between 2000 and 2012, the Gini coefﬁcient of household per capita income
fell from 0.513 to 0.418. The Gini coefﬁcient of labour earnings among
employed workers declined from 0.504 in 2000 to 0.470 in 2012
(Table 15.1). The reduction in labour earnings inequality is in keeping with
the fact that earnings suffered a larger reduction for high-earning categories
compared to low-earning employment categories. However, it is interesting to
notice that earnings declined for all the categories. Consequently, the reduc-
tion in labour earnings inequality occurred at the expense of income losses.
A year-by-year analysis shows that the inequality of household per capita
income had an almost steady declining trend over the period with the excep-
tion of 2008, when it rose perhaps as an early effect of the crisis, and after
which the downward trend resumed. The Gini coefﬁcient of labour earnings
exhibited a similar trend, with an increase in 2009. After the international
crisis, a declining trend began that was interrupted in 2012.
Changes in household per capita income inequality in El Salvador have been
relatedmainly to changes in labour income.Azevedo et al. (2013b) decomposed
the change in theGini coefﬁcient of household per capita income for the period
2000–10 and found that changes in labour incomes contributed themost to the
inequality reduction over this period (the Gini coefﬁcient of household per
capita incomedecreased from0.513 to 0.445 between2000 and2010). Changes
in non-labour incomes, such as government transfers, and demographical
changes, like the share of adults per household, were also inequality-reducing.
Other studies have analysed the factors behind the evolution of labour income
inequality. Azevedo et al. (2013a) used a decomposition approach and found
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that changes in the education wage premium (or the ‘price effect’) were
inequality-reducing, while changes in the distribution of the stock of education
(the ‘quantity effect’) were inequality-increasing in El Salvador between 2000
and 2009. Gasparini et al. (2011) found large ﬂuctuations in the gap between
the wages of skilled workers (those with complete or incomplete college educa-
tion) andunskilledworkers (thosewhohave completed secondary education or
less) in El Salvador between 2000 and 2007, with a similar level at the end of the
period compared to the beginning. The authors claim that this pattern is
consistent with a volatile but roughly constant relative demand for skilled
labour over the period.
15.7 Conclusions
By Latin American standards, El Salvador experienced slow economic growth
during the 2000s. The country suffered a recession as a consequence of
the international crisis of 2008. The pre-recession output level was reached
in 2011.
The evidence on changes in labour market indicators during 2000–12 is
mixed. Some improved, while others deteriorated. The unemployment rate
fell from 2000 to 2012. The composition of the working population by occu-
pational group improved slightly over the period, with an overall shift from
low-earning occupations such as agricultural, forestry and ﬁshery, and craft
and trade jobs to mid-earning occupations such as service and sales jobs. The
employment composition by economic sector also improved slightly during
2000–12 as workers moved from low-earning sectors such as low-tech indus-
tries to mid-earning sectors like education and health and commerce. The
educational level of the employed population improved over the period.
On the other hand, other labour market indicators deteriorated. The employ-
ment structure by occupational position worsened between 2000 and 2012 as
the proportion of workers in high-earning categories (paid employees and
employers) fell and the proportion of workers in low-earning categories (self-
employed and unpaid workers) rose. The share of workers registered with the
social security system dropped from 2000 to 2012. Finally, labour earnings
decreased from 2000 to 2012. Poverty indicators fell over the period studied
and household and labour income inequality also decreased.
The international crisis of 2008 had an adverse effect onmost labour market
indicators. The unemployment rate increased during the crisis and returned to
pre-crisis levels in 2012. The employment structure by occupational position
worsened during and after the crisis and pre-crisis levels had not been reached
by the end of the period studied. The composition of employment by eco-
nomic sector deteriorated during the international crisis, though the pre-crisis
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level had been reached in 2010. The bulk of the reduction in the percentage of
workers registered with the social security system took place during and after
the international crisis of 2008. Labour incomes continued the pre-existing
downward trend during the Great Recession. Finally, while poverty and
inequality indicators increased during the crisis, the subsequent downward
trend set in almost immediately.
Youngworkers hadworse labourmarket outcomes over the period compared
to adults andweremore vulnerable to the international crisis.Men experienced
worse labour market outcomes compared to women, and suffered more from
the negative impacts of the international crisis. The unemployment rate was
higher for young compared to adult workers, the shares of young employed
workers in low-earning occupations and economic sectors were larger than the
shares of adult workers, the percentage of young workers registered with the
social security systemwas lower when compared to adults, and labour earnings
of young workers were below those of adults. In addition to the generally
inferior situation of young workers in the labour market compared to adults,
youth labour market indicators weremore adversely affected by the episodes of
crises. The youth unemployment rate increased by more than the adult
unemployment rate, the shares of workers in low-earning occupations and
positions increased for young workers, while they decreased for adults, and
the share of registered workers decreased more for young workers than for
adults. Disaggregating by gender, we found that women had better labour
market outcomes than men, with the only exceptions being the share of
workers in low-earning positions that was larger among women and labour
earnings that were higher for men. Moreover, men were hit hardest by the
international crisis, as the unemployment rate and the shares ofworkers in low-
earning occupations and positions increased more among men.
In summary, slow economic growth during the 2000s resulted in mixed
changes in labour market conditions for Salvadoran workers.
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16
Honduras
16.1 Introduction
This chapter on labour markets and growth in Honduras since 2000 is one of
sixteen studies of Latin American countries, each of which analyses the growth–
employment–poverty nexus and aims to answer the following broad questions:
Has economic growth resulted in economic development via improved labour
market conditions in Latin America in the 2000s, and have these improvements
halted or been reversed since the Great Recession? How do the rate and char-
acter of economic growth, changes in the various labour market indicators, and
changes in poverty relate to each other?
To answer these questions, we analyse the growth experience of Honduras
during the 2000s and a wide set of labour market indicators that we assign to
one of two different categories: employment and earnings indicators, and
poverty and income inequality indicators. More speciﬁcally, for the group of
employment and earnings indicators we construct statistics on the following
variables: the unemployment rate; the employment structure by occupa-
tional group, employment position, economic sector, registration of workers
with the social security system, and educational level; and mean labour
earnings and hourly wages. We present all these indicators for the employed
population as a whole and for different population groups (youth, adults,
men, and women). For the group of poverty and income inequality indica-
tors, we compute poverty rates using the ofﬁcial moderate and extreme
poverty lines and the international lines of 2.5 and 4 dollars a day. We also
calculate the Gini coefﬁcient of household per capita income and labour
earnings.
All the statistics in this chapter are obtained using microdata from the
Encuesta Permanente de Hogares de Propósitos Múltiples (EPHPM), for the
years 2001 to 2012. The nationwide surveys were processed following a
harmonization methodology and incorporated into the SEDLAC—Socio-
Economic Database for Latin America and the Caribbean (CEDLAS and
World Bank 2014).1 The resulting labour market indicators were compiled
into a large number of tables and ﬁgures, which are available in an earlier
version of this study (henceforth, Cruces et al. 2015). Chapter 1 of this book
provides the deﬁnition for each of the indicators we analyse here, while
Cruces et al. (2015) includes details on deﬁnitions and classiﬁcation systems
used by Honduras’s household surveys, and on comparability issues of these
surveys over time.
16.2 Economic Growth
Honduras experienced slow economic growth during the 2000s. The coun-
try underwent a recession as a consequence of the international crisis of
2008. While GDP returned to its pre-recession output level in 2010, GDP
per capita did the same in 2012. (Cruces et al. 2015: ﬁgures 1 and 2)
During the period 2000 to 2012 Honduras experienced slow economic growth
by Latin American standards. GDP per capita increased by 27.0 per cent, while
the average for the eighteen Latin American countries was 36.2 per cent
during the same period. GDP (measured in PPP dollars of 2005) grew by 61.6
per cent, and GDP per employed person exhibited a rise of 21.3 per cent. The
annual growth rate of GDP per capita was 2.2 per cent, and it varied from a
minimum of 4.4 per cent in 2009 to a maximum of 4.5 per cent in 2006
(Table 16.1).
The beginning of the period was characterized by slow growth in Honduras.
The economy was recovering from Hurricane Mitch that in 1998 affected four
out of ﬁve Hondurans (García Merino 2009). However, the policy efforts were
erratic and adulterated by institutional weaknesses which contributed to
widespread social unrest (IMF 2006). In 2001, the country was also affected
negatively by the slowdown of growth in the US and the collapse in world
coffee prices (IMF 2001). Between 2000 and 2003, the GDP growth rate
averaged 4.2 per cent and GDP per capita grew at 2.1 per cent annually.
Growth rebounded strongly in 2004, reﬂecting favourable external condi-
tions that allowed for export increases and rising consumption through the
strong growth in remittances (IMF 2006). From 2004 to 2008, the economy
grew rapidly at 5.9 per cent a year, while GDP per capita increased at 3.8 per cent
annually. Despite the strong economic growth, some social tensions re-emerged
as a result of the implementation of a ﬁscal adjustment, of which the key
element was the limitation of increases in the wage bill (IMF 2006).
1 See Cruces et al. (2015: table 1) for details on the size of Honduras household surveys.
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Table 16.1 Honduras: Evolution of growth and labour market indicators over the 2000s
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Growth
Indicators
GDP per capita 2,880 2,898 2,946 3,019 3,143 3,268 3,414 3,554 3,631 3,473 3,531 3,593 3,657
GDP per capita
growth rate
3.57 0.63 1.67 2.46 4.12 3.95 4.47 4.10 2.18 4.36 1.67 1.76 1.78
Employment
and Earnings
Indicators
Employment-to-
population ratio
. . . 59.91 58.39 54.76 56.07 58.65 57.72 57.07 57.19 59.32 59.36 57.24 56.21
Unemployment
rate
. . . 4.60 4.24 5.54 5.99 4.92 3.58 3.15 3.11 3.28 4.10 4.42 3.73
Share of low-
earnings
occupations
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61.93 62.49 63.07 61.13 62.12 61.71 59.72 61.34
Share of mid-
earnings
occupations
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25.21 23.56 22.74 23.85 24.69 25.40 26.74 25.67
Share of high-
earnings
occupations
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12.86 13.95 14.19 15.03 13.19 12.90 13.54 13.00
Share of employers . . . 10.38 9.33 9.07 11.90 11.56 11.88 13.74 13.66 12.54 13.21 11.12 11.59
Share of wage/
salaried
employees
. . . 47.04 47.25 50.12 49.17 47.24 47.68 48.94 49.00 47.02 44.23 46.83 42.91
Share of self-
employed
workers
. . . 33.58 33.22 32.21 29.34 31.29 31.19 29.06 28.52 31.50 32.07 30.71 34.73
Share of unpaid
family workers
. . . 9.00 10.20 8.61 9.58 9.91 9.25 8.25 8.81 8.94 10.48 11.34 10.77
Share of workers in
low-earnings
sectors
. . . 46.51 52.73 48.94 49.67 48.21 50.91 48.84 47.70 48.66 49.91 49.43 50.11
Share of workers in
mid-earnings
sectors
. . . 43.66 37.68 41.71 40.50 42.11 38.90 40.94 41.29 41.49 40.15 41.17 40.31
Share of workers in
high-earnings
sectors
. . . 9.83 9.59 9.35 9.83 9.68 10.19 10.22 11.01 9.84 9.94 9.40 9.59
Share of low-
educated
workers
. . . 77.60 79.51 79.24 76.52 76.15 75.48 74.48 72.23 73.22 70.97 69.32 70.19
Share of medium-
educated
workers
. . . 17.30 14.86 16.07 18.11 18.63 19.00 19.60 21.25 21.18 22.72 24.04 23.60
Share of high-
educated
workers
. . . 5.10 5.63 4.69 5.37 5.22 5.52 5.91 6.52 5.60 6.31 6.63 6.21
Share ofworkers
registeredwithSS
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.19 5.00 6.34 4.40 5.63 5.42 5.21
Mean labour
earnings
. . . 430.1 393.2 394.6 404.1 372.1 391.6 431.2 457.9 421.2 416.3 448.4 395.0
Poverty and
Inequality
Indicators
Ofﬁcial extreme
poverty rate
. . . 45.7 50.9 47.8 45.4 46.5 41.1 37.1 38.8 36.2 38.8 41.0 44.6
Ofﬁcial moderate
poverty rate
. . . 64.7 69.5 66.7 64.5 65.5 61.0 59.6 59.7 58.2 59.8 61.2 65.3
Poverty rate 2.5
dollars-a-day
. . . 37.04 47.95 47.89 46.77 47.41 42.04 36.96 34.01 31.34 33.99 37.40 42.42
Poverty rate 4
dollars-a-day
. . . 55.91 64.28 64.38 63.29 64.16 58.80 56.00 52.05 50.04 53.30 56.39 61.28
GINI of household
per capita
income
. . . 0.539 0.577 0.583 0.581 0.593 0.573 0.560 0.556 0.516 0.534 0.572 0.573
GINI of labour
earnings
. . . 0.541 0.545 0.558 0.556 0.575 0.546 0.553 0.554 0.526 0.543 0.582 0.580
Note: The shaded ﬁgures of labour market indicators represent statistical signiﬁcant improvements at 5 per cent between the initial and ﬁnal years for all the employment and earnings indicators
and poverty and inequality indicators. The only exceptions are the share of mid-earnings occupations, share of mid-earnings sectors, and share of medium-educated workers for which we did not
assign welfare evaluation criteria.
Source: SEDLAC (CEDLAS and World Bank 2014) and World Development Indicators (World Bank 2014).
The international crisis of 2008 affected the country negatively, mostly
in terms of a drop in exports, foreign direct investment, and remittances
(Johnston and Lefebvre 2013). GDP declined by 2.4 per cent in 2009 while
GDP per capita fell by 4.4 per cent the same year. Besides the international
crisis, the country experienced problems stemming from a military coup in
2009. At the time of the coup, Honduras had proven itself relatively capable of
responding to the recession and of stimulating growth. The debt-to-GDP ratio,
debt-servicing costs, and ﬁscal deﬁcit were at low levels, enabling an expan-
sionary ﬁscal policy (Johnston and Lefebvre 2013). The political instability,
though, prevented the country from adopting the measures needed to coun-
teract the effects of the global recession, e.g. the new government reduced the
public expenditure level (Cordero 2009). The economy returned to the pre-
recession GDP level in 2010, but GDP per capita did not recover until 2012.
After the crisis, annual GDP and GDP per capita growth rates stabilized at
around 3.8 and 1.7 per cent respectively, led by increases in the external
demand for Honduran exports, increases in their prices, and rises in remit-
tances (Otter and Borja 2010).
16.3 Unemployment
The unemployment rate fell from 2001 to 2012, though erratically. It
decreased for youths, adults, and for men, but it had a mild increase for
women. During the international crisis, the unemployment rate increased
and had not fully recovered by 2012. (Cruces et al. 2015: ﬁgure 3)
The unemployment rate (measured as the ratio of unemployment to labour
force) decreased from 4.6 per cent in 2001 to 3.7 per cent in 2012 (Table 16.1).
The number of unemployed people, though, increased from 107,036 in 2001
to 120,832 in 2012. The downward general pattern in the unemployment rate
over the period was driven by amore rapid increase in the number of people in
the labour force (from 2,328,949 in 2001 to 3,237,912 in 2012).2 The behav-
iour of the unemployment rate over the period was erratic. The years 2001 and
2002 witnessed a drop from 4.6 to 4.2 per cent that was followed by an
increase to 6.0 per cent in 2004. The increase in the unemployment rate in
2004 took place in the context of a rapidly growing economy and an expand-
ing labour market (GDP increased by 6.2 per cent in 2004). The more rapid
increase in the number of unemployed people compared to the rise in the
2 A more rapid increase in the number of working-age people with respect to people in the
labour force determined a reducing labour force participation rate in Honduras over the period.
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number of persons in the labour force indicates that the labourmarket was not
able to absorb all new entrants. A major decline in the unemployment rate
was observed in the following years. The unemployment rate fell as low as
3.1 per cent in 2008.
During and after the Great Recession and as GDP growth slowed, though,
the unemployment rate increased and reached 4.4 per cent in 2011. Interest-
ingly, the number of people in the labour force barely changed in 2011 and
the number of employed persons declined (9,565 fewer employed persons),
suggesting a reduction in the number of jobs. A major increase in the min-
imum wage implemented in 2008 is a factor that, jointly with the inter-
national crisis, had a worsening impact on the unemployment rate. There is
evidence for Honduras showing that increases in the minimum wage led to
disemployment effects in the private sector (Gindling and Terrell 2007).
Speciﬁcally, the increase in the minimum wage in 2008 led to job losses in
small and medium enterprises and in the industry sector (Villa and Lovo
2009). By 2012, a recovery took place, but the unemployment rate was still
above the pre-crisis level (3.1 per cent in 2008 and 3.7 per cent in 2012).
The unemployment rate decreased for men, youth, and adult workers, while
it increased slightly for women between 2001 and 2012. The effect of the
international crisis on the unemployment rate was clear in 2010 and 2011.
Adults and women suffered the largest increases in their unemployment rates
compared to young workers and men. The unemployment rates of all popu-
lation groups fell in 2012, but for adults and women they were still above their
pre-crisis level of 2008.
16.4 Job Mix
The composition of employment by occupational group exhibited little
changes between 2005 (when data on this variable started becoming avail-
able) and 2012. The few changes can be interpreted as an improvement as
there was a shift overall from low-earning occupations such as elementary
and trades occupations to better-paying occupations such as management
and services and sales jobs. All population groups beneﬁted especially adult
workers and women. During the international crisis of 2008 the composition
of employment by occupational group worsened for all population groups.
(Cruces et al. 2015: ﬁgure 4)
The occupational structure of employment had a mild change over the period
2005–12.3 The few changes that did occur in the occupational composition of
3 There was a break in the composition of employment by occupational group in 2005, when
the classiﬁcations used by Honduras were changed. Despite attempts to adapt the pre- and post-
2005 classiﬁcations to our preferred categories, this rupture is evident. As a result, we decided to
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employment can be interpreted as an improvement insofar as the share of
low-earning occupations (elementary, agricultural, and craft and trade occu-
pations) decreased by 0.6 percentage points, while the share of mid-earning
(clerical, services and sales jobs, plant and machine operators) and high-
earning occupations (management, professionals, and technicians) increased
by 0.5 and 0.1 percentage points (Table 16.1). The small reduction in the share
of low-earning occupations is explained by a fall in the share of craft and
related trades jobs (drop of 3.0 percentage points) that was counteracted by an
increase in the share of agricultural, forestry, and ﬁshery occupations (rise of
2.8 percentage points). Among high-earning occupations, management jobs
increased their share by 0.6 percentage points, and this change was almost
offset by a reduction in the shares of professional and technical occupations.
Finally, the small increase in mid-earning jobs was related to the rise in
services and sales jobs (increase of 0.8 percentage points).
Adult workers and women appear to have beneﬁted from the changes in the
structure of employment by occupational group (they experienced a slight
improvement and an improvement respectively) more than young workers
and men respectively (both population groups exhibited a slight worsening).
During the international crisis of 2008, the composition of employment by
occupational group worsened for all population groups. The years 2008 and
2009 witnessed an increase in the share of low- and mid-earning occupations
in total employment and a reduction in the share of high-earning occupa-
tions. The increase was driven by agricultural and services jobs, which is in
accord with previous evidence indicating that agricultural and services sectors
were slightly affected by the crisis (Cruces et al. 2015: table 2). The share of
low-earning occupations in total employment recovered the pre-crisis level by
2011 for adult workers, men, and women. Young workers could not regain the
pre-recession share of low-earning occupations by the end of the period. The
share of high-earning occupations, on the contrary, did not recover the pre-
crisis level by 2012 for any of the population groups.
The employment structure by occupational position deteriorated between 2001
and 2012. The percentage of paid employees decreased overall, for youth and
adults, and for both men and women. Most of the change took place during and
after the international crisis of 2008. (Cruces et al. 2015: ﬁgure 5)
The share of wage/salaried employees—the largest category—in total employ-
ment decreased by 4.1 percentage points over the period, from 47.0 per cent in
2001 to 42.9 in 2012. The share of the self-employed, on the other hand,
increased by 1.2 percentage points, climbing from 33.6 per cent in 2001 to
limit our description of the changes in the employed population by occupational group to the
subperiod 2005–12.
Individual Country Analysis
308
34.7 per cent in 2012. The share of unpaid workers also grew, increasing by 1.8
percentage points over the period, as did the share of employers, which
witnessed an increase of 1.2 percentage points between 2001 and 2012
(Table 16.1). Insofar as the share of low-earning categories (self-employment
and unpaid employment) increased by a total of 1.5 percentage points and the
share of high-earning categories (paid employees and employers) decreased,
these changes can be characterized as a worsening of the employment struc-
ture in terms of occupational position.
The employment structure by occupational position deteriorated over the
period for youth and adult workers and for both men and women. Between
2001 and 2012, all population groups exhibited an increase in the share of
low-earning positions in total employment and a reduction in the share
of high-earning categories.
The deterioration in the employment structure by occupational position in
the aggregate and for all population groups occurred mainly during and
following the international crisis of 2008. Between 2001 and 2008, the shares
of wage/salaried employees and employers increased, while they fell during
and after the international crisis (from 2008 to 2012). The share of the self-
employed and the share of unpaid workers fell before the international crisis
(from 2001 to 2008), while they increased during and after that event
(from 2008 to 2012). The worsening in the structure of employment by
occupational position is striking considering that the unemployment rate is
low in Honduras—it suffered a slight increase during the crisis but recovered
the downward trend by the end of the period—and that the labour force
participation rate was falling over time. The changes in the structure of
employment by occupational position can be interpreted in light of our
previous ﬁnding related to the changes in the employment structure by
occupational group. Between 2008 and 2012, services and agricultural jobs
were among the occupations that exhibited the largest share of increases of
total employment, and self-employed workers have a high relative weight in
these occupational groups. On the other hand, technical jobs were among the
occupations with the largest share of reduction in total employment, and
wage/salaried employees have a high relative share in these occupations. By
2012, the employment structure by occupational position had not recovered
the pre-crisis levels in the aggregate and for any of the population groups.
The employment composition by economic sector worsened over the course of the
period studied, overall and for all population groups (youth, adults, men, and
women). The deterioration occurred especially during the international crisis of
2008. (Cruces et al. 2015: ﬁgure 6)
The period 2001–12 witnessed an increase from 46.5 per cent to 50.1 per cent
in the share of workers in low-earning sectors (domestic services, primary
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activities, and low-tech industries). The increase was driven by the rise in the
share of the primary activities sector. The share of workers in high-earning
sectors (public administration, skilled services, and utilities and transportation)
was largely unchanged over the period, shifting from 9.8 per cent in 2001 to
9.6 per cent in 2012. These changes resulted in a reduction in the share of mid-
earning sectors (high-tech industry, construction, commerce, education, and
health) in total employment (Table 16.1).
The employment composition by economic sector worsened for all popula-
tion groups between 2001 and 2012—that is, young and adult workers, men,
and women.
The international crisis of 2008 led to a worsening in the employment
composition by economic sector in the aggregate and for all population
groups. The growing share of workers in the primary activities sector—a low-
earning sector—intensiﬁed during 2008–9. On the other hand, the share of
workers in the low-tech industry sector—another low-earning sector—
suffered a decline as the maquila was one of the subsectors most affected by
the international crisis. However, the decline in the share of the low-industry
sector was not enough to compensate for the increase in the share of the
primary activities sector. At the other end of the scale, the share of workers in
public administration and in the skilled services sectors—high-earning
sectors—began a downward trend in 2008. All these changes determined a
worsening in the employment structure by economic sector during the inter-
national crisis. By 2012, young workers, adult workers, and men had a worse
employment composition by economic sector compared to the pre-crisis year
(2008). Women ﬁnished the period with lower shares of low- and high-
earning sectors than in 2008 and a larger share of mid-earning sectors.
The educational level of the employed population improved over the period for all
of the population groups, and especially among young workers. The international
crisis did not have an effect on this trend. (Cruces et al. 2015: ﬁgure 7)
The share of employedworkerswith low educational levels (eight years of school-
ing or less) dropped from77.6per cent in 2001 to 70.2 per cent in 2012,while the
share ofworkerswithmediumandhigh educational levels (nine to thirteen years
of schoolingandover thirteenyearsof schooling) grew from17.3per cent in2001
to 23.6 per cent in 2012 and from 5.1 per cent to 6.2 per cent respectively
(Table 16.1).4 We interpret this result as an improvement for the employed
population as the level of education is an important predictor of labour earnings.
Consequently, the changes in the employment structure by educational level
4 The most frequent value of years of education for employed workers in Honduras was six
during the entire period (around 28.0 per cent of employed workers had six years of education).
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implied an increase in the share of workers that tend to have high levels of
earnings and a decline in the share of workers with low earnings levels.5
The improvement in the educational level of the employed population
occurred for all population groups, and primarily for young workers.
The pattern of improvement in the level of education of the employed
population in Honduras continued even during the international crisis of
2008. That was also the case for all population groups.
Despite economic growth of the Honduran economy, the share of wage/salaried
employees registered with the social security system exhibited a slight reduction
between 2006 (when data on this variable started becoming available) and 2012,
especially amongst adult workers and women. Most of the reduction took place
during the international crisis of 2008. (Cruces et al. 2015: ﬁgure 8)
The social security system in Honduras is highly stratiﬁed. There are four con-
tributory schemes and no non-contributory pension schemes (Martínez
Franzoni 2013). First, the IHSS (Instituto Hondureño de Seguridad Social) grants
beneﬁts in the areas of illness, maternity, accidents at work, professional ill-
nesses, disability, old age, death, and involuntary unemployment to workers of
the private sector. Second, the INPREMA (Instituto Nacional de Previsión del
Magisterio) provides life insurance, a disability pension, and a separation and
retirement beneﬁt to teachers in the public and private systems. Third, the
INJUPEMP (Instituto Nacional de Jubilaciones y Pensiones de los Empleados y
Funcionarios del Poder Ejecutivo) provides beneﬁts in the case of retirement and
death while in active service, as well as a disability pension to workers from the
Executive branch. Finally, the IPM (Instituto de Previsión Militar) provides
retirementbeneﬁts to themilitary, the police force, andﬁreﬁghters. All contribu-
tory schemes are funded through contributions from employers and employees,
and there is also a contribution from the government for the IHSS. Health care
services are provided by the IHSS as part of the social security system.
Social security records show a small decrease in the percentage of wage/
salaried employees registered with the contributory schemes of the system
between 2006 and 2012, from 6.2 per cent in 2006 (76,301 registered workers) to
5.2 per cent in 2012 (69,730 registeredworkers) (Table 16.1). Thus, the employed
population in Honduras has been largely informal—just 5.5 per cent registered
over the period 2006–12.
All of the population groups, and primarily adult workers and women,
suffered a reduction in the share of wage/salaried workers registered with the
social security system over the period.
5 The improvement in the employment structure by educational level is related to changes in the
relative demand and supply of workers with high educational levels with corresponding implications
for the wage gap by educational group and the unemployment rate of each educational level. We
introduce a discussion about the role of these factors in Honduras in section 16.5.
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The bulk of the reduction in the share of wage/salaried workers registered
with the social security system took place during the international crisis of
2008. The share of wage/salaried workers enrolled with the social security
system dropped between 2008 and 2009. Those ﬁgures improved in 2010,
but then resumed the downward trend. The same pattern of adjustment was
observed for all population groups.
16.5 Labour Earnings
Labour earnings decreased erratically from 2001 to 2012. Workers were
affected by the 2008 international crisis and, as of 2012, earnings had not
returned to pre-crisis levels. Adult workers, men, and women lost labour
income between 2001 and 2012, while young workers increased their
earnings. The evidence of earnings changes by employment categories
indicates that labour earnings increased for low-earning categories and
fell for high-earning categories in most cases. (Cruces et al. 2015: ﬁgure 9)
Average monthly earnings, expressed in dollars at 2005 purchasing power
parity (PPP), decreased by 8.2 per cent, dropping from US$430 in 2001 to
US$395 in 2012 (Table 16.1). For most of the period, changes in labour earn-
ings did not reﬂect variations in the country’s economic performance. From
2001 to 2005, labour earnings decreased while GDP grew. Much of the drop in
labour earnings during the period can be attributed to a falling hourly wage
pattern (an average annual reduction of 1.9 per cent) (Cruces et al. 2015:
table 7). The downward trend in hourly wages was related to the implemen-
tation of a ﬁscal adjustment, of which the key element was the limitation of
increases in the wage bill (IMF 2006). From 2005 to 2009, there was a positive
relationship between changes in GDP and in labour earnings; both increased
from 2005 to 2008 and then fell in 2009 during the international crisis. The
increase in labour earnings between 2005 and 2008 can be explained by
higher hourly wages fuelled by continuous minimum wage increases that
reached their historical maximum in 2009 (Otter and Borja 2010). However,
average wage increases were always below the rises in the minimum wage for
two reasons. First, because only wage/salaried employees beneﬁt by its
increase and they have represented less than half of the total employed
population in Honduras over the period analysed. Second, among wage/sal-
aried employees, only two thirds of them receive a wage above the minimum
established by law. There is evidence showing that in Honduras minimum
wages are effectively enforced in medium- and large-scale ﬁrms, but not in
small ﬁrms or for the self-employed through a lighthouse effect (Gindling and
Terrell 2007). While GDP had resumed its upward trend by 2010, labour
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earnings continued to fall until 2011, when they increased brieﬂy only to drop
again in 2012.
Labour earnings of both men and women dropped from 2001 to 2012, as
did the earnings of adults. The labour earnings of young workers, however,
increased during that period. Among occupational groups, labour earnings of
low-earning occupations enjoyed an average increase, while high-earning
occupations suffered an average earnings reduction between 2001 and 2012.
Among occupational positions, self-employed workers experienced the largest
reduction in labour earnings between 2001 and 2012, followed by employers
and wage/salaried employees, whose labour earnings varied only slightly.
When broken down by economic sector, labour earnings increased for low-
earning sectors and decreased for high-earning sectors. Disaggregating by
educational levels, workers with medium levels of education experienced the
largest decrease in earnings over the period. They were followed by workers
with high educational levels; the earnings of workers with low educational
levels exhibited a small increase over the period.
The evidence of falling labour earnings for workers with medium and high
levels of education and almost no change for workers with low levels of
education can be interpreted in light of previous ﬁndings of deterioration in
the employment structure by occupational group and economic sector over
the period. The deterioration in the employment structure by occupational
group (especially during and after the international crisis) and economic sector
implied a decrease in the share of occupations and sectors that can be expected
to employ workers with high and medium educational levels, such as profes-
sional and technical occupations and the public administration sector, and an
increase in the share of occupations and sectors that employ workers with low
educational levels, such as agricultural, forestry, and ﬁshery occupations, and
the primary activities sector. This evidence indicates that the demand for
workers with high and medium educational levels relative to those with low
educational levels fell over the period in Honduras. On the other hand, the
educational level of people in the labour force improved over the same period,
indicating an increase in the relative supply of workers with high andmedium
levels of education (Cruces et al. 2015: table 8). The prediction of a supply and
demand analysis is that the relative wages of workers with high and medium
educational levels relative to those with low educational levels will fall. In the
Honduran labour market, the relative wages of workers with high andmedium
educational levels relative to those with low educational levels fell over the
period, while the relative wages of workers with high educational levels with
respect to workers with medium educational levels increased slightly (Cruces
et al. 2015: table 7). The adjustment process also led to a reduction in the
unemployment rate of workers with low educational levels and to an increase
in the unemployment rate of workers with medium educational levels.
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The unemployment rate of workers with high levels of education remained
essentially unchanged over the period (Cruces et al. 2015: table 9).
The international crisis of 2008 impacted negatively on labour earnings
overall and for most employment categories. Labour earnings decreased
between 2008 and 2009 and could not regain the pre-recession level by
2012. Workers in agricultural, forestry and ﬁshery occupations, management,
service and sales occupations, and professionals were affected negatively by
the international crisis; only workers from agricultural, forestry, and ﬁshery
occupations had returned to pre-crisis levels of income by 2012. Workers from
all occupational positions were impacted adversely by the international crisis.
Employers had returned to pre-recession earning levels by 2011; wage/salaried
employees recovered more quickly, surpassing pre-crisis levels of income by
2010. As of 2012, self-employed workers had not recovered their pre-crisis
income level. Workers in most economic sectors were affected negatively
by the crisis. Labour earnings in low- and high-tech industries, commerce,
utilities and transportation, skilled services, and education and health services
began a downward trend in 2008 and had not recovered as of 2012. The
earnings of workers performing primary activities had returned to pre-crisis
levels by 2011, and the earnings of domestic workers appear not to have been
affected by the crisis. The earnings of workers in the construction and public
administration sectors were unstable, climbing and then dropping after the
crisis. Amongst educational groups, as of 2012 none of them had recovered
pre-crisis levels of earnings.
16.6 Poverty and Inequality
Whether poverty rose or fell over the period depends on the deﬁnition
used. The moderate poverty rate and poverty rates based on inter-
national lines showed a mild increase between 2001 and 2012, while
the extreme poverty rate fell over the same period. Within the period,
poverty rates based on national and international poverty lines fell from
2002 to 2008 and increased during and after the Great Recession. The
rate of working poor households was largely unchanged.
(Cruces et al. 2015: ﬁgure 10)
The moderate poverty rate (measured by the country’s ofﬁcial poverty line)
increased slightly, going from 64.7 per cent in 2001 to 65.3 per cent in 2012;
the extreme poverty rate declined from 45.7 per cent to 44.6 per cent; and the
percentage of the working poor (deﬁned as the proportion of persons in the
population living in poor households where at least one member works)
barely changed from 54.3 per cent to 54.5 per cent over the same period
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(Table 16.1). The analysis based on the 2.5 and 4 dollars-a-day lines indicates
that poverty rates based on international poverty lines grew over the period as
a whole (5.4 percentage points using both international poverty lines).
A closer look at the evolution of these poverty indicators reveals a steady
downward trend from 2002 to 2009 followed by an increase after the inter-
national crisis. The reductions in all poverty indicators from 2002 to 2008
ensued during a period of relatively quick growth and of rising social spending
and minimum wages (Johnston and Lefebvre 2013). Gillingham et al. (2008)
indicate that social assistance instruments such as school lunches, PRAF
(programmes among beneﬁciaries’ families) education grants, and other subsid-
ies were all very well targeted during the poverty-reducing period, with at least
two thirds of the beneﬁts reaching the lowest two welfare quintiles. However,
Honduras had difﬁculty implementing conditional cash transfers programmes:
their impacts were limited and a duality emerged between the domestically
directed and the externally ﬁnanced programmes (Moore 2010). For the subper-
iod that spans from 2001 to 2004, Gindling and Terrell (2010) also demonstrate
that an increase in the minimumwage led to a reduction in poverty. Following
the international crisis of 2008, all poverty indicators began an upward trend
which led to the vanishing of the improvements observed in the previous years.
In fact, due to the rise at the end of the period, poverty rates based on inter-
national poverty lines grew over the period as a whole (5.4 percentage points
using both international poverty lines). Poverty rate increases were associated
with reductions in public spending in education, health, housing, and transport
from 2010 to 2012 (Johnston and Lefebvre 2013).
The poverty patterns reported in the last paragraph can be interpreted by
examining incomes from various sources. The analysis of sources of house-
hold total income indicates that labour income increased between 2002 and
2008, and decreased afterwards, mimicking the poverty indicators time trend
(Cruces et al. 2015: ﬁgure 11). Incomes from pensions increased overall, espe-
cially during the poverty-reducing period (from 2002 to 2006). Income from
poverty alleviation PRAF programme andMerienda Escolar programme mainly
suffered a reduction between 2007 (the earliest we have detailed data on these
variables) and 2009. In 2010, an upward trend started with the introduction of
the Bono 10.000, a programme for education, health, and nutrition. Remit-
tances have become an increasingly important source of income for Honduran
families, especially in the ﬁrst half of the 2000s. They represented around
10.0 per cent of total household income in 2007 (Villa and Lovo 2009). The
explanatory factors for the increasing share of remittances in total household
income are immigration to the US after Hurricane Mitch and the declining
transaction costs for sending money from abroad (IMF 2006). However, remit-
tances started a downward trend during the international crisis and had not
recovered the previous levels by 2012 (Johnston and Lefebvre 2013).
Honduras
315
While there were some ups and downs, the period as a whole witnessed a slight
increase in household per capita income inequality and labour earnings inequality.
(Cruces et al. 2015: ﬁgure 12)
Between 2001 and 2012 the Gini coefﬁcient of household per capita income
grew from 0.539 to 0.573, while the Gini coefﬁcient of labour earnings among
employed workers increased from 0.539 to 0.573 (Table 16.1). Household per
capita income and labour earnings inequality increased from 2001 to 2005, as
did GDP. The Gini coefﬁcient of household per capita income grew from
0.539 in 2001 to 0.593 in 2005 and the Gini coefﬁcient of labour earnings
increased from 0.541 in 2001 to 0.575 in 2005. The Gini fell from 2005 to
2009, reaching 0.516 in the case of household per capita income and 0.526 in
the case of labour earnings. An upward trend resumed after the international
crisis, with a slight recovery in 2012. Nonetheless, the inequality level meas-
ured by the Gini coefﬁcient is still well above the pre-crisis level for both
household per capita income and labour earnings.
Changes in household per capita income inequality in Honduras have been
related mainly to changes in non-labour incomes. Azevedo et al. (2013b)
decomposed the change in the Gini coefﬁcient of household per capita
income for the period 1999–2010 and found that changes in incomes from
transfers and the share of adults by household contributed the most to the
inequality reduction over this period (the Gini coefﬁcient of household per
capita income decreased from 0.543 to 0.534 between 1999 and 2010).
Changes in labour incomes had only a small effect that was inequality-
increasing. Otter and Borja (2010) analysed the period 2002–7 and found
labour income reductions in the lower tail of the distribution of household
per capita income that were compensated for by government transfers and
remittances from abroad. On the other hand, there were labour income gains
in the upper tail of the distribution. These structural changes resulted in a small
change in the Gini coefﬁcient of household per capita income, but made
poorer people less able to improve their wellbeing through the labour market.
Azevedo et al. (2013a) used a decomposition approach and found that changes
in the education wage premium (or the ‘price effect’) were inequality-reducing,
while changes in the distribution of the stock of education (the ‘quantity
effect’) were inequality-increasing in Honduras between 1999 and 2009. How-
ever, both effects are small andmost of the increase in the Gini coefﬁcient over
the period studied by these authors remained unexplained. Gasparini et al.
(2011) found a reduction in the gap between the wages of skilled workers
(those with complete or incomplete college education) and unskilled workers
(those who have completed secondary education or less) in Honduras over the
2000s. The shrinking educational earnings gap can be explained by factors
related to supply and demand: the relative supply of skilled workers increased
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steadily while the relative demand for those workers fell. Another factor asso-
ciated with the evolution of earnings inequality is the minimum wage. Otter
and Borja (2010) highlighted that increases in theminimumwage inHonduras
only beneﬁt wage/salaried workers, e.g. hourly wages of self-employed workers
do not follow the trend of the minimum wage, and among wage/salaried
workers one third receive less than the wage established by law, e.g. minimum
wages are not completely enforced. As a result, self-employed workers end up
receiving lower real wages than wage/salaried workers even in periods of
economic growth.
16.7 Conclusions
By Latin American standards, Honduras experienced slow economic growth
during the 2000s. The country underwent a recession as a consequence of the
international crisis of 2008, and while the Honduran economy returned to the
pre-recession GDP level in 2010, GDP per capita did not reach the pre-crisis
level until 2012.
The evidence regarding the changes in labour market indicators between
2001 and 2012 showedmore deteriorations than improvements. The improve-
ments were as follows. The unemployment rate fell from 2001 to 2012. The
composition of employment by occupational group improved slightly from
2005 to 2012, shifting overall from low-earning occupations such as elemen-
tary and trade occupations to better-paying occupations such as management
and services and sales jobs. The educational level of the employed population
improved over the period. On the other hand, some labour market indicators
deteriorated. The employment structure by occupational position worsened
during 2001–12 as the proportion of workers in high-earning categories (paid
employees and employers) fell and the proportion in low-earning categories
(self-employment and unpaid employment) rose. Employment composition
by economic sector also worsened over the course of the period studied as the
share of workers in low-earning sectors (domestic service, primary activities,
and low-tech industries) increased while the share of workers in high-earning
sectors (public administration, skilled services, and utilities and transportation)
was largely unchanged. Despite the growth of the Honduran economy, the
share of wage/salaried employees registered with the social security system
experienced a slight reduction during 2006–12. Finally, labour earnings
decreased from 2001 to 2012. The moderate poverty rate increased slightly
from 2001 to 2012, as did household per capita income and labour earnings
inequality measured by the Gini coefﬁcient. On the other hand, the extreme
poverty rate decreased over the period and the rate of working poor house-
holds was largely unchanged.
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Looking speciﬁcally at the international crisis of 2008, most labour market
indicators were affected negatively by the crisis. The unemployment rate
increased and had not fully recovered by 2012. The employment structure
by occupational group worsened during the crisis. Most of the deterioration in
the employment structure by occupational position and economic sector over
the period 2001–12 took place during and after the international crisis of
2008. Labour earnings were affected negatively by the crisis and, as of 2012,
earnings had not returned to pre-crisis levels. The poverty rates based on
national and international poverty lines and the inequality of household per
capita income and labour earnings increased during the international crisis
and none of them returned to their pre-recession level by 2012.
Young workers had worse labour market outcomes over the period compared
to adults, and men and women exhibited a balanced situation in the labour
market. The international crisis affected adult workers more than young work-
ers, while the impacts were evenly distributed between men and women. The
unemployment rate was higher for young compared to adult workers, the share
of young employed workers in low-earning occupations and sectors was larger
than the share of adult workers, the percentage of youngworkers registeredwith
the social security system was lower when compared to adults, and labour
earnings of young workers were below those of adults. On the other hand, the
share of young workers in low-earning positions was lower compared to adults.
Despite the generally inferior situation of young workers in the labour market
compared to adults, adult labourmarket indicators weremore adversely affected
by the episode of the international crisis. Disaggregating by gender, we found
that men had better labour market outcomes than women in some cases, such
as the unemployment rate, the share of workers in low-earning positions, and
average labour earnings, while women were better than men for other labour
market indicators, such as the share of workers in low-earning occupations and
sectors, and the share of unregistered workers. Both men and women were
evenly impacted by the international crisis.
In summary, slow economic growth in Honduras during the 2000s was
associated, in general, with labour market conditions that moved in a worsen-
ing direction. Most of them were affected adversely by the international crisis
of 2008 and did not recover their pre-crisis level by 2012.
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17
Mexico
17.1 Introduction
This chapter on labour markets and growth in Mexico since 2000 is one of
sixteen studies of Latin American countries, each of which analyses the
growth–employment–poverty nexus and aims to answer the following broad
questions: Has economic growth resulted in economic development via
improved labour market conditions in Latin America in the 2000s, and have
these improvements halted or been reversed since the Great Recession? How
do the rate and character of economic growth, changes in the various labour
market indicators, and changes in poverty relate to each other?
To answer these questions, we analyse the growth experience of Mexico
during the 2000s and a wide set of labour market indicators that we assign
to one of two different categories: employment and earnings indicators,
and poverty and income inequality indicators. More speciﬁcally, for the
group of employment and earnings indicators we construct statistics on the
following variables: the unemployment rate; the employment structure by
occupational group, employment position, economic sector, registration of
workers with the social security system, and educational level; and mean
labour earnings and hourly wages. We present all these indicators for the
employed population as a whole and for different population groups
(youth, adults, men, and women). For the group of poverty and income
inequality indicators, we compute poverty rates using the ofﬁcial moderate
and extreme poverty lines and the international lines of 2.5 and 4 dollars a
day. We also calculate the Gini coefﬁcient of household per capita income
and labour earnings.
All the statistics in this chapter are obtained using microdata from the
Encuesta Nacional de Ingresos y Gastos de los Hogares (ENIGH) for the years
2000, 2002, 2004–6, 2008, 2010, and 2012. The nationwide surveys were
processed following a harmonization methodology and incorporated into
the SEDLAC—Socio-Economic Database for Latin America and the Caribbean
(CEDLAS andWorld Bank 2014).1 The resulting labour market indicators were
compiled into a large number of tables and ﬁgures, which are available in an
earlier version of this study (henceforth, Cruces et al. 2015). Chapter 1 of this
book provides the deﬁnition for each of the indicators we analyse here, while
Cruces et al. (2015) includes details on deﬁnitions and classiﬁcation systems
used by Mexico’s household surveys, and on comparability issues of these
surveys over time.
17.2 Economic Growth
Mexico experienced slow economic growth from 2000 to 2012. The coun-
try’s economy was affected by the 2000–01 recession in the US, and it was
severely hurt by the international crisis of 2008, although by 2012 output
levels had surpassed pre-crisis levels. (Cruces et al. 2015: ﬁgures 1 and 2)
During the period 2000–12, Mexico experienced slow economic growth by
Latin American standards. GDP per capita increased by 10.6 per cent, while
the average for the eighteen Latin American countries was 36.2 per cent
during the same period. GDP (measured in PPP dollars of 2005) grew by 28.7
per cent, and GDP per employed person rose by 6.1 per cent. The annual
growth rate of GDP per capita was 1.1 per cent, and it varied from a min-
imum of 5.9 per cent in 2009 to a maximum of 3.8 per cent in 2010
(Table 17.1).
Mexico (jointly with Guatemala) exhibited the worst economic perform-
ance among all of the countries in Latin America in terms of GDP per capita
growth during the 2000s. The period under studywas characterized bymarked
ﬂuctuations in the growth rate which were closely related to variations in the
U.S. growth rate. In fact, changes in U.S. growth have been one of the factors
explaining the variation in Mexico’s growth rate since the formation of the
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) in 1994 (Blecker 2008).2
A ﬁrst episode of slow growth occurred from 2001 to 2003, during which
Mexico’s economy was affected by the 2000–1 recession in the U.S. Though
GDP grew at an average rate of 0.3 per cent per year from 2001 to 2003, annual
GDP per capita fell by 1.0 per cent.
The economy bounced back and resumed growth in the following years, but
another sharp decline ensued in 2009 as a consequence of the economic crisis
in Europe and the U.S. Indeed, Mexico was affected more by the international
1 See Cruces et al. (2015: table 1) for details on the size of Mexico household surveys.
2 The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) is a trilateral free trade agreement that
eliminated trade and investment barriers between Canada, Mexico, and the United States.
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Table 17.1 Mexico: Evolution of growth and labour market indicators over the 2000s
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Growth Indicators GDP per capita 11,810 11,575 11,440 11,460 11,807 12,017 12,462 12,695 12,711 11,962 12,412 12,747 13,067
GDP per capita growth
rate
3.72 1.99 1.17 0.17 3.03 1.78 3.70 1.86 0.13 5.89 3.76 2.70 2.51
Employment and
Earnings Indicators
Employment-to-
population ratio
59.43 . . . 59.89 . . . 59.28 59.72 62.34 . . . 59.43 . . . 57.79 . . . 62.48
Unemployment rate 2.18 . . . 2.95 . . . 3.77 3.77 3.31 . . . 4.48 . . . 5.66 . . . 4.23
Share of low-earnings
occupations
32.04 . . . 31.26 . . . 28.91 28.98 29.16 . . . 28.98 . . . 41.41 . . . 43.08
Share of mid-earnings
occupations
53.01 . . . 55.43 . . . 56.49 55.76 55.59 . . . 55.42 . . . 39.64 . . . 39.06
Share of high-earnings
occupations
14.95 . . . 13.31 . . . 14.60 15.26 15.26 . . . 15.60 . . . 18.94 . . . 17.86
Share of employers 4.79 . . . 4.04 . . . 3.29 3.81 4.07 . . . 9.93 . . . 9.43 . . . 10.72
Share of wage/salaried
employees
66.14 . . . 65.73 . . . 70.22 68.86 67.16 . . . 71.78 . . . 72.94 . . . 68.31
Share of self-employed
workers
21.81 . . . 23.21 . . . 21.17 21.39 22.61 . . . 12.80 . . . 12.76 . . . 15.06
Share of unpaid family
workers
7.26 . . . 7.02 . . . 5.31 5.94 6.17 . . . 5.49 . . . 4.87 . . . 5.91
Share of workers in
low-earnings sectors
31.52 . . . 30.13 . . . 26.74 26.56 26.24 . . . 26.11 . . . 25.93 . . . 28.12
Share of workers in
mid-earnings sectors
47.80 . . . 49.13 . . . 50.53 50.79 51.84 . . . 50.99 . . . 50.65 . . . 49.64
Share of workers in
high-earnings sectors
20.67 . . . 20.74 . . . 22.74 22.65 21.92 . . . 22.91 . . . 23.43 . . . 22.24
Share of low-educated
workers
49.48 . . . 48.48 . . . 45.01 44.06 42.69 . . . 40.98 . . . 37.86 . . . 37.19
Share of medium-
educated workers
35.49 . . . 38.14 . . . 39.72 40.50 41.92 . . . 43.64 . . . 44.66 . . . 46.25
Share of high-educated
workers
15.03 . . . 13.38 . . . 15.27 15.43 15.39 . . . 15.38 . . . 17.48 . . . 16.56
Share of workers
registered with SS
45.63 . . . 41.58 . . . 40.32 39.38 40.99 . . . 39.61 . . . 37.15 . . . 34.94
Mean labour earnings 598.6 . . . 575.4 . . . 591.7 616.5 616.6 . . . 622.0 . . . 554.6 . . . 563.9
Poverty and
Inequality
Indicators
Ofﬁcial extreme poverty
rate
24.61 . . . 20.49 . . . 18.67 18.89 15.15 . . . 19.26 . . . 19.31 . . . 20.16
Ofﬁcial moderate
poverty rate
55.63 . . . 51.59 . . . 47.89 47.71 44.43 . . . 48.51 . . . 50.88 . . . 52.00
Poverty rate 2.5
dollars-a-day
19.54 . . . 17.15 . . . 14.73 14.98 11.83 . . . 13.57 . . . 12.61 . . . 11.45
Poverty rate 4
dollars-a-day
36.97 . . . 34.10 . . . 30.82 29.89 27.03 . . . 28.54 . . . 28.16 . . . 27.65
GINI of household per
capita income
0.536 . . . 0.510 . . . 0.507 0.509 0.495 . . . 0.502 . . . 0.472 . . . 0.491
GINI of labour earnings 0.520 . . . 0.515 . . . 0.497 0.507 0.505 . . . 0.508 . . . 0.474 . . . 0.512
Note: The shaded ﬁgures of labour market indicators represent statistical signiﬁcant improvements at 5 per cent between the initial and ﬁnal years for all the employment and earnings indicators and poverty and
inequality indicators. The only exceptions are the share of mid-earnings occupations, share of mid-earnings sectors, and share of medium-educated workers for which we did not assign welfare evaluation criteria. The
vertical lines indicate that series are not fully comparable before and after that line. For occupational indicators we compared 2000 and 2008; for employment position indicators we compared 2000 and 2006.
Source: SEDLAC (CEDLAS and World Bank 2014) and World Development Indicators (World Bank 2014).
crisis than any other Latin American country. The impact of the crisis was felt
in Mexico through several channels. First, the deep recession in the U.S. led to
a drop in the demand for Mexico’s exports. The high dependence of Mexico
on exports to the U.S. (Mexican exports to the U.S. accounted for almost 80
per cent of total exports before the crisis) as well as their composition (a
considerable proportion of those exports are durable goods) are factors that
help explain why the growth collapse was more pronounced in Mexico com-
pared to other countries in Latin America (Martorano 2014). Second, the
global recession also led to a drop in international energy prices; because
Mexico is an oil exporter, this drop coupled with a decline in domestic oil
production had an unfavourable effect on Mexico’s export earnings. Third,
due to the labour market downturn in the U.S. Mexican migrants to the U.S.
faced greater difﬁculties in ﬁnding and keeping jobs, which negatively
affected the ﬂow of remittances to Mexico (Sidaoui et al. 2011).3 The effect
of the international crisis was also felt through some ﬁnancial channels. The
crisis led to an increase in the risk premium of emerging market debt and to a
reversal in capital ﬂows to these economies. In Mexico, big conglomerates
were affected the most due to their dependence on external funds for their
operation. The depreciation of the Mexican peso also impacted negatively on
the private sector, which owed more than 50 per cent of Mexico’s external
debt, a large fraction of it in foreign currency (Moreno-Brid and Paunovic
2009). GDP per capita fell by 5.9 per cent in 2009, although pre-crisis levels
were regained relatively quickly by the year 2011, and economic growth
continued throughout 2012.
The recovery resulted primarily from three factors. First, a rebound in
manufacturing exports, mostly to the U.S. but also to other markets. Second,
a strengthening internal market fuelled by a healthy domestic ﬁnancial sector
and the growth in employment rates.4 Third, signiﬁcant capital inﬂows from
advanced economies seeking higher rates of return in emerging markets such
as Mexico (Cañas et al. 2011; IMF 2013).
3 Remittances represented 3.9 per cent of private consumption in 2007. Even though this ﬁgure
does not seem high, the consumption of low-income families in the regions of Mexico with high
migration rates depends heavily on the ﬂow of remittances from the United States (Sidaoui et al.
2011).
4 The stimulus package of theMexican government included infrastructure spending, support to
small- and medium-sized enterprises and to the export sector, introduction or expansion of
employment programmes (Programa de Preservación del Empleo and Programa Temporal de Empleo),
expansion of theOportunidades cash transfer programme, regulations to facilitate the withdrawal of
savings from individual pension accounts, extension of coverage of the medical insurance and
maternity beneﬁts for dismissed workers, and guaranteed pension to elderly individuals who
became unemployed and had contributed for at least twenty-four years (Martorano 2014). There
is no evidence indicating to what extent each of these policy measures contributed to the recovery
of the economy.
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17.3 Unemployment
The unemployment rate increased substantially between 2000 and 2012
overall and for all population groups. Within the period, the unemploy-
ment rate increased from 2000 to 2004, fell from 2004 to 2006, exhibited
an upward trend again until 2010, and dropped in the last year of the
period. The international crisis of 2008 led to an increase in the unemploy-
ment rate. (Cruces et al. 2015: ﬁgure 3)
The unemployment rate (measured as the ratio of unemployment to labour
force) grew from 2.2 per cent in 2000 (861,563 unemployed persons) to
4.2 per cent in 2012 (2,327,977 unemployed persons) (Table 17.1). Even
though these unemployment rates are relatively low by developed country
standards, the unemployment rate almost doubled in the twelve years under
study. Themovements along this increasing trend followed the business cycle.
The unemployment rate rose from 2.2 per cent to 3.8 per cent between 2000
and 2004 when the country suffered the effects of the U.S. recession of
2000–1. It then stabilized at around 3.5 per cent and even decreased slightly
in 2006. However, it shot up once again during and after the Great Recession,
reaching a maximum for the period of 5.7 per cent in 2010 (2,816,714
unemployed persons). The increase in the unemployment rate after the inter-
national crisis was driven mainly by the destruction of jobs in the manufac-
turing sector (Freije et al. 2011). Unemployment fell to 4.2 per cent in 2012—
while lower than the level of 2008, this is still higher than the pre-crisis rate
(3.0 per cent in 2006).
Between 2000 and 2012, the unemployment rate increased for young and
adult workers, and for men and women. Within the period, the unemploy-
ment rate followed the aggregate trend for each population group, with an
increase in the early years of the period, a reduction between 2004 and 2006
for young workers, between 2005 and 2006 for adults and men, and between
2004 and 2005 for women, an upward trend up to 2010, and a reduction
in 2012.
The international crisis led to an increase in the aggregate unemployment
rate and in the unemployment rate of all population groups. Both the number
of persons in the labour force and the number of employed persons increased
between 2006 and 2010, indicating that the increase in the unemployment
rate during the international crisis was explained by the new entrants into the
labour market who could not ﬁnd a job. By 2012, the youth unemployment
rate and the unemployment rate for women were below the pre-crisis value of
2006; the adult unemployment rate was above the level of 2006 and 2008;
the unemployment rate for men was below the level of 2008 but above the
level of 2006.
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17.4 Job Mix
The employment composition by occupational group improved moder-
ately between 2000 and 2008 in the aggregate and for all population
groups, and deteriorated between 2010 and 2012 overall and for adult
workers, men, and women. (Cruces et al. 2015: ﬁgure 4)5
The share of the following occupations shrank between 2000 and 2008:
agricultural occupations (drop of 3.9 percentage points); crafts and trades
occupations (drop of 1.8 percentage points); and plant andmachine operators
(drop of 0.7 percentage points). The share of the following occupations grew:
services and sales workers (increase of 4.2 percentage points) and elementary
(increase of 1.5 percentage points). The share of the other occupational groups
remained largely unchanged. These changes in the occupational composition
of employment can be interpreted as a slight improvement since low-earning
occupations (agricultural, elementary, and plant and machine operators)
reduced their share in total employment by 3.1 percentage points between
2000 and 2008, while mid-earning (crafts and trades workers, services and
sales, clerical, and armed forces) and high-earning occupations (management,
professionals, and technicians) gained share in total employment (increase of
2.4 and 0.7 percentage points respectively) (Table 17.1).
During the period 2000–8, youngworkers, adults,men, andwomen improved
their employment structure by occupational groups.
Due to a methodological change in the household survey, the series up to
2008 is not fully comparable with the years 2010–12. Unfortunately, the effect
of the crisis is difﬁcult to disentangle from the methodological change.6
Nonetheless, from 2010 to 2012 there was an increase in the share of low-
earning occupations in total employment and a decrease in the share of high-
earning occupations. The increase in the share of workers in low-earning
occupations is explained mainly by the rise in the share of agricultural occu-
pations. These changes suggest a worsening in the employment composition
after the crisis, with no sign of recovery in the short term. Disaggregating by
population group, the changes in the employment structure by occupational
group between 2010 and 2012 show a worsening for adult workers and
women, a slight worsening for men, and an improvement for young workers.
5 A methodological change in the classiﬁcation of occupations used by Mexico’s household
surveys in the year 2010 prevents us from comparing the series up to 2008 with the years 2010–12.
See the WIDER Working Paper of this chapter for more details.
6 Until 2010, the participation of occupations related to services and sales was the largest in
relation to total employment. However, in 2010 the participation of elementary occupations
increased by 12.0 percentage points in two years to become the main occupational category. The
methodological change in the classiﬁcation seems to be behind this evolution.
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The employment structure by occupational position remained essentially
unchanged from 2000 to 2006 and worsened from 2008 to 2012, in the aggregate
and for all population groups. After the international crisis of 2008, the employ-
ment structure by occupational position improved overall and for young workers,
adults, and women, but it remained largely unchanged for men.
(Cruces et al. 2015: ﬁgure 5)7
During 2000–6, the employment structure by occupational position exhibited
small changes. The share of low-earning positions in total employment (self-
employed and unpaid workers) dropped by only 0.3 percentage points. From
2008 to 2012, the employment structure by occupational position worsened,
as the share of low-earning categories increased by 2.7 percentage points
(Table 17.1).
Between 2000 and 2006, the employment structure by occupational position
improved for youngworkers andmen, while it remained largely unchanged for
adults and women, and worsened between 2008 and 2012 for all population
groups. The deterioration that took place from 2008 to 2012 is explained by
the rise in the share of self-employment for all population groups. In a context
of increasing unemployment, as was the period 2008–10 in Mexico, economic
necessity may have compelled workers to take up free-entry self-employment
activities.
During the international crisis of 2008, the employment structure by occu-
pational position exhibited a slight improvement in the aggregate, for young
and adult workers and women, and small changes for men. Between 2008 and
2010 (a comparison between 2006 and 2010 is not possible due to a meth-
odological change in the survey), the share of low-earning positions in total
employment dropped in the aggregate and for young workers, adults, and
women. For young workers, men, and women, there was a substantial increase
in the share of low-earning positions in total employment after the crisis
(between 2010 and 2012) due to the rise in the share of self-employment.
The employment composition by economic sector improved over the course of
the period studied overall and for all population groups. The international crisis of
2008 did not interrupt the improving trend in the employment structure by
economic sector in the aggregate and for young workers, adults, and women, but
it led to a slight worsening for men. (Cruces et al. 2015: ﬁgure 6)
The period 2000–12 witnessed a reduction (from 31.5 per cent to 28.1 per cent)
in the share of workers in low-earning sectors (domestic service, primary
activities, and low-tech industry). There was, during the same period, an
7 The comparison between the periods 2000–6 and 2008–12 is problematic because in 2008 the
survey questionnaire was modiﬁed with different questions geared to identify occupational
positions.
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increase (from 20.7 per cent to 22.2 per cent) in the share of high-earning
sectors (skilled services, public administration, and education and health) in
the total. These changes resulted in an increase in the share of mid-earning
sectors in total employment (from 47.8 per cent to 49.6 per cent) over the same
period (Table 17.1).
The employment composition by economic sector improved during
2000–12 for young and adult workers, men, and women, as they moved
from low-earning sectors to high-earning sectors.
The international crisis of 2008 did not affect the improving trend in the
employment composition by economic sector in the aggregate and for young
workers, adults, and women, but it led to a slight worsening for men. The
continued improvement in the structure of employment by economic sector
despite the international crisis in the aggregate and for young workers, adults,
and women can be explained by the reduction in the share of workers in the
low-tech industry sector in total employment. That occurred as a consequence
of the sharp drop in exports to the U.S. (Villareal 2010). As the low-tech
industry sector is a low-earning sector in Mexico, the reduction in its share
in total employment implied an improvement in the labour market for those
workers who remained employed.
By contrast, between 2006 and 2010, the share of low-earning sectors in
total employment increased for men. The share of high-earning sectors
increased as well, but by slightly less. The share of low-and high-earning
sectors continued to increase by the end of the period for men, but the
increase in the share of high-earning sectors was always below that of the
low-earning sectors.
The educational level of the employed population in Mexico improved steadily
over the period for all population groups, and especially among young workers.
The improving trend was not adversely affected by the international crisis of 2008.
(Cruces et al. 2015: ﬁgure 7)
The share of employed workers with low educational levels (eight years of
schooling or less) dropped from 49.5 per cent in 2000 to 37.2 per cent in 2012,
while the shares of workers with medium and high educational levels (nine to
thirteen years of schooling and over thirteen years of schooling) grew from
35.5 per cent in 2000 to 46.3 per cent in 2012 and from 15.0 per cent to 16.6
per cent respectively (Table 17.1).8 We interpret this result as an improvement
for the employed population as the level of education is an important pre-
dictor of labour earnings. Consequently, the changes in the employment
8 The most frequent value of years of education for employed workers in Mexico was six in 2000
(18.9 per cent of employed workers had six years of education) and nine from 2002 to 2012 (around
21.8 per cent of employed workers had nine years of education).
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structure by educational level implied an increase in the share of workers that
tend to have high levels of earnings and a decline in the share of workers with
low earnings levels.9
The educational level of the employed population improved during the
period 2000–12 for all groups and especially for young workers. The more
rapid reduction in the share of workers with low levels of education for youth
compared to adults could be indicating that the insertion of young workers
into the labour market is more difﬁcult as they need higher education to
become employed compared to adults (for whom their educational level is
largely predetermined). However, Lopez-Calva et al. (2013b) indicated that
the improvement in the educational level of the employed population
seems to be associated with higher public spending per student in basic
education and an increase in education coverage in rural areas. These factors
eased supply-side constraints while the conditional cash transfer programme
Oportunidades reduced demand-side constraints by compensating poor house-
holds for schooling costs and for the opportunity cost of children’s labour.
The pattern of improvement in the level of education of the employed
population in Mexico continued even during the international crisis of
2008, overall and for all population groups.
The percentage of wage/salaried employees registered with the social security
system decreased between 2000 and 2012 overall and for all population groups.
The worsening trend continued during the international crisis of 2008.
(Cruces et al. 2015: ﬁgure 8)
Mexico has several social security systems, which are intended to provide
pensions and health care as well as other beneﬁts to workers and their families
(ISSA 2014). Some of the systems are: (1) the IMSS, which covers workers in
private enterprises, and a series of full subsystems; (2) the ISSSTE, which covers
public employees; (3) the ISSFAM, which covers armed forces employees;
(4) Pemex (Mexico’s state oil company), which covers Pemex’s workers; and
(5) RJP IMSS, which covers IMSS employees. In addition to these traditional
institutions of contributory social security (the social security system, for
short), recent programmes have provided some social insurance beneﬁts for
those not covered by the system. Most notably, the Seguro Popular provides
health insurance only for poor persons, informal, and self-employed workers.
The beneﬁts are provided by the social security systems through contribu-
tory and non-contributory schemes. The contributory scheme is mandatory
9 The improvement in the employment structure by educational level is related to changes in
the relative demand and supply of workers with high levels of education with corresponding
implications for the wage gap by educational group and the unemployment rate of each
educational level. We introduce a discussion about the role of these factors in Mexico in
section 17.5.
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for private-sector employees who contribute to the system jointly with
employers and the government to cover health risks and old-age pensions.
For other workers, like self-employed persons, householdworkers, and employ-
ers, the contribution is voluntary. The non-contributory schemes cover per-
sons living in households with income below a legally deﬁned threshold and
are funded totally by the government. An intermediate system is the Seguro
Popular that covers health risks for informal workers, the self-employed, and
poor persons. The system is funded by the government and by the families
according to their socioeconomic level.
Mexican social security system records show that the percentage of wage/
salaried employees who are registered with traditional institutions of con-
tributory social security fell from 45.6 per cent in 2000 to 34.9 per cent in
2012 (Table 17.1). This trend abated in 2006, but resumed at a steady rate in
2008 during the Great Recession. Indeed, in terms of registered employment,
Mexico was one of the countries most affected by the economic crisis (ECLAC-
ILO 2012), and there was no sign of a major recovery in this employment
indicator as of 2012. There was a lower rate of registration with the social
security system among wage/salaried employees in Mexico in 2012 than in
2000 for two reasons. First, registered wage/salaried employees increased
much less compared to wage/salaried unregistered workers from 2000 to
2012. The number of registered workers grew by 876,414, while the number
of unregistered workers increased by 9,472,012. Second, those workers who
were unemployed or inactive and who wanted to enter the labour market
found it more difﬁcult to obtain registered (formal) jobs so they took up
unregistered (informal) wage and salaried employment or self-employment
instead (Lederman et al. 2011). Consequently, themix of employment involved
larger numbers of unregistered employees compared to the number of regis-
tered employees.
The rate of registration with the social security system dropped for all
population groups (young and adult workers, men, and women). The pattern
of reduction in the percentage of wage/salaried employees registered with the
social security system continued during the international crisis of 2008 overall
and for all population groups. The number of registered workers contracted by
136,143 between 2006 and 2010, while the number of unregistered workers
increased by 3,045,103 over the same period.
17.5 Labour Earnings
Labour earnings decreased between 2000 and 2012 for workers as a whole.
Within the period, there was a reduction in the early years of the period
(from 2000 to 2002), an increase from 2002 to 2008, a fall in 2010, and an
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upward change in the last year. Over the full period (2000 to 2012), labour
earnings decreased for adult workers and men, but increased for young
workers and women. The evidence of earning changes by employment
categories over the period indicates that labour earnings reductions tended
to be larger in percentages for high-earning categories compared to low-
earning categories. All population groups and employment categories were
affected negatively by the 2008 crisis in terms of earnings.
(Cruces et al. 2015: ﬁgure 9)
Average monthly earnings, expressed in dollars at 2005 purchasing power
parity (PPP), decreased by 5.8 per cent, from US$599 in 2000 to US$564
in 2012 (Table 17.1). Labour earnings fell at the beginning of the period—
between 2000 and 2002—rose between 2002 and 2008, fell during the inter-
national crisis, and increased in the last year of the period studied. Interest-
ingly, in a context of moderate inﬂation, as was the case in Mexico during the
2000s, the adjustment of the labour market took place mainly through
changes in the level of employment rather than changes in real hourly
wages, in contrast to what happened in the 1980s and 1990s (Samaniego
2009; Messina and Gambetti 2014).
Disaggregating, we ﬁnd that adult workers and men suffered a reduction in
their labour earnings, while young workers and women enjoyed an increase
between 2000 and 2012. Labour earnings fell between 2000 and 2002 for young
workers, adults, and men, increased for all population groups in the following
years, and experienced a new reduction during the international crisis.
Between 2000 and 2012, average earnings increased for some employment
categories and decreased for others. The earnings decreases (increases) tended
to be larger for workers in high-earning (low-earning) categories compared to
low-earning (high-earning) categories. Among occupational groups, we can
only compare 2000 with 2008 and 2010 with 2012. Agricultural, forestry and
ﬁshery workers, workers in elementary occupations, and plant and machine
operators (low-earning occupational groups) had an average increase in their
labour earnings between 2000 and 2008 and an earnings reduction between
2010 and 2012. Workers in management, professionals, and technicians
(high-earning occupational groups) suffered an earnings reduction on average
between 2000 and 2008, and an increase between 2010 and 2012. When the
working population is broken down by occupational position, we can make
comparisons between 2000 and 2006, and between 2008 and 2012. The self-
employed had a larger increase in labour earnings than employers between
2000 and 2006, and a larger reduction between 2008 and 2012. Among
economic sectors, domestic workers and workers from primary activities and
low-tech industry (low-earning sectors) exhibited larger earnings gains over
the period than workers in skilled services, public administration, and educa-
tion and health (high-earning sectors). Finally, labour earnings of workers with
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high educational levels suffered a larger earnings loss than workers with
medium and low levels of education.
The evidence of falling labour earnings for all educational groups can be
interpreted in light of previous ﬁndings of improving educational levels of the
Mexican employed population and improving employment structure by eco-
nomic sector over the period. The improving employment structure by
economic sector implied an increase in the share of sectors that can be
expected to employ workers with high educational levels, such as skilled
services, public administration, and education and health, and a reduction
in the share of sectors that employ workers with low educational levels, such
as primary activities and low-tech industries. This evidence indicates that the
demand for workers with high and medium educational levels relative to
those with low educational levels increased between 2000 and 2012. On the
other hand, the educational level of people in the labour force improved
over the same period, indicating an increase in the relative supply of workers
with high and low levels of education (Cruces et al. 2015: table 8). The
prediction of a supply and demand analysis is that the relative wages of
workers with high and medium educational levels relative to those with low
educational levels will rise or fall depending on which effect dominates
(increase in the relative demand versus increase in the relative supply). In the
Mexican labour market the relative wages of workers with high and medium
educational levels relative to those with low educational levels fell over the
period (Cruces et al. 2015: table 7). The adjustment process also led to an
increase in the unemployment rate of all educational groups with a larger
increase for workers with high levels of education (Cruces et al. 2015: table 9).
The international crisis of 2008 led to a reduction in labour earnings in the
aggregate and for all population groups and employment categories. The only
employment category that recovered its pre-crisis level of earnings by 2012
was the public administration sector.10
17.6 Poverty and Inequality
For all poverty lines, the poverty rate was lower in 2012 than in 2000, and
so too was the percentage of households classiﬁed as working poor. Within
the period, the poverty indicators decreased between 2000 and 2006 and
then either increased or decreased at a slower pace than before, depending
on the poverty line used. (Cruces et al. 2015: ﬁgure 10)
10 We did not include the effect of the international crisis on labour earnings by occupational
categories due to comparability problems in the series.
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The moderate poverty rate (measured by the country’s ofﬁcial poverty line)
fell from 55.6 per cent in 2000 to 52.0 per cent in 2012; the extreme poverty
rate dropped from 24.6 per cent to 20.2 per cent (Table 17.1); the percentage
of working poor (deﬁned as the proportion of persons in the population
living in poor households where at least one member works) decreased from
43.8 per cent to 40.8 per cent over the same period. The analysis of trends
based on the 2.5 and 4 dollars-a-day PPP international poverty lines also
shows a reduction between 2000 and 2012. A closer look at the evolution of
poverty indicators based on the ofﬁcial poverty lines over the period under
study indicates a U-shaped pattern with the lowest poverty levels in 2006.
Poverty levels increased markedly with the economic crisis of 2008 and the
substantial increase in food prices. The number of poor persons according to
the ofﬁcial moderate poverty line increased from 47.6 million in 2006 to
56.8 million in 2010. Poverty indicators responded more slowly than GDP
did. The moderate poverty rate continued to increase until 2012, when it
reached 52.0 per cent. The patterns are very similar for the evolution of the
proportion of the working poor, and for the proportion of the extreme poor.
The analysis of trends based on the 2.5 and 4 dollars-a-day PPP international
poverty lines shows an almost monotonic reduction over the period. These
poverty rates increased slightly in 2008, and then resumed the downward
trend of the previous period, although at a slower pace: the poverty rate based
on the 2.5 dollars-a-day line fully recovered from the crisis (drop of 2.1
percentage points between 2008 and 2012), while the poverty level based on
the 4 dollars-a-day PPP line had only partially recovered, not reaching its pre-
crisis level (drop of 0.9 percentage points between 2008 and 2012).
The poverty patterns reported in the last paragraph can be interpreted by
examining incomes from various sources as well as government programmes.
The analysis of sources of household total income indicates that labour
income and transfers from poverty alleviation programmes increased between
2000 and 2008 (Cruces et al. 2015: ﬁgure 11). There is evidence showing that
half of the reduction in the moderate poverty rate measured by the ofﬁcial
poverty line between 2002 and 2004 can be explained by the Oportunidades
programme (del Río et al. 2011). Moreover, government transfers enabled
2.6 million persons to escape poverty in 2008 (CONEVAL 2009). On the
other hand, income from capital declined from 2000 to 2008, while income
from pensions was stable. Between 2008 and 2010, labour earnings exhibited
a substantial decrease; capital income and transfers from poverty alleviation
programmes like Oportunidades, Programa para adultos mayores, and other pro-
grammes suffered a small decline. However, government transfers recovered
in 2012.
Despite the poverty reduction effort of Mexico’s government, the poverty
rates based on Mexico’s ofﬁcial poverty lines increased between 2006 and
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2012. When the analysis is based on the international poverty lines, poverty
increases were smaller and temporary (they increased between 2006 and 2008
only) compared to the poverty increases based on the ofﬁcial lines. These
differing patterns of poverty indicators between 2006 and 2012 can be
explained by the different procedure applied to adjust the poverty lines over
time. International lines are constant in real terms using the CPI. Ofﬁcial
poverty lines are constant in real terms using the FPI. The increase in food
prices that occurred starting in 2008 determined a more rapid increase in the
ofﬁcial poverty lines compared to the international lines in current pesos.
Consequently, poverty rates measured by the ofﬁcial poverty lines increased
from 2006 and 2012, while poverty indicators based on international poverty
lines decreased.
Household per capita income inequality diminished over the period, while
inequality of labour earnings did not change substantially.
(Cruces et al. 2015: ﬁgure 12)
Household per capita income inequality decreased in conjunction with the
increase in GDP up to 2006. It did not follow a clear pattern afterwards:
inequality increased slightly between that year and 2008, and then dropped
markedly until 2010, when it increased once again. The overall evolution is
captured by the Gini coefﬁcient, which fell from 0.536 in 2000 to 0.491 in
2012 (Table 17.1). The origin of the decline in household per capita income
inequality from 2000 to 2006 has been attributed to the enactment of the
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) (Esquivel 2009) and to the
progressiveness of public spending (Esquivel et al. 2010; Lopez-Calva et al.
2013a). In 1994, the Mexican government launched Procampo, an income-
support programme aimed to help farmers deal with the transition costs
resulting from the opening of agricultural trade under NAFTA. Progresa
(known as Oportunidades since 2002) was established in 1997. It is a large
anti-poverty conditional cash transfer programme, which reached around
19.0 per cent of households in 2012. Labour markets also played an important
role for the evolution of income inequality. Esquivel et al. (2010), Campos
et al. (2012), Lopez-Calva et al. (2013a), and Cornia (2013) found that labour
incomes contributed to income equalization during the 2000s. Remittances
too proved to be equalizing in Mexico during the 2000s (Esquivel et al. 2010;
Cornia 2013).
The level of inequality of labour earnings also diminished over the period
under study but in a smaller magnitude. The Gini of labour earnings among
employed workers was 0.520 in 2000 and 0.512 in 2012 (Table 17.1). It was
mostly stable over these years, with the exception of a pronounced fall in
2010, after the economic crisis, when it reached a level of 0.474. According to
our previous evidence, after the international crisis, workers withmedium and
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low levels of education increased their earnings relative to those with high
levels of education. However, it is interesting to notice that earnings declined
for all workers, regardless of their level of education. Consequently, the reduc-
tion in labour earnings inequality occurred at the expense of lower labour
incomes. The main driver of the reduction in labour earnings inequality
during the 2000s was the reduction in the education wage premium (or the
‘price effect’). The gap between the wages of skilled workers (those with
secondary or higher education) and unskilled workers (those with no school-
ing or incomplete primary schooling) fell systematically over the period under
study (Esquivel et al. 2010). This change in the wage structure has been
explained by market forces—i.e. an increase in the relative supply of skilled
workers along with a reduction in the relative demand for skilled labour
(Gasparini et al. 2011; Campos et al. 2012; Cornia 2013)—rather than by
institutional factors (Campos et al. 2012). The distribution of the stock of
education (the ‘quantity effect’) in the labour force became more equal too
(Gasparini and Lustig 2011). The reduction in the relative supply of workers
with low levels of skills (measured by school attainment) might be associated
with changes in public spending on education combined with the effects of
the conditional cash transfer programme Oportunidades, which tied monetary
transfers to keeping children of poor households in school. Although the
distribution of educational attainment has become more equal, this change
has had a disequalizing or neutral effect (Campos et al. 2012; Azevedo et al.
2013).11 Then, the reduction of income inequality in Mexico is explained by
the falling education wage premium or price effect.
17.7 Conclusions
By Latin American standards, Mexico experienced slow economic growth
during the 2000s. The country was severely hurt by the international crisis
of 2008, but Mexico surpassed their pre-crisis output levels by 2012.
The evidence regarding the changes in labour market indicators between
2000 and 2012 was mixed. Some of them improved while others deteriorated
over the period. The improvements were as follows. The employment com-
position by occupational group improvedmoderately between 2000 and 2008
as workers moved from agricultural, forestry and ﬁshery occupations, and
occupations related to plant and machine operation to better-paying occu-
pations like professional jobs. The employment structure by occupational
11 This means that had the skill premium remained unchanged, educational upgrading would
have been disequalizing. Because this sounds counter-intuitive, this ﬁnding is known as the
‘paradox of progress’.
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position improved from 2000 to 2006 through the increase in the share of
employers and wage/salaried employees in total employment. The employ-
ment composition by economic sector improved from 2000 to 2012 as the
share of high-earning sectors like skilled services, public administration, and
education and health increased and the share of low-earning sectors like
primary activities and low-tech industries diminished. The educational level
of the Mexican employed population improved steadily from 2000 to 2012.
The moderate and extreme poverty rates and the rate of working poor house-
holds showed important reductions between 2000 and 2012, as the Gini
coefﬁcient of per capita household income, while the Gini coefﬁcient of
labour earnings remained essentially unchanged.
The worsening was as follows. The unemployment rate increased substan-
tially between 2000 and 2012. The employment composition by occupational
group deteriorated between 2010 and 2012. The employment structure by
occupational position worsened from 2008 to 2012. The percentage of wage/
salaried employees registered with the social security system decreased
between 2000 and 2012, and labour earnings fell.
Looking speciﬁcally at the international crisis of 2008, most labour market
indicators were affected negatively. The unemployment rate increased and
recovered its pre-crisis level by 2012. The employment structure by occupa-
tional group worsened between 2010 and 2012. The worsening trend in the
percentage of wage/salaried employees registered with the social security
system continued during the international crisis. Labour earnings fell between
2006 and 2010 and never recovered their pre-crisis level. The poverty indica-
tors increased during the international crisis of 2008. The comparison
between the effects of the international crisis of 2008 on labour market
indicators and the effects generated by the recession in the US at the begin-
ning of the period (2001–3) reveals that the Great Recession impacted Mexico
more strongly. The reduction in GDP, the increase in the unemployment rate,
and the decrease in labour earnings were larger during the international crisis
than in the recession of 2001–3. Moreover, the moderate poverty rate (meas-
ured by the country’s ofﬁcial poverty line) increased during the international
crisis, while it continued to decrease during the ﬁrst recessionary episode. The
reasons behind the larger negative impacts of the international crisis com-
pared to the recession at the beginning of the decade were the fall in the
demand for Mexican exports and the domestic demand, and the reduction in
remittances and the emigration of workers to the US due to the recessive
labour market conditions in that country.
Youngworkers hadworse labourmarket outcomes over the period compared
to adults, but they do not seem to bemore vulnerable tomacroeconomic crises.
Men and women exhibited a balanced situation in their labour market out-
comes, and the negative impacts of the crises were evenly distributed among
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them. The unemployment rate was higher for young compared to adult work-
ers; the shares of young employed workers in low-earning occupational groups
and economic sectors were larger than the shares of adult workers; the percent-
age of young workers registered with the social security system was lower
when compared to adults; and labour earnings of young workers were below
those of adults. On the other hand, the share of young workers in low-earning
occupational positions was lower than the share for adults, and their educa-
tional level improved more rapidly. Despite the generally inferior situation of
young workers in the labour market, only two youth labour market indicators
were more affected by the episodes of crises. They were the unemployment
rate, which increased more for young workers than for adults during the
recession at the beginning of the period and during the international crisis of
2008, and the percentage of registered workers, which decreased more for
young workers during the international crisis. Disaggregating by gender, we
found that men were better than women in some cases, e.g. the share of male
workers in low-earning positions was lower compared to women, and labour
earnings of men were higher than labour earnings of women; in other cases,
the opposite occurred, e.g. the female unemployment rate was lower, and the
percentage of workers registered with the social security system was larger
for women compared to men. The negative impacts of the crises were also
evenly distributed between men and women. Men were hit hardest by both
crises in the case of the unemployment rate, the percentage of workers in low-
earning sectors, and labour earnings. Women were the main losers during the
crises episodes when we analysed the percentage of workers in low-earning
occupational groups and the percentage of workers registered with the social
security system.
In summary, Mexico exhibited mixed labour market changes during the
2000s and some deterioration during the international crisis of 2008, and
while all population groups were vulnerable to macroeconomic crises, no
group was clearly more vulnerable than any other.
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18
Panama
18.1 Introduction
This chapter on labour markets and growth in Panama since 2000 is one
of sixteen studies of Latin American countries, each of which analyses the
growth–employment–poverty nexus and aims to answer the following broad
questions: Has economic growth resulted in economic development via
improved labour market conditions in Latin America in the 2000s, and have
these improvements halted or been reversed since the Great Recession? How
do the rate and character of economic growth, changes in the various labour
market indicators, and changes in poverty relate to each other?
To answer these questions, we analyse the growth experience of Panama
during the 2000s and a wide set of labour market indicators that we assign to
one of two different categories: employment and earnings indicators, and
poverty and income inequality indicators. More speciﬁcally, for the group of
employment and earnings indicators we construct statistics on the following
variables: the unemployment rate; the employment structure by occupational
group, employment position, economic sector, registration of workers with
the social security system, and educational level; and mean labour earnings
and hourly wages. We present all these indicators for the employed popula-
tion as a whole and for different population groups (youth, adults, men, and
women). For the group of poverty and income inequality indicators, we
compute poverty rates using the ofﬁcial moderate and extreme poverty lines
and the international lines of 2.5 and 4 dollars a day. We also calculate the
Gini coefﬁcient of household per capita income and labour earnings.
All the statistics in this chapter are obtained using microdata from the
Encuesta de Hogares (EH), for the years 2001–12. The nationwide surveys
were processed following a harmonization methodology and incorporated
into the SEDLAC—Socio-Economic Database for Latin America and the Carib-
bean (CEDLAS andWorld Bank 2014).1 The resulting labourmarket indicators
1 See Cruces et al. (2015: table 1) for details on the size of Panama household surveys.
were compiled into a large number of tables and ﬁgures, which are available in
an earlier version of this study (henceforth, Cruces et al. 2015). Chapter 1 of
this book provides the deﬁnition for each of the indicators we analyse here,
while Cruces et al. (2015) includes details on deﬁnitions and classiﬁcation
systems used by Panama’s household surveys, and on comparability issues
of these surveys over time.
18.2 Economic Growth
The Panamanian economy grew rapidly during the period 2000–12.
The international crisis of 2008 did not affect the economy substantially.
(Cruces et al. 2015: ﬁgures 1 and 2)
Panama is the Latin American economy that exhibited the highest economic
growth from 2000 to 2012. The country’s GDP (measured in PPP dollars of
2005) grew by 126.5 per cent, GDP per capita increased by 81.9 per cent, and
GDP per person employed rose by 51.8 per cent. The annual growth of GDP
per capita averaged 4.8 per cent, varying from1.4 per cent in 2001 to 10.1 in
2007 (Table 18.1).
From 2000 to 2002, the growth of the Panamanian economy was sluggish.
GDP and GDP per capita annual growth rates averaged 1.8 and 0.2 per cent
respectively. The poor performance of the Panamanian economy at the begin-
ning of the 2000s is mainly attributable to the slow growth of the developed
world and also to the setback of the Latin American region in 2002. As a
consequence, three out of the four sectors which depend on external demand
suffered a contraction (ECLAC 2002).2
From 2003 to 2012, the country experienced a real boom in the economy,
even during the international crisis of 2008. On average, GDP increased
by 8.3 per cent per year between 2003 and 2012, while GDP per capita grew
at 6.3 per cent annually over the same period. The growth of the economy
took place in a context of an expanding world economy and was led by sectors
that provide services to the rest of the world, such as the Panama Canal, the
international banking centre, the Colon Free Trade Zone, and also by the
construction, communication, and transportation sectors (ECLAC 2005;
IMF 2009).
During the international economic crisis of 2008, economic growth slowed
due to the contraction in domestic credit, the slowdown of private construction,
and the reduction in the international demand for tourism (ECLAC 2008;
2 The international banking centre, the Colon Free Trade Zone, and exports contracted between
2000 and 2002, while the Panama Canal continued to grow.
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Table 18.1 Panama: Evolution of growth and labour market indicators over the 2000s
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Growth Indicators GDP per capita 7,869 7,758 7,776 7,947 8,383 8,819 9,396 10,346 11,192 11,424 12,067 13,154 14,320
GDP per capita growth
rate
0.66 1.41 0.23 2.20 5.49 5.20 6.55 10.10 8.18 2.06 5.63 9.01 8.87
Employment and
Earnings Indicators
Employment-to-
population ratio
. . . 52.02 54.11 54.60 55.87 57.35 57.33 58.83 60.39 60.03 59.47 59.13 61.01
Unemployment rate . . . 9.60 9.28 9.60 8.63 8.95 7.75 5.68 5.06 6.11 6.02 4.05 3.66
Share of low-earnings
occupations
. . . 52.77 53.78 53.43 52.32 53.47 53.34 52.66 51.33 50.15 49.46 49.12 49.62
Share of mid-earnings
occupations
. . . 30.86 29.78 29.76 31.48 30.52 31.09 30.99 31.87 32.29 32.35 27.11 25.77
Share of high-earnings
occupations
. . . 16.37 16.45 16.82 16.20 16.01 15.57 16.35 16.80 17.56 18.19 23.77 24.61
Share of employers . . . 2.54 2.94 2.90 3.23 3.07 3.08 3.06 3.21 3.11 3.21 3.05 2.74
Share of wage/salaried
employees
. . . 63.20 62.45 61.71 62.63 61.77 62.99 65.33 66.06 64.67 65.89 68.00 68.06
Share of self-employed
workers
. . . 29.45 30.29 30.75 30.00 30.33 28.96 26.44 25.87 27.13 26.48 25.20 24.39
Share of unpaid family
workers
. . . 4.82 4.32 4.64 4.14 4.83 4.97 5.18 4.86 5.09 4.42 3.75 4.80
Share of workers in low-
earnings sectors
. . . 31.72 31.47 31.32 30.27 30.12 30.49 29.83 28.50 28.05 27.07 25.41 25.26
Share of workers in mid-
earnings sectors
. . . 47.62 48.22 48.06 48.81 49.64 49.39 49.67 51.13 50.77 50.99 50.86 51.28
Share of workers in
high-earnings sectors
. . . 20.66 20.31 20.63 20.93 20.25 20.13 20.50 20.36 21.18 21.94 23.72 23.46
Share of low-educated
workers
. . . 45.35 44.70 43.17 41.60 42.02 40.56 39.27 37.15 36.98 36.59 34.38 33.52
Share of medium-
educated workers
. . . 36.11 36.46 36.94 37.41 37.39 38.14 40.06 41.37 40.83 40.88 40.27 40.45
Share of high-educated
workers
. . . 18.54 18.84 19.89 20.99 20.60 21.30 20.67 21.48 22.19 22.52 25.35 26.03
Share of workers
registered with SS
. . . . . . . . . . . . 52.82 51.96 53.28 55.40 57.42 58.07 58.71 61.85 62.34
Mean labour earnings . . . 641.7 630.7 637.7 626.7 596.3 605.5 606.2 610.3 637.1 643.7 715.8 730.5
Poverty and
Inequality
Indicators
Ofﬁcial extreme poverty
rate
. . . 22.4 18.7 17.6 16.6 16.0 16.2 11.0 10.7 8.8 10.0 8.9 9.8
Ofﬁcial moderate
poverty rate
. . . 45.9 43.5 42.4 40.8 40.0 39.3 31.0 27.5 27.2 25.1 22.6 22.4
Poverty rate 2.5 dollars-
a-day
. . . 28.70 25.41 24.09 22.77 22.48 22.23 15.89 14.45 12.30 13.16 11.60 11.78
Poverty rate 4 dollars-a-
day
. . . 43.39 40.72 39.04 38.33 37.48 37.14 28.63 26.18 25.34 23.96 21.25 20.90
GINI of household per
capita income
. . . 0.565 0.564 0.561 0.549 0.538 0.549 0.526 0.526 0.520 0.519 0.518 0.519
GINI of labour earnings . . . 0.501 0.535 0.528 0.521 0.515 0.515 0.491 0.480 0.484 0.472 0.475 0.481
Note: The shaded ﬁgures of labour market indicators represent statistical signiﬁcant improvements at 5 per cent between the initial and ﬁnal years for all the employment and earnings
indicators and poverty and inequality indicators. The only exceptions are the share of mid-earnings occupations, share of mid-earnings sectors, and share of medium-educated workers for
which we did not assign welfare evaluation criteria. The vertical lines indicate that series are not fully comparable before and after that line. For occupational indicators we compared 2001 and
2010.
Source: SEDLAC (CEDLAS and World Bank 2014) and World Development Indicators (World Bank 2014).
IMF 2010). However, economic growth remained positive. GDP and GDP per
capita grew by 3.9 and 2.1 per cent in 2009. In the following years, GDP per
capita growth accelerated quickly to 5.6 per cent in 2010, 9.0 per cent in 2011,
and 8.9 per cent in 2012. The recovery of high growth rates was related to public
infrastructure projects, mainly the expansion of the Panama Canal, and to the
increase in domestic consumption (IADB 2014).
18.3 Unemployment
The 2001–12 period witnessed a signiﬁcant drop in the aggregate
unemployment rate and in the unemployment rate for all population
groups. The international crisis of 2008 led to a temporary increase in the
unemployment rate. (Cruces et al. 2015: ﬁgure 3)
Panama experienced a dramatic reduction in its unemployment rate during
2001–12, which was one of the main improvements in the Panamanian
labour market over the period. In the year 2001, the unemployment rate
stood at 9.6 per cent (111,099 unemployed persons); twelve years later, it
had fallen to only 3.7 per cent (61,714 unemployed persons), less than half
its original level (Table 18.1). This is undoubtedly a major labour market
improvement, one which mainly took place during the period of rapid eco-
nomic growth. Between 2001 and 2005, the behaviour of the unemployment
rate was erratic, with several ups and downs and an average level of 9.2 per
cent. Starting in 2006, the unemployment rate began to fall. The downward
trend was interrupted in 2009 and 2010, a period that included the Great
Recession, when the unemployment rate reached 6.1 per cent (18,011 new
unemployed persons in 2009 compared to 2008). Both the number of persons
in the labour force and the number of employed persons increased between
2008 and 2009 by 36,850 and 18,801 respectively. These ﬁgures suggest that
the increase in the unemployment rate during the international crisis was
brought about by the entry of new persons into the labour market who could
not ﬁnd a job. In 2011, the unemployment rate recovered the downward
trend and closed the period at 4.0 per cent in 2012.
The unemployment rate decreased between 2001–12 for all population
groups (youth, adults, men, andwomen), and all of them suffered a temporary
increase in their unemployment rate during the international crisis. The
unemployment rate of youth, adults, men, and women increased in 2009
and recovered the downward trend in 2010 (young workers and women) or
2011 (adults and men). By 2012, the unemployment rates of all population
groups were below their pre-crisis level.
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18.4 Job Mix
The employment composition by occupational group improved between
2001 and 2010 overall, for young and adult workers, and men, while there
was a slight worsening for women. The international crisis of 2008 did not
affect the improving trend in the aggregate, and for young, adult workers
and men, while it led to an improvement for women. Between 2011 and
2012 there was a slight improvement in the structure of employment by
occupational group in the aggregate and for youth, adults, and men, and a
worsening for women. (Cruces et al. 2015: ﬁgure 4).
The share of the following occupations shrank between 2001 and 2010:
agricultural, forestry, and ﬁshery jobs (drop of 3.7 percentage points) and
elementary occupations (drop of 1.0 percentage points). The share of the
following occupations grew: crafts and trades (increase of 1.7 percentage
points); services and sales workers (increase of 1.4 percentage points); and
professionals (increase of 1.2 percentage points). The share of the other occu-
pational groups remained largely unchanged. These changes in the occupa-
tional composition of employment can be interpreted as an improvement
since low-earning occupations (agricultural, elementary, and services and
sales occupations) reduced their share in total employment by 3.3 percentage
points between 2001 and 2010, while high-earning occupations (manage-
ment, professionals, and technicians and associate professionals) gained
share in total employment (increase of 1.8 percentage points). These changes
resulted in an increase in the share of mid-earning occupations (clerical jobs,
plant and machine operators, craft and related trades occupations) in total
employment over the period (increase of 1.5 percentage points) (Table 18.1).
Between 2011 and 2012, the share of low and high-earning occupations in
total employment exhibited a slight increase (rise of 0.5 and 0.8 percentage
points respectively), and consequently, the share of mid-earning occupations
fell (drop of 1.3 percentage points).
The improvements in the occupational composition of employment between
2001 and 2010 were observed for young and adult workers and for men, while
there was a slight worsening for women. Between 2011 and 2012, young
workers, adults, and men exhibited a small increase in the share of both low-
and high-earning occupations, while women suffered a deterioration in the
structure of employment through a reduction in the share of high-earning
occupations and an increase in the share of low-earning occupations.
The international crisis of 2008 did not adversely affect the improvement in
the composition of employment by occupational group in the aggregate and for
young workers, adults, and men, while it led to an improvement for women.
Between 2008 and 2009 the share of low-earning occupations continued to fall
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and the share of high-earning occupations increased in the aggregate and for
youth, adults, and men. For women, an improvement in their structure of
employment took place between 2008 and 2009, reversing the slight deterior-
ation of the previous years.
The employment structure by occupational position improved between 2001 and
2012 overall, and for young, adult workers, and men, while there was a worsening
for women. The international crisis of 2008 affected negatively the employment
structure by occupational position mainly through a reduction in the share of
wage/salaried employees in total employment, which recovered its pre-crisis level
by 2011. (Cruces et al. 2015: ﬁgure 5)
Between 2001 and 2012, the employment structure by occupational position
exhibited a substantial increase in the share of wage/salaried employees in total
employment and a corresponding reduction in the share of self-employed. The
share of wage/salaried employees in total employment—the largest employ-
ment category in Panama—increased from 63.2 per cent in 2001 to 68.1 per
cent in 2012, while the percentage of self-employed diminished from 29.4 to
24.4 per cent during the same period (Table 18.1). The shares of employers and
unpaid workers remained largely unchanged over the period. These changes in
the employment structure by occupational position can be interpreted as an
improvement since the share of high-earning positions in total employment
(wage/salaried employees and employers) increased, and the share of low-
earning positions (self-employed and unpaid workers) diminished.
The distribution of employment by occupational position improved for
youth, adults, and men, and deteriorated for women from 2001 to 2012.
The international crisis of 2008 led to a deterioration in the employment
structure by occupational position overall and for young, adult workers,
and men, while it did not interrupt the deterioration that was taking place
for women. Between 2008 and 2009, the share of high-earning positions in
total employment decreased, mainly through the reduction in the share of
wage/salaried employees. Consequently, the share of low-earning positions
in total employment increased by the same magnitude. The increase in the
share of low-earning positions took place through an increase in the share of
self-employment. The worsening in the employment structure by occupational
position is in accord with the increase in the unemployment rate, as economic
necessity may compel workers to look for free-entry self-employment activities.
All population groups returned to their pre-crisis structure of employment
by 2010.
The employment composition by economic sector improved over the course of
the period studied overall and for all population groups. The international crisis of
2008 did not interrupt the improving trend in the structure of employment by
economic sector. (Cruces et al. 2015: ﬁgure 6)
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The period from 2001 to 2012 witnessed a reduction (from 31.7 per cent to
25.3 per cent) in the share of workers in low-earning sectors in total employ-
ment (domestic service, primary activities, and low-tech industry). The pri-
mary activities sector was the one that experienced the largest reduction in the
share of workers in total employment, in accordance with the shrinking of the
agricultural sector as a share of GDP. There was, during the same period, an
increase (from 20.7 per cent to 23.5 per cent) in the share of high-earning
sectors (skilled services, utilities and transportation, and public administra-
tion) in the total. Among the high-earning sectors, the skilled services sector
was the one that exhibited the largest increase in the share of workers in total
employment. This evidence is in keeping with the role that ﬁnance services
and real estate activities had in the Panamanian growth process. All these
changes resulted in an increase in the share of mid-earning sectors in total
employment (education and health, construction, high-tech industry, and
commerce) over the period. Construction and commerce were the sectors
that led this increase (Table 18.1).
The employment composition by economic sector improved between 2001
and 2012 for young and adult workers, men, and women, as they moved from
low-earning sectors to high-earning sectors.
The international crisis of 2008 did not halt the improving trend in the
employment composition by economic sector overall and for adult workers,
men, and women, but led to a slight worsening for youth. Between 2008 and
2009, the share of low-earning sectors continued to decrease, while the share
of high-earning sectors in total employment kept on increasing in the aggre-
gate and for adult workers, men, and women. Young workers exhibited an
increase in the share of both low- and high-earning sectors in total employ-
ment between 2008 and 2009. By 2010, young workers recovered their pre-
crisis structure of employment by economic sector.
The educational level of the Panamanian employed population improved steadily
over the period, overall and for all population groups. The international crisis of
2008 had no effect on this upward trend. (Cruces et al. 2015: ﬁgure 7)
The share of workers with low educational levels (eight years of schooling or
less) declined from 45.4 per cent in 2001 to 33.5 per cent in 2012, while the
share of workers with medium education levels (nine to thirteen years of
schooling) grew from 36.1 per cent in 2001 to 40.5 per cent in 2012, and
those with high levels of education (over thirteen years of schooling)
increased from 18.5 to 26.0 per cent (Table 18.1).3 We interpret this result as
3 The most frequent value of years of education for employed workers in Panama was six from
2001 to 2009 (around 21.2 per cent of employed workers had six years of education) and twelve
from 2010 to 2012 (around 22.4 per cent of employed workers had twelve years of education).
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an improvement for the employed population as the level of education is an
important predictor of labour earnings. Consequently, the changes in the
employment structure by educational level implied an increase in the share
of workers that tend to have high levels of earnings and a decline in the share
of workers with low earnings levels.4 Panama has one of the highest shares of
employed workers with medium and high educational levels in the Latin
American region. However, the quality of education in Panama, measured by
the Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA) and national
evaluations, is among the lowest in the region (Harris 2007; OECD 2010).
The government has launched several programmes during the 2000s aimed
at increasing coverage and improving the quality of Panamanian education,
such as school nutrition programmes, delivery of resources for students, schol-
arships, and a curricular change programme (Rodríguez Mojica 2013).
The educational level of the employed population improved between
2001 and 2012 for all population groups (young and adult workers, men and
women).
The pattern of improvement in the educational level of the employed
population in Panama was not affected negatively in the aggregate or at the
population group level by the international crisis of 2008.
The share of workers registered with the social security system increased from 2004
(the earliest year with data on this indicator) to 2012, overall, for youth and adults,
and for men and women. The international crisis of 2008 led to a slowdown in the
upward trend of the registration rate. (Cruces et al. 2015: ﬁgure 8)
The Panamanian social security system is administered by the Caja del Seguro
Social (CSS), which is organized in three programmes: (1) disability, old age,
and death beneﬁts; (2) health and maternity care; and (3) professional risks.
A reform of the social security system in 2005 created two contributory
subsystems. First, the old deﬁned beneﬁt system, in which afﬁliates at the
moment of the reform could decide whether to remain or not. Second, a
mixed subsystem which combines a deﬁned-beneﬁts component with an
individual savings component. The afﬁliation to the CSS is mandatory for all
workers employed in public and private ﬁrms and, since 2007, for independ-
ent workers. The afﬁliation for informal workers, domestic workers, and
housekeepers is voluntary. The system is ﬁnanced by employees’ and employ-
ers’ contributions and by government funds. The social security system also
contains non-contributory programmes totally funded by the government,
such as the 100 a los 70 programme (Rodríguez Mojica 2013).
4 The improvement in the employment structure by educational level is related to changes in the
relative demand and supply ofworkerswith high levels of educationwith corresponding implications
for the wage gap by educational groups and the unemployment rate of each educational level. We
introduce a discussion about the role of these factors in Panama in section 18.5.
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Social security records show an increase in the percentage of workers regis-
tered with the contributory schemes of the system, from 52.8 per cent in 2004
(632,497 registered workers) to 62.3 per cent in 2012 (1,011,130 registered
workers) (Table 18.1). Between 2004 and 2008, the share of workers registered
with the social security system increased by 1.2 percentage points annually.
The Great Recession led to a slowdown in this upward trend and between
2008 and 2010, the share of registered workers increased by only 0.6 percent-
age points a year (19,078 new registered workers per year). In 2011, the share
of registered workers grew rapidly (3.2 percentage points), and in 2012 it
slowed down again (increase of 0.5 percentage points).
All population groups exhibited an increase in the share of workers regis-
tered with the social security system between 2004 and 2012, and the increase
was larger for youth compared to adults, and for men compared to women.
The international crisis of 2008 led to a slowdown in the upward trend of
registered employment overall, for young and adult workers and men, while
the improving trend stalled for women.
18.5 Labour Earnings
Real labour market earnings increased overall from 2001 to 2012. Within
the period, labour earnings decreased from 2001 to 2005, and increased
from 2006 to 2012, rising even during the international crisis. Labour
earnings increased for all population groups over the period, and workers
in low-earning categories tended to experience a larger increase in labour
earnings than did workers in high-earning categories.
(Cruces et al. 2015: ﬁgure 9)
Average monthly earnings, expressed in PPP dollars of 2005, increased by 13.8
per cent, fromUS$642 in 2001 to US$730 in 2012 (Table 18.1). However, there
were substantial ﬂuctuations in labour incomes during this period, which
cannot be entirely attributed to the variations in the country’s economic
performance. Average labour earnings decreased slightly at the beginning of
the period (from 2001 to 2002), mirroring the slow growth in GDP per capita.
In the following years, from 2003 to 2005, GDP per capita rose by around 11.0
per cent while average labour earnings fell by 6.5 per cent. Galiani (2009)
claims that the decrease in average real earnings during the 2001–5 period was
due to a composition effect. The jobs created during this period were mainly
informal (without a contract) which paid less than a formal job, bringing
down average labour earnings. From 2006 to 2008, real labour earnings were
stable (increase of just 0.8 per cent), while GDP per capita was increasing
(growth of 19.1 per cent). From 2009 to 2012, real labour earnings increased
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along with GDP per capita, although at a slower pace (14.6 and 25.4 per cent
respectively). An interesting characteristic of the Panamanian labour market is
that theminimumwage has increasedmore than themean hourly wage of the
economy over the 2000s, indicating an increase in the rate of non-compliance
with labour market regulations (Cruces and Galiani 2013).
When changes in earnings are analysed by population groups and employ-
ment categories, they follow the overall pattern: a reduction from 2001 to
2005 followed by a stabilization from 2006 to 2008, and an increase from
2009 to 2012. Men exhibited a larger gain in earnings compared to women,
while young workers increased their labour incomes by more than adult
workers. Among occupational groups, workers in low-earning occupations
experienced a mild increase in labour earnings between 2001 and 2010,
while workers in high-earning occupations suffered a reduction.5 Among
occupational positions, workers in low-earning positions increased their
labour earnings more than workers in high-earning positions. Labour earn-
ings of workers in low-earning sectors were largely unchanged between 2001
and 2012, while earnings of workers in high-earning sectors increased (rise of
6.0 per cent). Workers with medium educational levels experienced the
largest increase in labour incomes, followed by workers with low levels of
education. Workers with high levels of education suffered an earnings reduc-
tion over the period.
The evidence of falling labour earnings for workers with high educational
levels and labour earnings increases for workers with medium and low levels
of education can be interpreted in light of previous ﬁndings of improving
employment structure by occupational group and economic sector over the
period. The improving employment structure by occupational group and
economic sector implied an increase in the share of occupations and sectors
that can be expected to employ workers with high and medium levels of
education, like professional and technical occupations, and skilled services
sectors, and a reduction in the share of occupations and sectors that employ
workers with low educational levels, like agricultural and elementary occupa-
tions, domestic service, primary activities, and low-tech industry. This evi-
dence indicates that the demand for workers with high and medium
educational levels relative to those with low educational levels increased
between 2001 and 2012. On the other hand, the educational levels of people
in the labour force improved over the same period, indicating an increase in
the relative supply of workers with high and medium levels of education
(Cruces et al. 2015: table 8). The prediction of a supply and demand analysis
5 Labour earnings by occupational group can only be analysed from 2001 to 2010 and from 2011
to 2012 due to comparability problems in the classiﬁcation of occupations.
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is that the relative wages of workers with high and medium educational levels
relative to those with low educational levels will rise or fall depending on
which effect dominates (increase in the relative demand versus increase in the
relative supply). In the Panamanian labour market the relative wages of work-
ers with high and medium educational levels relative to those with low
educational levels fell over the period, though slightly, and the relative
wages of workers with high educational levels relative to those with medium
levels of education also decreased (Cruces et al. 2015: table 7). The adjustment
process also led to a reduction in the unemployment rate of all educational
groups with larger reductions for workers with medium levels of education
(Cruces et al. 2015: table 9).
The international crisis of 2008 did not affect the upward trend in labour
earnings overall, for all population groups and most employment categories.
Average labour earnings in Panama increased from 2008 to 2009. Young and
adult workers, men and women also experienced an increase in their labour
earnings during the international crisis. Among employment categories, some
groups were hurt by the crisis. Managers and plant and machine operators
suffered an earnings reduction between 2008 and 2009. By 2010, they had not
reached their pre-crisis earning levels. Workers in low-tech industry, utilities
and transportation, and public administration sectors exhibited a fall in earn-
ings during the international crisis, and all of them surpassed their pre-crisis
level of earning by the end of the period.
18.6 Poverty and Inequality
Poverty fell between 2001 and 2012 for all poverty lines used. The rate of
working poor households also exhibited a decreasing trend. The pattern of
poverty reduction over time was slowed down or temporarily reversed
during the international crisis of 2008 depending on the poverty line used.
(Cruces et al. 2015: ﬁgure 10)
The moderate poverty rate (measured by the country’s ofﬁcial poverty line)
fell from 45.9 per cent in 2001 to 22.4 per cent in 2012; the extreme poverty
rate decreased from 22.4 to 9.8 per cent; the percentage of the working poor
(deﬁned as the proportion of persons in the population living in poor house-
holds with at least one working member) decreased from 31.3 to 13.5 per cent
over the same period. An analysis based on the 2.5 and 4 dollars-a-day PPP
international poverty lines also shows a drop in the poverty rate from 2001 to
2012. The 4 dollars-a-day poverty rate fell from 43.4 per cent in 2001 to 20.9
per cent in 2012, and the 2.5 dollars-a-day poverty rate diminished from 28.7
to 11.8 per cent over the same period (Table 18.1).
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Despite the superb growth performance, poverty reduction in Panama was
less responsive to economic growth compared to other Latin American coun-
tries. The low growth elasticity of poverty reduction in Panama compared to
the rest of the region is associated with the large contribution of indigenous
population to poverty, as the indigenous poor have very low levels of human
capital and skills, and are less able to take advantage of the growth process
(World Bank 2011).
The international crisis of 2008 led to a slowdown in the pattern of poverty
reduction measured by the moderate poverty line and the 4 dollars-a-day
international poverty line, and in the percentage of working poor, while the
extreme poverty rate and the 2.5 dollars-a-day poverty rate increased slightly
between 2009 and 2010. The moderate poverty rate fell by only 0.4 percent-
age points between 2008 and 2009, while it had decreased by 2.6 percentage
points a year from 2001 to 2008. Those ﬁgures were 0.8 and 2.5 percentage
points for the 4 dollars-a-day poverty rate, and 0.5 and 1.9 percentage points
for the percentage of working poor. The extreme and 2.5 dollars-a-day
poverty rates suffered a slight increase between 2009 and 2010 (46,861
new extremely poor persons and 35,551 new poor by the 2.5 dollars-a-day
poverty line). The 2.5 dollars-a-day poverty rate was below the level of 2009
by 2011. The extreme poverty rate never reached the level of 2009, but was
below the level of 2008 by 2012.
The poverty patterns reported in the last paragraph can be interpreted by
examining incomes from various sources. The analysis of sources of house-
hold total income indicates that labour income increased between 2001 and
2012. Government transfers increased between 2001 and 2011, but an
important reduction took place in 2012 determining an overall reduction
from 2001 to 2012. Incomes from pensions and capital income diminished
over the same period (Cruces et al. 2015: ﬁgure 11). From 2004 to 2009, the
government of Panama implemented the Red de Oportunidades conditional
cash transfer programme, which targeted extremely poor households.
During this period, government transfers captured by the EH increased at
3.4 per cent annually. The programme accounted for one quarter of the
extreme poverty reduction among the indigenous population between
2003 and 2008, who make up the largest share of the extremely poor in
Panama (World Bank 2011).
Household per capita income inequality diminished substantially between 2001
and 2012, and labour earnings inequality also fell, but to a smaller extent.
(Cruces et al. 2015: ﬁgure 12)
Household per capita income inequality decreased slowly but steadily from
2001 to 2012. The overall evolution is captured by the Gini coefﬁcient, which
fell from 0.565 in 2001 to 0.519 in 2010, remaining at that level until 2012.
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On the other hand, the inequality of labour earnings also decreased over the
period under study. The Gini of labour earnings among employed workers was
0.501 in 2001 and 0.481 in 2012. It increased from 2001 to 2002, when it
peaked at 0.535, and then fell steadily until 2010, when it reached the lowest
level of the twelve-year period (0.472) before rising to the level of 2012 (0.481)
(Table 18.1). This reduction in labour earnings inequality is in keeping with
the fact that earnings increased more for low-earning employment categories
compared to high-earning categories. However, it is interesting to notice that
earnings declined for some high-earning employment categories. Conse-
quently, the reduction in labour earning inequality occurred at the expense
of income losses for some categories.
Changes in household per capita income inequality in Panama have been
related mainly to changes in labour income. Azevedo et al. (2013b) decom-
posed the change in the Gini coefﬁcient of household per capita income for
the period 2002–10 and found that changes in labour incomes contributed
the most to the inequality reduction over this period (the Gini coefﬁcient of
household per capita income decreased from 0.564 to 0.519 between 2002
and 2010). Changes in non-labour incomes, such as government transfers
and pensions were also inequality-reducing, while demographic changes,
like the share of adults per household, were inequality-increasing. Other
studies have analysed the factors behind the evolution of labour income
inequality. Azevedo et al. (2013a) used a decomposition approach and found
that changes in the education wage premium (or the ‘price effect’) were
inequality-reducing, while changes in the distribution of the stock of educa-
tion (the ‘quantity effect’) were inequality-increasing in Panama between
2001 and 2009. Gasparini et al. (2011) found a reduction in the gap between
the wages of skilled workers (those with complete or incomplete college
education) and unskilled workers (those who have completed secondary edu-
cation or less) in Panama between 2001 and 2009. The shrinking educational
earnings gap can be explained by factors related to supply and demand: the
relative supply of skilled workers increased steadily while the relative demand
for those workers fell.
18.7 Conclusions
The economic performance of Panama during the years 2000 to 2012 was
outstanding, and it boasted the strongest economic growth in Latin America
in that period. The economy suffered a slowdown as a consequence of the
international crisis of 2008, but Panama was one of the few countries in Latin
America to have sustained positive growth during that episode.
Panama
353
The result of this impressive economic growth was a clear improvement in
labour market indicators. By 2012, unemployment had fallen to less than half
its level in 2001. The composition of employment also improved steadily in a
number of dimensions. The share of workers in agricultural and elementary
occupations diminished, while the share in professional and technical jobs
increased. The share of wage/salaried employees rose and the share of self-
employed workers decreased. The employment composition by economic
sector improved as workers moved from primary activity, domestic service,
and low-tech industry to better-paying sectors, such as skilled services. The
share of registered workers increased between 2004 and 2012. There was also a
steady improvement in the educational level of the employed population.
Average labour market earnings increased between 2001 and 2012, though
not steadily. All poverty indicators decreased between 2001 and 2012, as did
the Gini coefﬁcient of household per capita income and labour earnings.
The international crisis of 2008 affected some of these indicators, even
while GDP continued to rise. The unemployment rate rose, the share of paid
employees fell between 2008 and 2009, and some poverty indicators increased
between 2009 and 2010. The worsening of these indicators was reversed by
the end of the period studied.
Young workers had worse labour market outcomes over the period com-
pared to adults and were more vulnerable to the international crisis. Men
experienced worse labour market outcomes compared to women, but
women suffered more from the negative impacts of the international crisis.
The unemployment rate was higher for young compared to adult workers; the
share of young employed workers in low-earning occupations, positions, and
economic sectors was larger than the share of adult workers; the percentage of
young workers registered with the social security system was lower when
compared to adults; and labour earnings of young workers were below those
of adults. In addition to the generally inferior situation of young workers in
the labour market compared to adults, youth labour market indicators were
more adversely affected by the crisis. The youth unemployment rate increased
by more than the adult unemployment rate, and the share of workers in low-
earning positions increased for young workers, while it decreased for adults.
Disaggregating by gender, we found that women had better labour market
outcomes than men, with the only exceptions being the unemployment rate
that was larger among women and labour earnings that were higher for men.
However, women were hit hardest by the international crisis, as the
unemployment rate and the share of workers in low-earning positions
increased more among women.
In summary, Panamanian workers beneﬁted from the impressive economic
growth over the decade as their labour market conditions were in a better state
in 2012 than they were at the start of the millennium.
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Paraguay
19.1 Introduction
This chapter on labour markets and growth in Paraguay since 2000 is one of
sixteen studies of Latin American countries, each of which analyses the
growth–employment–poverty nexus and aims to answer the following
broad questions: Has economic growth resulted in economic development
via improved labour market conditions in Latin America in the 2000s, and
have these improvements halted or been reversed since the Great Recession?
How do the rate and character of economic growth, changes in the various
labour market indicators, and changes in poverty relate to each other?
To answer these questions, we analyse the growth experience of Paraguay
during the 2000s and a wide set of labour market indicators that we assign to
one of two different categories: employment and earnings indicators, and
poverty and income inequality indicators. More speciﬁcally, for the group of
employment and earnings indicators we construct statistics on the following
variables: the unemployment rate; the employment structure by occupational
group, employment position, economic sector, registration of workers with
the social security system, and educational level; and mean labour earnings
and hourly wages. We present all these indicators for the employed popula-
tion as a whole and for different population groups (youth, adults, men, and
women). For the group of poverty and income inequality indicators, we
compute poverty rates using the ofﬁcial moderate and extreme poverty lines
and the international lines of 2.5 and 4 dollars a day. We also calculate the
Gini coefﬁcient of household per capita income and labour earnings.
All the statistics in this chapter are obtained using microdata from the
Encuesta Integrada de Hogares (EIH) for the year 2001, and the Encuesta
Permanente de Hogares (EPH) from the years 2002 to 2013. The nationwide
surveys were processed following a harmonization methodology and incorp-
orated into the SEDLAC—Socio-Economic Database for Latin America and the
Caribbean (CEDLAS and World Bank 2014).1 The resulting labour market
indicators were compiled into a large number of tables and ﬁgures, which
are available in an earlier version of this study (henceforth, Cruces et al. 2015).
Chapter 1 of this book provides the deﬁnition for each of the indicators we
analyse here, while Cruces et al. (2015) includes details on deﬁnitions and
classiﬁcation systems used by Paraguay’s household surveys, and on compar-
ability issues of these surveys over time.
19.2 Economic Growth
Paraguay experienced slow economic growth from 2000 to 2013. The
growth process was erratic. Within the period, the country suffered a
serious macroeconomic crisis in the early years, grew steadily from 2003
to 2008, suffered a recession induced by the international crisis of 2008,
experienced a quick recovery led by agriculture, suffered a recession once
again generated by a severe drought in 2012, and exhibited the largest
growth rates of the period in 2013. (Cruces et al. 2015: ﬁgures 1 and 2)
During the period 2000 to 2013, Paraguay experienced low economic growth
by Latin American standards. GDP per capita increased by 29.1 per cent, while
the average for the eighteen Latin American countries was 36.2 per cent
during the same period. GDP (measured in 2005 PPP dollars) grew by 64.2
per cent, and GDP per employed person experienced a rise of 14.0 per cent.
The annual growth rate of GDP per capita was 1.6 per cent, and it varied from a
minimum of –5.7 per cent in 2009 to a maximum of 11.6 per cent in 2013
(Table 19.1).
The process of economic growth in Paraguay was erratic. The volatility of
the GDP growth rate in Paraguay during the 2000s was associated both with
external factors, such as shocks to terms of trade and foreign demand, and
domestic factors, such as weather conditions (World Bank 2013; ILO 2014).
The country experienced a serious macroeconomic crisis in the ﬁrst years of
the period analysed. That crisis, which began in 1997, was associated with a
number of factors: a domestic banking crisis and foreign economic crises
(speciﬁcally in East Asian countries, Russia, Brazil, and Argentina). GDP
declined by 1.1 per cent a year from 2000 to 2002, while GDP per capita fell
by 3.1 per cent annually during the same period.
Starting in 2003, the economy recovered through a boom in the volume of
exports and in prices despite a context of declining terms of trade (Hausmann
and Klinger 2007). The upward trend in exports was related to the rapid spread
1 See Cruces et al. (2015: table 1) for details on the size of Paraguay household surveys.
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Table 19.1 Paraguay: Evolution of growth and labour market indicators over the 2000s
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Growth
Indicators
GDP per capita 4,572 4,442 4,353 4,453 4,544 4,554 4685 4,850 5,067 4,781 5,313 5,448 5,290 5,904
GDP per capita
growth rate
4.32 2.84 2.01 2.28 2.06 0.22 2.88 3.52 4.47 5.65 11.13 2.54 2.90 11.61
Employment
and
Earnings
Indicators
Employment-to-
population ratio
. . . 63.91 62.12 62.93 66.61 66.64 63.31 65.60 65.62 65.65 64.44 64.75 68.37 66.81
Unemployment rate . . . 7.57 10.70 7.94 7.35 5.78 6.68 5.62 5.59 6.50 5.70 5.51 4.85 5.01
Share of low-earnings
occupations
. . . 62.94 64.10 63.01 64.86 61.70 62.17 61.21 59.48 58.89 . . . . . . . . . . . .
Share of
mid-earnings
occupations
. . . 27.76 28.62 28.28 27.71 28.96 28.70 29.93 30.62 32.36 . . . . . . . . . . . .
Share of
high-earnings
occupations
. . . 9.30 7.28 8.71 7.44 9.34 9.14 8.86 9.89 8.76 . . . . . . . . . . . .
Share of employers . . . 6.07 3.84 4.49 4.39 4.67 4.67 5.27 5.26 5.80 5.25 5.14 5.68 6.34
Share of wage/
salaried employees
. . . 45.82 44.05 45.07 44.14 47.70 47.38 49.19 51.23 49.29 52.64 53.39 52.21 55.42
Share of
self-employed
workers
. . . 38.35 39.99 40.38 41.32 38.36 37.83 37.47 35.06 36.05 34.18 34.06 35.57 31.50
Share of unpaid
family workers
. . . 9.76 12.12 10.06 10.15 9.28 10.12 8.08 8.46 8.86 7.93 7.40 6.54 6.74
(continued)
Table 19.1 Continued
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Share of workers in
low-earnings
sectors
. . . 50.32 50.56 50.08 51.23 48.86 47.81 48.02 45.35 45.93 44.46 42.66 43.10 40.03
Share of workers in
mid-earnings
sectors
. . . 38.78 37.62 38.35 37.83 38.86 39.62 40.16 41.32 40.88 41.54 38.84 38.48 39.74
Share of workers in
high-earnings
sectors
. . . 10.90 11.82 11.57 10.94 12.28 12.56 11.82 13.34 13.19 14.00 18.50 18.42 20.24
Share of
low-educated
workers
. . . 65.22 65.08 61.07 62.21 56.48 58.23 56.23 54.11 51.54 52.89 48.13 48.84 45.35
Share of
medium-educated
workers
. . . 24.54 25.98 27.60 27.41 30.24 30.10 31.10 31.76 34.27 32.67 34.16 35.16 34.38
Share of
high-educated
workers
. . . 10.24 8.94 11.34 10.38 13.28 11.67 12.67 14.13 14.19 14.44 17.71 16.00 20.26
Share of workers
registered with SS
. . . 13.03 12.56 12.52 10.97 14.11 12.03 15.14 15.86 16.24 . . . 18.95 19.24 21.88
Mean labour
earnings
. . . 570.8 528.3 546.0 517.2 515.3 469.7 508.3 530.6 518.4 579.8 642.5 571.0 651.2
Poverty and
Inequality
Indicators
Ofﬁcial extreme
poverty rate
. . . 15.40 23.57 19.74 16.11 15.55 23.33 22.19 17.73 17.80 17.90 16.48 12.29 9.11
Ofﬁcial moderate
poverty rate
. . . 34.19 48.21 42.19 38.33 37.22 43.50 39.70 36.55 34.05 32.84 30.81 25.28 22.17
Poverty rate 2.5
dollars a day
. . . 22.05 30.68 23.87 21.13 19.39 24.69 19.67 17.29 18.10 16.35 14.43 12.04 8.27
Poverty rate 4 dollars
a day
. . . 37.67 48.52 42.29 40.33 37.60 43.69 38.69 35.69 32.99 30.69 27.75 24.08 20.20
GINI of household
per capita income
. . . 0.547 0.573 0.555 0.525 0.513 0.536 0.521 0.510 0.496 0.518 0.526 0.482 0.482
GINI of labour
earnings
. . . 0.548 0.588 0.562 0.546 0.519 0.513 0.534 0.513 0.512 0.509 0.527 0.494 0.498
Note: The shaded ﬁgures of labour market indicators represent statistical signiﬁcant improvements at 5 per cent between the initial and ﬁnal years for all the employment and earnings indicators and poverty and
inequality indicators. The only exceptions are the share of mid-earnings occupations, share of mid-earnings sectors, and share of medium-educated workers for which we did not assign welfare evaluation criteria.
Source: SEDLAC (CEDLAS and World Bank 2014) and World Development Indicators (World Bank 2014b).
of soybean production thanks to innovations, such as genetically modiﬁed
seeds, as well as greater meat production. Over the period 2003–8, the Para-
guayan economy grew at an annual rate of 4.5 per cent while the GDP per
capita growth rate averaged 2.6 per cent a year.
The country was negatively affected by the international crisis of 2008,
which induced a drop in external demand, and also by the fall in inter-
national prices for agricultural products and by a drought in 2009. GDP fell
by 4.0 per cent in 2009, and GDP per capita declined by 5.7 per cent that
year. The growth trend quickly resumed with the growth in the agricultural
sector, the better weather conditions, and the implementation of a counter-
cyclical policy response (Plan Estratégico) that included public works projects,
the deferral of tax increases, and agricultural subsidies (Ramírez and González
2009; CEPAL 2010; IMF 2012). GDP grew by 13.0 per cent and GDP per capita
by 11.1 per cent in 2010. Later, the country was adversely affected by a severe
drought that impacted on agriculture (leading to a ban on meat exports)
and local negative shocks to the non-agricultural sector (IMF 2012;
Castilleja et al. 2014). Growth slowed to 4.3 per cent in 2011 and fell to 1.2
per cent in 2012. In 2013, the economy bounced back sharply and that year
witnessed the largest growth rate of the entire period. GDP grew by 13.5 per
cent and GDP per capita by 11.6 per cent. The agricultural sector and the
recovery of the meat export markets were largely responsible for that growth
(Castilleja et al. 2014).
19.3 Unemployment
The unemployment rate moved jointly with the business cycle. It
decreased between 2001 and 2013 overall and for all population groups.
Within the period, the unemployment rate increased in the early years, it
decreased from 2003 to 2008, grew once again during the international
crisis of 2008, recovered the downward trend after that episode, and had a
new rise by the end of the period. The increase in the unemployment rate
led by the international crisis held for all population groups.
(Cruces et al. 2015: ﬁgure 3)
The unemployment rate (measured as the ratio of unemployment to labour
force) fell from 7.6 per cent in 2001 (188,610 unemployed persons) to 5.0 per
cent in 2013 (168,386 unemployed persons) (Table 19.1). Changes in the
unemployment rate followed the business cycle. The unemployment rate
increased between 2001 and 2002 when the economy was immersed in a
major macroeconomic crisis, climbing from 7.6 to 10.7 per cent (66,937 new
unemployed persons). From 2002 to 2008, the unemployment rate decreased,
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dropping to 5.6 per cent in 2008. This reductionwas not steady; the unemploy-
ment rate experienced an increase in 2006. In 2009, the unemployment rate
increased once again as a result of the international crisis, reaching 6.5 per cent
(38,243 new unemployed persons compared to 2008). Both the number of
persons in the labour force and the number of persons employed increased
between 2008 and 2009 by 190,167 and 151,924 respectively. These ﬁgures
suggest that the increase in the unemployment rate during the international
crisis was explained by new entrants into the labourmarket who could not ﬁnd
a job. By the end of the period, the unemployment rate was decreasing in
conjunction with economic recovery, though there was a slight increase in
2013, probably as a response to the recession of 2012.
From2001 to 2013, the unemployment rate dropped for all population groups
(youth and adults, men and women). The erratic evolution of the unemploy-
ment rate that was observed in the aggregate held for all population groups.
Their unemployment rates increased at the beginning of the period, from 2001
to 2002, began a downward trend in 2003, but experienced new increases in
2006 and 2009. The increase of 2013 appeared only for men and adult workers.
The unemployment rate increased during the international crisis for young
and adult workers, men, and women. The unemployment rate recovered the
pre-recession level in 2010 for adults, in 2011 for both men and women, and
in 2012 for young workers.
19.4 Job Mix
There was a slight improvement in the composition of employment by
occupational group between 2001 and 2009 (when data on this variable
stopped being available) as workers moved from elementary, agricultural,
and forestry and ﬁshery occupations to better paying occupations such as
service and sales, and clerical jobs. Young and adult workers, men, and
women beneﬁted from the improvement in the structure of employment
by occupational group over the period. Within the period, the structure of
employment suffered a worsening between 2001 and 2002 overall and for
all population groups and an improvement in the following years that was
not affected by the international crisis of 2008, either overall or at the
population group level. (Cruces et al. 2015: ﬁgure 4)
Changes in the occupational composition of employment over the period
2001–9 showed a mild improvement. Low-earning occupations (elementary,
craft and trades, and agricultural, forestry, and ﬁshery occupations) lost share in
total employment (drop of 4.1 percentage points). High-earning occupations
(management, armed forces, and professionals) also reduced their share in total
employment (drop of 0.5 percentage points). Mid-earning occupations (plant
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and machine operators, and technical, clerical, services and sales jobs), then,
are those that gained share (increase of 4.6 percentage points) (Table 19.1).
Within the period 2001–9, there was a worsening in the employment structure
by occupational group between 2001 and 2002, when the share of low-earning
occupations in total employment increased and the share of high-earning
occupations decreased. Starting in 2003, the employment structure by occupa-
tional group improved,mainly through the increase in the share ofmid-earning
occupations in total employment. The improvement continued up to the
end of the period with an interruption in 2004.
The improvements in the occupational composition of employment bet-
ween 2001 and 2009 took place for young and adult workers and for men
and women. All population groups suffered a worsening in the employment
structure by occupational group in the early years of the period and a slight
improvement after that.
The international crisis of 2008 did not affect the improving trend in the
employment composition by occupational group, either overall or for any
population group. The changes in employment composition by occupational
groups that took place in the years following the Great Recession cannot be
analysed because the classiﬁcation is only available until 2009.
The employment structure by occupational position improved from 2001 to 2013
as the shares of wage/salaried employees in total employment increased and the
shares of self-employed and unpaid workers decreased. All population groups
beneﬁted from the improvement in the structure of employment by occupational
position over the period. Within the period, the employment structure deterior-
ated in the early years overall and for all population groups, it improved in the
following years, and suffered a worsening once again during the international
crisis of 2008, in the aggregate and for adults, men, and women, but not for young
workers. All occupational positions returned to their pre-crisis shares in 2010.
(Cruces et al. 2015: ﬁgure 5)
The share of paid employees—the largest category in Paraguay—increased from
45.8 per cent in 2001 to 55.4 per cent in 2013. The share of the self-employed
and unpaid workers decreased from 38.4 per cent in 2001 to 31.5 per cent in
2013 and from 9.8 per cent to 6.7 per cent respectively. The share of employers
was essentially unchanged over the period (Table 19.1). These changes in the
structure of employment by occupational position can be interpreted as an
improvement due to the fall in the share of low-earning positions (self-
employment and unpaid workers) and the increase in the share of high-earning
positions (employers and wage/salaried employees). Within the period, the
employment structure by occupational position deteriorated at the beginning,
when the economywas immersed in a severemacroeconomic crisis, andbeganan
improving trend in 2003 that was interrupted by the international crisis of 2008.
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All population groups (young and adultworkers,men, andwomen) beneﬁted
from the improvement in the employment structure by occupational position
between 2001 and 2013. All population groups experienced a worsening in
their employment structure by occupational position between 2001 and 2002.
In 2003, an improving trend began for all population groups, which was
interrupted in 2009 during the international crisis.
The international crisis of 2008 led to a deterioration in the employment
structure by occupational position for adult workers, men, and women,
while it remained largely unchanged for young workers. The deterioration in
the employment structure by occupational position is in accord with the
increase in the unemployment rate during the crisis, as economic necessity
may compel workers to look for free-entry activities such as unpaid family
jobs or self-employment. By 2010, all of the affected groups recovered their
pre-crisis levels.
The employment composition by economic sector improved over the period
studied, overall and for all population groups, though erratically. The inter-
national crisis reversed this tendency for adult workers, men, and women but
they recovered the previous structure of employment by 2010.
(Cruces et al. 2015: ﬁgure 6)
The period 2001–13 witnessed a reduction in the share of workers in low-
earning sectors (domestic service, primary activities, and industry), as the
percentage of workers in those sectors dropped from 50.3 per cent in 2001
to 40.0 per cent in 2013. As mentioned above, although the agricultural sector
fuelled economic growth in Paraguay from 2002 to 2008, this sector’s share of
total employment fell due to increased mechanization and the capital- and
land-intensive characteristics of soy production, the main Paraguayan export
(Hausmann and Klinger 2007; Castilleja et al. 2014). During the same period,
the share of workers in high-earning sectors (skilled services, utilities and
transportation, and public administration) increased from 10.9 per cent to
20.2 per cent (Table 19.1). Consequently, the share of mid-earning sectors in
total employment (construction, commerce, education, and health) experi-
enced a small change over the period (increase of 1.0 percentage point).
Within the period, there was a slight deterioration in the employment struc-
ture by economic sector at the beginning, from 2001 to 2004, as the share of
low-earning sectors in total employment increased alongwith a slight increase
in the share of high-earning sectors. From 2004 and up to the end of the
period, the employment structure by economic sector improved with some
ups and downs in the share of each category. Speciﬁcally, low-earning sectors
had a small increase during the international crisis of 2008 and rose once
again in 2012, while high-earning sectors decreased slightly.
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The employment compositionby economic sector improvedduring2001–13
for young and adult workers and for men and women as they moved from
low-earning sectors to high-earning sectors. The changes in the employment
structure by economic sector were erratic for all population groups. There was a
worsening in the early years of the period for all of them. The employment
structure by economic sector then improved steadilyup to2008 for adults,men,
and womenwho suffered the negative effects of the international crisis. Young
workers were not affected. Adults, men, and women recovered the improving
trend in 2010. In 2011, adults and women suffered a worsening once again,
while young workers exhibited a deterioration in their employment structure
by economic sector in 2013.
The international crisis of 2008 led to a slight worsening in the employment
composition by economic sector overall and for adult workers, men, and
women, while young workers continued with the pre-recession trend in
their employment composition. All of the affected groups recovered their
pre-crisis shares by 2010.
The educational level of the employed population improved over the period for all
population groups, and especially among young workers. The international crisis
of 2008 did not have an effect on the structure of employment by educational
level. (Cruces et al. 2015: ﬁgure 7)
The share of workers with low educational levels (eight years of schooling or
less) dropped from 65.2 per cent in 2001 to 45.4 per cent in 2013, while
the share of workers with medium and high educational levels (nine to
thirteen years of schooling and over thirteen years of schooling) grew from
24.5 per cent in 2001 to 34.4 per cent in 2013 and from 10.1 per cent to
20.3 per cent respectively (Table 19.1).2 We interpret this result as an improve-
ment for the employed population as the level of education is an important
predictor of labour earnings. Consequently, the changes in the employment
structure by educational level implied an increase in the share of workers that
tend to have high levels of earnings and a decline in the share of workers with
low earnings levels.3 The changes in the structure of employment by educa-
tional level took place with small ups and downs over the period. The
improvement in the educational level of the employed population took
place simultaneously with the implementation of programmes aiming to
improve access to and permanence in basic school (Escuela Viva since 2001)
2 Themost frequent value of years of education for employed workers in Paraguay was six during
the entire period (around 22.0 per cent of employed workers had six years of education).
3 The improvement in the employment structure by educational level is related to changes in
the relative demand and supply of workers with high educational levels with corresponding
implications for the wage gap by educational group and the unemployment rate of each
educational level. We introduce a discussion about the role of these factors in Paraguay in
section 19.5.
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and literacy programmes for young and adult people (Paraguay lee y escribe,
since 2007) (Lavigne 2012; Castilleja et al. 2014).
The improvement in the educational level of the employed population
occurred for all population groups, and primarily for young workers. The
pattern of improvement in the level of education of the employed population
in Paraguay continued even during the international crisis of 2008, overall
and for all population groups.
The overall share of workers registered with the social security system increased
between 2001 and 2013, though erratically. However, the employed population in
Paraguay has been largely unregistered over the period. All population groups
beneﬁted from the improvement in the share of registered workers over the period.
The improvement was not interrupted by the international crisis of 2008.
(Cruces et al. 2015: ﬁgure 8)
The social security system in Paraguay is composed of a contributory scheme
and a non-contributory scheme. The contributory scheme comprises a pen-
sion system and a national health system. Paraguay has eight social security
institutions but two of them concentrate most of the insured population: the
Caja Fiscal and the Instituto de Previsión Social (IPS). The others are adminis-
tered by municipalities, railways, banks, Parliament, the national administra-
tion for electricity, and Itaipú (the bi-national hydroelectric power plant
located between Brazil and Paraguay). The IPS is the main organization man-
aging social security for wage earners who work in the private sector in urban
areas, but in recent years it has been incorporating public-sector workers. The
IPS provides both retirement pensions and health coverage for its afﬁliates and
their families, protecting them against diverse risks, including illness, acci-
dents, maternity, old age, and disability. The old age retirement fund is funded
by employers’ and employees’ contributions, while the IPS contributory
health insurance is also funded by the government. The non-contributory
scheme comprises different programmes directed at persons in poverty and is
funded totally by the government. These programmes include the Pensión
alimentaria para adultos mayores en situación de pobreza, survivor pension, and
Veterans of the Chaco War (Lavigne 2012; Higgins et al. 2013; ILO 2014).
The social security records show an increase in the percentage of workers
registered with the contributory scheme between 2001 and 2013 from 13.0
per cent to 21.9 per cent (397,850 new registered workers) (Table 19.1).
Despite several years of economic growth, the increase in registered employ-
ment in Paraguay was slow. The productive infrastructure based on micro and
small enterprises, with a concentration of agricultural exports of little value
added and very vulnerable to weather conditions and external shocks,
explains the slow reduction in unregistered employment (ILO 2014). The
changes were erratic. From 2001 to 2004, the percentage of workers registered
Paraguay
367
with the social security system fell from 13.0 per cent to 11.0 per cent. That
ﬁgure increased in 2005 to 14.1 per cent only to fall again in 2006 to 12.0 per
cent. From 2007 onwards, the share of workers registered with the social
security system increased steadily, and this trend was not interrupted by the
international crisis of 2008. In an effort to expand coverage, the IPS launched
several institutional reforms in 2003, such as the improvement and modern-
ization of institutional management and the development of skills of IPS’s
human resources. Some legal reforms also had a positive effect on expanding
retirement coverage. In 2004, Paraguay ratiﬁed a reciprocity agreement among
Mercosur countries, by which a worker who contributed in a Mercosur mem-
ber country can access social security beneﬁts in another member country.4 In
2009, the country also adopted reciprocity agreements between the different
ﬁscal funds and the IPS. The exchange of information between the IPS and
public-sector entities, such as the Tax Secretariat and the National Directorate
of Public Contracting, also helps explain the reduced evasion and increased
coverage (ILO 2014).
Disaggregating, the rateof registrationwith the social security system increased
for all population groups (young and adult workers, men, and women) over the
period. All of them suffered a reduction in the percentage of registered workers
in the early years of the period, from 2001 to 2004, an increase in 2005, a fall in
2006, and a steady improvement in the following years.
The international crisis of 2008 did not affect the upward trend in the share
of workers registered with the social security system that took place from 2006
onwards, overall and for any of the population groups.
19.5 Labour Earnings
Labour earnings increased overall during the period studied, though erratic-
ally.Within the period, labour earnings experienced a downward trend in the
ﬁrst half (from2001 to 2006)with someups and downs and began an upward
trend in 2006 that was interrupted by the international crisis of 2008 and by
the local crisis of 2012. Though workers’ earnings were affected by the 2008
international crisis, they surpassed pre-crisis levels by 2010. All population
groups experienced earnings gains between 2001 and 2013, but labour
incomes moved erratically for all of them. The evidence indicates that work-
ers from low-earning categories increased their labour earnings, while workers
from high-earning categories tended to suffer earnings losses over the period.
(Cruces et al. 2015: ﬁgure 9)
4 Mercosur is a regional trade agreement between Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay, that
was established in 1991.
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Average monthly earnings, expressed in PPP dollars of 2005, increased by
14.1 per cent over the period, climbing from US$571 in 2001 to US$651 in
2013 (Table 19.1). The increase in labour earnings was just half of the increase
in GDP per capita over the period that was 29.1 per cent. From 2001 to 2006,
changes in labour earnings did not reﬂect changes in the country’s economic
performance. Between 2001 and 2002, GDP changed only slightly (drop of
0.02 per cent) while labour earnings decreased by 7.4 per cent. From 2003 to
2006, the economy grew at a rate of 3.8 per cent annually, while labour
earnings decreased at a rate of 2.8 per cent a year. From 2007 onwards, labour
earnings moved with the business cycle; GDP and earnings experienced a
general upward trend during that period, with setbacks in 2009, when labour
earnings fell by 2.3 per cent, and in 2012, when they fell by 11.1 per cent.
Labour earnings of young and adult workers, men, and women increased
between 2001 and 2013, though erratically. All population groups suffered an
earnings reduction in the ﬁrst half of the period analysed (from 2001 to 2006).
An upward trend began in 2007 for all groups with earnings losses in 2009 and
in 2012.
Workers from low-earning categories increased their labour earnings
between 2001 and 2013, while workers from high-earning categories tended
to suffer earnings losses. Among occupational positions, labour earnings of
the self-employed increased more than those of paid employees, while
employers suffered an earnings loss. The earnings of workers in high-earning
sectors (skilled services, utilities and transportation, and public administra-
tion) decreased over the period studied, while the earnings of workers in low-
earning sectors (domestic service, primary activities, and industry) increased.
Labour earnings of the remaining sectors (construction, commerce, and edu-
cation and health) increased as well. Disaggregating by educational levels, the
change in labour earnings from 2001 to 2013 favoured less educated workers.
Labour earnings of workers with high and medium educational levels fell.
Workers with low educational levels were the only educational group whose
labour earnings increased over the period. Among occupational groups, the
labour earnings of all groups decreased during 2001–9. After 2007, the aggre-
gate trend for labour earnings was upward, but due to the international crisis
of 2008, there was a negative overall change from 2001 to 2009.
The evidence of increasing labour earnings between 2001 and 2013 for
workers with low educational levels, and falling labour earnings for workers
with medium and high levels of education, can be interpreted in light of
previous ﬁndings of improving educational levels of the Paraguayan
employed population and improving employment structure by economic
sector over that period. The improving employment structure by economic
sector implied an increase in the share of sectors that can be expected to
employ workers with high and medium educational levels, such as skilled
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services and public administration, and a reduction in the share of sectors that
employ workers with low educational levels, such as domestic service, primary
activities, and industry. This evidence indicates that the demand for workers
with high and medium educational levels relative to those with low educa-
tional levels increased between 2001 and 2013. On the other hand, the
educational level of persons in the labour force improved over the same
period, indicating an increase in the relative supply of workers with high
and medium levels of education (Cruces et al. 2015: table 8). The prediction
of a supply and demand analysis is that the relative wages of workers
with high and medium educational levels relative to those with low levels
of education will rise or fall depending on which effect dominates (increase in
the relative demand versus increase in the relative supply). In the Paraguayan
labour market, the relative wages of workers with high and medium educa-
tional levels relative to those with low educational levels fell over the period,
while the relative wages of workers with high educational levels relative
to those with medium educational levels also decreased (Cruces et al. 2015:
table 7). The adjustment process also led to a reduction in the unemploy-
ment rate of all educational groups between 2001 and 2013 that was larger
for workers with medium and low levels of education compared to those with
high levels of education (Cruces et al. 2015: table 9).
The international crisis of 2008 had a negative impact on labour earn-
ings in the aggregate, for adult workers, men, and women, and for most
occupational categories. Labour earnings decreased between 2008 and
2009 but recovered quickly and surpassed the pre-crisis level in 2010. In
2012, there was a new reduction in labour earnings as a consequence of the
local crisis. By 2013, labour earnings were at their highest level of the
entire period.
19.6 Poverty and Inequality
The poverty rate and the rate of working poor households dropped
between 2001 and 2013 for all poverty lines. Within the period, they
increased in the early years (from 2001 to 2002), fell between 2002 and
2005, experienced an increase in 2006 and began a downward trend after
that year. Those reducing trends were not interrupted by the international
crisis of 2008 or the local crisis of 2012, except for the poverty rate meas-
ured by the US$2.5 dollars-a-day international line that suffered a slight
increase between 2008 and 2009 and the extreme poverty rate that exhib-
ited a small rise in 2010. (Cruces et al. 2015: ﬁgure 10)
The moderate poverty rate (measured by the country’s ofﬁcial poverty line)
fell from 34.2 per cent in 2001 to 22.2 per cent in 2013; the extreme poverty
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rate dropped from 15.4 per cent to 9.1 per cent over the period. The percentage
of working poor households (deﬁned as the proportion of persons in the popu-
lation living in poor households where at least one member works) decreased
from 24.4 per cent to 15.6 per cent over the same period (Table 19.1). These
poverty indicators increased between 2001 and 2002, dropped between 2002
and 2005, increased again in 2006, and then began a steady downward trend
that was not interrupted by the international crisis of 2008 or by the local
crisis of 2012. The only exception was the extreme poverty rate that stopped
decreasing in 2009 and exhibited a small increase in 2010 (rise of 0.1 percent-
age points). The analysis based on the 2.5 and 4 dollars-a-day PPP inter-
national poverty lines also shows a drop in the poverty rate from 2001 to
2013. The poverty rate based on the 2.5 dollars-a-day poverty line fell
from 22.1 per cent in 2001 to 8.3 per cent in 2013. The reduction was from
37.7 per cent in 2001 to 20.2 per cent in 2013 for the poverty rate based on the
4 dollars-a-day poverty line (Table 19.1). Both poverty indicators followed
similar trends compared to the poverty indicators based on the ofﬁcial poverty
lines: they increased between 2001 and 2002, fell from 2002 to 2005,
increased once again in 2006, and then started a downward trend up to the
end of the period. The downward trend was interrupted by the international
crisis of 2008 only for the poverty rate based on the 2.5 dollars-a-day poverty
line (increase of 0.8 percentage points).
Rising labour incomes have been the driving force of poverty reduction
during the 2000s, both because of increased earnings and increased numbers
of earners (World Bank 2014a). Household labour incomes fell at the begin-
ning of the decade, from 2001 to 2006, but exhibited an increase of 46.5 per
cent between 2006 and 2013 (Cruces et al. 2015: ﬁgure 11). Non-labour
incomes, such as public transfers, only started to play a signiﬁcant role in
2011 due to important increases in coverage of the main social programmes.
In fact, direct transfers had a small poverty-reducing effect in 2010 due to the
low coverage among the poor and the low per capita transfers to those who
are covered (Higgins et al. 2013). Between 2010 and 2013, incomes from
government transfers at the household level grew by 87.3 per cent. The
reduction in food prices also played a role in poverty reduction in the last
years of the period under study (World Bank 2014a). As a result, between 2011
and 2013, all poverty indicators exhibited important reductions compared to
previous years.
Household per capita income and labour earning inequality decreased from 2001
to 2013. Changes in the inequality indices over the period were erratic: they
increased at the beginning of the period (from 2001 to 2002), fell from 2002 to
2005, rose once again in 2006 and began a downward trend in 2007 that was
interrupted by the international crisis of 2008. (Cruces et al. 2015: ﬁgure 12)
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The Gini coefﬁcient of household per capita income fell from 0.547 in 2001 to
0.482 in 2013 (Table 19.1). This indicator increased between 2001 and 2002,
dropped between 2002 and 2005, increased again in 2006, and then entered
into a downward trend that was interrupted by the international crisis of
2008. The Gini coefﬁcient of household per capita income increased from
0.496 in 2009 to 0.526 in 2011; the downward trend resumed in 2012. The
Gini coefﬁcient of labour earnings among employed workers tended to be
higher than the Gini coefﬁcient of household per capita income over the
period and dropped from 0.548 in 2001 to 0.498 in 2013 (Table 19.1); this
reduction in labour earnings inequality is in accord with the evidence pre-
sented above showing earnings increases for low-earning categories and earn-
ings reductions for high-earning categories. Consequently, the reduction in
labour earnings inequality in Paraguay occurred at the expense of income
losses for some categories. The Gini coefﬁcient of labour earnings exhibited
the same trends as the Gini coefﬁcient of household per capita income over
the period.
Changes in household per capita income inequality in Paraguay have been
related mainly to changes in demographical factors. Azevedo et al. (2013b)
decomposed the change in the Gini coefﬁcient of household per capita
income for the period 1999–2010 and found that changes in demographical
factors, such as the share of adults in the population and the share of adults in
the total employment, were inequality-reducing, while changes in labour and
non-labour income were inequality-increasing over that period. Other studies
have analysed the factors behind the evolution of labour income inequality.
Azevedo et al. (2013a) used a decomposition approach and found that
changes in the education wage premium (or the ‘price effect’) and changes
in the distribution of the stock of education (the ‘quantity effect’) were
inequality-reducing between 1999 and 2010. Gasparini et al. (2011) found a
reduction in the gap between the wages of skilled workers (those with com-
plete or incomplete college education) and unskilled workers (those who have
completed secondary education or less) in Paraguay between 2003 and 2009.
The shrinking educational earnings gap can be explained by factors related to
supply and demand: the relative supply of skilled workers increased steadily
while the relative demand for those workers fell.
19.7 Conclusions
Overall, Paraguay experienced slow economic growth by Latin American
standards between 2000 and 2013. Within the period, the country suffered
a serious macroeconomic crisis in the early years, grew steadily from 2003
to 2008, suffered a recession induced by the international crisis of 2008,
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experienced a quick recovery led by agriculture, suffered a recession once
again in 2012 generated by a severe drought, and exhibited the largest growth
rates of the period in 2013.
Most labour market indicators followed the erratic pattern of economic
growth over the period. The unemployment rate fell overall between 2001
and 2013 and exhibited an increase in the early years of the period, a down-
ward trend from 2003 to 2008, an increase after the international crisis, a
recovery of the downward trend, and a ﬁnal increase by the end of the period.
The composition of employment by occupational group suffered a worsening
at the beginning of the period but exhibited a slight improvement overall
between 2001 and 2009 (the latest we have data on this classiﬁcation) that was
not affected by the Great Recession. The employment structure by occupa-
tional position improved overall from 2001 to 2013, as the shares of paid
employees and employers in total employment increased and the shares of
self-employed and unpaid workers decreased. Within the period, the employ-
ment structure by occupational position changed erratically, with a worsening
in the early years of the period (from 2001 to 2002), an improvement in the
following years, a worsening during the international crisis of 2008, and a
recovery of the pre-crisis structure by the end of the period. The employment
composition by economic sector changed erratically over the period and was
affected negatively by the international crisis. Overall, there was an improve-
ment between 2001 and 2013. The overall share of workers registered with the
social security system increased between 2001 and 2013, with ups and downs.
The improving trend was not interrupted by the international crisis of 2008.
Labour earnings increased overall between 2001 and 2013. Within the period,
labour earnings experienced a downward trend in the ﬁrst half (from 2001 to
2006) with some ups and downs, and began an upward trend in 2006 that was
interrupted by the international crisis of 2008 and by the local crisis of 2012.
The evidence indicated that workers from low-earning categories increased
their labour earnings, while workers from high-earning categories tended to
suffer earnings losses.
All poverty indicators and the inequality of household per capita income
and labour earnings dropped between 2001 and 2013.Within the period, they
increased in the early years (from 2001 to 2002), fell between 2002 and 2005,
experienced an increase in 2006, and began a downward trend after that year.
Those reducing trends were not interrupted by the international crisis of 2008
or the local crisis of 2012 for the moderate poverty rate and the poverty rate
based on the 4 dollars-a-day international line, but were affected negatively by
the international crisis for the inequality indices, the extreme poverty rate,
and the poverty rate based on the 2.5 dollars-a-day international line, but only
slightly. The only labour market indicator that changed steadily over the
period was the educational level of the employed population that improved
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over the period and was not affected negatively by the international crisis
of 2008.
The comparison between the effects of the international crisis of 2008 on
labour market indicators and the effects generated by the macroeconomic
crisis at the beginning of the period (2001–2) and the recession caused by
the severe drought of 2012 reveals that the 2001–2 crisis impacted Paraguay
more strongly. The increase in the unemployment rate and the growth in the
share of low-earning positions in total employment were larger during the
2001–2 crisis compared to the international crisis of 2008 and the 2012
recession. The share of low-earning occupations in total employment, the
share of unregistered workers, and all poverty and inequality indicators
increased during the 2001–2 crisis, while in general they fell during the
other recessionary episodes. On the other hand, the reduction in GDP and
the increase in the share of low-earning sectors in total employment were
larger during the Great Recession, while the reduction in labour earnings was
larger during the 2012 recession.
Young workers had worse labour market outcomes over the period com-
pared to adults, but they do not seem to be more vulnerable to macroeco-
nomic crises. Men and women exhibited a balanced situation in their labour
market outcomes, but men were most affected by the negative impacts of
the crises. The unemployment rate was higher for young compared to adult
workers, the share of young employed workers in low-earning occupational
groups was larger than the share of adult workers, the percentage of
young workers registered with the social security system was lower when
compared to adults, and labour earnings of young workers were below those
of adults. On the other hand, the shares of young workers in low-earning
occupational positions and sectors were lower compared to adults and
their educational level improved more than that of adults. Despite the
generally inferior situation of young workers in the labour market, adult
workers were more affected by the episodes of crises, speciﬁcally the inter-
national crisis of 2008, in all labour market indicators, except for the
increase in the unemployment rate that was larger among young workers.
Disaggregating by gender, we found that men were better than women in
some cases, e.g. the male unemployment rate was lower, the share of male
workers in low-earning positions was lower compared to women, and labour
earnings of men were higher than labour earnings of women; in other
cases, the opposite occurred, e.g. the percentage of workers registered with
the social security system tended to be larger for women compared to
men, and the share of workers in low-earning occupations and sectors
tended to be lower for women compared to men. The negative impacts of
the international crisis of 2008 affected men more than women in all labour
market indicators.
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In summary, the growth process of Paraguay during the 2000s was volatile.
Most employment and earnings indicators and poverty and inequality indi-
cators followed the erratic pattern of economic growth, but ended the period
with a general improvement relative to the starting point (the year 2000).
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Peru
20.1 Introduction
This chapter on labourmarkets and growth in Peru since 2000 is one of sixteen
studies of Latin American countries, each of which analyses the growth–
employment–poverty nexus and aims to answer the following broad ques-
tions: Has economic growth resulted in economic development via improved
labour market conditions in Latin America in the 2000s, and have these
improvements halted or been reversed since the Great Recession? How do
the rate and character of economic growth, changes in the various labour
market indicators, and changes in poverty relate to each other?
To answer these questions, we analyse the growth experience of Peru
during the 2000s and a wide set of labour market indicators that we assign
to one of two different categories: employment and earnings indicators,
and poverty and income inequality indicators. More speciﬁcally, for the
group of employment and earnings indicators we construct statistics on the
following variables: the unemployment rate; the employment structure by
occupational group, employment position, economic sector, registration of
workers with the social security system, and educational level; and mean
labour earnings and hourly wages. We present all these indicators for the
employed population as a whole and for different population groups (youth,
adults, men, and women). For the group of poverty and income inequality
indicators, we compute poverty rates using the ofﬁcial moderate and extreme
poverty lines and the international lines of 2.5 and 4 dollars a day. We
also calculate the Gini coefﬁcient of household per capita income and
labour earnings.
All the statistics in this chapter are obtained using microdata from the
Encuesta Nacional de Hogares (ENAHO), from 2003 to 2012. The nationwide
surveys were processed following a harmonization methodology and incorp-
orated into the SEDLAC—Socio-Economic Database for Latin America and the
Caribbean (CEDLAS and World Bank 2014).1 The resulting labour market
indicators were compiled into a large number of tables and ﬁgures, which
are available in an earlier version of this study (henceforth, Cruces et al. 2015).
Chapter 1 of this book provides the deﬁnition for each of the indicators we
analyse here, while Cruces et al. (2015) includes details on deﬁnitions and
classiﬁcation systems used by Peru’s household surveys, and on comparability
issues of these surveys over time.
20.2 Economic Growth
The Peruvian economy performed exceptionally well between 2000 and
2012 with a growth performance that placed the country well above the
regional average. The economy proved highly resilient in response to the
global economic crisis of 2008. The country suffered a slowdown in 2009
and recovered quickly in 2010. (Cruces et al. 2015: ﬁgures 1 and 2)
During the period 2000–12, the Peruvian economy had one of the highest
growth rates in Latin America and experienced rapid economic growth by the
region’s standards. GDP per capita increased by 71.1 per cent, placing Peru’s
growth performance at twice the average of 32.6 per cent for the eighteen
Latin American countries during the same period. GDP (measured in PPP
dollars of 2005) grew by 97.3 per cent, and GDP per employed person rose
by 45.5 per cent. The annual growth rate of GDP per capita was 4.4 per cent,
and it varied from a minimum of 1.2 per cent in 2001 to a maximum of
8.6 per cent in 2008 (Table 20.1).
Peru suffered an episode of slow growth at the beginning of the period
analysed, between 2000 and 2001, as a consequence of the Russian crisis,
which led to a strong reduction in capital inﬂows to the country and declining
terms of trade (Mendoza Bellido 2013). Two factors form the basis for Peru’s
economic expansion from 2002 to 2012. First, growing investment, a higher
rate of private consumption, and returning capital inﬂows fuelled the economy.
Second, a favourable international environment, characterized by growing
foreign demand for Peruvian products and a prolonged period of improvements
in its terms of trade, laid the grounds for considerable export growth. Between
2002 and 2009, Peruvian exports grew at an average annual rate of 18.3 per
cent. This was driven by an increase in both traditional and non-traditional
exports (Guerra 2012). But, while the volume of Peru’s traditional exports—
minerals, hydrocarbon, and raw materials—increased mostly due to a price
1 See Cruces et al. (2015: table 1) for details on the size of Peru household surveys.
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Table 20.1 Peru: Evolution of growth and labour market indicators over the 2000s
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Growth
Indicators
GDP per capita 5,514 5,447 5,644 5,797 6,013 6,349 6,765 7,288 7,916 7,904 8,503 8,982 9,431
GDP per capita
growth rate
1.41 1.20 3.62 2.71 3.71 5.60 6.56 7.72 8.62 0.15 7.57 5.63 5.01
Employment
and
Earnings
Indicators
Employment-to-
population ratio
. . . . . . . . . 68.47 68.02 66.98 68.69 70.42 70.45 70.78 71.14 70.72 70.52
Unemployment rate . . . . . . . . . 5.06 5.18 5.16 4.54 4.55 4.41 4.29 3.90 3.77 3.45
Share of low-earnings
occupations
. . . . . . . . . 61.74 63.18 63.25 61.84 59.37 57.92 55.69 54.82 53.82 52.59
Share of mid-earnings
occupations
. . . . . . . . . 25.31 24.43 24.90 25.56 26.52 28.13 29.84 31.01 31.95 32.42
Share of
high-earnings
occupations
. . . . . . . . . 12.95 12.39 11.85 12.60 14.11 13.95 14.47 14.17 14.23 14.99
Share of employers . . . . . . . . . 5.31 5.49 5.64 5.60 5.92 5.62 5.65 5.98 5.44 5.59
Share of wage/
salaried employees
. . . . . . . . . 39.78 40.96 41.33 43.22 44.58 45.09 45.31 45.22 45.26 46.64
Share of
self-employed
workers
. . . . . . . . . 37.34 36.00 36.46 35.22 35.85 36.34 36.04 36.56 36.81 36.42
Share of unpaid family
workers
. . . . . . . . . 17.57 17.54 16.57 15.96 13.65 12.95 13.00 12.23 12.49 11.35
Share of workers in
low-earnings
sectors
. . . . . . . . . 44.44 43.97 44.08 43.02 40.17 39.21 38.04 37.10 36.83 35.83
(continued)
Table 20.1 Continued
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Share of workers in
mid-earnings
sectors
. . . . . . . . . 44.67 44.79 44.93 45.08 47.36 48.33 48.80 49.94 50.11 50.40
Share of workers in
high-earnings
sectors
. . . . . . . . . 10.89 11.24 11.00 11.90 12.47 12.46 13.16 12.96 13.07 13.76
Share of
low-educated
workers
. . . . . . . . . 45.32 44.20 44.29 42.60 39.80 39.06 38.75 38.43 37.87 36.07
Share of medium-
educated workers
. . . . . . . . . 37.03 37.67 37.72 38.42 39.25 40.11 39.95 40.31 40.25 40.90
Share of
high-educated
workers
. . . . . . . . . 17.65 18.13 17.99 18.98 20.95 20.83 21.30 21.26 21.88 23.04
Share of workers
registered with SS
. . . . . . . . . 14.85 20.10 19.71 22.57 25.96 26.47 28.82 29.69 30.49 32.39
Mean labour earnings . . . . . . . . . 408.3 375.3 368.9 386.3 413.7 423.3 449.9 457.8 467.3 486.3
Poverty and
Inequality
Indicators
Ofﬁcial extreme
poverty rate
. . . . . . . . . 26.2 21.3 23.5 19.8 17.7 16.1 14.2 12.2 9.5 9.1
Ofﬁcial moderate
poverty rate
. . . . . . . . . 51.6 47.8 51.5 45.7 40.5 37.4 34.6 31.1 27.2 24.9
Poverty rate
2.5 dollars-a-day
. . . . . . . . . 28.29 25.24 27.21 22.98 21.22 17.23 14.61 12.64 12.75 11.07
Poverty rate
4 dollars-a-day
. . . . . . . . . 47.30 44.64 46.67 41.38 37.62 33.55 30.04 26.87 25.80 22.29
GINI of household per
capita income
. . . . . . . . . 0.538 0.487 0.493 0.491 0.496 0.469 0.462 0.449 0.457 0.453
GINI of labour
earnings
. . . . . . . . . 0.559 0.518 0.522 0.514 0.524 0.513 0.509 0.506 0.496 0.489
Note: The shaded ﬁgures of labour market indicators represent statistical signiﬁcant improvements at 5 per cent between the initial and ﬁnal years for all the employment and earnings indicators and poverty
and inequality indicators. The only exceptions are the share of mid-earnings occupations, share of mid-earnings sectors, and share of medium-educated workers for which we did not assign welfare evaluation
criteria.
Source: SEDLAC (CEDLAS and World Bank 2014) and World Development Indicators (World Bank 2014).
boom, exports of a few non-traditional agro-industrial products more than
tripled between 2002 and 2008. According to Guerra (2012), Peru did not take
advantage of the favourable international climate to further diversify its export
base. Consequently, with an economic structure characterized by undiversiﬁed
exports, and imports that comprised mainly of complementary goods, the
country was highly vulnerable to movements in its terms of trade (Mendoza
Bellido 2013). The increasing prices for Peru’s products also had a pronounced
effect on tax revenues through the income tax paid by the export sector. The
increased revenues enabled the Peruvian government to improve public
ﬁnances. Indeed, following the establishment of the Fiscal Responsibility and
Transparency Law in 2001, the government achieved a signiﬁcant reduction in
the ﬁscal deﬁcit and in the debt-to-GDP ratio (IMF 2013).
The Peruvian economy proved highly resilient in response to the global
economic crisis. A deceleration was observed in 2009 when the GDP growth
rate was only 0.9 per cent and GDP per capita growth 0.15 per cent. This
slowdown was due to a fall in foreign demand for Peruvian products, a
dramatic drop in the international prices of Peruvian exports, a reduction in
remittances from abroad, and falling investment and external credit (Moron
et al. 2009; Rozenberg 2009). However, the economy bounced back the fol-
lowing year, surpassing pre-crisis GDP and GDP per capita levels. Peru’s resili-
ence in the face of the global crisis can be explained by earlier prudent policies
like the creation of ﬁscal and international reserve buffers and the implemen-
tation of a timely countercyclical policy response (IMF 2010; Mendoza Bellido
2013). These policies included the injection of liquidity into the system, the
reduction in the interest rate by means of central bank policies, and a ﬁscal
stimulus plan.
20.3 Unemployment
The 2003–12 period witnessed a drop in the unemployment rate in the
aggregate and for all population groups. The international crisis of 2008
did not affect the downward trend in the unemployment rate in the
aggregate and for women, but led to a slight increase in the unemployment
rate of men and young workers, while the adult unemployment rate
remained unchanged. (Cruces et al. 2015: ﬁgure 3)
The unemployment rate (measured as the ratio of the unemployed to the
labour force) fell over the period, from 5.1 per cent in 2003 (656,181
unemployed people) to 3.5 per cent in 2012 (573,560 unemployed people)
(Table 20.1). The evolution of the unemployment rate can be divided into
two stages. It initially kept stable at around 5.1 per cent from 2003 to 2005.
Individual Country Analysis
382
The unemployment rate then dropped signiﬁcantly from 2005 to 2012, falling
from 5.2 to 3.5 per cent while GDP was growing. The downward trend of the
unemployment rate continued even during the Great Recession.
Despite the growth performance over the period, the unemployment
rate did not experience a major decline in Peru. Osorio Amezaga (2014)
ﬁnds a negative and modest association between GDP growth and the
unemployment rate (which was 0.12) through the estimation of Okun’s
coefﬁcient from 2001 to 2012. This fact cannot be explained by standard
arguments that revolve around workers leaving the labour market as soon
as they are faced with limited prospects for employment since the parti-
cipation rate increased over the period analysed. On the other hand, the
widespread failure to comply with laws mandating employment beneﬁts
and labour protection should encourage employers to hire more workers
during periods of expansion. The author concludes that the low output
elasticity of unemployment can be attributed to particularities of the Peru-
vian labour market.
The unemployment rate fell for young and adult workers, men, and women
between 2003 and 2012. The unemployment rates of all population groups
were essentially unchanged from 2003 to 2005, and began a downward trend
from 2005 to 2012. The declining pattern was not interrupted by the inter-
national crisis for women, but the unemployment rate of young workers and
men suffered a slight increase. By 2010,men had recovered the pre-crisis level of
unemployment. Young workers returned to their pre-recession unemployment
rate in 2012. The unemployment rate of adult workers stopped decreasing
during the international crisis but recovered the downward trend immediately.
TheWorld Bank (2010) claims that the small effect of the international crisis on
the unemployment rate in Peru could be explained by an increase in the share
of unregistered or informal labour relationships in total employment, which
eased the adjustment process in the presence of wage rigidities and employ-
ment protection legislation.
20.4 Job Mix
The composition of employment by occupational group improved
between 2003 and 2012 as workers moved from agricultural, forestry and
ﬁshery occupations, and elementary jobs to better paying occupations like
professional and technical jobs. All demographic groups—young and adult
workers, men, and women—beneﬁted from the improvement in the occu-
pational composition of employment over the period. The international
crisis of 2008 did not affect the improving trend in the composition of
employment by occupational group. (Cruces et al. 2015: ﬁgure 4)
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The share of the following occupations shrank between 2003 and 2012:
elementary occupations (drop of 7.8 percentage points) and agricultural,
forestry, and ﬁshery jobs (drop of 2.5 percentage points). The share of the
following occupations grew: clerical (increase of 2.5 percentage points); ser-
vices and sales workers (increase of 2.7 percentage points); plant and machine
operators (increase of 1.9 percentage points); and technicians and associate
professionals (increase of 1.2 percentage points). The share of the other occu-
pational groups remained largely unchanged. These changes in the occupa-
tional composition of employment can be interpreted as an improvement,
since low-earning occupations (agricultural, elementary, and crafts and
trades occupations) reduced their share in total employment by 9.2 percent-
age points between 2003 and 2012, while high-earning occupations (man-
agement, professionals, and technicians and associate professionals) gained
share in total employment (increase of 2.0 percentage points) (Table 20.1).
These changes resulted in an increase in the share of mid-earning occupa-
tions (services and sales occupations, plant and machine operators, clerical
jobs, and armed forces) in total employment over the period (increase of 7.1
percentage points).
The improvements in the occupational composition of employment
between 2003 and 2012 were observed for young and adult workers and for
men and women. The decrease in the rate of working in low-earning occupa-
tions in total employment was larger among youth compared to adult workers
as was the increase in the rate of working in high-earning occupations.
When the analysis is broken down by gender, women experienced a larger
reduction in the share of employment in low-earning occupations compared
to men, but a lower increase in share of high-earning occupations in total
employment.
The international crisis of 2008 did not adversely affect the improvement in
the composition of employment by occupational group. Between 2008 and
2009, the share of low-earning occupations continued to fall in the aggregate
and for all population groups, while the share of high-earning occupations
increased overall and for adult workers, men, and women. For young workers,
though, a slight reduction in the share of high-earning occupations resulted in
an increase in the share of mid-earning occupations. The share of high-
earning occupations in total employment reached and surpassed the pre-crisis
level by 2010 for young workers.
The employment structure by occupational position improved from 2003 to 2012
as the share of paid employees and employers in total employment increased and
the share of self-employed and unpaid workers decreased. The improving trend in
the composition of employment by occupational position was experienced by
young and adult workers, men, and women. The international crisis of 2008 did
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not affect adversely the improvement in the structure of employment by occupa-
tional position for the employed population overall, for young workers, adults,
and men, but led to a standstill for women. (Cruces et al. 2015: ﬁgure 5)
Between 2003 and 2012, the share of paid employees in total employment—
the largest category—grew from 39.8 to 46.6 per cent. The share of employers
also increased, but slightly, from 5.3 to 5.6 per cent. The shares of the self-
employed and unpaid workers decreased over the period. The reduction was
from 37.3 per cent in 2003 to 36.4 per cent in 2012 for the self-employed, and
from 17.6 to 11.4 per cent for unpaid workers (Table 20.1). These changes can
be characterized as an improvement of the employment structure by occupa-
tional position, as the share of low-earning categories (self-employment and
unpaid employment) dropped by a total of 7.2 percentage points and the
share of high-earning categories (paid employees and employers) increased.
The employment structure by occupational position improved between
2003 and 2012 for all population groups (young and adult workers, men,
and women).
The international crisis of 2008 did not reverse the improvements that had
been taking place for the employed population overall and for young workers,
adults, and men, while there was a worsening for women. The share of low-
earning positions recovered the previous downward trend in 2010 for women.
The employment composition by economic sector improved over the course of
the period studied overall and for all population groups. The international crisis of
2008 did not interrupt the improving trend in the structure of employment by
economic sector. (Cruces et al. 2015: ﬁgure 6)
The period 2003–12 witnessed a reduction (from 44.4 per cent to 35.8 per cent)
in the share of workers in low-earning sectors (primary activities, domestic
service, and low-tech industry). There was, during the same period, an increase
(from 10.9 per cent to 13.8 per cent) in the share of high-earning sectors
(skilled services, public administration, and high-tech industry) in the total
(Table 20.1). These changes resulted in an increase in the share of mid-earning
sectors in total employment over the period. Despite the improvement in the
employment structure by economic sector, a large portion of workers remained
employed in sectors like primary activities (26.8 per cent in 2012) and com-
merce (26.2 per cent in 2012); these sectors tend to have a low degree of
formalization and pay low wages (Guerra 2012).
The employment composition by economic sector improved between 2003
and 2012 for young and adult workers, men, and women, as they moved from
low-earning sectors to high-earning sectors.
The international crisis of 2008 did not halt the improving trend in the
employment composition by economic sector overall and for all population
groups. Between 2008 and 2009 the share of low-earning sectors continued to
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decrease, while the share of high-earning sectors in total employment kept on
increasing in the aggregate and for young, adult workers, men, and women.
The continued improvement in the structure of employment by economic
sector despite the international crisis in the aggregate and for all population
groups, can be explained by the reduction in the share of workers in the
primary activities sector, which includes the mining subsector in our classiﬁ-
cation, and by the reduction in the share of workers in the low-tech industry
sector in total employment between 2008 and 2009. That occurred as a
consequence of the drop in the exports of minerals, hydrocarbons, and agro-
industrial products. As the primary activities and low-tech industry sectors are
low-earning sectors in Peru, the reduction of their share in total employment
implied an improvement in the labour market.
The educational level of the Peruvian employed population improved steadily
over the period for all population groups, and especially among young workers.
The international crisis of 2008 led to a slowdown in the falling trend of the share
of employed workers with low educational levels in the aggregate and for all
population groups. (Cruces et al. 2015: ﬁgure 7)
The share of employed workers with low educational levels (eight years of
schooling or less) dropped from 45.3 per cent in 2003 to 36.1 per cent in 2012,
while the share of workers with medium and high educational levels (nine to
thirteen years of schooling and over thirteen years of schooling) grew from
37.0 per cent in 2003 to 40.9 per cent in 2012 and from 17.7 per cent to 23.0
per cent respectively (Table 20.1).2 We interpret this result as an improvement
for the employed population as the level of education is an important predictor
of labour earnings. Consequently, the changes in the employment structure
by educational level implied an increase in the share of workers that tend to
have high levels of earnings and a decline in the share of workers with low
earnings levels.3
The educational level of the employed population improved between 2003
and 2012 for all groups and especially for young workers.
The international crisis of 2008 led to a slowdown in the improving trend in
the structure of employment by educational level overall and for all popula-
tion groups. Between 2008 and 2009, the share of employed workers with
low levels of education continued to fall, but at a slower pace than before the
crisis. The pattern of slowdown in the improving trend in the structure of
2 The most frequent value of years of education for employed workers in Peru was eleven during
the entire period (around 24.6 per cent of employed workers had eleven years of education).
3 The improvement in the employment structure by educational level is related to changes in
the relative demand and supply of workers with high educational levels with corresponding
implications for the wage gap by educational groups and the unemployment rate of each
educational level. We introduce a discussion about the role of these factors in Peru in section 20.5.
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employment by educational level took place for young and adult workers,
men, and women.
The overall share of workers registered with the social security system increased
over the period analysed. Nonetheless, the share of unregistered workers in Peru is
still very high, despite sustained economic growth. The international crisis of 2008
led to a slowdown in the upward trend of the registration rate.
(Cruces et al. 2015: ﬁgure 8)
The Peruvian social security system comprises contributory schemes and non-
contributory schemes (Lavigne 2013). The contributory scheme of the pen-
sion system is composed of four regimes: (1) the Sistema Nacional de Pensiones,
which covers both private- and public-sector employees; (2) the Cédula Viva,
which is a special regime that covers teachers that started working before
1980, workers at state companies, and magistrates; (3) the Sistema Privado de
Pensiones, which is an individual capitalization system; and (4) the Fondo de
Pensiones Sociales, which is a voluntary pension system for workers who are
not covered by any of the other regimes. The public contributory regimes are
funded by employers, employees, and the government, while the private
regime is funded by worker contributions. The Peruvian social security system
also offers two non-contributory pensions for the vulnerable elderly who did
not contribute to a pension fund or whose contributions do not allow them to
receive a decent pension: the Pensión Mínima de Vejez and the Pensión Nacional
de Asistencia Solidaria. The contributory scheme of the health insurance sys-
tem is composed of two regimes, EsSalud and the Sanidades de las Fuerzas
Armadas y de la Policía Nacional, which are compulsory for wage earners and
members of cooperatives from both the private and public sectors and for
independent workers that decide to afﬁliate, and for personnel from the
army and police forces respectively. Finally, the Seguro Integral de Salud is
the non-contributory scheme of the health insurance system and covers the
non-insured population, with a speciﬁc focus on undernourished children
and elderly living in poverty and extreme poverty.
The share of workers registered with the contributory schemes of the social
security system (public and private) increased by 17.5 percentage points dur-
ing the 2000s, climbing from 14.9 per cent in 2003 to 32.4 per cent in 2012
(Table 20.1). The government of Peru instituted a set of policies designed to
improve working conditions over the period. Those measures included a
special regime for small enterprises which provides tax incentives and reduces
labour obligations, such as payment for unjustiﬁed dismissal. In addition, the
Fondo de Pensiones Sociales (FPS) was created. Small enterprises were not
obliged to contribute to any social protection system before the creation of
the FPS. Since its creation in 2008, small-enterprise workers can voluntarily
access the FPS which includes a government co-payment. In terms of health
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insurance, the obligation to contribute to Essalud for small-enterprise workers
was eliminated and government–worker co-ﬁnancing was established for
afﬁliating workers to the Seguro Integral de Salud (ILO 2014). Available evidence
indicates that these policies did not have an important effect on the formal-
ization of workers (Díaz 2014). On the contrary, they may have contributed to
the deterioration in working conditions. Vidal Bermúdez et al. (2012) point
out that the increase in the registration of workers with the social security
system during the 2000s occurred through the set-up of the Seguro Integral de
Salud, which offers a minimum coverage with standards that are below those
of the contributory health insurance scheme, and through temporary con-
tracts. A further institutional change was the implementation of an electronic
system through which employers with three or more workers must send
monthly reports to the National Tax Authority indicating the number of
workers, service providers, personnel in training, and outsourced workers.
This administrative change increased the Ministry of Labour’s capacity to
supervise and monitor compliance with labour obligations. It is estimated
that the introduction of the electronic system contributed to the registration
of jobs (ILO 2014).
The tendency towards formalization was slightly affected by the economic
crisis of 2008. The growth in the share of registered workers slowed down after
the Great Recession, though not immediately. In 2009 alone, the share of
registered workers rose by 2.4 percentage points, whereas the increases in 2010
and 2011 were only 0.9 and 0.8 percentage points respectively. The World
Bank (2010) claims that unregistered employment in Peru may have eased the
adjustment process during the Great Recession in a labour market character-
ized by wage rigidities and rigid labour market regulations. Despite sustained
economic growth in Peru, the share of registered workers continues to be very
low (32.4 per cent in 2012). Questions remain, then, about the ability of the
country to turn growth in employment into an increase in employed work-
force formalization (Guerra 2012). Chacaltana and Yamada (2009) also point
out that the pronounced growth in employment has meant an increase in
both formal and informal employment. Indeed, between 2003 and 2012,
the number of registered workers increased from 2,371,403 to 6,531,140
(4,159,737 new registered workers), while the number of unregistered workers
also rose from 15,612,469 to 16,231,855 (619,386 new unregistered workers).
Failure to register with the social security system is a long-standing problem
in Peru. First, a demographic change at the beginning of the twenty-ﬁrst
century meant an increase in the economically active working-age population
that could not be absorbed into the wage/salaried employment sector. As a
result, there was an increase in low-productivity self-employment (Garavito
2010). Self-employed workers account for themajority of unregistered workers
in the country. For this occupational position, the rate of unregistered workers
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fell from 96.1 per cent in 2003 to 84.1 per cent in 2012. For wage/salaried
employees the rate of unregistered workers dropped from 68.7 per cent in
2003 to 47.7 per cent in 2012. Second, the Peruvian labour market has
restrictive labour market regulations, which have contributed to the increase
in unregistered employment (Toyama et al. 2009; World Bank 2010).
The rate of registration with the social security system increased for all
population groups (young and adult workers, men, and women). Young
workers are the least likely to be registered with the social security system,
and while the share of young workers enrolled increased over the period,
adult workers were at the forefront of the trend towards registration. Men
were more likely to be registered in the system than women, and the rate of
registration increased more dramatically for them compared to women over
the period. The rate of registration with the social security system continued
to increase for young workers, adults, men, and women during the inter-
national crisis.
20.5 Labour Earnings
Labour earnings increased between 2003 and 2012. Within the period,
there was a reduction between 2003 and 2005 and a steady increase
in the following years. Labour earnings increased overall, for young and
adult workers, men, and women. The evidence of earning changes
by employment category over the period indicates that low-earning cat-
egories increased their earnings, while high-earning categories tended to
suffer earnings reductions. Workers were not affected negatively by the
2008 crisis in the aggregate, but some employment categories suffered
earnings losses. (Cruces et al. 2015: ﬁgure 9)
Average monthly earnings, expressed in PPP dollars of 2005, increased by
19.1 per cent, from US$408 in 2003 to US$486 in 2012 (Table 20.1). Labour
earnings decreased at the beginning of the period—between 2003 and 2005—
and grew steadily in the following years. From 2003 to 2008, GDP per capita
grew by 5.8 per cent a year, but the annual increase in real labour earnings
and hourly wages was just 0.7 and 0.9 per cent respectively. Two reasons
have been presented to explain the real wages stagnation in Peru despite
rapid economic growth. First, the increase in labour supply may have com-
pensated for the increase in labour demand; or a highly elastic labour supply
may have allowed for an increase in the employment level without increases
in hourly wages (World Bank 2010). Second, the predominant type of con-
tract in Peru is the temporal contract which limits the access of workers to
trade unions, which are the main tool they have to increase their wages
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(Vidal Bermúdez et al. 2012). Real labour earnings were not affected nega-
tively by the Great Recession. In fact, in 2009 real earnings exhibited the
largest annual growth rate of the period. The increase in real labour earnings
during the international crisis can be explained by the reduction in the
inﬂation rate (World Bank 2010).
Men, women, and young and adult workers all increased their labour
earnings between 2003 and 2012. The trend in their labour earnings reﬂected
the overall time path, with reductions from 2003 to 2005 and increases
thereafter. Average earnings rose between 2003 and 2012 for workers
employed in low-earning employment categories and tended to fall for
workers in high-earning categories. Among occupational groups, agricultural,
forestry, and ﬁshery workers, workers in elementary occupations, and crafts
and trades workers had an average increase in their labour earnings, while
workers in management, professionals, and technicians had an average earn-
ings reduction between 2003 and 2012. When the employed population is
broken down by occupational position, the self-employed had a larger
increase in labour earnings compared to employers and paid employees.
Among economic sectors, workers in primary activities, domestic workers,
and workers in low-tech industries increased their labour earnings over the
period, while workers in high-earning sectors like skilled services, public
administration, and high-tech industries suffered an earnings loss. Finally,
labour earnings of workers with high educational levels fell, while workers
with medium and low levels of education enjoyed an increase in their labour
earnings.
The evidence of falling labour earnings for workers with high educational
levels and labour earnings increases for workers with medium and low levels
of education can be interpreted in light of previous ﬁndings of improving
employment structure by occupational group and economic sector over the
period. The improving employment structure by occupational group and
economic sector implied an increase in the share of occupations and sectors
that can be expected to use workers with high and medium levels of educa-
tion, like professional and technical occupations, public administration,
skilled services, and high-tech industry sectors, and a reduction in the share
of occupations and sectors that employ workers with low educational levels,
like elementary and agricultural occupations, domestic service, and primary
activities sectors. This evidence indicates that the demand for workers with
high and medium educational levels relative to those with low educational
levels increased between 2003 and 2012. On the other hand, the educational
levels of persons in the labour force improved over the same period, indicating
an increase in the relative supply of workers with high and medium levels of
education (Cruces et al. 2015: table 8). The prediction of a supply and demand
analysis is that the relative wages of workers with high andmedium educational
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levels relative to those with low educational levels will rise or fall depending
on which effect dominates (increase in the relative demand versus increase in
the relative supply). In the Peruvian labour market, the relative wages of
workers with high and medium educational levels relative to those with low
educational levels fell over the period, and the relative wages of workers with
high educational levels relative to those with medium educational levels also
decreased (Cruces et al. 2015: table 7). The adjustment process also led to a
reduction in the unemployment rate of all educational groups with a larger
reduction for workers with medium levels of education (Cruces et al. 2015:
table 9).
Even during the international crisis of 2008, labour earnings continued to
grow, overall and for all demographic groups. However, some employment
categories were impacted adversely by the crisis. Among occupational groups,
workers in the armed forces and technicians were affected negatively by the
international crisis of 2008. Workers in both occupations recovered their pre-
crisis level of earnings in 2012. Among occupational positions, employers
were the only group impacted negatively by the international crisis of 2008.
Employers returned to their pre-recession level of labour income in 2010.
Among economic sectors, workers in the utilities and transportation sector
were affected negatively by the crisis but returned in 2010 to their pre-crisis
level of earnings.
20.6 Poverty and Inequality
Poverty fell between 2003 and 2012 for all poverty lines used. The rate of
working poor households also exhibited a decreasing trend. The pattern of
poverty reduction over time was not interrupted by the international crisis
of 2008. (Cruces et al. 2015: ﬁgure 10)
The moderate poverty rate (measured by the country’s ofﬁcial poverty line)
fell from 51.6 per cent in 2003 to 24.9 per cent in 2012; the extreme poverty
rate dropped from 26.2 per cent to 9.1 per cent; the percentage of the working
poor (deﬁned as the proportion of persons in the population living in poor
households where at least one member works) decreased from 42.7 per cent to
20.1 per cent over the same period (Table 20.1). These indicators decreased
consistently every year but 2005, when they had an increase. Thus, in Peru
there was a negative correlation between economic growth and poverty.
García Carpio and Céspedes Reynaga (2011) computed growth–poverty elasti-
cities for the period 2001–10 using Kakwani’s (1990)methodology. They found
that growth–poverty elasticities increased in absolute terms over the period
and changed from being positive in 2001 (0.9) to negative in 2010 (1.7). The
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authors also found that economic growth was pro-poor in Peru between 2001
and 2010, using the measures proposed by Kakwani and Pernia (2000) and
Kakwani and Son (2002).
An analysis based on the 2.5 and 4 dollars-a-day PPP international poverty
lines also shows a drop in the poverty rate from 2003 to 2012 and a negative
association between the poverty rate and the growth of the economy. The
poverty rate based on those measures fell between 2003 and 2004, increased
from 2004 to 2005, and began a downward trend up to the end of the period.
The international crisis of 2008 did not affect the pattern of poverty reduction.
However, the growth–poverty elasticity was largely unchanged between 2008
and 2009 while it had shown an increasing pattern in absolute value in the
previous years, and the pro-poor growth index indicates that the growth was
not pro-poor during the international crisis (García Carpio and Céspedes
Reynaga 2011).
The poverty patterns reported in the last paragraph can be understood by
examining incomes from various sources. The analysis of sources of house-
hold total income indicates that labour income and income from transfers
(public and private) increased between 2003 and 2012, while income from
capital and pensions suffered a slight reduction over the same period (Cruces
et al. 2015: ﬁgure 11). The increase in labour earnings (30.7 per cent between
2003 and 2012) was the most important factor to explain the increase in
household total income over the period.
Household per capita income and labour earnings inequality decreased between
2003 and 2012. The international crisis of 2008 did not affect the downward trend
in the inequality indices. (Cruces et al. 2015: ﬁgure 12)
Household per capita income and labour earnings inequality decreased while
GDP increased over the period. The Gini coefﬁcient of household per capita
income fell from 0.538 in 2003 to 0.453 in 2012. This indicator fell at the
beginning of the period from 0.538 in 2003 to 0.487 in 2004, a level it
maintained until 2007. The downward trend continued in 2007 until 2011,
when a new increase set in. Throughout the period, the Gini coefﬁcient of
labour earnings among employed workers was higher than that of household
per capita income, and fell from 0.559 in 2003 to 0.489 in 2012 (Table 20.1);
this reduction in labour earnings inequality is in accord with the evidence
presented in section 20.5 showing earnings increases for workers employed in
low-earning categories and earnings reductions for workers in high-earning
categories. Consequently, the reduction in labour earnings inequality in Peru
occurred at the expense of income losses for some categories. The evolution of
the Gini coefﬁcient of labour earnings over time was similar to the trend
shown by the Gini coefﬁcient of per capita household income.
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Several studies have found that the reduction in both labour and non-labour
income inequality contributed to the reduction in household income inequal-
ity. Urrutia (2014) and Jaramillo and Saavedra (2011) presented evidence of the
reduction in labour income inequality. They found that the relative wage of
workers with high andmedium levels of education decreased during the 2000s
mainly as a result of the increase in their labour supply. The importance of non-
labour income to explain the reduction in household income inequality in
Peru was analysed by Yamada et al. (2012) and Jaramillo and Saavedra (2011).
Yamada et al. (2012) found that 25 per cent of the reduction in the Gini
coefﬁcient of household per capita income between 2006 and 2010 can be
accounted for by government transfers, like Programa JUNTOS. Jaramillo and
Saavedra (2011) claimed that the pro-poor orientation of social spending in
Peru and the improvement in access to public services were themain factors to
explain the reduction in income inequality during the 2000–6 period.
20.7 Conclusions
From 2000 to 2012, the Peruvian economy performed exceptionally well, with
a growth performance that placed the country well above the regional average.
The economy suffered a slowdown as a consequence of the international crisis
of 2008, but Peru continued to grow during that episode.
All labour market indicators improved between 2003 and 2012. The
unemployment rate was always low and fell moderately. The composition
of the employed population by occupational group improved over the period
as workers moved from agricultural, forestry, and ﬁshery occupations and
elementary jobs to better-paying occupations like professional and technical
jobs. The employment structure by occupational position also improved
through the reduction in the share of self-employed and unpaid workers
in total employment and the increase in the share of paid employees and
employers. Workers moved from low-earning economic sectors like primary
activities, domestic service, and low-tech industry to high-earning sectors
such as skilled services, public administration, and high-tech industry. More-
over, the educational level of the Peruvian employed population, the overall
share of workers registered with the social security system, and labour earnings
all increased between 2003 and 2012. The evidence of labour income changes
by employment categories indicates that low-earning categories increased
their earnings, while high-earning categories tended to suffer earnings reduc-
tions. The moderate and extreme poverty rates and the rate of working poor
households showed important reductions between 2003 and 2012, as did the
Gini coefﬁcient of per capita household income and labour earnings.
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Looking speciﬁcally at the international crisis of 2008, the only labour
market indicators that were affected by the crisis were the employment
structure by educational level and the share of employment registered with
the social security system which suffered a slowdown in their upward trends.
The comparison between the effects of the international crisis of 2008 on
labour market indicators and the effects generated by the recession at the
beginning of the decade (2000–1) reveals that the crisis at the beginning of
the 2000s impacted Peru more strongly. The crisis of 2000–1 generated a
larger reduction in GDP per capita and increases in the unemployment rate
and in the shares of workers in low-earning occupational groups and eco-
nomic sectors, while the unemployment rate and the shares of workers in
low-earning occupational groups and sectors continued to decrease during
the Great Recession. Other labour market indicators improved during both
crises. The smaller negative impacts of the international crisis compared to
the recession at the beginning of the decade can be explained by the prudent
policies the government implemented after the 2000–1 crisis, like the cre-
ation of ﬁscal and international reserve buffers, and the implementation of
timely countercyclical policy responses that were not available in the ﬁrst
recessionary episode.
Young workers and women had worse labour market outcomes over the
period compared to adults andmen respectively, and while women seem to be
more vulnerable to macroeconomic crises compared to men, young workers
and adults were slightly and equally affected by the crises. The unemployment
rate was higher for young compared to adult workers, the shares of young
employed workers in low-earning occupational groups and economic sectors
were larger than the shares of adult workers, the percentage of young workers
registered with the social security system was lower when compared to adults,
and labour earnings of young workers were below those of adults. On the
other hand, the share of young workers in low-earning occupational positions
was lower compared to adults. Despite the generally inferior situation of
young workers in the labour market compared to adults, youth were slightly
affected by the episodes of crises and the same was true for adult workers.
Disaggregating by gender, we found that men had better labour market out-
comes than women, with the only exception being the share of workers in
low-earning occupations that was larger among men. Both men and women
were slightly affected by themacroeconomic crises. The negative impacts were
larger for women compared to men, as they suffered a larger increase in the
unemployment rate and in the shares of workers in low-earning positions and
economic sectors.
In summary, all population groups were quite resilient to macroeconomic
crises, and labour market conditions were in a better state in 2012 than they
were at the start of the millennium.
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21
Uruguay
21.1 Introduction
This chapter on labour markets and growth in Uruguay since 2000 is one of
sixteen studies of Latin American countries, each of which analyses the
growth–employment–poverty nexus and aims to answer the following broad
questions: Has economic growth resulted in economic development via
improved labour market conditions in Latin America in the 2000s, and have
these improvements halted or been reversed since the Great Recession? How
do the rate and character of economic growth, changes in the various labour
market indicators, and changes in poverty relate to each other?
To answer these questions, we analyse the growth experience of Uruguay
during the 2000s and a wide set of labour market indicators that we assign to
one of two different categories: employment and earnings indicators, and
poverty and income inequality indicators. More speciﬁcally, for the group of
employment and earnings indicators we construct statistics on the following
variables: the unemployment rate; the employment structure by occupational
group, employment position, economic sector, registration of workers with
the social security system, and educational level; and mean labour earnings
and hourly wages. We present all these indicators for the employed popula-
tion as a whole and for different population groups (youth, adults, men, and
women). For the group of poverty and income inequality indicators, we
compute poverty rates using the ofﬁcial moderate and extreme poverty lines
and the international lines of 2.5 and 4 dollars a day. We also calculate the
Gini coefﬁcient of household per capita income and labour earnings.
All the statistics in this chapter are obtained using microdata from the
Encuesta Continua de Hogares (ECH) for the years 2000 to 2012. Until 2005,
the ECH encompassed solely urban areas; since 2006, it has been nationwide in
scope. The surveys were processed following a harmonizationmethodology and
incorporated into the SEDLAC—Socio-Economic Database for Latin America
and the Caribbean (CEDLAS and World Bank 2014).1 The resulting labour
market indicators were compiled into a large number of tables and ﬁgures,
which are available in an earlier version of this study (henceforth, Cruces et al.
2015). Chapter 1 of this book provides the deﬁnition for each of the indicators
we analyse here, while Cruces et al. (2015) includes details on deﬁnitions and
classiﬁcation systems used by Uruguay’s household surveys, and on compar-
ability issues of these surveys over time. For consistency, the analysis in this
chapter focuses on the same set of urban areas for the entire period studied,
although we also make remarks on the statistics at the national level for the
period 2006–12.
21.2 Economic Growth
Uruguay experienced rapid economic growth from 2000 to 2012. While
economic performance slowed down following the international crisis of
2008, overall GDP and GDP per capita continued to grow in 2009.
(Cruces et al. 2015: ﬁgures 1 and 2)
From 2000 to 2012, Uruguay experienced rapid economic growth by Latin
American standards. GDP per capita increased by 44.7 per cent, while the
average for the region’s eighteen countries during the period was 36.2 per cent.
GDP (measured in PPP dollars of 2005) grew by 48.0 per cent, and GDP per
employed person rose by 4.5 per cent. Annual GDP per capita grew in real
terms by an average of 2.8 per cent, ranging from a low of7.8 per cent in 2002
to a high of 8.6 per cent in 2010 (Table 21.1).
At the beginning of the 2000s, from 2000 to 2002, Uruguay was affected by
the devaluation of the Brazilian Real in 1999, which led to a loss of competi-
tiveness, and by the collapse of the Argentine economy at the end of 2001,
which led to a ﬁnancial crisis. Uruguay was extremely vulnerable to shocks
stemming from Argentina and Brazil due to the strong commercial and ﬁnan-
cial linkages between the countries (Sosa 2010). The crisis disrupted the
Uruguayan banking system and caused the collapse of its currency, generating
a credit crunch and a steep contraction of GDP (IMF 2003; Hausmann et al.
2005). From 2000 to 2002, average annual GDP growth was 4.5 per cent and
the rate of GDP per capita annual growth was, on average, 4.7 per cent.
A package of ﬁscal, monetary, and banking reform measures helped the
country to stabilize and to start a trend of positive growth. The external position
of the country improved considerably, the peso stabilized, the inﬂation was
brought under control, capital ﬂight was stopped and partially reversed, and
1 See Cruces et al. (2015: table 1) for details on the size of Uruguay household surveys.
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Table 21.1 Uruguay: Evolution of growth and labour market indicators over the 2000s
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Growth
Indicators
GDP per capita 9,551 9,168 8,457 8,530 8,962 9,626 10,006 10,634 11,361 11,577 12,569 13,344 13,821
GDP per capita growth
rate
2.28 4.02 7.75 0.87 5.05 7.42 3.94 6.28 6.84 1.89 8.57 6.17 3.58
Employment
and Earnings
Indicators
Employment-to-
population ratio
52.59 52.30 49.99 49.26 51.76 52.37 54.79 57.44 58.51 59.36 59.35 61.55 60.74
Unemployment rate 13.54 15.24 16.91 16.81 13.05 12.12 11.31 9.55 8.00 7.63 7.04 6.60 6.35
Share of low-earnings
occupations
53.17 53.78 52.63 53.76 52.59 52.60 53.95 53.24 52.88 51.62 52.41 50.25 . . .
Share of mid-earnings
occupations
24.74 24.37 25.00 23.65 24.23 24.38 24.38 24.05 24.52 24.66 24.69 25.00 . . .
Share of high-earnings
occupations
22.09 21.86 22.37 22.59 23.19 23.03 21.67 22.71 22.60 23.72 22.90 24.75 . . .
Share of employers 3.71 3.94 3.70 3.42 3.53 3.94 4.32 4.43 4.62 4.48 4.52 4.59 4.25
Share of wage/salaried
employees
72.86 71.04 69.98 70.15 70.27 71.22 71.28 71.16 71.48 71.84 72.46 73.94 74.24
Share of self-employed
workers
21.99 23.65 24.81 25.07 24.65 23.53 22.97 23.00 22.60 22.31 21.95 20.61 20.59
Share of unpaid family
workers
1.44 1.37 1.50 1.35 1.56 1.31 1.43 1.41 1.29 1.37 1.06 0.87 0.92
Share of workers in
low-earnings sectors
26.48 26.10 24.68 24.93 23.60 24.05 24.30 24.70 24.27 23.60 24.12 23.38 21.70
Share of workers in
mid-earnings sectors
50.28 49.67 50.33 50.55 52.61 52.44 53.49 53.53 53.78 54.00 54.12 53.68 50.25
(continued)
Table 21.1 Continued
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Share of workers in
high-earnings
sectors
23.24 24.23 24.99 24.52 23.79 23.51 22.21 21.76 21.95 22.39 21.76 22.94 23.55
Share of low-educated
workers
43.99 39.78 38.87 38.72 37.10 36.85 39.21 39.10 41.22 39.07 40.25 35.39 34.67
Share of medium-
educated workers
40.61 41.84 41.62 41.75 42.36 42.22 42.12 41.98 40.81 42.07 42.06 43.61 45.76
Share of high-
educated workers
15.40 18.38 19.52 19.52 20.54 20.93 18.67 18.92 17.97 18.86 17.69 21.00 19.57
Share of workers
registered with SS
. . . 64.14 62.88 60.56 59.39 61.32 64.78 65.24 66.53 67.90 68.37 72.37 73.83
Mean labour earnings 723.6 654.0 582.6 483.8 483.5 486.7 524.2 554.5 591.9 641.2 627.0 668.2 661.3
Poverty and
Inequality
Indicators
Ofﬁcial extreme
poverty rate
2.4 3.2 3.8 4.9 7.0 6.3 4.6 4.8 3.9 3.6 2.9 2.8 2.8
Ofﬁcial moderate
poverty rate
21.4 25.8 30.4 39.1 40.0 37.5 35.4 35.7 33.1 31.8 30.9 26.9 24.9
Poverty rate 2.5
dollars-a-day
3.59 4.78 6.41 7.73 9.78 8.90 7.25 6.25 4.18 3.51 2.84 2.57 2.61
Poverty rate 4
dollars-a-day
11.22 13.92 17.78 22.76 23.72 21.60 20.76 18.94 14.17 12.00 11.28 8.85 8.32
GINI of household per
capita income
0.444 0.462 0.466 0.462 0.471 0.459 0.473 0.478 0.465 0.464 0.454 0.436 0.415
GINI of labour
earnings
0.462 0.485 0.495 0.500 0.505 0.499 0.504 0.507 0.502 0.495 0.479 0.450 0.420
Note: The shaded ﬁgures of labour market indicators represent statistical signiﬁcant improvements at 5 per cent between the initial and ﬁnal years for all the employment and earnings indicators and
poverty and inequality indicators. The only exceptions are the share of mid-earnings occupations, share of mid-earnings sectors, and share of medium-educated workers for which we did not assign
welfare evaluation criteria.
Source: SEDLAC (CEDLAS and World Bank 2014) and World Development Indicators (World Bank 2014).
bank credit to the private sector began to recover (IMF 2005). From 2003 to
2008, average annual GDP andGDP per capita growth rates were 5.2 and 5.1 per
cent respectively. While the international crisis of 2008 led to a slowdown in
the Uruguayan economy, it continued to grow throughout the global recession.
The Uruguayan economy was better prepared to face the international crisis of
2008 than it was at the beginning of the decade when it faced the Brazilian and
Argentine crises. The strengths stemmed from a well-regulated banking system,
a reduced debt-to-GDP ratio, and a stabilized macroeconomic scenario (IMF
2010). The rate ofGDP growth dropped from7.2 per cent in 2008 to 2.3 per cent
in 2009, andGDP per capita growth rate diminished from6.8 per cent to 1.9 per
cent. The relatively mild impact of the crisis was concentrated in some export-
oriented sectors; the agriculture, livestock, and energy sectors also suffered as a
result of a severe drought. By 2010, though, GDP and GDP per capita growth
rates had surpassed their pre-crisis levels.
All of the precedingmacroeconomic data are for the Uruguayan economy as
a whole. The following labour market and income distribution data focus on
urban Uruguay. Some remarks are presented regarding the statistics at the
national level for the period 2006–12.
21.3 Unemployment
The 2000–12periodwitnessed a signiﬁcant drop in the aggregate unemploy-
ment rate and in the unemployment rate for all population groups. Within
this period, the unemployment rate increased in the early years of the period
and exhibited a steady downward trend in the later years. The international
crisis of 2008 led to a slowdown in the downward trend in the unemploy-
ment rate. (Cruces et al. 2015: ﬁgure 3)
The urban unemployment rate (measured as the ratio of unemployment to
labour force) dropped from 13.5 per cent in 2000 (158,585 unemployed
persons) to 6.4 per cent in 2012 (98,719 unemployed persons) (Table 21.1).
Initially, the unemployment rate increased in conjunction with a fall in GDP
from2000 to 2002, growing from13.5 to 16.9 per cent (30,625 newunemployed
persons). The downward trend in the unemployment rate began in 2003 and
continued through the end of the period studied. The international crisis of
2008 did not impact adversely on the unemployment rate, but led to a drop in
the pace of reduction. Between 2003 and 2008 the unemployment rate fell by
1.5 percentage points a year, while from 2009 to 2012 the reduction was only
0.4 percentage points annually. The evolution of the national unemployment
rate from 2006 to 2012 exhibits the same pattern as the urban unemployment
rate with a slightly lower level.
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Between 2000 and 2012, the unemployment rate decreased for all popula-
tion groups. All population groups exhibited the same trend as the aggregate
unemployment rate with an increase at the beginning of the decade, from
2000 to 2002, and a reduction afterwards.
The international crisis of 2008 led to a slowdown in the downward
trend in the aggregate unemployment rate and in the rate for all population
groups.
21.4 Job Mix
The composition of employment by occupational group improved from
2000 to 2011 (the last year for which we can construct the classiﬁcation of
occupations described previously) as workers moved from service and sales,
and craft and trade occupations to better paying occupations such as man-
agement, professional and technical jobs. All demographic groups—youth
and adult workers, men, and women—beneﬁted from this improvement.
This trend was not affected by the international crisis of 2008.
(Cruces et al. 2015: ﬁgure 4)
The share of the following occupations shrank from 2000 to 2011: craft and
trade occupations (drop of 3.5 percentage points); service and sales occupations
(drop of 0.7 percentage points); armed forces (drop of 0.7 percentage points);
and agriculture, forestry, and ﬁshery occupations (drop of 0.5 percentage
points). The share of the following occupations grew: professional jobs (increase
of 1.4 percentage points); elementary occupations (increase of 1.3 percentage
points); clerical positions (increase of 1.1 percentage points); and technical
occupations (increase of 0.9 percentage points). The share of the other occupa-
tional groups remained largely unchanged. These changes in the compositionof
employmentbyoccupational group canbe interpreted as an improvement since
the share of low-earning occupations (elementary, service and sales, and craft
and trade occupations) diminished by 2.9 percentage points between 2000 and
2011, while the share of high-earning occupations (management, professional,
and technician jobs) grew by 2.7 percentage points during the same period
(Table 21.1). The structure of employment byoccupational group at thenational
level also improved from 2006 to 2011.When the rural sector is included in the
statistics, the share of mid-earning occupations in total employment is larger
compared to urban ﬁgures, the share of high-earning occupations is lower, and
the share of low-earning occupations is essentially the same as in urban areas.
The larger share ofmid-earningoccupations in total employment at thenational
level compared to the urban area is explained by the larger share of agriculture
and forestry and ﬁshery occupations once the rural area is considered.
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The improvements in occupational composition between 2000 and 2011
were observed for young and adult workers, men, and women.
The international crisis of 2008 did not have an adverse effect on the
improvement in the composition of employment by occupational group.
Between 2008 and 2009, the share of low-earning occupations fell in the
aggregate and for all population groups, while the share of high-earning occu-
pations increased.
The employment structure by occupational position improved between 2000 and
2012 as the share of paid employees and employers in total employment increased
and the share of self-employed and unpaid workers decreased.Within the period, the
structure of employment by occupational position deteriorated from 2000 to 2003
and then improved steadily. While this trend towards improvement in employment
structure by occupational position beneﬁted young and adult workers, and men, the
employment structure for women remained largely unchanged. The international
crisis of 2008 did not have an adverse effect on the improvement in the structure of
employment by occupational position. (Cruces et al. 2015: ﬁgure 5)
Between 2000 and 2012, the share of paid employees in total employment—
the largest category in urban Uruguay—grew from 72.9 to 74.2 per cent. The
share of employers also increased from 3.7 to 4.3 per cent. The shares of the
self-employed and of unpaid workers, on the other hand, fell from 22.0 to 20.6
per cent and from 1.4 to 0.9 per cent respectively (Table 21.1). These changes
can be characterized as an improvement in the employment structure by
occupational position insofar as the share of low-earning categories (self-
employment and unpaid employment) dropped by a total of 1.9 percentage
points and the share of high-earning categories (paid employees and employ-
ers) increased correspondingly. Within the period, the employment structure
by occupational position deteriorated from 2000 to 2003 through an increase
in the share of self-employed workers and a reduction in the share of
wage/salaried employees, and improved steadily in the following years. The
worsening at the beginning of the decade is in keeping with the increase in the
unemployment rate, as economic necessity may compel workers to look for
free-entry self-employment activities. The structure of employment by occu-
pational position at the national level also exhibited an improvement from
2006 to 2012. When the rural sector is included in the statistics, the share of
low-earning positions in total employment is larger compared to urban ﬁg-
ures, due to the larger share of both self-employed and unpaid workers.
The employment structure by occupational position improved between
2000 and 2012 for young and adult workers, and for men, while for women
the structure remained largely unchanged. All population groups suffered
a worsening in the employment composition by occupational positions at
the beginning of the period, from 2000 to 2003, and an improvement in the
following years.
Uruguay
403
The international crisis of 2008 did not bring about a reversal in the
improvements that had been taking place overall and for youth, adults, and
male workers. The share of paid employees increased from 2008 and 2009,
while the shares of unpaid workers and of the self-employed diminished. The
share of employers also decreased, though the share of that occupational
position resumed growth after the crisis. When broken down by population
group, the improving trend in the structure of employment by occupational
position was not interrupted in 2009 for young or adult workers, or for men.
Likewise, the employment structure by occupational position was largely
unchanged for women through 2009.
The employment composition by economic sector improved over the course of
the period studied. While all population groups beneﬁted from the improving
trend, the improvement was larger for young workers than for adults and for
women than for men. The international crisis of 2008 did not interrupt the
pattern of improvement in the employment composition by economic sector.
(Cruces et al. 2015: ﬁgure 6)
The period 2000–12witnessed a drop from 26.5 per cent to 21.7 per cent in the
share of workers in low-earning sectors (domestic service, construction, and
low-tech industry). During the same period, there was a slight increase (from
23.2 per cent to 23.6 per cent) in the share of high-earning sectors (public
administration, skilled services, and utilities and transportation) along with a
larger increase (from 50.3 per cent to 54.8 per cent) in the share of mid-earning
sectors (commerce, primary activities, high-tech industry, and education and
health) (Table 21.1). The structure of employment by economic sector at the
national level also improved from 2006 to 2012. When the rural sector is
included in the statistics, the share of mid-earning sectors in total employ-
ment is larger compared to urban ﬁgures, while the shares of low- and high-
earning sectors are lower. The larger share of mid-earning sectors in total
employment at the national level compared to the urban level is explained
by the larger share of the primary activity sector, which increases when the
rural area is considered in the statistics.
Employment composition by economic sector in urban Uruguay improved
between 2000 and 2012 for men, women, and for young and adult workers,
though the improvement was mild in the case of adults.
The international crisis of 2008 did not reverse the downward trend in
the share of employment in low-earning sectors at the aggregate level
and for any population group, nor did it reverse the upward trend in the
share of employment in high-earning sectors at the aggregate level and for
young workers, men, and women. Indeed, there was a slight increase in
the share of employment in high-earning sectors for adult workers during
the crisis.
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The educational level of the urbanUruguayan employed population improved from
2000 to 2012 for the entire population and for all population groups. Within this
period, there was an increase in the share of employed workers with high education
levels and a reduction in the share of employed persons with low levels of education
from 2000 to 2005. In the mid years of the period, between 2005 and 2010, a
worsening in the educational level of the employed population took place, and
a new improvement closed the period. During the international crisis of 2008, the
share of employed persons with high educational levels continued with the down-
ward trend overall and for all population groups. (Cruces et al. 2015: ﬁgure 7)
The share of employed persons with low educational levels (eight years of
schooling or less) dropped from 44.0 per cent in 2000 to 34.7 per cent in 2012,
while the share of employed persons with medium and high educational
levels (nine to thirteen years of schooling and over thirteen years of schooling)
grew from 40.6 per cent in 2000 to 45.8 per cent in 2012 and from 15.4 per
cent to 19.6 per cent respectively (Table 21.1).2 We interpret this result as an
improvement for the employed population as the level of education is an
important predictor of labour earnings. Consequently, the changes in the
employment structure by educational level implied an increase in the share
of workers that tend to have high levels of earnings and a decline in the
share of workers with low earnings levels.3
The evolution of the shares of employed workers with low and high educa-
tional levels was not steady over the period. From 2000 to 2005, the share of
employed persons with low educational levels decreased, while the share of
employed workers with high levels of education increased. Between 2005 and
2010, the shares of workers with low and high educational levels grew and fell
respectively. From 2010 to 2012, the trend of the ﬁrst half of the decade
resumed and the shares of workers with low and high educational levels fell
and increased respectively. The increase in the share of employed workers
with low educational levels between 2005 and 2010, and the corresponding
decrease in the share of employed workers with high levels of education,
reﬂects the change in the structure of employment by economic sector over
this period. From 2005 to 2010, the share of the primary sector exhibited the
largest increase among all economic sectors due to the boom in soybean
production. As the primary activity sector employs mainly workers with
low educational levels, the change in the structure of employment in
2 The most frequent value of years of education for employed workers in urban and national
Uruguay was six over the entire period (around 19.6 per cent of urban employed workers and 20.6
per cent of workers at the national level had six years of education).
3 The improvement in the employment structure by educational level is related to changes in
the relative demand and supply of workers with high educational levels with corresponding
implications for the wage gap by educational group and the unemployment rate of each
educational level. We introduce a discussion about the role of these factors in Uruguay in
section 21.5.
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the Uruguayan labour market between 2005 and 2010 can explain the
deterioration in the educational level of the employed population over the
same period.
The educational level of the employed population, considering both rural
and urban areas in Uruguay between 2006 and 2012, exhibited the same
trend as that of statistics for urban areas. However, the share of employed
workers with low levels of education is larger in national statistics compared
to urban statistics, while the shares of employed workers with medium and
high levels of education are lower at the national level compared to the
urban level.4
The educational level of the employed population improved between
2000 and 2012 for all population groups (young and adult workers, men
and women).
During the international crisis of 2008, the structure of employment by
educational level continued with the worsening trend that had started in
2005, overall and for all population groups. This trend was associated with
the increase in the share of the primary activity sector in total employment. By
2011, the share of employed workers with high educational levels surpassed
the pre-crisis value in the aggregate and for all population groups. The recov-
ery was related to the reduction in the share of the primary activity sector in
total employment due to the fall in the international prices of Uruguayan
products. However, a new decrease took place in 2012 that was compensated
for by the increase in the share of employed workers with medium levels
of education.
The share of workers registered with the social security system increased from 2001
(the earliest year with data on this indicator) to 2012 in urban Uruguay. Within
this period, the registration rate fell between 2001 and 2004 but increased in the
following years. This upward trend, starting in 2004, held for all population
groups; it was not interrupted by the international crisis of 2008.
(Cruces et al. 2015: ﬁgure 8)
The pension system in Uruguay is composed of a contributory scheme and a
non-contributory scheme. The contributory scheme comprises two regimes.
First, a mandatory pay-as-you-go regime, which is funded through payroll
taxes, other taxes, and government contributions. Second, an individual
capitalization regime, which is also compulsory but only for workers whose
earnings are above a certain threshold. The non-contributory scheme provides
economic support to all persons who lack amonetary income andwho cannot
4 The most frequent value of years of education for employed workers in urban and national
Uruguay was six over the entire period (around 19.6 per cent of urban employed workers and 20.6
per cent of workers at the national level had six years of education).
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support themselves due to old age or disability. The health system also com-
prises two regimes. First, the public health regime which provides services
through the Administración de Servicios de Salud del Estado and is funded by
both budgetary allocations and the contributions of people registered with the
social security administration. Second, the private regime which is composed
mostly of mutuals (mutual societies—similar to Health Maintenance Organai-
zations in the United States), which are funded by the monthly fees paid by
afﬁliated members and transfers received through the social security system.
Insured members under the public regime may opt between the services
provided by the mutuals or the Administración de Servicios de Salud del
Estado (Filgueira and Hernandez 2012).
The percentage of workers registered with the contributory scheme of the
social security system increased by 9.7 percentage points from 2001 to 2012
(Table 21.1). Interestingly, both the number of registered and unregistered
workers increased over the period. The number of workers registered with
the social security system grew by 446,005 while the number of unregistered
workers increased by 29,317. From 2001 to 2004, the period of the economic
downturn, the share of registered workers fell from 64.1 to 59.4 per cent. From
2004 to 2012, a period that included the Great Recession, that share grew
steadily, reaching 73.8 per cent in 2012. The share of workers registered with
the social security system at the national level between 2006 and 2012 exhib-
ited the same level and trend as urban ﬁgures. In 2005, the government of
Uruguay started to implement a group of economic and social protection
policies that can explain the increase in the percentage of registered workers
(Cruces and Bergolo 2013; ILO 2014). These policies included the reactivation
of collective bargaining, a tax reform that included increases in the social
security contributions for some economic sectors and reductions for others,
and the revision of social protection programmes which led to the extension
of health insurance coverage to dependent children and spouses of registered
workers. Starting in 2005 there was also a greater control exerted by the Banco
de Previsión Social (the social security administration) and Dirección General
Impositiva (the tax authority) on ﬁrms to detect situations of non-compliance
with the registration of workers and the payment of social security contribu-
tions (Mazzuchi 2009).
The share of workers registered with the social security system increased
over the period for young and adult workers, men andwomen. The percentage
of workers registered decreased from 2001 to 2004 for all population groups,
and grew in the following years.
The international crisis of 2008 did not affect the upward trend in the
percentage of registered workers. Between 2008 and 2009, the share of workers
registered with the social security system increased overall and for all popula-
tion groups.
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21.5 Labour Earnings
Three years of falling labour earnings were followed by ten years of rising
labour earnings, but the increases were not large enough in 2012 to drive
labour earnings back up to where they had started (2000). The pattern of
falling labour earnings between 2000 and 2003 and rising labour earnings
between 2003 and 2012 held for all population groups, but while men,
women, and adults had lower labour earnings in 2012 compared to 2000,
young employed workers enjoyed a rise. Workers in high-earning categor-
ies experienced a larger drop in labour earnings than did workers in low-
earning categories. Earnings were not affected adversely by the 2008 crisis.
(Cruces et al. 2015: ﬁgure 9)
Averagemonthly earnings in urban Uruguay, expressed in PPP dollars of 2005,
fell by 8.6 per cent, from US$724 in 2000 to US$661 in 2012 (Table 21.1).
Labour earnings fell at the beginning of the period (from 2000 and 2004) and
rose in most of the following years.5 The recovery of labour earnings in 2005
was associated with the reactivation of collective bargaining at the sector level,
which meant an increase in real wages (Mazzuchi 2009). The upward trend
was interrupted in 2010 when labour earnings fell by 1.2 per cent and in 2012
when they dropped by 1.0 per cent. Average monthly earnings at the national
level exhibited the same level and trend as urbanmonthly earnings from 2006
to 2012.
Labour earnings of adult, male, and female employed workers decreased
between 2000 and 2012, while labour earnings of young employed persons
increased. The pattern of falling labour earnings at the beginning of the period
(2000–3) and rising labour earnings in the following years (2003–12) held for
all population groups.
Mean earnings fell between 2000 and 2012 for workers in both low- andhigh-
earning categories, but earnings ofworkers employed in high-earning categories
dropped more than labour incomes of workers employed in low-earning cat-
egories. Employed workers from all employment categories suffered an earnings
reduction from 2000 to 2003–4 and a steady earnings increase from 2004–5 to
2012. When broken down by occupational groups, labour earnings of workers
in low-earning occupational groups (elementary occupations, services and sales
jobs, and craft and trade occupations) decreased by less (in percentage terms)
than earnings of employedworkers in high-earning occupations (management,
professional, and technical jobs). A breakdown of the aggregate statistics on
5 Ofﬁcial statistics show a recovery of real labour earnings in 2012 compared to the level they
had in 2000. This difference with respect to our statistics can be explained by the imputation of the
health insurance as part of labour incomes by the statistical institute of Uruguay. We do not follow
the imputation procedure to favour the comparability of statistics across countries.
Individual Country Analysis
408
labour earnings by occupational position reveals that labour earnings of the
self-employed (low-earning positions) dropped by less (in percentage terms)
than labour incomes of paid employees (high-earning positions). In terms of
economic sectors, earnings of workers in low-earning sectors (domestic service,
construction, and low-tech industries) remained largely the same during the
period, while the earnings of workers in high-earning sectors (skilled services,
utilities and transportation, and public administration) dropped between 2000
and 2012. Finally, labour earnings of employed workers with high educational
levels fell by more (in percentage terms) than earnings of employed persons
with medium and low educational levels.
The evidence of falling labour earnings for all educational groups can be
interpreted in light of previous ﬁndings of improving educational levels of the
Uruguayan urban employed population and improving employment struc-
ture by economic sector and occupational group over the period. The improv-
ing employment structure by economic sector and occupational group
implied an increase in the share of sectors and occupations that are more
likely to use workers with high and medium educational levels, such as skilled
services, education and health, and professionals and technical occupations,
and a reduction in the share of sectors and occupations that employ workers
with low educational levels, such as domestic services, construction and low-
tech industry, and elementary activities, service and sales, and craft and trade
occupations. This evidence indicates that the demand for workers with high
and medium educational levels relative to those with low educational levels
increased between 2000 and 2012. On the other hand, the educational levels
of people in the labour force improved over the same period, indicating an
increase in the relative supply of workers with high and medium levels of
education (Cruces et al. 2015: table 8). It is interesting to notice that between
2007 and 2010 the share of workers with low educational levels in the labour
force increased. However, that share was always below the level of 2000. The
prediction of a supply and demand analysis is that the relative wages of
workers with high and medium levels of education relative to those with
low educational levels will rise or fall depending on which effect dominates
(increase in the relative demand versus increase in the relative supply). In the
Uruguayan labour market, the wages of workers with high and medium
educational levels relative to those with low educational levels fell over the
period, while the wages of workers with high educational levels relative to
those with medium educational levels also decreased (Cruces et al. 2015:
table 7). The adjustment process also led to a reduction in the unemployment
rate of all educational groups with a larger reduction for workers with low
levels of education (Cruces et al. 2015: table 9).
The international crisis of 2008 did not have a negative effect on the upward
trend in labour earnings that began in 2004; a trend that held true for the
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aggregate and for all demographic groups. Some occupational groups, how-
ever, were adversely affected by the 2008 crisis. Earnings of workers in agri-
cultural, forestry, and ﬁshery occupations and in armed forces dropped during
the crisis. By 2011, the labour earnings of both occupational groups had
returned to pre-crisis levels. The incomes of the other occupational categories
were not adversely affected by the international crisis of 2008.
21.6 Poverty and Inequality
All poverty indicators increased in the early years of the period studied
(from 2000 to 2004) but fell steadily in the later years (from 2004 to 2012).
Comparing 2012 with 2000, Uruguay registered more poverty for some
poverty lines, and less poverty for others. Despite the international crisis of
2008, the downward trend in poverty indicators during the second half of
the period analysed was not reversed. (Cruces et al. 2015: ﬁgure 10)
The moderate poverty rate in urban Uruguay (measured by the country’s
ofﬁcial poverty line) increased from 21.4 per cent in 2000 to 24.9 per cent in
2012; the extreme poverty rate rose from 2.4 per cent to 2.8 per cent; the
percentage of working poor (deﬁned as the proportion of persons in the popu-
lation living in poor households where at least one member works) increased
from 11.9 per cent to 15.5 per cent over the same period (Table 21.1). Consistent
with the U-shaped pattern of GDP, the ﬁgures for all these poverty indicators
increased between 2000 and 2004 while GDP was falling, and then began a
steady downward trend that was not abated by the international crisis of 2008.
Notwithstanding, by 2012 the levels had failed to fall below the ﬁgures for the
beginning of the period. When the poverty rate is analysed on the basis of the
2.5 and 4 dollars-a-day PPP international poverty lines, there is a drop in poverty
from 2000 to 2012. When the 2.5 dollars-a-day poverty line is used, the poverty
rate drops from 3.6 per cent in 2000 to 2.6 per cent in 2012; when poverty is
calculated using the 4 dollars-a-day poverty line, the drop is from11.2 per cent to
8.3 per cent over the same period. According to these indicators, the period
witnessed an increase in poverty from 2000 to 2004, followed by a downward
trend that, by 2012, had reduced poverty rates to below the 2000 level. The post-
2004 downward trend in the poverty rate and in the rate of the working poor
was not interrupted by the international crisis of 2008. Poverty indicators at the
national level exhibited the same trend as urban poverty indicators from 2006 to
2012, and a slightly lower level.
The poverty patterns reported in the last paragraph can be understood by
examining incomes from various sources as well as government programmes.
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The analysis of sources of household total income indicates that labour
income, pensions, capital income, and government transfers fell at the begin-
ning of the period, while poverty indicators increased. Labour earnings
dropped from 2000 to 2003, capital income fell from 2000 to 2006, government
transfers were lower in 2004 than in 2001 (the earliest year with data on this
source of income), and pensions fell from 2000 to 2005 (Cruces et al. 2015:
ﬁgure 11). Incomes from labour and government transfers led the recovery of
household income. Among government transfers, the PANES emergency pro-
gramme was implemented between 2005 and 2007 to reduce the effects of the
economic crisis. This programme is credited with a reduction in the extreme
poverty rate. In the absence of the programme, the extreme poverty rate would
have been 50 per cent higher in 2006 (Reuben et al. 2008). In 2008 the govern-
ment of Uruguay replaced the PANES with the Plan de Equidad. Plan de Equidad
comprises the main conditional cash transfer programme of Uruguay, the
Asignaciones Familiares. The implementation of the Plan de Equidad explains
the increase in government transfers between 2008 and 2010.
Household per capita income inequality and labour earnings inequality increased
from 2000 to 2004, then stabilized and started a downward trend in 2007 that
allowed both inequality indices to fall in 2012 below the level of 2000.
The international crisis of 2008 did not affect the downward trend in inequality
indices that was observed in the last years of the period.
(Cruces et al. 2015: ﬁgure 12)
From 2000 to 2012, the inequality of household per capita income gauged by
the Gini coefﬁcient fell from 0.444 to 0.415. The Gini coefﬁcient of household
per capita income increased between 2000 and 2004, from 0.444 to 0.471,
then stabilized around that level and began a downward trend in 2007. The
Gini coefﬁcient of labour earnings among employed workers was higher than
the Gini coefﬁcient of household per capita income over the whole period
under study. The inequality of labour earnings measured by the Gini coefﬁ-
cient also decreased between 2000 and 2012, from 0.462 to 0.420, and exhib-
ited a similar trend as the Gini coefﬁcient of household per capita income
(Table 21.1). The reduction of the inequality of labour earnings started in
2007, coinciding with the increase in the share of workers with low levels of
education in total employment that took place from 2007 to 2010. This
reduction in labour earnings inequality is also in keeping with the fact that
the reduction in earnings for high-earning categories was greater than the
reduction for low-earning categories. Consequently, the reduction in labour
earnings inequality in Uruguay occurred at the expense of income losses for all
employment categories. The Gini coefﬁcient of household per capita income
and that of labour earnings at the national level exhibited essentially the same
values as the coefﬁcients at the urban level.
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Changes in household per capita income inequality in Uruguay have been
related mainly to changes in labour income. Azevedo et al. (2013b) decom-
posed the change in the Gini coefﬁcient of household per capita income for
the period 2000–10 and found that changes in labour incomes contributed to
the inequality increase over this period (the Gini coefﬁcient of household
per capita income increased from 0.444 to 0.454 between 2000 and 2010).
On the other hand, changes in non-labour incomes, such as government
transfers, and demographic changes (e.g. the share of adults per household)
were inequality-reducing. Other studies have analysed the factors behind the
evolution of labour income inequality. Azevedo et al. (2013a) used a decom-
position approach and found that changes in the education wage premium (or
the ‘price effect’) were inequality-increasing in Uruguay between 2000 and
2010, while the distribution of the stock of education (the ‘quantity effect’)
was inequality-reducing. Gasparini et al. (2011) found a reduction in the wage
premium in urban Uruguay between 2000 and 2010 that was associated with
an increase in the relative supply and a decrease in the relative demand of
skilled workers. Finally, the reduction in labour earnings inequality from 2007
to 2012 has been associated with different policy measures implemented by
the government of Uruguay, such as the reactivation of collective bargaining
in 2005, the increase in the national minimumwage in 2005, and a tax reform
implemented in 2007 (Amarante et al. 2007; Amarante et al. 2011).
21.7 Conclusions
Overall, Uruguay experienced rapid economic growth by Latin American
standards between 2000 and 2012. Within the period, the pattern of eco-
nomic growthwas U-shaped: GDP fell during 2000–2 and grew steadily during
2003–12. Growth slowed following the international crisis of 2008, but it was
not reversed.
Most labour market indicators followed the U-shaped pattern of economic
growth over the period. The unemployment rate exhibited an increase in the
early years of the period and a downward trend in the later years, falling
overall between 2000 and 2012. The composition of employment by occupa-
tional group improved from 2000 to 2011—the last year for which we can
construct a consistent times series on occupations—as workers moved from
service and sales, and craft and trade occupations to better-paying jobs like
professional and technical positions. The employment structure by occupa-
tional position deteriorated at the beginning of the period and then improved
steadily as the share of paid employees and of employers increased and the
share of self-employed and unpaid workers decreased. The employment
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composition by economic sector improved slightly over the course of the
period studied as workers moved from low-earning sectors like domestic
service, construction, and low-tech industry, to better-paying sectors like
education and health, skilled services, and commerce. The educational level
of the Uruguayan employed population increased between 2000 and 2012,
but the evolution was not steady. There was a worsening in the structure of
employment by educational level in the mid-years of the period studied. The
share of workers registered with the social security system increased from 2001
(the ﬁrst year with data on this variable) to 2012.Within this period, there was
a reduction in the percentage of registered workers at the beginning of the
period and a steady upward trend from 2004. The only labour market indica-
tor that did not improve between 2000 and 2012 is labour earnings, which
dropped. The earnings of workers in high-earning categories dropped more
than earnings of workers in low-earning categories. Labour earnings fell in the
early years of the period and then started an upward trend, but by 2012 real
labour incomes were still below their level in 2000. Poverty rates rose and then
fell; whether they were higher or lower in 2012 than in 2000 depends on the
poverty line used. The moderate and extreme poverty rates calculated using
ofﬁcial poverty lines and the rate of working poor households increased
between 2000 and 2012. Following the pattern of GDP growth, poverty
indicators grew at the beginning of the period and then started a downward
trend. However, they were still above the value of 2000. The same pattern over
time appears for poverty indicators using international poverty lines, but
these indicators reached a lower value in 2012 than they had in 2000. The
Gini coefﬁcient of household per capita income and of labour earnings
decreased over the period. Inequality indices increased in the early years of
the period and fell in the later years.
The labour market indicators that were affected negatively by the inter-
national crisis of 2008 were the unemployment rate and the employment
structure by educational level. The downward trend in the unemployment
rate abated and a reduction in the share of employed workers with high
educational levels took place after the crisis (between 2009 and 2010) with
a recovery in 2011. The reduction in poverty and inequality underway during
the second half of the period analysed was not reversed by the international
crisis. The comparison between the effects of the international crisis of 2008
on labour market indicators and the effects generated by the crisis at the
beginning of the period, from 2000 to 2002, reveals that the crisis at
the beginning of the 2000s had a stronger negative impact on Uruguay. The
crisis of 2000–2 generated a reduction in GDP, increases in the unemploy-
ment rate, the share of workers in low-earning positions, and the share of
unregistered workers, a decrease in labour earnings, and increases in poverty
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and inequality indicators. On the other hand, during the Great Recession,
GDP continued to grow although at a slower pace, whereas the unemploy-
ment rate, the share of workers in low-earning positions, and the share of
unregistered workers fell, labour earnings increased, and poverty and inequal-
ity indicators dropped. The Uruguayan economy seemed to be better pre-
pared to face the international crisis of 2008, which was relatively severe,
than it was at the beginning of the decade when it faced the crises of Brazil
and Argentina, its main trading partners.
Youngworkers andwomen experienced worse labourmarket outcomes over
the period compared to adults andmen respectively, and while young workers
seem to bemore vulnerable to macroeconomic crises compared to adults, men
and women were similarly affected by the episodes of crises. The unemploy-
ment rate was higher for young compared to adult workers, the share of young
employed workers in low-earning occupations was larger than the share of
adult workers, the share of workers in high-earning sectors and the share
of workers registered with the social security system were lower for youth
compared to adults, and labour earnings of young workers were below those
of adults. On the other hand, the share of young workers in low-earning
occupational positions was lower compared to adults. In addition to the
generally inferior situation of young workers in the labour market compared
to adults, youth labour market indicators were more affected by the crisis at
the beginning of the 2000s and by the slowdown in the pace of reduction in
the unemployment rate during the international crisis of 2008. Disaggregat-
ing by gender, we found that men had better labour market outcomes than
women, with the exceptions of the share of workers in low-earning positions
that was larger among men and the share of workers in low-earning occupa-
tions that was similar between men and women. Both genders were similarly
affected by the crisis at the beginning of the 2000s, although the slowdown in
the reduction of the unemployment rate during the Great Recession affected
women more than men.
In summary, Uruguay was able to improve most labour market indicators
between 2000 and 2012 despite the economic crisis at the beginning of the
2000s and the international crisis of 2008. The only exceptions were labour
earnings and poverty indicators based on the ofﬁcial poverty lines.
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Venezuela
22.1 Introduction
This chapter on labour markets and growth in Venezuela since 2000 is one of
sixteen studies of Latin American countries, each of which analyses the
growth–employment–poverty nexus and aims to answer the following broad
questions: Has economic growth resulted in economic development via
improved labour market conditions in Latin America in the 2000s, and have
these improvements halted or been reversed since the Great Recession? How
do the rate and character of economic growth, changes in the various labour
market indicators, and changes in poverty relate to each other?
To answer these questions, we analyse the growth experience of Venezuela
during the 2000s and a wide set of labour market indicators that we assign to
one of two different categories: employment and earnings indicators, and
poverty and income inequality indicators. More speciﬁcally, for the group of
employment and earnings indicators we construct statistics on the following
variables: the unemployment rate; the employment structure by occupational
group, employment position, economic sector, registration of workers with
the social security system, and educational level; and mean labour earnings
and hourly wages. We present all these indicators for the employed popula-
tion as a whole and for different population groups (youth, adults, men, and
women). For the group of poverty and income inequality indicators, we
compute poverty rates using the ofﬁcial moderate and extreme poverty lines
and the international lines of 2.5 and 4 dollars a day. We also calculate the
Gini coefﬁcient of household per capita income and labour earnings.
All the statistics in this chapter are obtained using microdata from the
Encuesta de Hogares por Muestreo (EPM), for the second semester of
years 2000 to 2012. The nationwide surveys from 2000 to 2006 were pro-
cessed following a harmonization methodology and incorporated into the
SEDLAC—Socio-Economic Database for Latin America and the Caribbean
(CEDLAS and World Bank 2014), while we made our own processing of the
remaining surveys.1 The resulting labour market indicators were compiled
into a large number of tables and ﬁgures, which are available in an earlier
version of this study (henceforth, Cruces et al. 2015). Chapter 1 of this book
provides the deﬁnition for each of the indicators we analyse here, while
Cruces et al. (2015) includes details on deﬁnitions and classiﬁcation systems
used by Venezuela’s household surveys, and on comparability issues of these
surveys over time.
22.2 Economic Growth
Venezuela experienced slow economic growth during the 2000s. The
country underwent a recession at the beginning of the period and during
the international crisis of 2008. The Venezuelan economy surpassed
its pre-recession GDP level in 2012, but GDP per capita was still below
the pre-crisis level by the end of the period studied.
(Cruces et al. 2015: ﬁgures 1 and 2)
During the period 2000 to 2012, Venezuela experienced low economic growth
by Latin American standards. GDP per capita increased by 22.0 per cent, while
the average for the eighteen Latin American countries was 36.2 per cent
during the same period. GDP (measured in PPP dollars of 2005) grew by 49.7
per cent, and GDP per employed person rose by 28.4 per cent. The annual
growth rate of GDP per capita was 1.2 per cent, and it varied from a minimum
of10.5 per cent in 2002 to a maximum of 16.2 per cent in 2004 (Table 22.1).
Venezuela is an economy that depends to a great extent on oil revenues and
where GDP per capita follows themovements of oil prices. At the beginning of
the 2000s, the Venezuelan economy was affected negatively by its political
instability and a two-month strike by the state-run oil company (Alvarez and
Hanson 2009). The consequence of the strike was a rapid drop in GDP of 8.3
per cent annually from 2001 to 2003. In the following years, rising inter-
national oil prices helped the economy to recover. The government regained
control over the oil company after the two-month strike. The implementation
of changes in the oil revenues’ distribution policy along with changes in
taxation allowed the government to obtain a larger amount of oil revenues and
to implement an expansionary ﬁscal policy. Indeed, public spending was the
driving force of the economy from 2003 to 2008 (Guerra and Olivo 2009). The
expansionary ﬁscal policy was accompanied by an expansionary monetary
policy, and foreign exchange rate, and price controls. GDP and GDP per capita
growth rates averaged 10.5 and 8.6 per cent respectively between 2004 and 2008.
1 See Cruces et al. (2015: table 1) for details on the size of Venezuela household surveys.
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Table 22.1 Venezuela: Evolution of growth and labour market indicators over the 2000s
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Growth Indicators GDP per capita 9,527 9,667 8,650 7,835 9,104 9,869 10,658 11,396 11,799 11,237 10,894 11,173 11,623
GDP per capita
growth rate
1.72 1.47 10.52 9.41 16.20 8.40 7.99 6.92 3.54 4.77 3.05 2.56 4.02
Employment and
Earnings
Indicators
Employment-to-
population ratio
56.06 58.94 57.98 57.82 58.69 58.80 59.47 60.13 60.75 59.85 59.31 59.65 59.37
Unemployment rate 13.23 12.78 16.17 16.78 13.94 11.35 9.33 7.47 6.85 8.05 8.45 7.84 7.41
Share of low-earnings
occupations
. . . . . . . . . . . . 53.85 50.78 50.75 50.04 49.83 49.91 49.65 49.03 48.96
Share of mid-earnings
occupations
. . . . . . . . . . . . 30.90 31.75 32.59 33.24 33.18 32.68 32.28 32.85 31.96
Share of high-earnings
occupations
. . . . . . . . . . . . 15.25 17.47 16.66 16.71 17.00 17.41 18.07 18.12 19.08
Share of employers 5.10 6.62 5.53 5.08 4.80 4.89 4.49 4.17 4.09 3.78 3.46 3.48 3.26
Share of wage/salaried
employees
56.58 56.22 55.17 53.86 55.81 57.79 58.51 59.30 58.43 57.73 56.95 57.19 58.78
Share of self-employed
workers
36.60 34.81 36.69 38.34 37.43 35.72 35.77 35.55 36.30 37.72 39.00 38.46 37.19
Share of unpaid family
workers
1.71 2.34 2.61 2.72 1.96 1.60 1.22 0.98 1.18 0.77 0.59 0.88 0.77
(continued )
Table 22.1 Continued
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Share of workers in
low-earnings sectors
41.54 41.39 42.58 42.64 41.13 40.39 38.31 37.87 37.52 37.86 37.56 37.03 37.35
Share of workers in
mid-earnings
sectors
40.56 39.10 37.65 37.63 39.55 39.54 40.74 40.73 40.42 39.83 39.67 39.86 39.60
Share of workers in
high-earnings
sectors
17.90 19.51 19.77 19.72 19.33 20.07 20.95 21.39 22.06 22.30 22.76 23.11 23.05
Share of low-educated
workers
52.55 50.59 50.37 50.25 49.37 46.21 44.18 42.95 41.24 40.02 38.35 36.75 37.19
Share of medium-
educated workers
31.73 33.13 33.42 33.35 33.71 35.73 36.20 36.81 37.32 36.60 36.55 37.03 35.30
Share of high-
educated workers
15.72 16.28 16.21 16.40 16.92 18.06 19.63 20.24 21.44 23.38 25.10 26.22 27.51
Share of workers
registered with SS
68.56 64.82 61.48 58.83 60.16 60.33 60.85 62.86 66.03 71.13 70.83 72.99 69.12
Mean labour earnings 380.4 402.3 346.0 297.0 330.9 398.2 463.0 501.7 500.4 493.0 469.3 455.7 511.0
Poverty and
Inequality
Indicators
Ofﬁcial extreme
poverty rate
13.79 15.72 21.69 27.21 24.20 18.69 10.06 7.41 8.86 8.03 8.45 8.31 7.19
Ofﬁcial moderate
poverty rate
37.44 42.77 50.23 58.00 55.07 44.09 31.92 25.83 30.38 28.95 29.99 29.24 23.52
Poverty rate 2.5
dollars-a-day
29.83 27.49 36.96 42.56 36.30 28.25 18.09 12.74 11.92 11.92 12.13 12.42 11.05
Poverty rate
4 dollars-a-day
51.67 49.45 58.52 64.79 59.30 48.52 36.33 29.02 27.77 27.57 28.06 28.99 24.66
GINI of household
per capita income
0.440 0.464 0.473 0.460 0.453 0.474 0.433 0.415 0.401 0.400 0.384 0.388 0.402
GINI of labour
earnings
0.403 0.437 0.438 0.425 0.412 0.436 0.382 0.365 0.352 0.343 0.310 0.319 0.342
Note: The shaded ﬁgures of labour market indicators represent statistical signiﬁcant improvements at 5 per cent between the initial and ﬁnal years for all the employment and earnings indicators and poverty and
inequality indicators. The only exceptions are the share of mid-earnings occupations, share of mid-earnings sectors, and share of medium-educated workers for which we did not assign welfare evaluation criteria.
Source: SEDLAC (CEDLAS and World Bank 2014) and World Development Indicators (World Bank 2014).
The economy was affected adversely by the international crisis of 2008,
mostly through the drop in international oil prices. The reduced oil revenues
prevented the government from instrumenting countercyclical policies
(Guerra and Olivo 2009; Weisbrot and Johnston 2012). The public spending
was reduced and taxes were increased in 2009 to face the international crisis.
Moreover, the government did not increase its debt signiﬁcantly despite
having a low stock of public and external debt (Weisbrot and Johnston
2012). GDP fell by 3.2 per cent in 2009 while GDP per capita dropped by 4.8
per cent that year. The economy returned to its pre-crisis GDP level in 2012,
helped by the recovery in oil prices and the increase in public spending starting
in 2010. GDP per capita was slightly below its pre-recession value by 2012.
The share of the industry and agricultural sectors in the economy
increased, while the share of the service sector diminished between 2000
and 2010 (when data on this variable stopped becoming available). The
share of the industry sector, the largest one in the Venezuelan economy,
increased from 49.7 per cent in 2000 to 52.2 per cent in 2010 (Cruces et al.
2015: table 2). The increase was led by the growth of the oil subsector which
followed the rise in the international oil price between 2004 and 2008.
Conversely, the manufacturing subsector lost share over the period due to
price and exchange rate controls, and increases in imports driven by an
overvalued currency (Guerra and Olivo 2009). The share of the service
sector, on the other hand, diminished during the same period from 46.1
per cent in 2000 to 41.1 per cent in 2010. The agricultural sector increased
its share in the total economy from 4.2 per cent in 2000 to 5.8 per cent in
2010. Turning to the year of international crisis, 2008, industry was the
sector most affected by the turmoil. In 2009, the share of this sector declined
by 9.9 percentage points and its value added fell by 5.0 per cent due to
both the reduction in oil prices and electricity blackouts (Weisbrot and Ray
2010). The share of the industry sector in the economy and its value added
had not regained their pre-crisis levels by 2010. The agricultural and service
sectors suffered smaller changes in their value added compared to the indus-
try sector between 2008 and 2009 (an increase of 1.0 per cent and a drop of
0.9 per cent respectively).
22.3 Unemployment
The unemployment rate dropped from 2000 to 2012 following the move-
ments in the business cycle. It decreased for youths, adults, men, and
women. During the international crisis, the unemployment rate increased
but recovered its pre-crisis level by 2012. (Cruces et al. 2015: ﬁgure 3)
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The unemployment rate (measured as the ratio of unemployment to labour
force) decreased from 13.2 per cent in 2000 (1,365,752 unemployed people) to
7.4 per cent in 2012 (1,006,400 unemployed people) and moved along with the
business cycle over the period (Table 22.1). Between 2001 and 2003, the
unemployment rate increased from 12.8 per cent to 16.8 per cent while GDP
was falling. Between 2004 and 2008, the unemployment rate decreased and
reached its lowest value for the period (6.9 per cent in 2008). The international
crisis of 2008 led to an increase in the unemployment rate, which rose to 8.1 per
cent in 2009 and continued its upward trend until 2010. Both the number of
persons in the labour force and the number of employed persons increased
between2008and2009by245,548 and73,126 respectively. Theseﬁgures suggest
that the increase in the unemployment rate from 2008 to 2009 was explained
by the new entrants into the labour market that could not ﬁnd a job. In 2012
the unemployment rate returned to its 2007 level, but was still above the level
of 2008.
The unemployment rate decreased for youth, adults, men, and women
between 2000 and 2012. The international crisis hit young workers slightly
harder than adult workers, and women more than men. For all population
groups, the unemployment rate continued to rise until 2011, when it began
declining again. By 2012, the unemployment rates of adults and men had
recovered their pre-crisis levels. For youth and women, though, their
unemployment rates were above the pre-recession values.
22.4 Job Mix
The composition of employment by occupational group improved from
2004 (the earliest when we can construct the classiﬁcation of occupations
described previously) to 2012, shifting overall from low-earning occupa-
tions to better-paying occupations. All population groups beneﬁted, espe-
cially women. During the international crisis of 2008, the structure of
employment by occupational group slightly worsened for youth and
men, improved for women, and remained unchanged for adults. Youth
and men recovered the pre-crisis structure of employment by the end of
the period. (Cruces et al. 2015: ﬁgure 4)
The share of the following occupations shrank between 2004 and 2012:
services and sales occupations (drop of 2.4 percentage points); elementary
jobs (drop of 1.5 percentage points); and agricultural, forestry, and ﬁshery
occupations (drop of 1.0 percentage points). The share of the following occu-
pations grew: professionals (increase of 3.4 percentage points) and plant
and machine operators and assemblers (increase of 1.1 percentage points).
The share of the other occupational groups remained largely unchanged.
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These changes in the occupational composition of employment can be inter-
preted as an improvement since the share of low-earning occupations (elem-
entary, agricultural, forestry and ﬁshery, and services and sales occupations)
decreased by 4.9 percentage points, while the share of high-earning occupa-
tions (armed forces, management, and professionals) increased by 3.8 per-
centage points (Table 22.1). The international crisis of 2008 did not affect the
employment structure by occupational group in the aggregate.
All population groups beneﬁted from the improvement in the employment
structure by occupational group, with women beneﬁting at the fastest rate.
During the international crisis of 2008, the occupational structure of
employment slightly worsened for young workers and men, improved for
women, and remained largely unchanged for adults. Young workers resumed
the downward trend in the rate of working in low-earning occupations in
2010, while the recovery for men took place in 2011.
The employment structure by occupational position remained essentially
unchanged between 2000 and 2012 for the employed population as a whole.
Adult workers and women exhibited an improvement in their structure of employ-
ment by occupational position; men suffered a worsening, while the structure of
employment remained largely unchanged for young workers. Within the period,
the employment structure by occupational position deteriorated at the beginning
of the period, improved in the following years, and worsened once again during
the international crisis of 2008. All population groups but young workers were
impacted negatively by the Great Recession and only women recovered the pre-
recession structure of employment by 2012. (Cruces et al. 2015: ﬁgure 5)
Between 2000 and 2012, the share of paid employees in total employment—
the largest category—grew from 56.6 to 58.8 per cent. The share of the self-
employed also increased but by less, from 36.6 to 37.2 per cent, whereas the
shares of employers and unpaid workers fell from 5.1 to 3.3 per cent and
from 1.7 to 0.8 per cent respectively (Table 22.1). These changes implied an
unchanged structure of employment by occupational position since the shares
of low-earning (self-employment and unpaid employment) and high-earning
categories (paid employees and employers) exhibited small changes overall
(drop and rise of 0.4 percentage points respectively). Within the period, the
employment structure by occupational position suffered a worsening in the
early years, when the country underwent a serious recession. It improved in the
following years and deteriorated once during the international crisis of 2008.
By 2012, low- and high-earning positions returned to their pre-crisis shares. In
summary, in contexts of increasing unemployment and economic necessity,
workers took up free-entry self-employment activities.
Between 2000 and 2012, the employment structure by occupational pos-
ition deteriorated for men, improved for adult workers and women, and was
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essentially unchanged for young workers. All population groups suffered a
worsening in their employment structure by occupational position at the
beginning of the period (from 2001 to 2003) that was followed by an improve-
ment. A new deterioration took place during the international crisis for all
population groups except young workers.
The international crisis of 2008 led to a deterioration in the employment
structure by occupational position for adult workers, men, and women, while
there was no change for young workers. By 2012, women reached their pre-
recession share of low-earning positions. Adult workers and men had not
reached their pre-crisis levels by 2012.
The employment composition by economic sector improved over the period
studied, overall and for all population groups (youth, adults, men, and women).
Within the period, the employment structure by economic sector deteriorated in
the early years (from 2001 to 2003), improved from 2003 to 2008, and the
improving trend stalled during the international crisis and resumed in 2010.
(Cruces et al. 2015: ﬁgure 6)
The share of the following sectors fell between 2000 and 2012: primary
activities (drop of 2.3 percentage points); high-tech industry (drop of
1.4 percentage points); commerce (drop of 1.2 percentage points); and low-
tech industry (drop of 1.1 percentage points). Workers employed in the oil
subsector are included in the primary activities sector in our classiﬁcation. The
increase in the employment share of the oil subsector in Venezuela mainly
between 2004 and 2008 was counteracted by the reduction in the employment
share of the agricultural subsector, resulting in a decline in the share of the
primary activities sector over time. The share of the following sectors grew:
public administration (increase of 2.4 percentage points); utilities and transpor-
tation (increase of 2.1 percentage points); and education and health (increase of
1.1 percentage points). The share of the other sector remained essentially
unchanged. These changes clearly reveal a growth process based on public
spending, i.e. the public administration sector exhibited the largest increase
among all sectors, along with shrinking industry and agricultural sectors which
reduced their production due to higher imports and price controls.
The employment structure by economic sector improved from 2000 to 2012
since the share of workers in low-earning sectors (domestic service, primary
activities, and commerce) declined from 41.5 per cent to 37.4 per cent and the
share of workers in high-earning sectors (skilled services, public administra-
tion, and utilities and transportation) grew over the period, from 17.9 per cent
in 2000 to 23.1 per cent in 2012 (Table 22.1). Within the period, the employ-
ment structure by economic sector suffered a worsening at the outset
(from 2001 to 2003) through an increase in the share of domestic workers
(low-earning occupations) and a reduction in the share of industry sectors
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(mid-earning sectors), and improved in the following years (from 2003 to
2008). The improving trend stalled during the international crisis but resumed
in the post-crisis period (from 2010 to 2012).
The improvement in the composition of employment by economic sector
during the period took place for all population groups—that is, young and
adult workers, men, and women. Within the period, all population groups
suffered an initial worsening in their employment structure by economic sector
(from 2001 to 2003) through an increase in the share of low-earning sectors in
total employment and a decrease in the share of high-earning sectors (young
workers and women), or through a larger increase in the share of low-earning
sectors compared to the increase in the share of high-earning sectors (adult
workers and men). An improvement took place in the following years up to
2008. The employment structure remained essentially unchanged during the
international crisis of 2008 for adult workers, men, and women, while there
was a slight worsening for young workers. The improving trend resumed in
2010 for adult workers, men, and women. For young workers, the worsening
trend continued up to 2012.
The educational level of the employed population improved over the period
overall and for all population groups, and especially among young workers. The
economic crisis did not have an effect on this trend. (Cruces et al. 2015: ﬁgure 7)
The share of employed workers with low educational levels (eight years of
schooling or less) dropped from 52.6 per cent in 2000 to 37.2 per cent in 2012,
while the share of employed workers with medium and high educational
levels (nine to thirteen years of schooling and over thirteen years of schooling)
grew from 31.7 per cent in 2000 to 35.3 per cent in 2012 and from 15.7 per cent
to 27.5 per cent respectively (Table 22.1).2 We interpret this result as an
improvement for the employed population as the level of education is an
important predictor of labour earnings. Consequently, the changes in the
employment structure by educational level implied an increase in the share
of workers that tend to have high levels of earnings and a decline in the
share of workers with low earnings levels.3
The improvement in the educational level of the employed population took
place for all population groups, and primarily among young workers.
2 The most frequent value of years of education for employed workers in Venezuela was six from
2000 to 2007 (around 21.0 per cent of employed workers had six years of education) and eleven
from 2008 to 2012 (around 22.2 per cent of employed workers had eleven years of education).
3 The improvement in the employment structure by educational level is related to changes
in the relative demand and supply of workers with high educational levels with corresponding
implications for the wage gap by educational group and the unemployment rate of each
educational level. We introduce a discussion about the role of these factors in Venezuela in
section 22.5.
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The pattern of improvement in the level of education of the employed
population in Venezuela continued even during the international crisis of
2008. This was also the case for all population groups.
The share of wage/salaried employees registered with the social security
system changed only slightly from 2000 to 2012. The registration rate fell
in the early years of this period and increased in the later years. This
pattern of change held overall and for all population groups. The inter-
national crisis of 2008 did not interrupt the upward trend that the share of
registered workers exhibited in the second half of period studied (Cruces
et al. 2015: ﬁgure 8).
Social security in Venezuela is provided by two types of institutions which
serve different segments of the population. The Instituo Venezolano de los
Seguros Sociales (IVSS) is the main provider of social security for public and
private workers in the country; the Instituto de Prevision Social de las Fuerzas
Armadas (IPSFA) provides social security for military personnel (Fernandez
Salas 2010). These institutions provide pension insurance, health insurance,
and occupational hazard insurance. Coverage is voluntary for self-employed
workers, unemployed pregnant women, and persons who were previously
covered (ISSA 2014). The Venezuelan social security system combines con-
tributory and non-contributory schemes. Under the contributory scheme,
social security beneﬁts are ﬁnanced through contributions from employees,
employers, and the government. The non-contributory scheme ( pensiones
asistenciales) covered persons who lack contributory capacity or receive an
insufﬁcient pension from the contributory scheme (Fernandez Salas 2010).
The non-contributory scheme is funded totally by the government.
The percentage of wage/salaried employees registered with the contributory
scheme of the social security system changed slightly from 2000 to 2012,
when it increased from 68.6 per cent to 69.1 per cent (Table 22.1). Within
the period, the share of registered workers fell from 68.6 to 60.3 per cent
between 2000 and 2005. From 2005 to 2011, a period that included the
Great Recession, that share grew steadily and reached 73.0 per cent in 2011.
A downward trend began at the end of the period and the percentage of
registered workers was 69.1 per cent in 2012.
All population groups exhibited small changes in the share of workers
registered with the social security system, but this variable moved erratically
over the period. For all population groups, the percentage of registered wage/
salaried employees fell at the beginning of the period, then increased, and
then dropped again in 2012.
The international crisis of 2008 did not affect the upward trend in the
percentage of registered wage/salaried employees that took place in the second
half of the period analysed. Between 2008 and 2009, the share of workers
registered with the social security system increased overall and for all population
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groups. In the following years, that share stabilized at a high level and ﬁnally
fell in 2012.
22.5 Labour Earnings
Labour earnings increased from 2000 to 2012 overall and for all population
groups and employment categories. Low-earning categories had larger
percentage income gains than high-earning categories. Workers were
affected negatively by the 2008 crisis and not all of the groups recovered
the pre-crisis level of incomes by 2012. (Cruces et al. 2015: ﬁgure 9)
Average monthly earnings, expressed in dollars at 2005 PPP, increased by 34.3
per cent, going from US$380 in 2000 to US$511 in 2012 (Table 22.1).4 Labour
earnings followed the movements of GDP over the period. They decreased in
the ﬁrst years, reaching a minimum of US$297 in 2003, increased steadily
from 2003 to 2007, and then decreased up to 2011. In 2012, labour earnings
surpassed the level of 2008. Part of the increase in labour earnings over the
period can be explained by regular increases in the minimum wage which
impacted mainly on the lower tail of the wage distribution (Boada and
Mayorca 2011).
All population groups and employment categories experienced increases in
labour earnings between 2000 and 2012. Low-earning categories (low-earning
occupations, low-earning positions, and low-earning sectors) had larger per-
centage income gains than high-earning categories (high-earning occupa-
tions, high-earning positions, and high-earning sectors), while workers with
low educational levels beneﬁted the most from the increase in labour earnings
over the period studied compared to workers with medium and high levels of
education.
The evidence of larger earnings gains for workers with low and medium
educational levels compared to workers with high educational levels can be
interpreted in light of previous ﬁndings of improving employment structure
by occupational group and economic sector over the period. The improving
employment structure by occupational group and economic sector implied an
increase in the share of occupations and sectors that can be expected to use
workers with high and medium educational levels, such as professional occu-
pations, and public administration, and utilities and transportation sectors,
and a reduction in the share of occupations and sectors that employ workers
4 The domestic currency of Venezuela was changed from bolivar to bolivar fuerte in January 2008
at the rate of 1 bolivar fuerte = 1000 bolivares due to inﬂation. We considered this change in our
calculations.
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with low educational levels, such as elementary, agricultural, services and sales
occupations, and primary activity and commerce sectors. This evidence indi-
cates that the demand for workers with high and medium educational levels
relative to those with low educational levels increased between 2000 and 2012
(or from 2004 to 2012 according to our classiﬁcation of occupations). On the
other side, the educational levels of persons in the labour force improved over
the same period, indicating an increase in the relative supply of workers with
high and medium levels of education (Cruces et al. 2015: table 8). The predic-
tion of a supply and demand analysis is that the relative wages of workers with
high and medium educational levels relative to those with low educational
levels will rise or fall depending on which effect dominates (increase in the
relative demand versus increase in the relative supply). In the Venezuelan
labour market, the relative wages of workers with high and medium educa-
tional levels relative to those with low educational levels fell over the period,
and the relative wages of workers with high educational levels relative to those
with medium educational levels also decreased (Cruces et al. 2015: table 7).
The adjustment process also led to a reduction in the unemployment rate of
all educational groups with larger reductions for workers with medium and
low levels of education (Cruces et al. 2015: table 9).
The international crisis of 2008 had a negative impact on labour earnings
overall and for most population groups and employment categories. Young,
adult workers, and men suffered income reductions during the international
crisis, while women were not affected negatively. Both young and adult
workers and also men surpassed their pre-crisis levels of income by 2012.
Among occupational groups, the categories most affected by the international
crisis were management, professionals, and agriculture, forestry, and ﬁshery
workers. None of these groups regained their levels of earnings of 2008 by the
end of the period. Among occupational positions, workers in high-earning
categories suffered a reduction in labour earnings between 2008 and 2009,
and by 2012 only wage/salaried workers returned to their pre-recession
levels of income, while employers were still below that level. Workers from
low-earning occupational positions were not impacted by the Great Recession.
Among economic sectors, labour earnings of workers from the construction
sector and high and low-tech industries exhibited the largest reductions.
Workers from the construction sector had not recovered their pre-crisis level
of incomes by the end of the period studied. All of the educational groups
suffered income losses during the international crisis. Labour earnings of
workers with high levels of education exhibited a larger reduction compared
to earnings losses of workers with medium and low levels of education. High-
educated workers had not recovered the pre-crisis level of earnings by 2012,
while medium- and low-educated workers recovered the pre-crisis level of
income that year.
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22.6 Poverty and Inequality
Poverty fell over the period studied for all poverty lines used. The rate of
working poor households also exhibited a decreasing trend. The pattern
of poverty reduction over time was interrupted by the international crisis
of 2008 but poverty indices were again declining by 2012.
(Cruces et al. 2015: ﬁgure 10)
The moderate poverty rate (measured by the country’s ofﬁcial poverty line)
decreased from 37.4 per cent in 2000 to 23.5 per cent in 2012, and the extreme
poverty rate declined from 13.8 per cent to 7.2 per cent (Table 22.1). The rate
of working poor households (deﬁned as the proportion of persons in the
population living in a poor household in which at least one member works)
fell from 36.2 per cent to 15.3 per cent over the same period. The evolution of
these indicators shows a negative association with GDP: poverty increased
from the beginning of the period and up to 2003 while GDP was decreasing;
fell from 2003 to 2007 while the economy was growing steadily; rose in 2008
and stabilized in the following years when the economy of Venezuela suffered
the effects of the international crisis; and ﬁnally dropped in 2012 when
economic growth resumed. The analysis based on the 2.5 and 4 dollars-a-day
PPP international poverty lines also shows a drop in the poverty rate from
2000 to 2012 and a negative association between the poverty rate and the
growth of the economy. Starting in 2009, all of the poverty indicators stopped
falling, but in 2012 they were again declining.
The poverty patterns reported in the last paragraph can be interpreted by
examining incomes from various sources. The analysis of sources of household
total income indicates that labour incomes suffered a decline between 2001
and 2003 when all poverty indicators peaked; increased steadily from 2003 to
2007when all poverty indicators fell; stabilized by the time of the international
crisis when poverty indicators stopped decreasing; and recovered the upward
trend by the end of the period when poverty indicators declined again (Cruces
et al. 2015: ﬁgure 11). Incomes from capital followed a similar pattern over the
period. Income from pensions did not suffer amajor decline during the crisis of
2003, showed a clear upward trend between 2003 and 2006, and ﬁnally a
decline that determined a similar level of pensions at the household level in
2012 compared to 2000. Finally, incomes from government transfers exhibited
an erratic pattern at the beginning of the period studied, between 2000 and
2004, a stable level between 2005 and 2009, and an upward trend by the end of
the period. The erratic pattern in the ﬁrst years of the period can be explained
by the erratic pattern of the number of beneﬁciaries from government trans-
fers. Despite this erratic pattern, a clear ﬁnding emerges. The number of
beneﬁciaries from government transfers increased dramatically after the crisis
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of 2003. The social programmes introduced by mid-2003 (misiones) were
primarily focused on education, health, and work opportunities and were
accompanied by a monetary transfer component that allowed the beneﬁ-
ciaries to escape extreme poverty and move into moderate poverty. As a
result, the extreme poverty rate exhibited a drastic reduction between 2003
and 2007 (Viloria 2011).
Household per capita income inequality and labour earnings inequality decreased
over the period. The international crisis of 2008 did not affect the downward trend
in the inequality indices immediately, but an upward trend began in 2010.
(Cruces et al. 2015: ﬁgure 12)
Between 2000 and 2012, the Gini coefﬁcient of household per capita income
inequality fell from 0.440 to 0.402. The Gini coefﬁcient of labour earnings
among employed workers also decreased from 0.403 in 2000 to 0.342 in 2012
(Table 22.1); this reduction in labour earnings inequality is in accord with the
evidence presented in section 22.5 showing larger earning increases for low-
earning categories in comparison to high-earning categories. Disaggregating
for different years, the inequality of household per capita income and labour
earnings increased from 2000 to 2002 while GDP was decreasing, and they
decreased from 2002 to 2008 when GDP was increasing with one exception:
2005 was a growth year in which inequality increased. During the inter-
national crisis, both inequality indices decreased while GDP was also falling.
From 2010 until the end of the period studied, the Gini coefﬁcient of house-
hold per capita income and labour earnings began an upward trend.
The decreasing trend in labour earnings inequality in Venezuela has been
analysed by Gallo (2010). Through a decomposition approach, the author
found that most of the change in labour earnings inequality (measured by
the Theil index) between 1997 and 2007 remained unexplained. Among the
observable factors he used in the analysis, those with greater explanatory
power were the level of education, the occupational group, and the occupa-
tional position. This result implies that changes in labour earnings inequality
are partly explained by changes in labour earnings inequality between educa-
tional groups, between occupational groups, and between occupational
positions. Gasparini et al. (2011) analysed the period 2002–6 and found a
signiﬁcant fall in the education wage premium in Venezuela which is
explained by an increase in the relative supply of highly educated workers
(those with some college education), and a decrease in their relative demand.
Some institutional factors were also at play in the decreasing trend in labour
earnings inequality in Venezuela. Boada and Mayorca (2011) claimed that the
continuous increases in the minimumwage mainly impacted the lower tail of
the earnings distribution.
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22.7 Conclusions
By Latin American standards, Venezuela experienced slow economic growth
during the 2000s. The country underwent a recession in the early years of the
period and during the international crisis of 2008. The Venezuelan economy
returned to pre-recessionGDP level in 2012, but GDP per capita was still below
the pre-crisis level by the end of the period studied.
The evidence regarding the changes in labour market indicators shows that
most of these improved between 2000 and 2012 and moved along with the
business cycle, with a worsening at the beginning of the period (from 2001 to
2003), a following improvement, and a deterioration during the international
crisis of 2008. Speciﬁcally, the unemployment rate exhibited an increase in
the early years of the period, a downward trend in the following years, and a
new increase during the international crisis, falling overall between 2000 and
2012. The composition of the employed population by occupational group
improved from 2004 (the earliest year of that time series) to 2012, shifting
overall from low-earning occupations such as elementary, agricultural, for-
estry and ﬁshery, and services and sales occupations to better-paying occupa-
tions such as professional occupations, and did not suffer any impact from the
international crisis in the aggregate. The employment composition by eco-
nomic sector improved overall between 2000 and 2012 and exhibited a
worsening at the beginning of the period and an improving trend in the
following years which stalled during the international crisis and resumed in
the years that followed. The educational level of the employed population
improved steadily over the period. Finally, labour earnings fell in the early
years of the period, improved from 2003 to 2007, deteriorated once again
during the international crisis, and recovered the upward trend by the end of
the period, improving overall from 2000 to 2012. The only employment
and earnings indicators that did not improve over the period studied were
the employment structure by occupational position and the share of regis-
tered workers with the social security system which remained essentially
unchanged overall between 2000 and 2012. The moderate and extreme pov-
erty rates, the rate of working poor households, and the Gini coefﬁcient of
household per capita income and labour earnings all decreased over the period
following the movements of the business cycle.
Looking speciﬁcally at the international crisis of 2008, most labour market
indicators were affected negatively by the crisis. The unemployment rate
increased but then fell, recovering the pre-recession level by 2012. The
employment structure by occupational position worsened during the inter-
national crisis and only some of the population groups recovered the
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pre-recession level by 2012. The improving trend in the employment structure
by economic sector stalled during the crisis. Labour earnings were affected
negatively by the crisis and, as of 2012, earnings of some employment cat-
egories had not returned to pre-crisis levels. The international crisis led to an
interruption in the pattern of poverty reduction over time that was recovered
in 2012 and to an increase in the Gini coefﬁcient of household per capita
income and labour earnings in 2010 that continued to the end of the period.
The comparison between the effects of the international crisis of 2008 on
labour market indicators and the effects generated by the domestic crisis of
2003 reveals that the crisis at the beginning of the 2000s impacted Venezuela
more strongly. The crisis of 2003 generated a larger reduction in GDP, a larger
increase in the unemployment rate, a larger increase in the share of low-
earning positions in total employment, a decrease in the share of unregistered
workers with the social security system, and a larger decrease in labour earn-
ings compared to the Great Recession. Moreover, all poverty indicators
reached a peak during the recession of 2003, while they stabilized during the
international crisis of 2008.
Young workers and women had worse labour market outcomes over the
period compared to adults and men respectively, and while young workers
seem to be more vulnerable to macroeconomic crises compared to adults, men
were more negatively affected by the crises compared to women. The unemploy-
ment rate was higher for young compared to adult workers, the shares of young
employed workers in low-earning occupations and economic sectors were
larger than the shares of adult workers, the percentage of young workers regis-
tered with the social security system was lower when compared to adults, and
labour earnings of young workers were below those of adults. On the other
hand, the share of young workers in low-earning occupational positions was
lower compared to adults. In addition to the generally inferior situation of
young workers in the labour market compared to adults, youth labour market
indicators weremore adversely affected by the episodes of crises. Disaggregating
by gender, we found thatmen had better labourmarket outcomes thanwomen,
with the only exception being the share of workers registered with the social
security system which was larger among women. However, men were hit
hardest by both crises in most labour market indicators, with the increase in
the unemployment rate during the crisis of 2003 and during the international
crisis of 2008 being the only exceptions to this pattern.
In summary, notwithstanding Venezuela’s massive downturn from 2001 to
2003 and the international crisis of 2008, Venezuelan labour market condi-
tions were, in general, in a better state in 2012 than they were at the start of
the millennium.
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APPENDIX 1
Evolution of Labour Market Indicators over the 2000s by Country
Argentina
00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13
Unemployment rate 14.78 18.40 17.88 15.41 12.58 10.60 9.30 7.53 7.61 8.60 7.41 7.17 7.25 . . .
Share of low-earnings occupations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Share of high-earnings occupations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Share of wage/salaried employees 72.13 71.29 72.07 74.06 74.24 74.40 75.79 76.70 76.28 75.88 76.97 77.08 77.25 . . .
Share of self-employed workers 22.07 23.41 22.98 20.78 20.46 20.36 19.01 17.99 18.50 19.07 17.79 17.93 18.04 . . .
Share of unpaid family workers 1.19 0.92 0.98 1.40 1.17 1.10 1.02 0.90 0.62 0.73 0.78 0.64 0.54 . . .
Share of workers in low-earnings sectors 39.7 39.0 35.4 38.3 39.3 39.7 41.0 39.8 40.4 39.9 39.6 39.9 39.5 . . .
Share of workers in high-earnings sectors 18.3 18.5 20.8 19.5 18.4 18.5 18.4 19.0 19.2 19.9 19.9 19.6 20.5 . . .
Share of low-educated workers 37.04 36.17 35.51 34.55 33.59 32.76 31.18 29.09 28.37 27.58 26.38 26.13 24.93 . . .
Share of high-educated workers 24.18 25.89 25.24 26.07 26.90 27.80 28.46 28.52 29.33 29.98 30.83 31.49 31.13 . . .
Share of workers registered with SS 61.59 61.40 55.95 50.62 52.01 54.42 57.27 60.59 62.96 64.11 65.40 65.55 65.01 . . .
Mean labour earnings 761.7 736.0 497.8 . . . 578.4 646.1 705.8 732.6 718.5 747.4 756.8 799.0 781.0 . . .
Poverty rate 2.5 dollars-a-day 14.16 18.64 29.17 22.02 16.96 13.32 10.32 8.75 8.21 8.04 6.14 4.60 4.69 . . .
Poverty rate 4 dollars-a-day 27.46 32.86 45.54 36.44 30.96 25.80 20.62 19.54 17.26 16.31 14.07 11.55 10.84 . . .
GINI of household per capita income 0.504 0.522 0.533 0.526 0.496 0.488 0.475 0.469 0.459 0.449 0.442 0.433 0.423 . . .
GINI of labour earnings 0.459 0.476 0.498 0.481 0.463 0.459 0.440 0.434 0.416 0.412 0.403 0.400 0.388 . . .
Source: Authors’ calculations based on SEDLAC (CEDLAS and World Bank 2014).
Bolivia
00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13
Unemployment rate 5.90 6.50 5.76 5.80 . . . 7.05 6.53 6.85 4.62 4.81 . . . 4.12 3.91 . . .
Share of low-earnings occupations 61.77 63.90 63.61 60.56 . . . 59.48 56.03 57.33 58.11 55.91 . . . 56.43 56.01 . . .
Share of high-earnings occupations 4.71 6.67 6.64 5.58 . . . 7.32 9.42 9.35 7.99 8.70 . . . 11.07 11.66 . . .
Share of wage/salaried employees 33.10 34.89 33.04 37.39 . . . 36.06 36.61 39.28 38.96 41.78 . . . 39.50 40.67 . . .
Share of self-employed workers 44.74 39.52 39.43 38.99 . . . 38.13 37.48 36.04 35.58 35.36 . . . 36.53 38.34 . . .
Share of unpaid family workers 20.11 23.18 22.74 18.45 . . . 20.11 21.10 18.85 19.29 17.73 . . . 18.19 14.20 . . .
Share of workers in low-earnings sectors 62.12 65.31 63.47 60.18 . . . 59.35 55.75 56.62 57.00 54.19 . . . 55.71 55.54 . . .
Share of workers in high-earnings sectors 10.91 10.85 9.89 10.86 . . . 12.07 15.31 13.82 14.91 14.46 . . . 15.26 16.36 . . .
Share of low-educated workers 60.05 59.64 61.33 59.36 . . . 55.94 56.04 50.84 50.26 48.15 . . . 45.91 43.17 . . .
Share of high-educated workers 13.35 14.02 11.83 11.78 . . . 14.25 13.12 17.30 14.79 16.77 . . . 20.50 21.76 . . .
Share of workers registered with SS 12.29 11.85 9.66 10.47 . . . 19.83 18.73 13.65 13.03 14.89 . . . 17.44 18.06 . . .
Mean labour earnings 447.3 415.4 435.7 443.6 . . . 471.0 498.9 466.1 503.6 530.9 . . . 573.8 589.3 . . .
Poverty rate 2.5 dollars-a-day 43.25 34.72 39.70 30.50 . . . 34.81 32.00 30.29 22.84 20.64 . . . 16.19 17.05 . . .
Poverty rate 4 dollars-a-day 59.90 53.61 57.75 51.43 . . . 53.58 48.52 47.43 40.41 35.14 . . . 29.16 29.49 . . .
GINI of household per capita income 0.619 0.549 0.600 0.549 . . . 0.583 0.567 0.553 0.514 0.494 . . . 0.462 0.465 . . .
GINI of labour earnings 0.594 0.559 0.574 0.529 . . . 0.563 0.539 0.536 0.508 0.495 . . . 0.454 0.467 . . .
Source: Authors’ calculations based on SEDLAC (CEDLAS and World Bank 2014).
Brazil
00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13
Unemployment rate . . . 9.34 9.10 9.72 8.89 9.30 8.39 8.09 7.09 8.28 . . . 6.69 6.15 . . .
Share of low-earnings occupations . . . . . . 57.83 58.00 58.09 57.39 57.22 57.20 56.51 56.48 . . . 56.75 55.55 . . .
Share of high-earnings occupations . . . . . . 13.68 13.71 13.30 13.82 14.47 14.20 14.59 15.09 . . . 15.28 16.45 . . .
Share of wage/salaried employees . . . 63.00 62.90 62.93 63.66 63.65 64.36 65.51 66.39 66.87 . . . 68.44 68.89 . . .
Share of self-employed workers . . . 22.72 22.63 22.67 22.27 21.95 21.49 21.41 20.44 20.66 . . . 21.20 20.76 . . .
Share of unpaid family workers . . . 9.95 10.12 10.12 9.87 10.09 9.62 9.25 8.63 8.11 . . . 6.93 6.55 . . .
Share of workers in low-earnings sectors . . . 36.15 34.72 34.66 35.05 34.78 33.71 32.34 31.53 31.51 . . . 28.52 27.59 . . .
Share of workers in high-earnings sectors . . . 23.01 25.04 25.04 25.13 24.80 25.92 26.08 26.65 26.80 . . . 27.42 28.05 . . .
Share of low-educated workers . . . 63.79 61.96 59.97 58.56 56.83 54.69 53.05 50.72 48.93 . . . 46.38 44.95 . . .
Share of high-educated workers . . . 8.68 9.05 9.39 9.56 9.93 10.65 13.23 13.04 13.93 . . . 15.45 14.55 . . .
Share of workers registered with SS . . . 46.90 46.27 47.36 47.50 48.44 49.60 51.64 52.86 54.27 . . . 59.13 60.22 . . .
Mean labour earnings . . . 539.9 533.6 503.8 498.4 515.8 546.4 569.1 580.3 593.9 641.3 680.1 . . .
Poverty rate 2.5 dollars-a-day . . . 27.35 26.02 26.66 24.87 22.88 19.59 18.11 15.59 14.88 . . . 12.60 10.37 . . .
Poverty rate 4 dollars-a-day . . . 43.05 42.13 42.78 40.81 38.37 34.81 31.84 29.14 27.44 . . . 24.46 21.49 . . .
GINI of household per capita income . . . 0.588 0.583 0.576 0.566 0.564 0.559 0.549 0.542 0.536 . . . 0.527 0.523 . . .
GINI of labour earnings . . . 0.563 0.560 0.552 0.544 0.540 0.538 0.525 0.518 0.515 . . . 0.499 0.496 . . .
Source: Authors’ calculations based on SEDLAC (CEDLAS and World Bank 2014).
Chile
00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13
Unemployment rate 10.37 . . . . . . 9.98 . . . . . . 7.32 . . . . . . 10.22 . . . 7.73 . . . . . .
Share of low-earnings occupations 42.81 . . . . . . 41.64 . . . . . . 44.45 . . . . . . 45.57 . . . 44.13 . . . . . .
Share of high-earnings occupations 16.65 . . . . . . 16.17 . . . . . . 13.42 . . . . . . 13.75 . . . 17.08 . . . . . .
Share of wage/salaried employees 74.39 . . . . . . 74.28 . . . . . . 75.67 . . . . . . 76.28 . . . 77.42 . . . . . .
Share of self-employed workers 20.00 . . . . . . 20.40 . . . . . . 20.34 . . . . . . 20.13 . . . 20.29 . . . . . .
Share of unpaid family workers 1.48 . . . . . . 1.45 . . . . . . 0.91 . . . . . . 0.47 . . . 0.40 . . . . . .
Share of workers in low-earnings sectors 35.15 . . . . . . 35.15 . . . . . . 34.93 . . . . . . 34.78 . . . 36.17 . . . . . .
Share of workers in high-earnings sectors 25.25 . . . . . . 25.42 . . . . . . 25.30 . . . . . . 28.37 . . . 27.35 . . . . . .
Share of low-educated workers 31.29 . . . . . . 28.02 . . . . . . 27.01 . . . . . . 24.47 . . . 23.55 . . . . . .
Share of high-educated workers 20.69 . . . . . . 21.99 . . . . . . 22.03 . . . . . . 24.40 . . . 24.12 . . . . . .
Share of workers registered with SS 62.77 . . . . . . 63.65 . . . . . . 66.66 . . . . . . 66.03 . . . 68.76 . . . . . .
Mean labour earnings 702.6 . . . . . . 686.6 . . . . . . 685.0 . . . . . . 780.0 756.8 . . . . . .
Poverty rate 2.5 dollars-a-day 8.89 . . . . . . 7.64 . . . . . . 5.12 . . . . . . 4.09 . . . 2.88 . . . . . .
Poverty rate 4 dollars-a-day 22.99 . . . . . . 20.58 . . . . . . 15.62 . . . . . . 11.56 . . . 9.88 . . . . . .
GINI of household per capita income 0.552 . . . . . . 0.547 . . . . . . 0.517 . . . . . . 0.519 . . . 0.508 . . . . . .
GINI of labour earnings 0.560 . . . . . . 0.546 . . . . . . 0.532 . . . . . . 0.522 . . . 0.510 . . . . . .
Source: Authors’ calculations based on SEDLAC (CEDLAS and World Bank 2014).
Colombia
00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13
Unemployment rate . . . 13.58 14.33 13.57 12.06 11.08 . . . . . . 10.88 11.63 10.86 9.92 9.78 9.00
Share of low-earnings occupations . . . 46.15 45.34 46.00 45.20 45.36 . . . . . . 39.40 42.64 42.42 41.72 41.47 41.02
Share of high-earnings occupations . . . 10.50 11.49 11.37 11.74 12.16 . . . . . . 12.62 11.36 11.95 12.41 12.73 13.62
Share of wage/salaried employees . . . 50.00 50.77 49.58 49.35 52.00 . . . . . . 49.06 48.50 47.36 47.07 47.28 48.25
Share of self-employed workers . . . 40.89 40.15 40.54 40.94 38.48 . . . . . . 42.55 42.60 43.07 43.74 43.33 42.79
Share of unpaid family workers . . . 4.70 4.47 5.30 4.55 4.22 . . . . . . 3.72 3.91 4.56 4.16 4.44 4.37
Share of workers in low-earnings sectors . . . 54.03 52.79 52.18 50.58 51.94 . . . . . . 48.08 49.01 49.07 48.40 48.45 48.39
Share of workers in high-earnings sectors . . . 21.39 21.79 22.71 22.94 22.50 . . . . . . 24.45 24.14 23.37 24.11 24.14 25.43
Share of low-educated workers . . . 56.11 54.36 54.24 52.70 50.81 . . . . . . 47.09 48.36 48.00 45.30 45.37 42.60
Share of high-educated workers . . . 12.79 13.34 13.62 14.43 15.12 . . . . . . 16.88 15.97 15.60 16.51 16.18 17.83
Share of workers registered with SS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33.22 31.87 30.92 32.00 32.61 34.60
Mean labour earnings . . . 402.0 469.3 408.1 452.6 464.9 . . . . . . 516.9 537.1 543.5 546.0 545.6 573.5
Poverty rate 2.5 dollars-a-day . . . 39.04 29.84 31.05 28.37 25.30 . . . . . . 24.45 21.92 19.56 16.97 17.50 15.16
Poverty rate 4 dollars-a-day . . . 60.33 49.55 51.96 49.41 45.24 . . . . . . 41.64 39.61 36.51 33.14 32.92 30.75
GINI of household per capita income . . . 0.565 0.574 0.543 0.560 0.550 . . . . . . 0.558 0.557 0.553 0.535 0.534 0.533
GINI of labour earnings . . . 0.517 0.551 0.510 0.530 0.519 . . . . . . 0.502 0.514 0.516 0.504 0.506 0.499
Note: Vertical lines are used to indicate when the series are not fully comparable before and after that line.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on SEDLAC (CEDLAS and World Bank 2014).
Costa Rica
00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13
Unemployment rate . . . 6.04 6.39 6.65 6.44 6.63 5.92 4.55 4.93 7.82 7.29 7.66 7.77 . . .
Share of low-earnings occupations . . . 47.48 48.26 47.86 47.17 47.51 46.58 45.98 43.95 44.27 47.46 48.15 . . . . . .
Share of high-earnings occupations . . . 23.73 23.40 24.48 24.37 24.46 24.87 25.26 27.52 27.85 26.04 26.65 . . . . . .
Share of wage/salaried employees . . . 69.06 68.53 69.58 68.84 71.56 70.85 73.17 72.95 72.77 76.11 76.00 76.09 . . .
Share of self-employed workers . . . 20.38 20.80 19.35 20.77 18.90 19.42 17.93 18.06 18.52 18.87 18.77 18.69 . . .
Share of unpaid family workers . . . 2.54 2.74 2.42 2.24 2.04 1.97 1.64 1.46 1.49 1.65 1.50 1.66 . . .
Share of workers in low-earnings sectors . . . 28.96 28.75 27.52 27.40 28.94 27.71 26.45 24.72 24.14 28.00 27.10 26.44 . . .
Share of workers in high-earnings sectors . . . 26.21 26.34 26.82 26.28 25.78 26.01 26.57 28.06 28.82 28.21 28.46 30.26 . . .
Share of low-educated workers . . . 57.32 55.40 53.23 53.27 53.38 52.25 51.06 49.08 47.55 50.03 48.80 46.53 . . .
Share of high-educated workers . . . 15.68 16.45 17.14 17.28 17.59 18.64 18.67 20.02 20.77 19.16 19.73 20.85 . . .
Share of workers registered with SS . . . 50.70 50.53 50.35 51.31 50.68 51.23 53.47 54.69 55.26 55.65 54.58 56.06 . . .
Mean labour earnings . . . 749.7 736.3 740.3 694.7 675.3 703.5 764.7 784.8 832.2 794.1 812.0 833.0 . . .
Poverty rate 2.5 dollars-a-day . . . 13.78 13.55 13.07 12.26 10.76 10.58 7.27 6.87 7.46 4.53 5.09 4.73 . . .
Poverty rate 4 dollars-a-day . . . 26.72 26.45 24.87 25.93 23.07 22.98 17.88 17.01 17.42 12.70 13.01 12.18 . . .
GINI of household per capita income . . . 0.501 0.500 0.492 0.482 0.473 0.489 0.492 0.486 0.504 0.480 0.485 0.485 . . .
GINI of labour earnings . . . 0.464 0.463 0.454 0.435 0.440 0.454 0.459 0.455 0.459 0.466 0.477 0.471 . . .
Note: Vertical lines are used to indicate when the series are not fully comparable before and after that line.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on SEDLAC (CEDLAS and World Bank 2014).
Dominican Republic
00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13
Unemployment rate 4.72 5.49 4.11 4.92 4.21 4.25 3.64 3.20 2.07 3.85 3.14 3.94 4.92 . . .
Share of low-earnings occupations 48.77 48.84 49.98 47.81 48.52 48.63 49.84 50.28 50.42 52.54 52.08 53.59 52.96 . . .
Share of high-earnings occupations 15.35 15.53 15.39 17.06 16.47 16.24 16.74 16.34 17.17 17.03 16.81 15.81 16.76 . . .
Share of wage/salaried employees 56.90 54.30 53.29 54.80 55.18 52.83 53.56 54.23 52.14 51.07 50.62 51.33 53.18 . . .
Share of self-employed workers 38.98 40.26 42.16 40.27 38.57 39.99 40.04 39.14 40.20 42.56 43.36 43.79 41.87 . . .
Share of unpaid family workers 1.53 1.58 1.36 1.44 1.53 2.76 2.52 2.41 3.62 1.51 2.27 1.70 1.82 . . .
Share of workers in low-earnings sectors 31.21 28.51 29.71 27.65 28.66 27.59 27.40 27.55 26.54 25.84 25.55 25.85 25.70 . . .
Share of workers in high-earnings sectors 15.62 15.77 16.16 17.22 15.74 16.24 15.86 16.20 17.30 16.77 17.28 17.51 16.77 . . .
Share of low-educated workers 56.47 57.22 55.21 54.36 53.52 53.69 52.16 50.13 49.63 49.56 48.32 47.27 46.09 . . .
Share of high-educated workers 16.15 15.11 16.55 16.91 17.27 16.51 16.84 17.20 19.26 18.76 18.52 17.24 18.71 . . .
Share of workers registered with SS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46.66 53.89 64.07 71.43 71.75 74.72 71.18 70.89 . . .
Mean labour earnings 330.0 327.0 307.6 263.1 217.3 257.8 270.2 258.9 251.7 271.3 261.1 248.1 241.8 . . .
Poverty rate 2.5 dollars-a-day 15.71 15.84 17.61 21.83 27.77 21.08 18.66 17.90 18.44 16.40 16.14 13.97 14.55 . . .
Poverty rate 4 dollars-a-day 32.63 33.27 33.07 41.73 49.50 40.48 37.48 36.41 37.89 34.71 35.12 33.34 33.26 . . .
GINI of household per capita income 0.519 0.504 0.500 0.520 0.519 0.499 0.519 0.487 0.490 0.489 0.472 0.474 0.457 . . .
GINI of labour earnings 0.499 0.487 0.483 0.481 0.479 0.476 0.484 0.464 0.457 0.471 0.464 0.468 0.451 . . .
Note: Vertical lines are used to indicate when the series are not fully comparable before and after that line.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on SEDLAC (CEDLAS and World Bank 2014).
Ecuador
00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13
Unemployment rate . . . . . . . . . 13.19 8.50 8.37 6.72 5.48 6.43 6.86 5.22 4.50 4.40 . . .
Share of low-earnings occupations . . . . . . . . . 57.88 57.42 56.80 57.12 55.56 56.22 56.75 54.43 52.91 52.42 . . .
Share of high-earnings occupations . . . . . . . . . 7.78 8.51 8.56 8.44 8.96 8.76 8.61 9.42 8.49 9.65 . . .
Share of wage/salaried employees . . . . . . . . . 55.09 51.19 53.41 53.38 54.10 55.74 54.13 55.30 52.93 54.06 . . .
Share of self-employed workers . . . . . . . . . 31.29 30.64 30.53 28.90 29.76 29.08 30.68 31.64 34.82 33.16 . . .
Share of unpaid family workers . . . . . . . . . 8.73 11.47 9.77 11.70 10.93 9.89 10.99 9.58 8.72 9.01 . . .
Share of workers in low-earnings sectors . . . . . . . . . 42.39 42.61 42.35 41.55 40.68 39.90 40.07 38.76 38.13 37.92 . . .
Share of workers in high-earnings sectors . . . . . . . . . 11.24 10.83 11.22 10.72 10.70 12.00 11.42 12.16 12.59 13.12 . . .
Share of low-educated workers . . . . . . . . . 54.58 55.04 53.52 52.38 51.93 50.99 50.64 48.69 46.92 45.55 . . .
Share of high-educated workers . . . . . . . . . 18.39 18.81 18.73 18.63 19.21 19.56 20.14 21.38 21.31 22.24 . . .
Share of workers registered with SS . . . . . . . . . 32.97 33.53 33.15 33.30 34.04 36.00 39.95 45.24 53.30 54.67 . . .
Mean labour earnings . . . . . . . . . 457.6 511.1 502.6 529.2 575.1 546.8 515.7 559.7 559.0 589.6 . . .
Poverty rate 2.5 dollars-a-day . . . . . . . . . 31.33 28.81 25.61 20.00 19.81 19.29 18.85 15.88 13.55 12.85 . . .
Poverty rate 4 dollars-a-day . . . . . . . . . 51.44 48.03 43.60 38.34 38.11 36.75 37.11 33.43 29.54 27.76 . . .
GINI of household per capita income . . . . . . . . . 0.545 0.536 0.536 0.529 0.539 0.502 0.489 0.489 0.458 0.462 . . .
GINI of labour earnings . . . . . . . . . 0.515 0.527 0.501 0.489 0.524 0.482 0.466 0.463 0.436 0.431 . . .
Source: Authors’ calculations based on SEDLAC (CEDLAS and World Bank 2014).
Honduras
00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13
Unemployment rate . . . 4.60 4.24 5.54 5.99 4.92 3.58 3.15 3.11 3.28 4.10 4.42 3.73 . . .
Share of low-earnings occupations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61.93 62.49 63.07 61.13 62.12 61.71 59.72 61.34 . . .
Share of high-earnings occupations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12.86 13.95 14.19 15.03 13.19 12.90 13.54 13.00 . . .
Share of wage/salaried employees . . . 47.04 47.25 50.12 49.17 47.24 47.68 48.94 49.00 47.02 44.23 46.83 42.91 . . .
Share of self-employed workers . . . 33.58 33.22 32.21 29.34 31.29 31.19 29.06 28.52 31.50 32.07 30.71 34.73 . . .
Share of unpaid family workers . . . 9.00 10.20 8.61 9.58 9.91 9.25 8.25 8.81 8.94 10.48 11.34 10.77 . . .
Share of workers in low-earnings sectors . . . 46.51 52.73 48.94 49.67 48.21 50.91 48.84 47.70 48.66 49.91 49.43 50.11 . . .
Share of workers in high-earnings sectors . . . 9.83 9.59 9.35 9.83 9.68 10.19 10.22 11.01 9.84 9.94 9.40 9.59 . . .
Share of low-educated workers . . . 77.60 79.51 79.24 76.52 76.15 75.48 74.48 72.23 73.22 70.97 69.32 70.19 . . .
Share of high-educated workers . . . 5.10 5.63 4.69 5.37 5.22 5.52 5.91 6.52 5.60 6.31 6.63 6.21 . . .
Share of workers registered with SS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.19 5.00 6.34 4.40 5.63 5.42 5.21 . . .
Mean labour earnings . . . 430.1 393.2 394.6 404.1 372.1 391.6 431.2 457.9 421.2 416.3 448.4 395.0 . . .
Poverty rate 2.5 dollars-a-day . . . 37.04 47.95 47.89 46.77 47.41 42.04 36.96 34.01 31.34 33.99 37.40 42.42 . . .
Poverty rate 4 dollars-a-day . . . 55.91 64.28 64.38 63.29 64.16 58.80 56.00 52.05 50.04 53.30 56.39 61.28 . . .
GINI of household per capita income . . . 0.539 0.577 0.583 0.581 0.593 0.573 0.560 0.556 0.516 0.534 0.572 0.573 . . .
GINI of labour earnings . . . 0.541 0.545 0.558 0.556 0.575 0.546 0.553 0.554 0.526 0.543 0.582 0.580 . . .
Source: Authors’ calculations based on SEDLAC (CEDLAS and World Bank 2014).
Mexico
00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13
Unemployment rate 2.18 . . . 2.95 . . . 3.77 3.77 3.31 . . . 4.48 . . . 5.66 . . . 4.23 . . .
Share of low-earnings occupations 32.04 . . . 31.26 . . . 28.91 28.98 29.16 . . . 28.98 . . . 41.41 . . . 43.08 . . .
Share of high-earnings occupations 14.95 . . . 13.31 . . . 14.60 15.26 15.26 . . . 15.60 . . . 18.94 . . . 17.86 . . .
Share of wage/salaried employees 66.14 . . . 65.73 . . . 70.22 68.86 67.16 . . . 71.78 . . . 72.94 . . . 68.31 . . .
Share of self-employed workers 21.81 . . . 23.21 . . . 21.17 21.39 22.61 . . . 12.80 . . . 12.76 . . . 15.06 . . .
Share of unpaid family workers 7.26 . . . 7.02 . . . 5.31 5.94 6.17 . . . 5.49 . . . 4.87 . . . 5.91 . . .
Share of workers in low-earnings sectors 31.52 . . . 30.13 . . . 26.74 26.56 26.24 . . . 26.11 . . . 25.93 . . . 28.12 . . .
Share of workers in high-earnings sectors 20.67 . . . 20.74 . . . 22.74 22.65 21.92 . . . 22.91 . . . 23.43 . . . 22.24 . . .
Share of low-educated workers 49.48 . . . 48.48 . . . 45.01 44.06 42.69 . . . 40.98 . . . 37.86 . . . 37.19 . . .
Share of high-educated workers 15.03 . . . 13.38 . . . 15.27 15.43 15.39 . . . 15.38 . . . 17.48 . . . 16.56 . . .
Share of workers registered with SS 45.63 . . . 41.58 . . . 40.32 39.38 40.99 . . . 39.61 . . . 37.15 . . . 34.94 . . .
Mean labour earnings 598.6 . . . 575.4 . . . 591.7 616.5 616.6 . . . 622.0 . . . 554.6 . . . 563.9 . . .
Poverty rate 2.5 dollars-a-day 19.54 . . . 17.15 . . . 14.73 14.98 11.83 . . . 13.57 . . . 12.61 . . . 11.45 . . .
Poverty rate 4 dollars-a-day 36.97 . . . 34.10 . . . 30.82 29.89 27.03 . . . 28.54 . . . 28.16 . . . 27.65 . . .
GINI of household per capita income 0.536 . . . 0.510 . . . 0.507 0.509 0.495 . . . 0.502 . . . 0.472 . . . 0.491 . . .
GINI of labour earnings 0.520 . . . 0.515 . . . 0.497 0.507 0.505 . . . 0.508 . . . 0.474 . . . 0.512 . . .
Note: Vertical lines are used to indicate when the series are not fully comparable before and after that line.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on SEDLAC (CEDLAS and World Bank 2014).
Panama
00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13
Unemployment rate . . . 9.60 9.28 9.60 8.63 8.95 7.75 5.68 5.06 6.11 6.02 4.05 3.66 . . .
Share of low-earnings occupations . . . 52.77 53.78 53.43 52.32 53.47 53.34 52.66 51.33 50.15 49.46 49.12 49.62 . . .
Share of high-earnings occupations . . . 16.37 16.45 16.82 16.20 16.01 15.57 16.35 16.80 17.56 18.19 23.77 24.61 . . .
Share of wage/salaried employees . . . 63.20 62.45 61.71 62.63 61.77 62.99 65.33 66.06 64.67 65.89 68.00 68.06 . . .
Share of self-employed workers . . . 29.45 30.29 30.75 30.00 30.33 28.96 26.44 25.87 27.13 26.48 25.20 24.39 . . .
Share of unpaid family workers . . . 4.82 4.32 4.64 4.14 4.83 4.97 5.18 4.86 5.09 4.42 3.75 4.80 . . .
Share of workers in low-earnings sectors . . . 31.72 31.47 31.32 30.27 30.12 30.49 29.83 28.50 28.05 27.07 25.41 25.26 . . .
Share of workers in high-earnings sectors . . . 20.66 20.31 20.63 20.93 20.25 20.13 20.50 20.36 21.18 21.94 23.72 23.46 . . .
Share of low-educated workers . . . 45.35 44.70 43.17 41.60 42.02 40.56 39.27 37.15 36.98 36.59 34.38 33.52 . . .
Share of high-educated workers . . . 18.54 18.84 19.89 20.99 20.60 21.30 20.67 21.48 22.19 22.52 25.35 26.03 . . .
Share of workers registered with SS . . . . . . . . . . . . 52.82 51.96 53.28 55.40 57.42 58.07 58.71 61.85 62.34 . . .
Mean labour earnings . . . 641.7 630.7 637.7 626.7 596.3 605.5 606.2 610.3 637.1 643.7 715.8 730.5 . . .
Poverty rate 2.5 dollars-a-day . . . 28.70 25.41 24.09 22.77 22.48 22.23 15.89 14.45 12.30 13.16 11.60 11.78 . . .
Poverty rate 4 dollars-a-day . . . 43.39 40.72 39.04 38.33 37.48 37.14 28.63 26.18 25.34 23.96 21.25 20.90 . . .
GINI of household per capita income . . . 0.565 0.564 0.561 0.549 0.538 0.549 0.526 0.526 0.520 0.519 0.518 0.519 . . .
GINI of labour earnings . . . 0.501 0.535 0.528 0.521 0.515 0.515 0.491 0.480 0.484 0.472 0.475 0.481 . . .
Note: Vertical lines are used to indicate when the series are not fully comparable before and after that line.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on SEDLAC (CEDLAS and World Bank 2014).
Peru
00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13
Unemployment rate . . . . . . . . . 5.06 5.18 5.16 4.54 4.55 4.41 4.29 3.90 3.77 3.45 . . .
Share of low-earnings occupations . . . . . . . . . 61.74 63.18 63.25 61.84 59.37 57.92 55.69 54.82 53.82 52.59 . . .
Share of high-earnings occupations . . . . . . . . . 12.95 12.39 11.85 12.60 14.11 13.95 14.47 14.17 14.23 14.99 . . .
Share of wage/salaried employees . . . . . . . . . 39.78 40.96 41.33 43.22 44.58 45.09 45.31 45.22 45.26 46.64 . . .
Share of self-employed workers . . . . . . . . . 37.34 36.00 36.46 35.22 35.85 36.34 36.04 36.56 36.81 36.42 . . .
Share of unpaid family workers . . . . . . . . . 17.57 17.54 16.57 15.96 13.65 12.95 13.00 12.23 12.49 11.35 . . .
Share of workers in low-earnings sectors . . . . . . . . . 44.44 43.97 44.08 43.02 40.17 39.21 38.04 37.10 36.83 35.83 . . .
Share of workers in high-earnings sectors . . . . . . . . . 10.89 11.24 11.00 11.90 12.47 12.46 13.16 12.96 13.07 13.76 . . .
Share of low-educated workers . . . . . . . . . 45.32 44.20 44.29 42.60 39.80 39.06 38.75 38.43 37.87 36.07 . . .
Share of high-educated workers . . . . . . . . . 17.65 18.13 17.99 18.98 20.95 20.83 21.30 21.26 21.88 23.04 . . .
Share of workers registered with SS . . . . . . . . . 14.85 20.10 19.71 22.57 25.96 26.47 28.82 29.69 30.49 32.39 . . .
Mean labour earnings . . . . . . . . . 408.3 375.3 368.9 386.3 413.7 423.3 449.9 457.8 467.3 486.3 . . .
Poverty rate 2.5 dollars-a-day . . . . . . . . . 28.29 25.24 27.21 22.98 21.22 17.23 14.61 12.64 12.75 11.07 . . .
Poverty rate 4 dollars-a-day . . . . . . . . . 47.30 44.64 46.67 41.38 37.62 33.55 30.04 26.87 25.80 22.29 . . .
GINI of household per capita income . . . . . . . . . 0.538 0.487 0.493 0.491 0.496 0.469 0.462 0.449 0.457 0.453 . . .
GINI of labour earnings . . . . . . . . . 0.559 0.518 0.522 0.514 0.524 0.513 0.509 0.506 0.496 0.489 . . .
Source: Authors’ calculations based on SEDLAC (CEDLAS and World Bank 2014).
Paraguay
00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13
Unemployment rate . . . . . . . . . 5.06 5.18 5.16 4.54 4.55 4.41 4.29 3.90 3.77 3.45 . . .
Share of low-earnings occupations . . . . . . . . . 61.74 63.18 63.25 61.84 59.37 57.92 55.69 54.82 53.82 52.59 . . .
Share of high-earnings occupations . . . . . . . . . 12.95 12.39 11.85 12.60 14.11 13.95 14.47 14.17 14.23 14.99 . . .
Share of wage/salaried employees . . . . . . . . . 39.78 40.96 41.33 43.22 44.58 45.09 45.31 45.22 45.26 46.64 . . .
Share of self-employed workers . . . . . . . . . 37.34 36.00 36.46 35.22 35.85 36.34 36.04 36.56 36.81 36.42 . . .
Share of unpaid family workers . . . . . . . . . 17.57 17.54 16.57 15.96 13.65 12.95 13.00 12.23 12.49 11.35 . . .
Share of workers in low-earnings sectors . . . . . . . . . 44.44 43.97 44.08 43.02 40.17 39.21 38.04 37.10 36.83 35.83 . . .
Share of workers in high-earnings sectors . . . . . . . . . 10.89 11.24 11.00 11.90 12.47 12.46 13.16 12.96 13.07 13.76 . . .
Share of low-educated workers . . . . . . . . . 45.32 44.20 44.29 42.60 39.80 39.06 38.75 38.43 37.87 36.07 . . .
Share of high-educated workers . . . . . . . . . 17.65 18.13 17.99 18.98 20.95 20.83 21.30 21.26 21.88 23.04 . . .
Share of workers registered with SS . . . . . . . . . 14.85 20.10 19.71 22.57 25.96 26.47 28.82 29.69 30.49 32.39 . . .
Mean labour earnings . . . . . . . . . 408.3 375.3 368.9 386.3 413.7 423.3 449.9 457.8 467.3 486.3 . . .
Poverty rate 2.5 dollars-a-day . . . . . . . . . 28.29 25.24 27.21 22.98 21.22 17.23 14.61 12.64 12.75 11.07 . . .
Poverty rate 4 dollars-a-day . . . . . . . . . 47.30 44.64 46.67 41.38 37.62 33.55 30.04 26.87 25.80 22.29 . . .
GINI of household per capita income . . . . . . . . . 0.538 0.487 0.493 0.491 0.496 0.469 0.462 0.449 0.457 0.453 . . .
GINI of labour earnings . . . . . . . . . 0.559 0.518 0.522 0.514 0.524 0.513 0.509 0.506 0.496 0.489 . . .
Source: Authors’ calculations based on SEDLAC (CEDLAS and World Bank 2014).
El Salvador
00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13
Unemployment rate 6.86 7.00 6.20 6.95 6.78 7.19 6.50 6.39 5.92 7.34 7.04 6.64 6.06 . . .
Share of low-earnings occupations 57.32 56.97 55.78 54.94 55.73 55.11 55.19 54.76 55.86 55.56 55.21 55.54 55.86 . . .
Share of high-earnings occupations 12.59 12.19 12.77 12.84 11.98 13.39 12.85 12.91 12.73 12.63 11.83 11.34 11.78 . . .
Share of wage/salaried employees 57.35 58.15 56.49 59.26 60.42 57.67 61.17 59.88 58.90 56.88 57.75 57.88 57.65 . . .
Share of self-employed workers 30.58 28.78 31.10 28.86 28.65 29.93 27.12 28.15 29.22 30.82 30.42 30.22 29.48 . . .
Share of unpaid family workers 6.54 8.32 7.66 7.10 6.55 7.87 7.25 7.48 7.54 8.04 7.78 8.20 8.70 . . .
Share of workers in low-earnings sectors 38.97 38.39 36.54 34.99 35.47 35.00 34.32 33.78 35.98 36.52 35.92 36.76 36.28 . . .
Share of workers in high-earnings sectors 14.57 13.72 13.38 13.60 13.63 14.01 13.51 13.95 13.80 13.69 14.03 14.69 14.44 . . .
Share of low-educated workers 60.88 59.21 57.68 56.92 55.89 55.65 54.05 53.49 53.63 53.58 52.46 53.27 51.69 . . .
Share of high-educated workers 10.57 10.43 11.19 11.11 11.04 12.38 12.03 11.89 12.19 12.32 11.90 11.36 11.95 . . .
Share of workers registered with SS 31.07 30.81 31.17 31.28 30.32 30.41 31.50 31.33 30.72 28.65 28.03 28.03 27.65 . . .
Mean labour earnings 549.5 523.6 527.6 . . . 476.9 487.4 482.7 486.2 464.0 461.2 440.5 423.0 426.3 . . .
Poverty rate 2.5 dollars-a-day 23.78 25.32 25.16 . . . 22.34 22.29 18.68 15.16 20.21 18.72 19.75 16.57 14.68 . . .
Poverty rate 4 dollars-a-day 41.35 42.29 42.76 . . . 41.57 41.77 38.84 35.66 40.99 38.85 39.31 37.87 34.84 . . .
GINI of household per capita income 0.513 0.510 0.515 . . . 0.473 0.478 0.454 0.452 0.466 0.459 0.445 0.424 0.418 . . .
GINI of labour earnings 0.504 0.502 0.520 . . . 0.472 0.489 0.475 0.471 0.466 0.498 0.480 0.462 0.470 . . .
Source: Authors’ calculations based on SEDLAC (CEDLAS and World Bank 2014).
Uruguay
00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13
Unemployment rate 13.54 15.24 16.91 16.81 13.05 12.12 11.31 9.55 8.00 7.63 7.04 6.60 6.35 . . .
Share of low-earnings occupations 53.17 53.78 52.63 53.76 52.59 52.60 53.95 53.24 52.88 51.62 52.41 50.25 . . . . . .
Share of high-earnings occupations 22.09 21.86 22.37 22.59 23.19 23.03 21.67 22.71 22.60 23.72 22.90 24.75 . . . . . .
Share of wage/salaried employees 72.86 71.04 69.98 70.15 70.27 71.22 71.28 71.16 71.48 71.84 72.46 73.94 74.24 . . .
Share of self-employed workers 21.99 23.65 24.81 25.07 24.65 23.53 22.97 23.00 22.60 22.31 21.95 20.61 20.59 . . .
Share of unpaid family workers 1.44 1.37 1.50 1.35 1.56 1.31 1.43 1.41 1.29 1.37 1.06 0.87 0.92 . . .
Share of workers in low-earnings sectors 26.48 26.10 24.68 24.93 23.60 24.05 24.30 24.70 24.27 23.60 24.12 23.38 21.70 . . .
Share of workers in high-earnings sectors 23.24 24.23 24.99 24.52 23.79 23.51 22.21 21.76 21.95 22.39 21.76 22.94 23.55 . . .
Share of low-educated workers 43.99 39.78 38.87 38.72 37.10 36.85 39.21 39.10 41.22 39.07 40.25 35.39 34.67 . . .
Share of high-educated workers 15.40 18.38 19.52 19.52 20.54 20.93 18.67 18.92 17.97 18.86 17.69 21.00 19.57 . . .
Share of workers registered with SS . . . 64.14 62.88 60.56 59.39 61.32 64.78 65.24 66.53 67.90 68.37 72.37 73.83 . . .
Mean labour earnings 723.6 654.0 582.6 483.8 483.5 486.7 524.2 554.5 591.9 641.2 627.0 668.2 661.3 . . .
Poverty rate 2.5 dollars-a-day 3.59 4.78 6.41 7.73 9.78 8.90 7.25 6.25 4.18 3.51 2.84 2.57 2.61 . . .
Poverty rate 4 dollars-a-day 11.22 13.92 17.78 22.76 23.72 21.60 20.76 18.94 14.17 12.00 11.28 8.85 8.32 . . .
GINI of household per capita income 0.444 0.462 0.466 0.462 0.471 0.459 0.473 0.478 0.465 0.464 0.454 0.436 0.415 . . .
GINI of labour earnings 0.462 0.485 0.495 0.500 0.505 0.499 0.504 0.507 0.502 0.495 0.479 0.450 0.420 . . .
Source: Authors’ calculations based on SEDLAC (CEDLAS and World Bank 2014).
Venezuela
00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13
Unemployment rate 13.23 12.78 16.17 16.78 13.94 11.35 9.33 7.47 6.85 8.05 8.45 7.84 7.41 . . .
Share of low-earnings occupations . . . . . . . . . . . . 53.85 50.78 50.75 50.04 49.83 49.91 49.65 49.03 48.96 . . .
Share of high-earnings occupations . . . . . . . . . . . . 15.25 17.47 16.66 16.71 17.00 17.41 18.07 18.12 19.08 . . .
Share of wage/salaried employees 56.58 56.22 55.17 53.86 55.81 57.79 58.51 59.30 58.43 57.73 56.95 57.19 58.78 . . .
Share of self-employed workers 36.60 34.81 36.69 38.34 37.43 35.72 35.77 35.55 36.30 37.72 39.00 38.46 37.19 . . .
Share of unpaid family workers 1.71 2.34 2.61 2.72 1.96 1.60 1.22 0.98 1.18 0.77 0.59 0.88 0.77 . . .
Share of workers in low-earnings sectors 41.54 41.39 42.58 42.64 41.13 40.39 38.31 37.87 37.52 37.86 37.56 37.03 37.35 . . .
Share of workers in high-earnings sectors 17.90 19.51 19.77 19.72 19.33 20.07 20.95 21.39 22.06 22.30 22.76 23.11 23.05 . . .
Share of low-educated workers 52.55 50.59 50.37 50.25 49.37 46.21 44.18 42.95 41.24 40.02 38.35 36.75 37.19 . . .
Share of high-educated workers 15.72 16.28 16.21 16.40 16.92 18.06 19.63 20.24 21.44 23.38 25.10 26.22 27.51 . . .
Share of workers registered with SS 68.56 64.82 61.48 58.83 60.16 60.33 60.85 62.86 66.03 71.13 70.83 72.99 69.12 . . .
Mean labour earnings 380.4 402.3 346.0 297.0 330.9 398.2 463.0 501.7 500.4 493.0 469.3 455.7 511.0 . . .
Poverty rate 2.5 dollars-a-day 29.83 27.49 36.96 42.56 36.30 28.25 18.09 12.74 11.92 11.92 12.13 12.42 11.05 . . .
Poverty rate 4 dollars-a-day 51.67 49.45 58.52 64.79 59.30 48.52 36.33 29.02 27.77 27.57 28.06 28.99 24.66 . . .
GINI of household per capita income 0.440 0.464 0.473 0.460 0.453 0.474 0.433 0.415 0.401 0.400 0.384 0.388 0.402 . . .
GINI of labour earnings 0.403 0.437 0.438 0.425 0.412 0.436 0.382 0.365 0.352 0.343 0.310 0.319 0.342 . . .
Source: Authors’ calculations based on SEDLAC (CEDLAS and World Bank 2014).
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APPENDIX 2
Cross-Country Relationship between
Changes in Labour Market Indicators
and Changes in Macroeconomic Variables
during the 2000s
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Regression details: Y=.26+.2(.24)X
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Regression details: Y=–1.0+.83(.838)X
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Regression details: Y=–1.3+.94(1.11)X
Δ Poverty rate 4 USD-a-day. R2=.048.
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Figure A2.A Annualized change in agriculture’s percentage share of GDP
Note: The vertical axes display the annualized change in each labour market indicator. Δ denotes
changes in percentage points and %Δ denotes percentage changes. The line represents the linear
regression speciﬁed at the bottom of the ﬁgure. Robust standard error of the slope coefﬁcient
between parentheses. R-squared of the regression indicated along the title.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on SEDLAC (CEDLAS and World Bank 2014), World Develop-
ment Indicators (World Bank 2014), and CEPALSTAT (UN-ECLAC 2015).
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Regression details: Y=–.37–.01(.031)X
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Δ Shr of high-earnings occupations. R2=.086.
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Δ Shr of registered workers. R2=.123.
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Δ Shr of high-educated workers. R2=.071.
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% Δ Gini HPCI. R2=.003.
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% Δ Gini labour earnings. R2=.001.
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Regression details: Y=.59–2.12(.985)X
% Δ Mean labour earnings. R2=.249.
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Regression details: Y=–.26+.47(.183)X
Δ Unemployment rate. R2=.316.
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Regression details: Y=–1.0+.99(.447)X
Δ Poverty rate 2.5 USD-a-day. R2=.26.
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Regression details: Y=–1.3+1.41(.569)X
Δ Poverty rate 4 USD-a-day. R2=.305.
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Figure A2.B Annualized change in service’s percentage share of GDP
Note: The vertical axes display the annualized change in each labour market indicator. Δ denotes
changes in percentage points and %Δ denotes percentage changes. The line represents the linear
regression speciﬁed at the bottom of the ﬁgure. Robust standard error of the slope coefﬁcient
between parentheses. R-squared of the regression indicated along the title.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on SEDLAC (CEDLAS and World Bank 2014), World Develop-
ment Indicators (World Bank 2014), and CEPALSTAT (UN-ECLAC 2015).
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Regression details: Y=–.36+.27(.236)X
Δ Shr of low-earnings occupations. R2=.09.
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% Δ Gini HPCI. R2=.23.
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% Δ Gini labour earnings. R2=.391.
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Δ Industry as % of GDP
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Regression details: Y=.57+1.94(.791)X Regression details: Y=–.26–.31(.164)X
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Figure A2.C Annualized change in industry’s percentage share of GDP
Note: The vertical axes display the annualized change in each labour market indicator. Δ denotes
changes in percentage points and %Δ denotes percentage changes. The line represents the linear
regression speciﬁed at the bottom of the ﬁgure. Robust standard error of the slope coefﬁcient
between parentheses. R-squared of the regression indicated along the title.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on SEDLAC (CEDLAS and World Bank 2014), World Develop-
ment Indicators (World Bank 2014), and CEPALSTAT (UN-ECLAC 2015).
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Δ Industry as % of GDP
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Figure A2.D Annualized change in domestic consumption as a percentage of GDP
Note: The vertical axes display the annualized change in each labour market indicator. Δ denotes
changes in percentage points and %Δ denotes percentage changes. The line represents the linear
regression speciﬁed at the bottom of the ﬁgure. Robust standard error of the slope coefﬁcient
between parentheses. R-squared of the regression indicated along the title.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on SEDLAC (CEDLAS and World Bank 2014), World Develop-
ment Indicators (World Bank 2014), and CEPALSTAT (UN-ECLAC 2015).
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Figure A2.E Annualized change in public expenditure in education and health as a
percentage of GDP
Note: The vertical axes display the annualized change in each labour market indicator. Δ denotes
changes in percentage points and %Δ denotes percentage changes. The line represents the linear
regression speciﬁed at the bottom of the ﬁgure. Robust standard error of the slope coefﬁcient
between parentheses. R-squared of the regression indicated along the title.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on SEDLAC (CEDLAS and World Bank 2014), World Develop-
ment Indicators (World Bank 2014), and CEPALSTAT (UN-ECLAC 2015).
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Figure A2.F Annualized change in public expenditure in social security as a percentage
of GDP
Note: The vertical axes display the annualized change in each labour market indicator. Δ denotes
changes in percentage points and %Δ denotes percentage changes. The line represents the linear
regression speciﬁed at the bottom of the ﬁgure. Robust standard error of the slope coefﬁcient
between parentheses. R-squared of the regression indicated along the title.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on SEDLAC (CEDLAS and World Bank 2014), World Develop-
ment Indicators (World Bank 2014), and CEPALSTAT (UN-ECLAC 2015).
463
Appendix 2
Regression details: Y=–.7–1.07(.96)X
BO
BR
CL
CO
CR
DO
EC
SVHN
MX
PA
PY
PE
UY
VE
–1
–.5
0
.5
–.2 0 .2 .4 .6
Δ Shr of low-earnings occupations. R2=.007.
Regression details: Y=–.36–.13(.414)X
BO
BR
CL CO
CR
DO
EC
SVHN
MX
PA
PY
PE
UY
VE
0
.2
.4
.6
.8
–.2 0 .2 .4 .6
Regression details: Y=.26–.2(.31)X
Δ Shr of high-earnings occupations. R2=.032.
AR
BO
BR
CL
CO
CR
DO EC
SVHN
MX
PA
PY
PE
UY
VE
–.8
–.6
–.4
–.2
0
.2
–.2 0 .2 .4 .6
Regression details: Y=–.13+.14(.313)X
Δ Shr of unpaid workers. R2=.014.
ARBO
BR
CL CO
CR
DO
EC
SVHN MX
PA
PY
PE
UY
VE
–1
0
1
2
3
4
–.4 –.2 0 .2 .4
Regression details: Y=.87–1.3(1.36)X
Δ Shr of registered workers. R2=.061.
AR
BO BR
CL
CO
CR
DO
EC
SV
HN
MX
PA
PY
PEUY
VE
–2
–1.5
–1
–.5
0
–.2 0 .2 .4 .6
Regression details: Y=–.99–.97(.342)X
Δ Shr of low-educated workers. R2=.366.
AR
BO
BR
CL
CO
CR
DO
EC
SVHN MX
PA
PY
PE
UY
VE
0
.2
.4
.6
.8
1
–.2 0 .2 .4 .6
Regression details: Y=.43+.55(.33)X
Δ Shr of high-educated workers. R2=.166.
AR
BO
BR
CL CO
CR
DO
EC
SV
HN
MXPA
PY
PE
UY
VE
–3
–2
–1
0
1
–.2 0 .2 .4 .6
Regression details: Y=–.93–.33(1.04)X
% Δ Gini HPCI. R2=.007.
AR
BO
BR
CL
CO
CR
DO
EC
SV
HN
MXPA
PY
PE
UY
VE
–2
–1.5
–1
–.5
0
.5
–.2 0 .2 .4 .6
% Δ Gini labour earnings. R2=.081.
∆ Exp. in SS as % of GDP
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Figure A2.G Annualized change in exports as a percentage of GDP
Note: The vertical axes display the annualized change in each labour market indicator. Δ denotes
changes in percentage points and %Δ denotes percentage changes. The line represents the linear
regression speciﬁed at the bottom of the ﬁgure. Robust standard error of the slope coefﬁcient
between parentheses. R-squared of the regression indicated along the title.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on SEDLAC (CEDLAS and World Bank 2014), World Develop-
ment Indicators (World Bank 2014), and CEPALSTAT (UN-ECLAC 2015).
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Figure A2.G Continued
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Figure A2.H Annualized change in terms of trade
Note: The vertical axes display the annualized change in each labour market indicator. Δ denotes
changes in percentage points and %Δ denotes percentage changes. The line represents the linear
regression speciﬁed at the bottom of the ﬁgure. Robust standard error of the slope coefﬁcient
between parentheses. R-squared of the regression indicated along the title.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on SEDLAC (CEDLAS and World Bank 2014), World Develop-
ment Indicators (World Bank 2014), and CEPALSTAT (UN-ECLAC 2015).
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Regression details: Y=.87–1.95(1.63)X
% Δ Mean labour earnings. R2=.092.
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Regression details: Y=–.29+.11(.333)X
Δ Unemployment rate. R2=.008.
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Δ Shr of wage/sal. employees. R2=0.
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Regression details: Y=–.11+.04(.284)X
Δ Shr of self-empl. workers. R2=.002.
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Regression details: Y=–.38+.06(.351)X
Δ Shr of low-earnings sectors. R2=.002.
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Regression details: Y=.28–.28(.209)X
Δ Shr of high-earnings sectors. R2=.113.
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Regression details: Y=–1.1+1(.735)X
Δ Poverty rate 2.5 USD-a-day. R2=.117.
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Regression details: Y=–1.4+1.04(.989)X
Δ Poverty rate 4 USD-a-day. R2=.074.
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Figure A2.I Annualized change in foreign direct investment as a percentage of GDP
Note: The vertical axes display the annualized change in each labour market indicator. Δ denotes
changes in percentage points and %Δ denotes percentage changes. The line represents the linear
regression speciﬁed at the bottom of the ﬁgure. Robust standard error of the slope coefﬁcient
between parentheses. R-squared of the regression indicated along the title.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on SEDLAC (CEDLAS and World Bank 2014), World Develop-
ment Indicators (World Bank 2014), and CEPALSTAT (UN-ECLAC 2015).
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Regression details: Y=–.36–.05(.357)X
Δ Shr of low-earnings occupations. R2=.002.
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Regression details: Y=.23+.07(.271)X
Δ Shr of high-earnings occupations. R2=.005.
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Regression details: Y=–.12+.05(.238)X
Δ Shr of unpaid workers. R2=.003.
ARBO
BR
CLCO CR
DO
EC
SVHN
MX
PA
PY
PE
UY
VE
–1
0
1
2
3
4
–.4 –.2 0 .2 .4
Regression details: Y=.69+1.67(1.04)X
Δ Shr of registered workers. R2=.156.
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Regression details: Y=–1.1+.55(.29)X
Δ Shr of low-educated workers. R2=.203.
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Regression details: Y=.5–.2(.268)X
∆ Shr of high-educated workers. R2=.038.
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Regression details: Y=–1.0+1.29(.712)X
% Δ Gini HPCI. R2=.189.
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Regression details: Y=–.92+1.55(.633)X
% Δ Gini labour earnings. R2=.3.
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Regression details: Y=.01–.81(.206)X
% Δ Mean labour earnings. R2=.527.
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Regression details: Y=–.26+.03(.058)X
Δ Unemployment rate. R2=.022.
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Regression details: Y=.12–.13(.058)X
Δ Shr of wage/sal. employees. R2=.276.
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Regression details: Y=–.04+.08(.045)X
Δ Shr of self-empl. workers. R2=.192.
AR
BO BR
CL
CO
CR
DO
EC
SV
HN
MX
PA
PYPE
UYVE
–1
–.5
0
.5
–3 –2 –1 0 1 2
Regression details: Y=–.3+.09(.056)X
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Regression details: Y=.19–.07(.034)X
Δ Shr of high-earnings sectors. R2=.248.Δ Shr of low-earnings sectors. R2=.153.
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Regression details: Y=–.83+.29(.113)X
Δ Poverty rate 2.5 USD-a-day. R2=.314.
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Regression details: Y=–1.0+.41(.142)X
Δ Poverty rate 4 USD-a-day. R2=.378.
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Figure A2.J Annualized change in the stock of public debt as a percentage of GDP
Note: The vertical axes display the annualized change in each labour market indicator. Δ denotes
changes in percentage points and %Δ denotes percentage changes. The line represents the linear
regression speciﬁed at the bottom of the ﬁgure. Robust standard error of the slope coefﬁcient
between parentheses. R-squared of the regression indicated along the title.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on SEDLAC (CEDLAS and World Bank 2014), World Develop-
ment Indicators (World Bank 2014), and CEPALSTAT (UN-ECLAC 2015).
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Regression details: Y=–.2+.16(.039)X
Δ Shr of low-earnings occupations. R2=.552.
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Regression details: Y=.15–.08(.038)X
Δ Shr of high-earnings occupations. R2=.268.
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Regression details: Y=–.04+.08(.035)X
Δ Shr of unpaid workers. R2=.281.
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Δ Shr of registered workers. R2=.064.
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Δ Shr of high-educated workers. R2=.216.
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 % Δ Gini HPCI. R2=.031.
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Regression details: Y=–.93–1.54(.523)X
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Regression details: Y=.09+2.03(.969)X
% Δ Mean labour earnings. R2=.238.
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Regression details: Y=–.24–.14(.213)X
Δ Unemployment rate. R2=.029.
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Regression details: Y=.18+.18(.248)X
Δ Shr of wage/sal. employees. R2=.038.
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Regression details: Y=–.14+.11(.182)X
Δ Shr of self-empl. workers. R2=.024.
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Regression details: Y=–.33–.16(.224)X
Δ Shr of low-earnings sectors. R2=.034.
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Regression details: Y=.24+.06(.143)X
Δ Shr of high-earnings sectors. R2=.012.
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Regression details: Y=–.71–1.18(.398)X
Δ Poverty rate 2.5 USD-a-day. R2=.384.
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Δ Poverty rate 4 USD-a-day. R2=.383.
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Figure A2.K Annualized change in revenues from natural resources as a percentage of
GDP
Note: The vertical axes display the annualized change in each labour market indicator. Δ denotes
changes in percentage points and %Δ denotes percentage changes. The line represents the linear
regression speciﬁed at the bottom of the ﬁgure. Robust standard error of the slope coefﬁcient
between parentheses. R-squared of the regression indicated along the title.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on SEDLAC (CEDLAS and World Bank 2014), World Develop-
ment Indicators (World Bank 2014), and CEPALSTAT (UN-ECLAC 2015).
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Regression details: Y=–.35–.06(.147)X
Δ Shr of low-earnings occupations. R2=.012.
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Regression details: Y=.26–.08(.11)X
Δ Shr of high-earnings occupations. R2=.042.
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Regression details: Y=–.02–.31(.13)X
Δ Shr of unpaid workers. R2=.292.
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Regression details: Y=.63+.54(.679)X
Δ Shr of registered workers. R2=.044.
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Regression details: Y=–1.1+.07(.21)X
Δ Shr of low-educated workers. R2=.007. 
AR
BO
BR
CL
CO
CR
DO
EC
SV HN
MX
PA
PY
PE
UY
VE
0
.2
.4
.6
.8
1
0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1
Regression details: Y=.49–.02(.177)X
Δ Shr of high-educated workers. R2=.001.
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Regression details: Y=–.67–.94(.447)X
% Δ Gini HPCI. R2=.239.
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% Δ Gini labour earnings. R2=.189.
Δ Rev. of nat. res. as % of GDP 
Figure A2.K Continued
474
Appendix 2
References
CEDLAS and World Bank (2014). SEDLAC—Socio-Economic Database for Latin
America and the Caribbean. Centro de Estudios Distributivos, Laborales y Sociales,
Facultad de Ciencias Económicas, Universidad Nacional de La Plata and World Bank
Poverty Group LCR. Available at <http://sedlac.econo.unlp.edu.ar/eng/index.php>,
accessed 2014.
UN-ECLAC (2015). CEPALSTAT, United Nations, Economic Commission for Latin
America and the Caribbean. Available at <http://estadisticas.cepal.org/cepalstat/
WEB_CEPALSTAT/Portada.asp?idioma=i>, accessed April 2015.
World Bank (2014). World Development Indicators. Available at <http://data.wor
ldbank.org/data-catalog/world-development-indicators>, accessed April 2014.
475
Appendix 2
APPENDIX 3
Evolution of Macroeconomic Variables over the 2000s by Country
Argentina
00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12
GDP per capita (dollars PPP 2005) 10,290 9,739 8,596 9,271 10,019 10,843 11,658 12,556 13,288 13,285 14,376 15,515 15,672
Share of agriculture in GDP 5.1 4.9 10.8 11.0 10.5 9.5 8.5 9.5 9.9 7.6 10.1 10.7 9.1
Share of industry in GDP 28.1 27.0 32.4 34.9 35.8 35.8 35.9 34.0 32.5 32.1 31.2 31.1 30.5
Share of services in GDP 66.9 68.1 56.8 54.1 53.7 54.7 55.6 56.5 57.5 60.3 58.7 58.2 60.4
Domestic expenditure (% GDP) 87.2 77.7 78.2 75.7 75.9 74.5 74.2 75.8 79.7 78.3 78.3 81.0 81.9
Public expenditure in education and health (%GDP) 10.0 10.3 8.9 8.4 8.4 9.3 9.7 10.3 11.1 12.9 . . . . . . . . .
Public expenditure in social security (% GDP) 10.1 10.5 9.8 9.7 9.2 9.1 9.3 10.7 11.1 12.9 . . . . . . . . .
Exports (% GDP) 11.0 11.6 28.4 25.9 25.7 25.1 24.8 24.6 24.5 21.4 21.7 21.8 19.7
Terms of trade 100.0 99.3 98.7 107.2 109.2 106.9 113.4 117.5 133.2 127.1 126.6 135.0 130.3
Foreign direct investment (% GDP) 3.0 0.7 1.7 1.1 2.3 2.4 2.1 2.0 2.4 1.1 1.7 1.9 2.5
Revenue from natural resources (% GDP) 3.3 3.1 7.0 7.8 8.6 10.4 9.8 8.1 9.1 5.0 4.9 5.0 4.3
Stock of public debt (% GDP) 37.6 44.9 127.8 117.6 106.0 60.2 51.7 44.2 39.0 39.6 36.1 33.3 35.1
Source: Authors’ calculations based on World Development Indicators (World Bank 2014) and CEPALSTAT (UN-ECLAC 2015).
Bolivia
00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12
GDP per capita (dollars PPP 2005) 3,488 3,476 3,492 3,518 3,596 3,688 3,799 3,907 4,081 4,151 4,252 4,400 4,552
Share of agriculture in GDP 15.0 15.2 14.9 15.4 15.4 14.4 13.9 12.9 13.5 13.8 12.9 12.5 13.0
Share of industry in GDP 55.2 55.6 55.8 55.2 53.7 53.6 51.0 50.7 48.2 49.9 49.9 48.5 48.3
Share of services in GDP 29.8 29.2 29.3 29.4 31.0 32.0 35.1 36.4 38.4 36.2 37.3 38.9 38.7
Domestic expenditure (% GDP) 90.9 91.0 89.8 87.5 84.2 82.3 77.1 77.3 75.5 80.2 76.1 74.7 72.9
Public expenditure in education and health (% GDP) 6.5 7.0 7.9 8.1 8.0 7.7 7.8 7.7 6.7 7.8 7.5 7.2 6.6
Public expenditure in social security (% GDP) 4.8 5.1 5.1 5.0 4.8 4.4 4.0 3.7 4.6 5.0 4.7 4.2 4.7
Exports (% GDP) 18.3 20.0 21.6 25.6 31.1 35.5 41.8 41.8 44.9 35.7 41.2 44.1 47.3
Terms of trade 100.0 95.8 96.2 98.5 104.1 111.8 139.8 142.1 143.9 139.4 157.6 175.0 179.1
Foreign direct investment (% GDP) 8.8 8.7 8.6 2.4 0.7 2.5 2.5 2.8 3.1 2.4 3.2 3.6 3.9
Revenue from natural resources (% GDP) 8.0 8.2 8.0 13.7 20.3 38.8 37.8 36.2 39.9 16.6 18.5 21.3 17.4
Stock of public debt (% GDP) 60.6 72.6 77.1 86.4 81.0 75.4 49.7 37.2 34.0 36.3 34.6 34.5 29.1
Source: Authors’ calculations based on World Development Indicators (World Bank 2014) and CEPALSTAT (UN-ECLAC 2015).
Brazil
00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12
GDP per capita (dollars PPP 2005) 7,906 7,898 7,998 7,985 8,338 8,502 8,745 9,187 9,573 9,456 10,079 10,264 10,264
Share of agriculture in GDP 5.6 6.0 6.6 7.4 6.9 5.7 5.5 5.6 5.9 5.6 5.3 5.5 5.2
Share of industry in GDP 27.7 26.9 27.1 27.8 30.1 29.3 28.8 27.8 27.9 26.8 28.1 27.5 26.3
Share of services in GDP 66.7 67.1 66.3 64.8 63.0 65.0 65.8 66.6 66.2 67.5 66.6 67.0 68.5
Domestic expenditure (% GDP) 83.5 83.3 82.3 81.3 79.0 80.2 80.3 80.2 79.1 82.3 80.8 81.0 83.9
Public expenditure in education and health (%GDP) 8.8 9.2 7.9 9.3 8.9 8.9 9.3 9.9 10.0 10.9 10.9 10.9 10.9
Public expenditure in social security (% GDP) 11.2 11.1 12.3 11.6 11.9 12.3 12.9 12.8 12.8 13.8 13.8 13.8 13.8
Exports (% GDP) 10.0 12.2 14.1 15.0 16.4 15.1 14.4 13.4 13.7 11.0 10.9 11.9 12.6
Terms of trade 100.0 99.6 98.4 97.0 97.9 99.2 104.4 106.6 110.4 107.8 125.1 134.9 128.9
Foreign direct investment (% GDP) 5.1 4.1 3.3 1.8 2.7 1.8 1.8 3.3 3.1 1.9 2.5 2.9 3.4
Revenue from natural resources (% GDP) 2.5 2.6 3.1 3.6 4.1 5.3 5.5 6.3 7.1 3.7 4.9 5.4 5.1
Stock of public debt (% GDP) 63.5 76.4 78.7 73.1 70.2 67.4 56.7 58.5 58.9 61.3 53.6 53.6 60.5
Source: Authors’ calculations based on World Development Indicators (World Bank 2014) and CEPALSTAT (UN-ECLAC 2015).
Chile
00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12
GDP per capita (dollars PPP 2005) 10,990 11,224 11,337 11,655 12,228 12,773 13,201 13,746 14,061 13,784 14,443 15,149 15,848
Share of agriculture in GDP 5.9 5.2 5.5 5.3 4.7 4.6 4.1 3.9 3.6 3.5 3.4 3.7 3.6
Share of industry in GDP 32.2 32.8 33.1 32.7 35.3 36.9 44.2 43.0 38.0 37.6 39.1 38.0 35.5
Share of services in GDP 61.9 62.1 61.4 62.0 60.0 58.5 51.7 53.2 58.4 58.8 57.5 58.3 60.9
Domestic expenditure (% GDP) 76.6 77.7 77.5 75.1 71.7 69.9 66.0 66.9 72.1 72.1 71.3 73.1 74.9
Public expenditure in education and health (% GDP) 6.7 7.0 7.2 6.9 6.6 6.2 6.0 6.4 7.1 8.2 7.7 7.6 8.0
Public expenditure in social security (% GDP) 7.9 7.9 7.8 7.3 6.7 6.4 5.8 5.7 6.0 7.0 6.6 6.4 6.3
Exports (% GDP) 29.3 30.9 31.5 33.9 37.9 38.4 42.4 43.8 41.5 37.2 38.1 38.0 34.2
Terms of trade 100.0 93.3 97.2 102.8 124.9 139.8 183.2 189.5 164.8 166.7 204.0 205.3 182.4
Foreign direct investment (% GDP) 6.1 5.8 3.6 5.5 7.1 5.6 4.7 7.2 8.4 7.5 7.2 9.3 10.7
Revenue from natural resources (% GDP) 7.0 6.5 6.2 7.3 11.8 13.2 21.4 21.2 19.3 14.4 17.8 18.3 15.6
Stock of public debt (% GDP) 13.0 14.4 14.7 12.4 10.5 6.9 4.9 3.9 5.1 5.8 8.7 11.0 11.9
Source: Authors’ calculations based on World Development Indicators (World Bank 2014) and CEPALSTAT (UN-ECLAC 2015).
Colombia
00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12
GDP per capita (dollars PPP 2005) 6,597 6,598 6,655 6,808 7,060 7,280 7,651 8,059 8,223 8,241 8,450 8,890 9,143
Share of agriculture in GDP 8.9 9.0 9.2 9.0 8.6 8.4 8.1 7.8 7.5 7.5 7.1 6.9 6.5
Share of industry in GDP 29.4 29.4 29.8 31.4 32.4 32.8 33.8 33.7 35.5 34.5 35.0 37.9 37.5
Share of services in GDP 61.6 61.7 61.0 59.6 59.0 58.8 58.1 58.5 57.0 58.0 57.9 55.3 56.0
Domestic expenditure (% GDP) 80.2 82.7 82.6 81.2 80.1 81.1 79.7 80.1 82.2 83.1 82.1 83.0 82.6
Public expenditure in education and health (% GDP) 9.9 10.7 11.4 11.3 10.6 10.3 10.0 10.4 11.7 13.6 13.9 13.7 14.2
Public expenditure in social security (% GDP) 6.0 6.3 5.6 5.4 5.3 5.3 5.2 5.3 5.5 6.4 6.5 6.6 6.7
Exports (% GDP) 15.9 15.4 14.8 16.6 16.8 16.8 17.6 16.5 17.8 16.0 15.9 18.9 18.3
Terms of trade 100.0 94.2 92.5 95.2 102.3 111.0 115.2 124.4 138.1 118.8 134.4 150.2 151.1
Foreign direct investment (% GDP) 2.6 2.8 3.9 3.3 4.3 4.3 6.5 7.2 7.0 4.6 4.0 5.3 5.9
Revenue from natural resources (% GDP) 7.1 5.3 5.0 6.4 6.9 8.1 9.1 8.0 9.4 6.6 8.0 10.3 9.4
Stock of public debt (% GDP) 42.3 43.0 43.4 41.1 40.9 37.5 33.3 27.6 24.8 27.4 28.8 30.3 35.1
Source: Authors’ calculations based on World Development Indicators (World Bank 2014) and CEPALSTAT (UN-ECLAC 2015).
Costa Rica
00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12
GDP per capita (dollars PPP 2005) 8,116 8,032 8,102 8,462 8,666 9,019 9,649 10,250 10,369 10,110 10,456 10,763 11,156
Share of agriculture in GDP 9.5 8.8 8.5 8.7 8.6 9.0 8.9 8.5 7.2 7.4 7.2 6.5 6.3
Share of industry in GDP 32.1 29.7 29.1 28.6 29.5 29.1 29.2 29.3 28.7 27.4 26.2 25.3 25.1
Share of services in GDP 58.5 61.5 62.4 62.6 61.8 61.9 61.9 62.2 64.1 65.2 66.7 68.2 68.6
Domestic expenditure (% GDP) 80.2 82.7 82.6 81.2 80.1 81.1 79.7 80.1 82.2 83.1 82.1 83.0 82.6
Public expenditure in education and health (% GDP) 9.9 10.7 11.4 11.3 10.6 10.3 10.0 10.4 11.7 13.6 13.9 13.7 14.2
Public expenditure in social security (% GDP) 6.0 6.3 5.6 5.4 5.3 5.3 5.2 5.3 5.5 6.4 6.5 6.6 6.7
Exports (% GDP) 48.6 41.5 42.4 46.7 46.3 48.5 49.1 48.7 45.4 42.3 38.2 37.4 37.7
Terms of trade 100.0 98.4 96.9 95.5 91.9 88.3 85.8 84.9 81.7 84.4 81.1 78.1 77.7
Foreign direct investment (% GDP) 2.6 2.8 3.9 3.3 4.3 4.3 6.5 7.2 7.0 4.6 4.0 5.3 5.9
Revenue from natural resources (% GDP) . . . . . . . . . 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 . . .
Stock of public debt (% GDP) 42.3 43.0 43.4 41.1 40.9 37.5 33.3 27.6 24.8 27.4 28.8 30.3 35.1
Source: Authors’ calculations based on World Development Indicators (World Bank 2014) and CEPALSTAT (UN-ECLAC 2015).
Dominican Republic
00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12
GDP per capita (dollars PPP 2005) 5,737 5,751 5,991 5,886 5,876 6,326 6,901 7,380 7,660 7,818 8,312 8,573 8,794
Share of agriculture in GDP 7.2 7.5 7.2 6.4 7.0 7.5 7.1 6.6 6.3 6.2 6.2 6.0 6.1
Share of industry in GDP 35.9 34.2 35.0 33.8 33.0 32.1 32.2 31.6 32.2 32.5 32.0 33.1 31.7
Share of services in GDP 56.8 58.4 57.8 59.8 60.0 60.5 60.8 61.9 61.5 61.3 61.7 61.0 62.2
Domestic expenditure (% GDP) 85.5 86.2 86.7 85.4 84.3 89.0 89.6 90.2 95.4 93.2 94.7 93.9 92.4
Public expenditure in education and health (% GDP) 3.8 4.2 4.6 3.2 2.6 3.4 3.4 4.1 3.9 3.8 4.3 4.2 4.2
Public expenditure in social security (% GDP) 1.0 1.4 0.8 1.1 2.0 2.2 2.3 2.0 2.6 2.2 1.8 1.8 1.8
Exports (% GDP) 37.0 33.7 32.5 43.1 42.3 30.0 30.0 28.8 25.5 22.2 23.0 25.0 24.9
Terms of trade 100.0 100.9 101.5 97.9 96.7 95.8 94.9 98.0 93.6 101.3 97.5 92.4 91.5
Foreign direct investment (% GDP) 4.0 4.3 3.5 2.9 4.1 3.3 4.3 5.5 6.0 3.6 3.6 4.0 5.8
Revenue from natural resources (% GDP) 0.7 0.3 0.4 1.2 1.9 1.6 2.6 3.7 1.1 0.1 0.1 0.9 0.7
Stock of public debt (% GDP) 17.8 19.7 23.5 40.4 24.2 21.1 20.1 18.1 24.4 28.0 28.8 30.0 33.2
Source: Authors’ calculations based on World Development Indicators (World Bank 2014) and CEPALSTAT (UN-ECLAC 2015).
Ecuador
00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12
GDP per capita (dollars PPP 2005) 6,184 6,307 6,440 6,491 6,895 7,129 7,312 7,344 7,679 7,595 7,692 8,161 8,443
Share of agriculture in GDP 16.3 13.7 12.2 11.7 10.4 10.0 9.9 9.8 9.3 10.5 10.7 10.4 9.9
Share of industry in GDP 35.7 31.5 31.3 30.1 31.8 33.4 35.6 36.2 39.3 34.3 34.9 36.8 36.9
Share of services in GDP 48.0 54.7 56.4 58.2 57.8 56.6 54.5 53.9 51.4 55.2 54.4 52.8 53.3
Domestic expenditure (% GDP) 73.9 82.0 82.7 82.5 81.4 79.2 76.6 76.0 73.3 76.0 75.8 72.8 72.7
Public expenditure in education and health (% GDP) 2.3 3.2 3.9 3.5 3.7 3.7 3.8 3.9 4.6 6.1 6.2 6.2 6.5
Public expenditure in social security (% GDP) 0.4 0.6 0.3 0.4 0.3 0.7 0.7 1.1 1.0 1.4 1.7 1.5 1.4
Exports (% GDP) 32.1 23.2 21.5 22.6 24.6 27.6 30.3 31.9 34.2 25.2 28.7 32.2 31.2
Terms of trade 100.0 84.6 86.8 89.8 91.5 102.4 109.9 113.0 124.0 109.7 120.8 132.9 134.7
Foreign direct investment (% GDP) 0.1 2.2 2.7 2.7 2.3 1.2 0.6 0.4 1.6 0.5 0.2 0.8 0.7
Revenue from natural resources (% GDP) 19.3 12.0 10.1 11.5 17.4 22.8 24.7 23.8 26.8 15.1 17.7 21.4 19.3
Stock of public debt (% GDP) 63.7 49.4 43.9 40.4 36.4 32.4 26.5 25.2 20.6 14.9 17.8 17.3 20.2
Source: Authors’ calculations based on World Development Indicators (World Bank 2014) and CEPALSTAT (UN-ECLAC 2015).
Honduras
00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12
GDP per capita (dollars PPP 2005) 2,880 2,898 2,946 3,019 3,143 3,268 3,414 3,554 3,631 3,473 3,531 3,593 3,657
Share of agriculture in GDP 15.9 14.6 13.5 12.8 13.4 13.7 13.0 13.0 13.1 11.7 12.5 15.3 14.8
Share of industry in GDP 32.5 30.7 30.1 30.1 29.1 28.7 30.0 28.6 28.0 28.1 27.6 27.8 27.9
Share of services in GDP 51.7 54.7 56.4 57.2 57.5 57.6 57.0 58.4 58.9 60.3 59.9 56.9 57.3
Domestic expenditure (% GDP) 84.2 87.2 88.3 88.8 89.0 90.9 92.7 94.4 97.0 97.2 96.0 93.7 93.9
Public expenditure in education and health (% GDP) 7.6 8.5 8.4 10.0 9.7 9.4 9.4 9.6 9.9 11.5 11.2 . . . . . .
Public expenditure in social security (% GDP) 0.3 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.3 0.7 0.8 0.7 0.6 . . . . . .
Exports (% GDP) 54.0 51.4 52.7 54.1 58.4 59.0 56.1 53.5 51.3 39.5 45.8 51.3 50.4
Terms of trade 100.0 94.8 92.0 88.0 87.2 87.2 83.2 81.6 76.6 81.9 84.2 91.2 84.3
Foreign direct investment (% GDP) 5.4 4.0 3.5 4.9 6.2 6.2 6.6 7.9 8.7 3.4 3.1 5.9 5.8
Revenue from natural resources (% GDP) 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 1.3 1.1 0.7 0.6 0.9 0.9 0.8
Stock of public debt (% GDP) 55.5 53.6 55.3 60.5 59.5 44.7 28.7 17.4 20.1 23.9 29.2 31.5 34.9
Source: Authors’ calculations based on World Development Indicators (World Bank 2014) and CEPALSTAT (UN-ECLAC 2015).
Mexico
00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12
GDP per capita (dollars PPP 2005) 11,810 11,575 11,440 11,460 11,807 12,017 12,462 12,695 12,711 11,962 12,412 12,747 13,067
Share of agriculture in GDP 3.5 3.6 3.5 3.5 3.6 3.4 3.4 3.3 3.3 3.5 3.5 3.4 3.6
Share of industry in GDP 35.7 33.9 33.7 34.6 35.8 35.5 36.3 36.1 36.6 34.3 34.8 35.7 35.7
Share of services in GDP 60.8 62.5 62.7 61.9 60.7 61.2 60.3 60.6 60.2 62.2 61.7 60.9 60.7
Domestic expenditure (% GDP) 78.1 80.3 81.5 79.6 79.1 79.2 77.8 78.2 77.9 78.6 79.2 79.0 77.9
Public expenditure in education and health (% GDP) 5.4 5.8 5.7 5.9 5.6 5.9 5.9 5.9 6.0 6.7 6.5 6.6 6.2
Public expenditure in social security (% GDP) 2.3 2.3 2.1 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.3 2.5 2.6 3.0 3.1 3.3 3.1
Exports (% GDP) 26.0 23.4 23.2 24.6 26.1 26.4 27.6 27.7 27.9 27.3 30.0 31.5 32.9
Terms of trade 100.0 97.4 97.9 98.8 101.6 103.6 104.1 105.1 105.9 94.0 101.2 108.5 109.1
Foreign direct investment (% GDP) 2.6 4.1 3.2 2.6 3.2 2.8 2.2 3.1 2.6 1.9 2.2 2.0 1.5
Revenue from natural resources (% GDP) 4.5 3.6 3.5 4.8 6.1 8.0 8.6 8.4 10.0 6.4 7.3 8.7 8.3
Stock of public debt (% GDP) 20.6 20.2 21.4 21.7 20.3 19.6 20.2 20.6 24.0 27.2 27.2 27.5 28.2
Source: Authors’ calculations based on World Development Indicators (World Bank 2014) and CEPALSTAT (UN-ECLAC 2015).
Panama
00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12
GDP per capita (dollars PPP 2005) 7,869 7,758 7,776 7,947 8,383 8,819 9,396 10,346 11,192 11,424 12,067 13,154 14,320
Share of agriculture in GDP 7.2 7.7 7.5 7.8 8.0 7.0 6.5 6.0 5.4 5.0 4.7 4.1 3.9
Share of industry in GDP 18.9 16.8 15.8 16.9 18.2 16.6 16.6 16.5 17.8 17.2 16.9 16.7 17.8
Share of services in GDP 73.9 75.5 76.7 75.4 73.8 76.5 76.9 77.5 76.7 77.7 78.4 79.2 78.3
Domestic expenditure (% GDP) 73.1 75.6 79.1 75.9 77.6 75.2 73.3 70.6 66.0 63.9 74.6 74.2 67.7
Public expenditure in education and health (% GDP) 7.6 8.0 8.2 8.2 8.4 8.3 6.4 5.8 6.1 6.7 6.5 6.6 6.2
Public expenditure in social security (% GDP) 2.2 1.8 1.6 1.6 1.4 1.5 1.2 1.8 1.6 3.0 3.1 3.3 3.1
Exports (% GDP) 72.6 72.7 67.5 63.6 67.6 75.5 76.7 81.2 85.2 81.0 76.5 84.2 83.5
Terms of trade 100.0 102.7 101.6 97.2 95.3 93.5 90.8 90.0 85.9 90.0 88.3 86.4 86.2
Foreign direct investment (% GDP) 5.4 4.0 0.8 6.3 7.2 7.1 17.1 9.6 9.9 4.2 8.8 13.2 8.6
Revenue from natural resources (% GDP) . . . 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.6
Stock of public debt (% GDP) 61.4 65.7 64.7 62.4 65.2 61.0 56.5 49.0 41.4 41.7 39.7 37.9 37.0
Source: Authors’ calculations based on World Development Indicators (World Bank 2014) and CEPALSTAT (UN-ECLAC 2015).
Peru
00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12
GDP per capita (dollars PPP 2005) 5,514 5,447 5,644 5,797 6,013 6,349 6,765 7,288 7,916 7,904 8,503 8,982 9,431
Share of agriculture in GDP 8.5 8.2 7.8 7.6 7.3 7.2 7.0 7.0 7.2 7.3 6.8 7.0 7.0
Share of industry in GDP 29.9 29.6 30.4 30.8 33.0 34.3 37.0 37.0 36.6 34.2 36.1 36.6 34.6
Share of services in GDP 61.6 62.2 61.8 61.5 59.7 58.5 56.0 56.0 56.2 58.5 57.2 56.4 58.4
Domestic expenditure (% GDP) 84.0 85.2 83.5 83.4 80.6 78.4 72.0 70.6 72.3 75.2 71.7 70.2 71.8
Public expenditure in education and health (% GDP) 4.4 4.4 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.3 4.4 4.7 5.4 5.0 4.9 5.3
Public expenditure in social security (% GDP) 3.6 4.3 4.4 4.3 4.4 4.3 3.8 3.6 3.0 3.3 3.2 3.0 2.9
Exports (% GDP) 16.0 15.7 16.1 17.7 21.5 25.1 28.5 29.1 27.2 23.9 25.7 28.6 25.6
Terms of trade 100.0 95.6 98.4 102.2 111.3 119.4 152.1 157.6 136.6 129.1 152.5 171.9 163.7
Foreign direct investment (% GDP) 1.6 2.2 4.0 2.3 2.4 3.5 4.0 5.4 5.7 5.3 5.7 4.8 6.4
Revenue from natural resources (% GDP) 2.4 1.7 1.5 2.1 4.3 7.0 13.9 14.7 12.9 9.4 12.2 14.4 11.7
Stock of public debt (% GDP) 37.4 35.7 44.7 45.4 41.9 38.4 31.4 27.4 25.6 25.2 22.9 20.1 18.9
Source: Authors’ calculations based on World Development Indicators (World Bank 2014) and CEPALSTAT (UN-ECLAC 2015).
Paraguay
00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12
GDP per capita (dollars PPP 2005) 10,290 9,739 8,596 9,271 10,019 10,843 11,658 12,556 13,288 13,285 14,376 15,515 15,672
Share of agriculture in GDP 15.8 14.8 14.9 18.3 20.4 19.6 19.1 21.2 23.5 18.9 22.5 21.4 17.4
Share of industry in GDP 35.7 38.0 40.5 37.3 34.6 34.8 33.3 31.7 29.7 32.0 30.1 27.5 28.1
Share of services in GDP 48.5 47.3 44.6 44.4 45.1 45.7 47.6 47.1 46.7 49.0 47.4 51.0 54.5
Domestic expenditure (% GDP) 75.6 74.7 67.5 67.8 70.1 70.8 73.2 74.4 79.1 79.4 80.2 80.7 81.8
Public expenditure in education and health (% GDP) . . . . . . 6.1 4.8 5.4 6.1 6.5 6.6 6.5 8.3 7.6 8.4 10.0
Public expenditure in social security (% GDP) . . . . . . 1.6 3.7 3.4 4.0 5.2 5.2 4.8 6.6 5.4 6.2 7.3
Exports (% GDP) 46.1 44.2 52.9 54.3 53.8 57.3 58.3 56.3 54.3 51.2 54.6 48.9 46.6
Terms of trade 100.0 100.2 96.7 101.4 104.3 97.4 95.5 100.1 107.3 105.0 105.0 107.5 110.5
Foreign direct investment (% GDP) 1.3 1.1 0.2 0.4 0.5 0.1 1.8 0.8 1.4 0.3 1.7 1.8 2.0
Revenue from natural resources (% GDP) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Stock of public debt (% GDP) 35.3 33.5 47.0 38.7 34.3 29.3 23.2 15.9 14.3 14.6 14.1 12.1 12.6
Source: Authors’ calculations based on World Development Indicators (World Bank 2014) and CEPALSTAT (UN-ECLAC 2015).
El Salvador
00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12
GDP per capita (dollars PPP 2005) 5,155 5,220 5,322 5,425 5,506 5,682 5,880 6,080 6,129 5,906 5,953 6,048 6,125
Share of agriculture in GDP 10.5 10.1 9.1 9.0 9.5 10.6 10.7 11.9 12.5 12.4 12.6 12.5 11.8
Share of industry in GDP 31.4 31.9 32.2 31.8 30.4 29.7 29.1 28.2 27.7 27.0 26.7 26.9 27.2
Share of services in GDP 58.1 57.9 58.7 59.2 60.0 59.7 60.2 59.9 59.7 60.6 60.7 60.6 61.0
Domestic expenditure (% GDP) 98.1 99.1 98.3 98.9 101.1 102.4 103.7 106.1 107.6 102.0 103.6 104.3 104.4
Public expenditure in education and health (%GDP) . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.0 7.1 7.4 6.9 7.0 8.1 8.0 8.0 7.9
Public expenditure in social security (% GDP) . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.5 3.8 4.0 3.6 4.3 4.1 4.2 4.7 4.8
Exports (% GDP) 27.4 25.8 26.4 27.1 27.0 25.6 25.7 25.9 26.9 23.2 25.9 28.0 28.4
Terms of trade 100.0 102.5 101.6 97.7 96.8 96.8 95.5 94.6 91.9 94.9 91.3 91.3 90.2
Foreign direct investment (% GDP) 1.3 2.0 3.3 0.9 2.3 3.0 1.3 7.7 4.2 1.8 0.5 0.5 1.9
Revenue from natural resources (% GDP) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Stock of public debt (% GDP) 27.2 30.7 35.2 37.2 38.1 37.5 37.7 34.9 34.4 42.6 42.6 41.7 45.7
Source: Authors’ calculations based on World Development Indicators (World Bank 2014) and CEPALSTAT (UN-ECLAC 2015).
Uruguay
00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12
GDP per capita (dollars PPP 2005) 9,551 9,168 8,457 8,530 8,962 9,626 10006 10634 11361 11577 12569 13344 13821
Share of agriculture in GDP 7.0 6.5 8.7 11.1 12.9 10.4 10.7 10.2 10.9 8.4 7.9 9.4 8.4
Share of industry in GDP 24.5 24.5 24.3 26.1 25.6 27.1 26.4 27.2 25.8 25.6 26.1 23.9 24.7
Share of services in GDP 68.5 69.0 67.0 62.8 61.5 62.5 62.9 62.6 63.3 66.0 66.0 66.8 66.9
Domestic expenditure (% GDP) 88.9 88.4 85.7 81.7 79.8 80.4 81.9 81.5 81.6 79.6 80.6 81.4 82.3
Public expenditure in education and health (%GDP) 6.0 6.5 6.6 6.4 6.2 6.3 6.9 7.4 8.7 9.6 9.8 10.5 . . .
Public expenditure in social security (% GDP) 13.2 14.1 14.5 12.8 11.7 11.7 11.8 12.9 11.7 12.0 12.2 11.1 . . .
Exports (% GDP) 16.7 16.8 20.6 27.4 32.1 30.4 30.3 29.1 30.2 28.3 27.2 27.2 26.3
Terms of trade 100.0 104.0 102.6 103.5 99.9 90.7 88.6 88.7 94.1 96.9 100.0 101.8 104.2
Foreign direct investment (% GDP) 1.2 1.4 1.4 3.5 2.4 4.8 7.7 5.8 7.1 5.3 5.6 5.7 5.4
Revenue from natural resources (% GDP) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
Stock of public debt (% GDP) 31.6 38.9 96.0 95.5 74.7 66.7 61.6 52.9 51.6 46.7 40.9 40.3 39.2
Source: Authors’ calculations based on World Development Indicators (World Bank 2014) and CEPALSTAT (UN-ECLAC 2015).
Venezuela
00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12
GDP per capita (dollars PPP 2005) 9,527 9,667 8,650 7,835 9,104 9,869 10,658 11,396 11,799 11,237 10,894 11,173 11,623
Share of agriculture in GDP 4.2 4.5 4.1 4.6 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.1 4.4 6.1 5.8 9.4 8.4
Share of industry in GDP 49.7 46.1 49.8 51.6 55.5 57.8 56.5 53.3 54.1 44.2 52.2 23.9 24.7
Share of services in GDP 46.1 49.4 46.1 43.9 40.5 38.2 39.5 42.6 41.5 49.7 42.1 66.8 66.9
Domestic expenditure (% GDP) 64.2 69.1 66.5 67.7 61.2 57.8 58.7 63.6 63.4 76.6 67.1 66.7 71.5
Public expenditure in education and health (%GDP) 8.5 9.3 9.6 8.8 9.9 9.0 10.7 10.8 9.9 9.8 8.7 9.9 10.5
Public expenditure in social security (% GDP) 3.8 5.0 4.3 5.9 5.8 5.7 7.5 7.7 6.8 6.9 7.1 8.7 9.2
Exports (% GDP) 29.7 22.7 30.4 33.9 36.2 39.7 36.5 31.1 30.8 18.1 28.5 29.9 26.2
Terms of trade 100.0 82.2 87.6 98.7 118.1 154.4 184.4 202.1 249.5 181.7 215.9 259.5 262.1
Foreign direct investment (% GDP) 4.0 3.0 0.8 2.4 1.3 1.9 0.1 1.1 0.4 0.8 0.5 1.2 0.6
Revenue from natural resources (% GDP) 28.0 22.3 26.8 32.7 39.3 47.5 43.9 34.4 34.9 18.8 20.3 33.7 28.6
Stock of public debt (% GDP) 28.1 31.2 41.7 47.4 38.8 33.1 24.0 19.1 14.0 18.2 32.0 25.1 27.5
Source: Authors’ calculations based on World Development Indicators (World Bank 2014) and CEPALSTAT (UN-ECLAC 2015).
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As most chapters pertain to a particular country, the sub-headings for each country have not been
double-entered under main entries.
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